

EUROPEAN POWERS AND SOUTH-EAST AFRICA

A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ON THE SOUTH-EAST COAST OF AFRICA

1796-1856

MABEL V. JACKSON HAIGHT

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TO
MY MOTHER
MONTE
AND
HENRY

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PREFACE

In its original form this book was written as a doctoral thesis for the Ph.D. degree of the University of London. Since it was first published¹ the history of international relations has ceased to be an account of the exploits and actions of European powers. All the world is interested to know the response of African man to Asians and Europeans who invaded the East African mainland. This book may be said to be concerned with what the black, brown and white men of South East Africa may see of their past if they look across the ocean.

This new edition is an enlargement of the study which was actually written in 1937 and the early part of 1938 before the publication of the late Professor Coupland's book on the northern sector of the coast. At that time all Africa looked to Europe for direction, if not for inspiration, and this work attempted an inroad into an unknown field of international politics. It was a pioneer effort to show the relation between naval history and the economic history of the land and its people, to demonstrate that the colonial archives in Lisbon supplement the resources of the India Office and other departmental archives in London. The originality of the work then lay in the choice of South-East Africa as a field of study of international rivalries: a field which had been neglected because, in the words of Professor H. M. Robertson, 'no one knew enough about the history of South-East Africa to be able to judge its repercussions on the politics and powers of Europe and America'.²

To unearth historical material of this nature involved searching through a variety of sources, many of which, such as the papers on Muscat in the Public Record Office, appeared on first sight to be wholly unconnected with South-East Africa. In addition, it was necessary to delve carefully into the Foreign Office papers

¹ M. V. Jackson, *European Powers and South-East Africa, 1796-1856* (No. 18 Imperial Studies Series, Royal Empire Society, London, 1942).

² H. M. Robertson, *The South African Journal of Economics*, December 1943, 283.

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and into the confidential and other documents of the India Office (now housed at the Commonwealth Relations Office), the British Museum in London and of the *Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino*, then known as *Arquivo Histórico Colonial*, in Lisbon. Much of this material, some of it still unindexed, particularly the Admiralty Records, the India Office papers and those in Lisbon, had never been explored before. The mass of facts discovered—all interesting to a rounded picture of South-East African history—demanded ruthless restraint in selection. Wherever possible spelling has been modernized, but without pretence to consistency. 'Mozambique' which is commonly employed in English has been used in place of 'Moçambique' the official Portuguese spelling.

Coupland's book, *East Africa and its Invaders*, was published in 1938, and Eric Axelson's *South-East Africa, 1488–1530*, in 1948 to be followed in 1960 by the latter's *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600–1700*. But at the time my original study was written so little of East Africa's previous history could be taken for granted that the chapter after the introduction had to fill in the background from the first Portuguese discoveries of the sea route to the East in the fifteenth century. That chapter is no more than a résumé, much of which has become common knowledge even to the non-specialist; its function is to give historical perspective to South-East Africa as a tricontinental frontier. For the sake of the critical reader it must be added that the real body of the book begins with the chapters on the Portuguese possessions and with the effect on South-East Africa of Napoleon's schemes for an Indian Ocean empire.

Investigations and histories there have been in plenty describing the possible origin, extent and date of the Southern Rhodesian ruins—the riddle of the great Zimbabwe—the influence on East Africa of Arab, Persian and Indian contact, and the relations of these Muslim powers with each other, with the Bantu and with Madagascar, Ceylon, Malabar, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. But it is only in recent years that archaeologists and anthropologists, encouraged by the leaders of an awakening Africa, have made a concerted move to work together towards an unravelling of the story of Africa's intermittent contacts with Graeco-Roman, Arab, Indian, Chinese and other historic civilizations during the past two thousand years. New discoveries gathered from oral, literary, linguistic and archaeological sources are being synthe-

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sized, differences of emphasis are being ironed out and new and sometimes old hypotheses are gaining substance.

Today it still remains true that in the largely unexplored history of tropical Africa no part has been more neglected than the South-East African coast. Cecil Rhodes recognized this neglect of South-East African history and, at the time when he was planning his great northward march, he commissioned George McCall Theal to help fill in the missing three centuries. *The Records of South-East Africa* was the result. This, with all its imperfections, still remains one of the principal English works of reference on the subject. Except for the publication since 1960 of James Duffy's books—an overall picture of the Portuguese in East and West Africa—and P. R. Warhurst's *Anglo-Portuguese Relations in South Central Africa, 1890-1900*—there has been little or no attempt to make an accurate detailed study of South-East Africa in the nineteenth century. However, a band of stalwarts are busy filling in the omissions. In my bibliography I draw attention to most of these. Many are studies of the northern part of the coast which have helped to widen my understanding and perspective of the southern sector. Among the most important of these are the studies by Professors C. R. Boxer, R. A. Oliver and J. D. Fage, and the authors of the *History of East Africa* edited by Oliver and Mathew.

By Portuguese historians there has been much more investigation of South-East African affairs. Here it need only be noted that even the exhaustive studies by General J. J. Teixeira Botelho are rapidly being complemented by the valuable work of Alexandre Lobato, which puts a new face on and even supersedes much that thus far has been accepted by English-writing historians as standard history of the region. New information on the procuring wars in Zambezia has been supplied by F. G. de Almeida de Eça, and on the Bantu peoples and the tribal groupings by A. Rita-Ferreira. The story of the interior is by no means complete, but the English reader now has available the admirable translation of the explorer Gamitto's diaries by Ian Cunnison. It still remains true, however, that little or no attempt has been made on the part of either English or Portuguese writers to relate the nineteenth-century history of the region to an international and strategic setting.

My interest in historical research I owe to Professor W. M. Macmillan whose tuition and enthusiasm first set me on the path. In preparing this new volume I have missed the erudite criticism and skilful guidance of my original supervisor the late Professor

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A. P. Newton, but I should like to thank all those who have encouraged and helped me. I am indebted to Professor J. S. Marais for a careful reading of the manuscript; to Professor Gerald Graham for valuable advice and for arranging publication; to Dr. Leonel Pedro Banha da Silva, late of the *Agencia Geral do Ultramar* for sending me new publications; to my friends Luiz and Susan Marques for checking references, sending material, arranging mimeographs and many other tiresome details in Lisbon and to Luiz for helping me to translate many intricate documents; to Professor I. D. Schapera for the modern equivalents of names of African tribes; to Professors Gervase Mathew and A. Christie for reading the first pages of Chapter One; to Judge J. V. Mills for information on the early Chinese connection with East Africa; to Dr. N. R. Bennett and Dr. P. Duignan for copies of their studies on American activities on the East African coast and to Dr. A. Tous-saint for sending me information from the archives in Mauritius. Professor Boxer has drawn my attention to much relevant material. Miss Alison Smith was good enough to lend me in manuscript relevant chapters from volume I of the *History of East Africa* then in preparation, to give me copies of her own valuable studies on the slave trade and to comment on a draft of Chapter Seven. Mr. D. P. Abraham generously provided a reference to a most useful document in Lisbon and Mr. E. A. Alpers very kindly lent me a draft of his informative thesis on *The role of the Yao in the development of trade in East-Central Africa, 1698-c.1850*.

The criticism and advice of Mr. P. G. James and the patience and critical reading of drafts and proofs by my husband, Mr. F. A. Haight, have been invaluable. I am also deeply indebted to many at the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Institute of Historical Research, the Public Record Office, the British Museum, Rhodes House and the *Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire*, Geneva, who have assisted me to check or to trace material, and to Mlle. Margrit Richard for her efficient typing of the script. Last, but by no means least, I thank my brothers, Dr. Monté and Mr. Henry Jackson without whose unfailing encouragement and assistance this work would never have been done.

MABEL V. JACKSON HAIGHT

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTES

P.R.O.	Public Record Office
F.O.	Foreign Office
Ad.	Admiralty
I.O.R.	India Office Records, Commonwealth Relations Office
P. & S. Proc.	Political and Secret Proceedings
P. & S. Memo.	Political and Secret Memoranda
Bombay Com., E. & I. Reports	Bombay Commerce, External and Internal Reports
B.M., Add. MSS.	British Museum, Additional Manuscripts
C.O.	Colonial Office
A.H.U.	<i>Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino</i>
Moz.	Mozambique
R.H., MS.Afr.	Rhodes House (Oxford), African Manuscripts
Micr.	Microfilm of Manuscript
B.T.	Board of Trade
E.I.	East India
C.H.B.E.	<i>Cambridge History of the British Empire</i>
C.H.B.F.P.	<i>Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy</i>
C.M.H.	<i>Cambridge Modern History</i>
S.P.	British and Foreign State Papers
J.A.H.	<i>Journal of African History</i>
H.E.A.	<i>History of East Africa</i> (Eds. Oliver and Mathew)

Chapter One

INTRODUCTORY

'Neglect of historical knowledge is to a nation what the loss of memory is to a man.' STUBBS

In the twentieth century the Black African has become aware of his history and its significance in world affairs. This significance is the theme of this book which recalls the choice which geography and history have always presented to South-East Africa—the choice between Europe and Asia.

By outflanking the iron curtain between the Cross and the Crescent, drawn across the Mediterranean in the early Middle Ages, the Portuguese broke the exclusiveness of Asian contact with East Africa and gave European nations that command of the oceans which enabled them to export both Christianity and economic techniques to Southern Africa. There was, therefore, a two-fold impact of Europe upon Africa—one religious and the other material. Thus in a sense, as a consequence of Vasco da Gama's voyage the struggle of the Crusades was revived and continued in Southern Africa. At the present time there are those who claim that the pressure of the universal religions—Christianity and Mohammedanism—is more important for the future of Africa than the Euro-Asian rivalry for political power. But this view may well be modified if a form of Communism obtains widespread and deep-rooted hold in Africa.

The missionary movement in East Africa did not gain momentum until the mid-nineteenth century. It was then that the first abortive efforts of the Jesuits and the Dominican friars was succeeded by what Coupland so aptly described as a missionary invasion of Madagascar and British East Africa. In the period under review in this study the Portuguese efforts at evangelization of Mozambique had died down and what colonizing success there had been, chiefly in the Zambesi basin, had been obtained by the use of fire-arms and the importation of European blood and goods. In this, the region of deepest penetration, changes in the sociological structure of the Bantu

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were taking place for which Portuguese activity was mainly responsible.

The limits within which the history of Southern Africa are studied have been too narrowly drawn. Ever since the fifteenth century strategy and economics have helped to emphasize that to divide the coastline into sections is unreal. South-East Africa, being a part of the western seaboard of the Indian Ocean, is inextricably linked with the other parts of that great amphitheatre. Occurrences in Portuguese territory are closely affected by those in Natal, the Transvaal and the Cape, and also on the coasts to the north. In the same way, events in the Near, Middle and Far East—Egypt and Arabia, India and China—are not without their effects on the South-East African shore. Moreover, France and Britain, no less than Muscat and Portugal, were vitally interested in maintaining the balance of power in this region. The French islands, *Île de France* (*Mauritius*) and *Bourbon* (*Réunion*), were economically dependent upon East Africa, and British India had close economic ties with that coast. In the mid-nineteenth century when a British Consul was appointed to Zanzibar he was required, as an agent of the East India Company, to correspond with the Admiral of the East India command and to keep in contact with Muscat and the Persian Gulf. This connection between geography and power politics is essential to historical perspective—even more essential since the catchwords of self-determination and nationalism spread from Europe to Asia after the First World War and then to Africa after the Second World War. But the history of the coast was not divisible into sections even before the word 'freedom' or '*uburn*' gave some common, and therefore some unifying, aspiration to the various peoples and localities of Africa.

The Great Trek, which is usually considered as affecting only the Boers and British in South Africa, was also a major event in the history of the Portuguese colony. Portugal regarded both the English and the Trekker Boers as potential rivals and resisted their every effort, and incidentally that of all Europeans, to obtain a foothold either on the shores or close to the undefined frontiers of her colony. Had the Transvaal Boers, before the building of the railway from Lourenço Marques, succeeded in obtaining territory from the Portuguese and with it an outlet to the Indian Ocean the whole history of Southern Africa might have been different. The germ of the Delagoa Bay dispute, so important in the story of South Africa, is to be found in the history of the first third of

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the nineteenth century, while in the same period the first faint stirrings that developed ultimately into the 'scramble' for Africa may be discerned. Equally important are the echoes of liberal fervour from revolutionary France which, however distorted, reached South-East Africa, sometimes by way of the United States and Brazil. These resulted in the formation of a heterogeneous grouping of Europeans and Swahili whose opinions and political aspirations caused them to look towards the New World, particularly the future Latin America.

There is an essential unity in the major problem of the relation of native to European life which originated in the fifteenth-century contact of whites and blacks. The Bantu of Cape Colony, Natal and the Transvaal were disturbed by the movements of Boers and Britons and, moving northward, impinged upon the tribes in the territory anciently claimed by Portugal. The Portuguese, though they feared Bantu aggression, were forced to conciliate the chiefs and, except in the Zambesi valley, seem to have made little attempt to dispossess them. Yet by taking sides or initiating tribal wars they succeeded in forcing many Bantu to participate in the life of the European community as bondsmen. The military and the economic strength of the Portuguese colony was founded on the slave trade; hence the long rearguard action of the slave interest in this corner of the globe against the anti-slave trade zeal of the British; hence, too, the beginning of the growth of the barriers of distrust and hate sown by Europeans and Asians in their relations with the Bantu. For centuries before the arrival of the armed sailing-ship from Europe, ivory and slaves linked East Africa to the greater world from the Mediterranean to the China Seas. But if first Asia and then Europe enslaved Africans, a dream picture of East Africa as a great jewel box to resuscitate Europe's fortunes has also enslaved Portugal. In the twentieth century the name 'Vasco da Gama' has become a symbol which includes all these factors.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, South-East Africa was not of prime importance in world affairs. Nevertheless, it was by no means isolated from the main stream of events, and was recalled to the attention of European statesmen largely by developments in Europe. Napoleon's Mediterranean and Eastern schemes, his vain wooing and vainer attempts at the conquest of Portugal, his Continental System, the bankruptcy of the English East India Company and the conversion of Britain

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to the anti-slave trade policy were responsible for bringing East Africa into the political orbit of Europe. It is, therefore, as a pendant to European history that the nineteenth-century story of South-East Africa can best be understood. This history—of Bantu, Asian, Portuguese, Afrikaner and Briton—is affected by affairs in Europe as well as on the waters and shores of the Indian Ocean, and the correlation of these themes seems an essential preliminary to the further detailed examination of the history of Southern Africa.

In this study, the story of the East African coast and its contact with the Europeans and Asians, whom the ocean made its neighbours, covers the period between 1796 and 1856—that is, between the outbreak of the French Revolutionary wars and the coming of Livingstone. South-East Africa is considered in an international and strategic setting, as affected by circumstances in the sub-continent and by the presence of European powers in its waters. The ocean does not isolate Southern Africa but intimately connects it with councils and statecraft in distant European and Asian capitals.

Reviewed in this light three principal motives on the part of Europeans moulded the course of East African history during this period. The desire to obtain naval bases which would give the possessor a predominant strategic position in the Indian Ocean was from the earliest times impelled by a second objective, commercial rivalry. The French and English determination to hold the Île de France is an outstanding example of this, but English activity in Delagoa Bay and Zanzibar and the French seizure of the Comoro Islands and the Madagascar shore also illustrate the intensity of commercial rivalry.

Trade forced the pace of intervention, trade was responsible for the first Asian contact with East Africa, trade had first brought Europeans into the Indian Ocean and trade had been the life-blood of the Swahili economy and of the Arab, Portuguese and Dutch empires. It was the commercial possibilities of the un-explored interior—the potential market provided by the unseen consumer—that attracted Indian, Arab, Chinese, Dutch, French, British, American and German merchants and led finally to the penetration of the wilderness beyond the coast. The fact that lawful commerce was a weapon in the hands of the inveterate enemy of the slave trade was an added and all-powerful incentive for Britain to develop African trade.

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Throughout the period, the two dominant forces in British colonial politics—the influence of powerful evangelical and humanitarian ideals and the desire to develop new markets—affected the whole course of international relations in South-East African waters. Thus at a time when there was the greatest reluctance to extend territory, commercial, humanitarian and strategic considerations led the British government as early as 1807 to support plans for the acquisition of Portuguese territory in East Africa. Though projects of conquest never matured, England was committed after that time to an increasing participation in South-East African affairs.

Lastly, when the imperial dreams of European powers culminated in the later nineteenth century in a race for overseas possessions, East Africa was marked out as a region for conflict of territorial ambitions. The period under review is only the prologue to the drama, but by 1856, Portuguese, Dutch, French, British, Americans, Boers and Germans had all made their appearance on the scene. Livingstone's great journeys form an epoch in East African history; but by then the stage was set for the first act of the play. The scramble for Africa was about to begin.

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Chapter Two

THE PLACE OF SOUTH-EAST AFRICA IN OCEAN STRATEGY

[1]

A TRI-CONTINENTAL FRONTIER

Until a little more than a century and a half ago, the East coast of Africa for nearly two hundred years had been enveloped in a haze of obscurity and had been disregarded in the greater part of Europe. As late as 1812, a visiting ship-surgeon could truthfully remark that 'the obscurity in which the whole of the Eastern coast is involved is not only a blot upon our knowledge, but literally a blank in geography'.¹ This eclipse of East Africa from European eyes during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is all the more interesting since that coast for centuries had been an area of commercial and cultural contact between East and West.

The first Europeans to reach South-East Africa by sea from the south were under the command of Vasco da Gama at the end of the fifteenth century. On his famous first voyage to the Indian spice marts, da Gama touched at what is now the Kilimane, or Quelimane² River, Mozambique and Mombasa. There the Portuguese first met the civilization of the East, for that long Eastern seaboard had been a frontier of interests between Asia and Mediterranean Europe.

Before the Christian era, the existence of gold in lower Abyssinia was well known to the various seafaring peoples, such as the Phoenicians and Carthaginians, who traded in the Indian Ocean. Research on what has been described as 'the Graeco-Roman exploitation' of the Indian markets and of the East coast of Africa is still incomplete. But it is known that Graeco-Roman

¹ Prior, *Voyage along the Eastern coast of Africa . . . and Brazil in the 'Nisus' Frigates*,

² Frequently spelt Quilimane, Quelimane or Kilimane.

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ships were sent down the Red Sea in search of ivory and spices and that in certain ports on the Somali and Tanzania coasts and perhaps in the Lamu group of islands off the Kenya coast, if not in Zanzibar, they had an 'emporium' or 'fixed commercial organization and regular custom dues'. Their voyages of exploitation are believed to have resulted from the discovery, attributed to a certain Hippalus (according to a Greek commercial handbook, the *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea*), in the first century A.D., of the regularity of the monsoons in the Indian seas and their use to hold a direct course to India.¹ Certainly by the close of the fourth century, if not much earlier, it was known that by sailing south it was possible to reach Prason which is believed to be Cape Delgado. But, if Europe's contact with East Africa has been long that of Asia goes back even farther. Long before the time of the *Periplus* littoral peoples of the Middle East and South-East Asia had made use of the monsoon winds to trade between the China Seas and the Roman Orient.²

Coins of many kinds, Hellenistic of about the second century B.C., Roman, Parthian of the first and second century, Sassanian, Byzantine, Umayyad, Abbasid, Mamluk and Chinese, together with those minted in the East African towns,³ have been found along that coast. Some of these resemble coins from India; and as Mathew reminds us among them may be strays, 'but certainly not all'. Glass beads of Roman and eastern manufacture have also been unearthed. In 1955 Sir Mortimer Wheeler, after a brief stay in Tanganyika, said, 'I have never in my life seen so much broken china as I have seen in the past fortnight along the coast here and the Kilwa Islands; literally, fragments of Chinese porcelain by the shovel full . . . In fact I think it fair to say that so far as the Middle Ages are concerned from the tenth century onwards the buried history of Tanganyika is written in Chinese porcelain.'⁴

¹ H.E.A., I, 94-8. Judge J. V. Mills has drawn my attention to G. F. Hourani: *Arab Seafaring* (Princeton, 1951), 24-8, according to which the date of Hippalus 'can hardly be put later than 90 B.C.'; Hippalus discovered how to make the 'rough but swift' passage from the south of the Red Sea to the Malabar coast with the southwest monsoon; the *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea* was written 'around A.D. 50-60'.

² A. Christie, 'An obscure Passage from the *Periplus*' (reprinted from the *Bulletin, School of Oriental and African Studies*, 1957, XIX/2), 348; A. Toussaint, *Histoire de l'Ocean Indien* (Paris, 1961), 53-88.

³ Freeman-Grenville, 'Some Recent Archaeological Work on the Tanganyika Coast', *Man*, vol. LVIII, July 1958, 109.

⁴ *The Times*, 24 September 1955. For a list of Chinese wares found on the East coast, cf. J. Kirkman, *Gedi, The Palace* (The Hague, 1963), 76.

The Place of South-East Africa in Ocean Strategy

Whether Chinese ships visited that shore before the fifteenth century is unlikely. Even though the Emperors of China sent emissaries to Africa, it is generally accepted that it was only between 1405 and 1433, with the breakup of the Mongol Empire and when Islam in Persia closed the trade route between China and Europe, that the Emperor of China, desirous of overseas trade and prestige, dispatched a series of enormous naval expeditions westwards. They reached Ormuz, Aden and the African coast at Malindi, Brava and Mogadishu.¹ Until then the maritime trade between Africa and China was transacted by merchants from the Middle East, India and South-East Asia and was carried in bottoms from those regions. From time to time these traders may have taken passage in these ships, but on the whole the trade was conducted by the traditional middlemen of the Indian Ocean—Arabs, Persians and Indians. This seems to be as true when the first definite information concerning Africa appears in the *Yu-yang-tsa tsu* (written by a Chinese scholar who died in A.D. 863) as in the thirteenth century when the foreign seaborne trade of China reached its highest peak.² Thus since the dawn of maritime history Asians had been the carriers of the merchandise of the East across the Indian Ocean. At one stage the Arabs not only monopolized the seaborne traffic but in southern India are said to have distributed the merchandise to the consumers on land.³ It was inevitable, therefore, that the first dominating foreign influence in East Africa came from Asia and not from Europe.

Nature herself helped to initiate this Afro-Asian relationship. The first Afro-Asian contact was based on trade. In history as in life, development is a slow evolutionary process and not according to any fixed pattern. To over-systematize this early Afro-Asian contact would be a mistake. It found its most reliable allies in the Equatorial currents and the monsoon winds, those 'sovereign monarchs' of the Indian Ocean which still today are relied upon by Asian craft to take merchant navigators from the

¹ Duyvendak, *China's Discovery of Africa* (London, 1949), 13–32. Determined to increase Chinese sea power the Yung-Lo emperor, third of the Ming dynasty, sent fleets as far as East Africa in 1417–19 and 1421–2, cf. H.E.A., I, 121.

² Duyvendak, 12–28; Hirth and Rockhill, *Chau Ju-Kua* (St. Petersburg, 1911), XVI, 62–3 and 130, quoted by J. V. Mills, 'Notes on Early Chinese Voyages', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (London, April 1951).

³ R. S. Whiteway, *The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, 1497–1530* (London, 1899), 3.

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Arabian and Malabar Coasts and the China Seas to East Africa and to bring them home again. Ships bound from India avail themselves of the North-East monsoon which from October to April blows from the Sea of Japan across the Tropic of Cancer to the Equator and the East coast of Africa. Homeward-bound vessels are generally believed to have used the South-West monsoon which from May to October dominates the same area and brings the fair weather season to the Mozambique channel.¹ There are those who hold that Arab craft depended exclusively on the North-East Monsoon and that it was Hippalus who found that with the heavier European ships the South-West monsoon could be used.² It was probably the prevailing winds and equatorial currents which, early in the Christian era, brought the Malagasy-speaking people from Indonesia to Madagascar. Thence they could easily reach the Comoro Islands and the mainland. Traces of their influence have been found deep in the interior and it is believed not impossible that Indonesian traders first explored river trade routes that led towards what has since become the Rhodesian goldfield.³ In 1940 and 1948 Alan Villiers graphically described his voyages in Arab craft along the ancient seaways of the Indian Ocean.⁴

Afro-Asian contacts found a most helpful stimulant towards peaceful evolution, when in the late fourth and early fifth centuries the dominance of Persian sea power and the economic development of the empire of Axum eclipsed direct Graeco-Roman trade with East Africa. By 643 the Sassanian Empire was destroyed by the Muslim. By the eighth century the trade of Axum and its coastal lands had also been lost to Islam.⁵ Until the ninth

¹ There are several important exceptions which render navigation uncertain at various times of the year. The North-East monsoon commences at the north of the Mozambique channel in November and at the south in December. Between the monsoons is an intermediate period during which neither can be relied upon; the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Straits of Malacca are exempt from monsoon effects; between Cape Corientes and Madagascar, southerly winds blow throughout the year. This simplified description of the monsoons is based on information contained in Horsburgh's *India Directory*, 1852 edn. (cf. particularly, I, iv, 209); cf. also A.H.U., Moz., 47, de Silva to Meneses da Costa, Ibo, 2 June 1798.

² W. Kirk, *The North-East Monsoon and some aspects of African History* (paper to the Third Conference on History and Archaeology, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, July 1961).

³ H.E.A., I, 110.

⁴ Alan Villiers, *Sons of Sindbad* (London, 1940), 21; 'Sailing with Sindbad's Sons' (*National Geographical Magazine*, XCIV, No. 5, November 1948, 675).

⁵ H.E.A., I, 99.

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century the Indian Ocean, with the occasional exception of a few daring explorers, was closed to the West. Across the Mediterranean two hostile worlds, the Cross and the Crescent, faced each other. Europe's knowledge of East Africa faded and that coast became an integral part of Islam and of the medieval Asian trading circuit. 'Saracen's weapons and chain mail may have been of steel which successive craftsmen had mined in South-East Africa, forged in South-Western India and fashioned in Persia and Arabia.'¹

In the twelfth century with the revival of commerce between the West and East Mediterranean, and in the next century when the great Islamic states were developing as Indian Ocean powers, the products of East Africa shared in the rapidly expanding market of Western Europe. This is vouched for by the first gold coins to be struck at the London Mint, in the thirteenth century, which have been found by assay to be of African gold.² By the late fourteenth century when European demand for pepper, spices and luxury goods had brought a climax of prosperity to the Indian Ocean, the trade of East Africa was directed first towards Egypt and Venice and secondly towards the Persian Gulf, India and China.

Thus by the time of da Gama's arrival, long contact with Asia had given the whole East African coast an oriental cultural flavour. Along that seaboard were great walled commercial cities, palaces, stone houses and domed mosques. Between these lay a great number of coastal villages where life was comparatively crude and simple.³ The larger Arab-African settlements were outposts of eastern elegance and material culture and had long since been described by merchants in the markets of Damascus and Alexandria. Marco Polo had referred to them in the accounts of his travels. Nevertheless, at the cultural centre of Mogadishu and particularly at the wealthy commercial entrepôts of Kilwa and Mombasa, the reality far surpassed even what the early Portuguese navigators expected. Each house was a veritable fort of stone and mortar. Women, clad in fine silk garments and cotton from Cambaia, wore many jewels, fine Sofala gold and silver ear-rings, bangles and bracelets.⁴ Clothes were kept in

¹ Basil Davidson, *Old Africa Rediscovered* (London, 1959), 144.

² H.E.A., I, 112.

³ H.E.A., I, 132-3.

⁴ *The Book of Duarte Barbosa*, edited by Longworth Dame (Hakluyt Society, Series II, XLIV, London, MCMXVIII), 28. Ravenstein, *A Journal of the First Voyage of Vasco da Gama*, 1497-99 (London, 1848), 19-40.

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elegant brass-bound chests and domestic slaves carried richly chased Arab or Indian brass *sinia* with plates and bowls from China.¹ If this is not an idealization or exaggeration, then the Portuguese dream of East Africa as an extension and integral part of the wealth of the East must have seemed very real.

From time to time in their history the stronger towns dominated or influenced their neighbours. Although Kilwa's significance in the western Indian Ocean trade was never comparable to the part played by the Muslim-controlled entrepôt of Malacca in the Far East, from the twelfth century onwards Kilwa was master of the East African coastal trade from Pemba to Sofala. There are those who believe that a network of overland trade 'contacts' provided links with the remote interior—to the gold-bearing area in Rhodesia and perhaps even to West Africa and the Mali Empire.² Others hold that there was no overland route and that the contact with Sofala was purely maritime.³ In the fourteenth century Kilwa ruled Mafia Islands and possibly Tongoni on the mainland near Tanga. But Kilwa never gained power over the coastal cities to the north, where Mombasa and Malindi could control the coastal traffic towards the Red Sea and Kilwa's trade with the Persian Gulf and India. Moreover, Zanzibar was independent and hostile, and in the fifteenth century possessed its own mint. By then the Sofala trade was possibly at its height. But Kilwa, torn by domestic strife, was on the decline, while other trading cities—Pate, Malindi and Mombasa—were rising to power.⁴

By the sixteenth century the people of the Swahili coast—also known as Azania or the land of Zanj—were a racial amalgam. Culture was predominantly Arabic and nominally Islamic, influenced from South Arabia, Western India, Persia and perhaps some other Arian countries. To the Portuguese these coastal folk were all Moors⁵—a term used to describe all followers of Islam from Morocco to Malacca irrespective of colour or sect.

¹ H.E.A., I, 166.

² H.E.A., I, 112, 117. For a description of the gold and ivory drawn from Sofala and sold at Kilwa, see Alexandre Lobato, *A Expansão Portuguesa em Moçambique de 1498-1530* (Lisbon, 1960), 27, 24, 68, 115, 183, 389-92.

³ Alpers, *The role of the Yao in the development of trade in East-Central Africa, 1698-c. 1850* (unpublished thesis, University of London, 1966), Chapter I.

⁴ Freeman-Grenville, op. cit., 106. Barbosa, *A Description of the Coasts of East Africa and Malabar in the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1866), 5. According to Barbosa, Quilao (or Kilwa), at the time of da Gama, was the wealthiest town and dominated the islands from Zanzibar to Mozambique; see also Axelson, *South-East Africa, 1488-1530* (London, 1940), 72.

⁵ The Book of Duarte Barbosa, xv.

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The word Swahili was never used by the Portuguese, although at the time of their arrival the region of Swahili culture seems to have extended northward at least to Kismayu, in the present Somalia and southward to Sofala in what is now Portuguese East Africa. More than that, for centuries a pervasive Islamic influence seems to have followed the commercial network set up from the coastal cities.¹

In the absence of any unifying factor neither inland up the Zambesi valley nor on the coast was commercial or political cohesion anything but transitory. At no time were the fragmented tribal units welded into anything approximating an East African nation. But on the coast, after the fourteenth century, the Islamic religion and Swahili language must have given a semblance of unity. Until the arrival of the Portuguese, Swahili supremacy as far south as Sofala was unchallenged and they, the Arabs of Oman and the communities of Indian traders in some of the towns, maintained constant intercourse with the other shores of the Indian Ocean.

The sources of prosperity of the small oligarchic Swahili island cities were, on the one hand, trade with inner Africa and, on the other, the ocean which served as a great highway for ships and men. Using a variety of currency—beads, Maldivian cowries,² rolls of cloth and coins some of which were minted in East Africa—the various groups of island and harbour states traded with the Bantu in the interior. To the Indian Ocean world East Africa supplied ivory, slaves, gold from alluvial deposits in the hinterland of present-day Mozambique and Rhodesia, copper, iron and such interesting sidelines as myrrh, frankincense, yellow sandalwood, aloes, thick tortoise-shell, rhinoceros horn, leopard skins, not to mention occasional ostriches, giraffes, zebras and even, according to authorities on China's trade with East Africa, items described as dragon's saliva (*ambergris*) and dragon's blood (the exudation of a leguminous tree) from the Somali coast.³

There are many references to Zanj slaves on the shores of the Mediterranean and in the Far East. In Mesopotamia 'black warrior

¹ D. P. Abraham, 'Maramuca: an exercise in the combined use of Portuguese records and oral tradition', *J.A.H.*, II/2 (1961), 212.

² In the ninth century the Chola kingdom from South-West India had conquered the Maldivian Islands, and in the fourteenth century the use of cowries from these islands had spread across the African continent, *H.E.A.*, I, 110.

³ Duyvendak, 22-4, 30.

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slaves' from East Africa revolted in 696. Sassanian kings probably bought slaves from East Africa.¹ That slaves had been exported from the Zanj countries prior to the ninth century is further vouched for by the threat to the Caliphate in Southern Iraq by Zanj slaves from 869 to 883.² This Zanj revolt, some believe, depreciated slaves as a commodity. Nevertheless, most of the wealthy in Canton in the twelfth century possessed Negro slaves, and it seems that there was a steadily increasing slave traffic from East Africa.³ However, East Africa's most important basis of wealth was ivory, which was in constant demand both in India and China. High officials attended court in ivory palanquins. Nor did the use of such luxuries cease in Swahili Africa after the coming of the Portuguese. In seventeenth-century Pate, it is said, the nobles used silver ladders to climb into ivory beds. By the eighteenth century Lamu had evolved its own intricate style in wood carving and in many coloured textiles,⁴ interesting reminders that the advent of the Portuguese did not at once spell ruin for everybody in East Africa.⁵

The arrival of Vasco da Gama's ship heralded the triumph of Christian Europe's two hundred-year dream of outflanking the infidel's Egyptian base. For years Portuguese explorers had sought in vain the mythical Christian ally Prester John. The irruption of Portugal into the Indian Ocean meant that in part Europe's aim had been accomplished. The Mohammedan could be assailed from the rear. The riches of Africa and the East would be delivered from their tributary burden and the exclusiveness of the Afro-Asian contact broken.

[2]

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For Asia and for Europe the epoch initiated by Vasco da Gama has been shown to mark a turning-point in history.⁶ Henceforth European seapower was to decide the destiny of the Indian Ocean and the peoples on its shores. In East Africa, the destruction and the brutal cruelty employed by the Portuguese to achieve their

¹ H.E.A., I, 101.

² Freeman-Grenville, op. cit., 108.

³ H.E.A., I, 108; cf. also Duyvendak, 24.

⁴ Mathew, *Man*, vol. LVI, 1956, 63.

⁵ For other evidence, cf. Boxer and Azevedo, *Fort Jesus and the Portuguese in Mombasa* (London, 1960), 18–19, and particularly 44–5.

⁶ Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance* (London, 1953), 22 *et seqq.*

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immediate purpose was not solely responsible for the decline and the break up of Swahili prosperity and there is doubt whether the Portuguese sacking and attack on Kilwa and Mombasa were premeditated.¹ To the Portuguese and to all their Christian contemporaries the opportunity to capture the riches of the East was also a religious crusade—the counterpart of the Islamic Dar-al-Harb. But it is a fact that cruelty was deliberately adopted by Portugal as a terrorizing policy and because, as Barros reminds us, the Portuguese considered that 'Christians have no duties' towards 'Moors and Gentiles'.² The sort of precedent set by Vasco da Gama when he primed with gunpowder and fired a ship loaded with 380 Mecca pilgrims, men, women and children, was too often followed.³ It was never thought necessary to defend such atrocities. On the contrary, in an age when cruelty was regarded as strength, Portuguese chroniclers deliberately exaggerated 'not to excite pity but to invest' the 'hero with fresh glories'.⁴ This attitude was directed not only against Islam as some would have us believe. The Portuguese view of the Dutch Calvinists was expressed by Coelho de Barbuda in 1624: 'The Hollanders are merely good gunners, and are otherwise fit for nothing save to be burnt as desperate heretics.'⁵

Spurred on by religious zeal, driven by fanaticism to cut, by an out-flanking attack, at the root of Islam and its monopoly of the spice-trade, the fire-armed Portuguese, despite their comparatively small numbers, soon overpowered the Swahili cities. In this they were aided by a number of factors. Political and commercial jealousies kept the various Swahili city-states divided and quarrelling; friction and from time to time savage warfare between them and the Bantu of the interior facilitated Portuguese conquest and aided the retention of Portuguese dominion. Moreover, the great Mohammedan powers of Turkey, Egypt and Persia were at variance, and although the Persians made some attempt to assist their co-religionists in Hindustan those on the shores of Africa were given no assistance. By 1505 merciless sacking had established Portuguese control of the Swahili coast; Kilwa, Mombasa and Brava were destroyed and pillaged;

¹ H.E.A., I, 134.

² Barros, *Jodo de Couto, Diogo de, Decadas*, 24 vols, 1778-88, I, 6, 1, quoted by R. S. Whiteway, 21.

³ Axelson, op. cit., 58.

⁴ Whiteway, 22.
⁵ Boxer, 'Portuguese and Dutch Colonial Rivalry, 1641-1661', (*Storia*, 2, July, 1958), 9.

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Malindi's hatred of Mombasa and consequent friendship for Portugal saved her and much of her old culture survived; at Mozambique, Zanzibar, Pemba, the Bajun islands of Pate and Faza, and also at first at Sofala timely submission avoided disaster.¹

This conquest of East Africa was only one episode in the story of Portugal's expansion throughout the Indian Ocean. Madagascar and Abyssinia, the *île de France* and Ceylon were visited not without a toll of bloodshed and death. Socotra, Ormuz, Diu, Goa, Malacca and Cochin were taken, while diplomatic relations with Persia were set on foot. In 1500, only two years after Vasco da Gama first rounded the Cape, King Emmanuel of Portugal assumed the title 'Lord of the Conquest, Navigation, and Commerce of India, Ethiopia, Arabia and Persia',² a title in which is implicit the Portuguese view that these coasts were an integral part of greater India. The whole new Portuguese Empire in the East from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan was known as the *Estado da India*. From 1510 the capital of Portuguese India was fixed at an obviously central point—Goa, and was administered by a Viceroy or Governor.

By 1509 military control of the coast south of Cape Delgado was complete. A few small coastguard vessels, forts in the principal cities and stern repression sufficed to hold the Swahili population in subjection. In 1505 Sofala was regarded as the chief port of call, and a fort and seven houses were erected for the factor or *alcaide mor* and his garrison. But the Sofala harbour was shallow and many shoals impeded navigation so that in 1507 Mozambique became the port where vessels called on their way to and from Europe.³ By 1512 all the prominent bays on the coast of Africa had been named.⁴ After 1558 Mozambique was made the seat of government for the whole coast and the existing great fortress of San Sebastian was commenced.⁵ By then Portugal had acquired a chain of possessions extending along the coasts of West and East Africa, Persia, Malabar, Ceylon, Indo-China and the Malay Archipelago.

Nowhere, however, did the Portuguese aspire to more than

¹ Walker, *A History of South Africa* (London, 1928), 17–18; Johnston, *A History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races* (Cambridge, 1899), 31–2; Axelson, op cit., 32 et seq., Boxer and Azevedo, 17.

² Prestage, *Afonso d'Albuquerque* (Watford, 1929), 20.

³ Axelson, op. cit., 82–3, 96.

⁴ Theal, *The Portuguese in South Africa* (London, 1896), 114.

⁵ C.H.B.E. (Cambridge, 1963), VIII, 91; Theal, op. cit., 188.

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coastal conquests. Theirs was emphatically an ocean empire. The Indian Ocean and its coast formed the great amphitheatre in which was played out the dramatic rise and fall of Portuguese dominion in the East. In the centre lay the coasts of India with Goa as the emporium into which flowed 'the wealth of Ormuz and of Ind'—spices, silks and other textiles and riches of the East. On the East, Malacca and the Spice Islands led on to the countries of South and South-East Asia, China and the Pacific, while on the West were the posts guarding the Red Sea, Arabia and Persia and the fortresses on the East Coast of Africa, controlling the fabled gold trade and affording security to the homeward route. Although the Swahili coast has been described as a 'backwater' in so far as the *Estado da India* was concerned,¹ it was an essential keystone in the edifice of Portuguese imperial power in the East.

'During the Middle Ages no voyage could bring in such clear profit as the one to Sofala.'² Whether that prosperity ever held sufficient profit for both Europeans and Swahili is doubtful.³ Certainly East Africa's wealth proved largely ephemeral. From the beginning the royal revenue from Sofala seems to have been insufficient to cover the expenditure of the fortress and the factory.⁴ But the plunder seized from Arab and Swahili traders was in itself no unimportant prize.⁵ More than that, the coast's strategic position made it a vital link in a line of oceanic communication between East and the West—an essential base in a far-flung chain of posts to control the commerce, from Brazil to China, of three continents and three oceans.

The magnificent conception of empire here outlined was carried out and established by Afonso d'Albuquerque and Francisco d'Almeida, justly acclaimed the architects and builders of their country's Eastern Empire. Almeida was sent out as Viceroy of the Indies in 1505 with very extensive powers. He could not have been responsible for the formulation of Portuguese policy⁵ any more than King Emmanuel, the Fortunate, who signed his instructions; both were heirs to a tradition and to the spirit of an age of Portuguese maritime adventure inaugurated by Prince Henry the Navigator.⁶ Almeida concentrated the whole naval and military force of the kingdom on the maintenance of

¹ Boxer and Azevedo, 17.

² H.E.A., I, 113.

³ H.E.A., I, 137, 135.

⁴ On this point compare Axelson, op. cit., 108–24, and Alexandre Lobato, op. cit., 84–91.

⁵ Axelson, op. cit., 62.

⁶ Panikkar, 24.

maritime supremacy and opposed every attempt to establish a land empire. 'Let all your force be on the sea, because if we should not be powerful at sea, everything will at once be against us.'¹ Portugal, he claimed, could not afford to become involved in the affairs of the land, for he feared that to maintain both armies and fleets would be too great a strain on her manpower. His additions to Portuguese territory were, therefore, confined to the capture of the Arab seaports of Kilwa and Mombasa during his outward passage.² He seems to have been acting under the realization that these centres of Muslim hostility so closely flanked the sea route between Europe and Asia where it skirted the African coastline that they could be a permanent threat to Portuguese power.³ But so ruthlessly and thoroughly did he break Swahili power on the coast before he passed on to India that henceforth Portugal was supreme in those waters. Portuguese power, however, could not be wholly secure so long as it was open to external attack. Almeida's greatest claim to fame, therefore, rests on his memorable naval victory over the forces of the Sultan of Egypt at Diu in 1509.⁴ Though fought in Indian waters this battle was an event of considerable importance in the history of Africa for it established Portugal's complete command of the Indian Ocean for a century.

While Almeida effected the King's purpose in African waters and thus set the western side of the stage, Albuquerque executed the rest of the grandiose strategical scheme. The rule of the Indian Ocean consolidated by Albuquerque has no precise parallel in history. He completed the Portuguese control of the three sea gates to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea—the straits of Ormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb and Malacca⁵—for, although he failed to take Aden, he and his successors watched the entrance to the straits with their cruisers. These sea fortresses acted both as centres of trade and strategic bases for controlling the traffic of the Indian Ocean.⁶ By closing the trade through the two western straits, the Portuguese diverted the maritime trade with Europe to the sea route round the Cape of Good Hope which consequently acquired new significance.⁷ A whole oceanic area was in

¹ Prestage, 25.

² Prestage, 24-5; Stephens, *Albuquerque* (Oxford, 1892), 39.

³ Ballard, *Rulers of the Indian Ocean* (London, 1927), 68.

⁴ C.H.B.E., VIII, 89.

⁵ Prestage, 28-9, 48-50, 53, 60.

⁶ Stephens, 64, 137 *et seqq.*

⁷ After Almeida met his death at Table Bay a possible project for a watering station there was abandoned, cf. Axelson, *op. cit.*, 117.

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this way subjected to control from the strong points around it, of which three fortress towns on the African seaboard—Sofala, Mozambique and Mombasa—played an essential part. Throughout the whole of the sixteenth century the power which Portugal wielded from the twelve cities and twenty-three fortress towns of her ocean empire, for defence and control of trade during the absence of the fleet, suffered no rivalry. The commerce of the East became as much a monopoly of Portugal as it had previously been of the men of Asia. But the Portuguese were soon to realize that supremacy at sea was not enough to supplant Arab-Swahili influence on the East African coast. Nor was the great achievement of Portugal accomplished without Arab opposition.

The Swahili-Arabs determined to save their high standard of living. From the first they refused the imposition of the exclusive, aggressive Portuguese trade system which forbade to Islam the coastal trade in any commodity that had value at Sofala. The men of the Indian Ocean had certain very definite advantages over the European newcomers. They were acclimatized. They still had some wealth and above all they had their skill and their boats. They were superb pilots and knew every creek and hazard on the long dangerous East African coastline.

They could not prevent the Portuguese traders and missionaries in the Zambezi region from taking over their fairs as well as their more important trading centres at Sena and Tete on the right or Tonga bank some 160 and 360 miles respectively from the sea. These became the most important of the Portuguese towns in the Rios de Sena which was the only area where effective Portuguese dominion extended more than 10 miles into the interior.

The Portuguese, imbued with the dual purpose of serving God and extracting wealth, wherever possible emulated Swahili methods and took sides in the quarrels of the local tribes. To secure allegiance a system used by the Swahili and based on Bantu custom was inaugurated whereby, in return for gifts and 'protection', the chiefs paid tribute in kind. It became incumbent upon the Captain of Mozambique to send a fixed payment or *curva* (an Arabic word) of cloth and beads to the head Monomotapa—Mwene Mutapa, the official name of the chief of the Karanga, a Shona tribe—to ensure the freedom of traders and their goods.² Some of the chiefs were baptized and were made to promise to encourage Christianity.

² Lebato, op. cit., 113.

The Portuguese in the Rivers of Sena depended upon the river as their only open highway to the outside world. And here the Arabs saw their opportunity. Relying upon sporadic African co-operation, merchandise was diverted from Sofala to Angoche (or Angoxa) and the other small ports of the Zambezi delta. As round the badly guarded ports of Mombasa, Malindi and Pate, goods were smuggled up unknown creeks and rivers into the interior. To starve out the Portuguese and to cut their established trade routes in the country around Sofala, dissensions between the Bantu chiefs were promoted, while along the coast a naval blockade was instituted to support the commercial war in the interior. At one stage conditions became so bad that the Portuguese in Sofala were forced to appeal to Lisbon.¹

The Europeans soon found themselves hemmed in and enmeshed in barriers. Nature created them. Man strengthened them and everywhere added his own barriers of mistrust and misunderstanding. Each year, particularly in March and April, the Zambezi flooded and fertilized its banks. The malarial mosquito thrived and in the summer season the Portuguese paid their deadly toll. Added to malaria, plague, smallpox and measles frequently took their tribute. As if disease and death were not enough, the flow of trade between the ports and the passage of men between the fever-stricken coastal belt and the high plateau land of the interior were impeded or barred by hostility, resentment and jealousies.

Death, contraband and intrigue were not the only blights that threatened to make Portuguese power in East African waters untenable and helped to bring poverty and instability to life in the Swahili city-states. In the late 1580s a cannibal tribe known as the Zimba came from what is now Tanzania. Today said to be the core of the Maravi nation, the Zimba have sometimes been identified with the Zulu, the Masai and the cannibal Jaga.² Having destroyed Sena and Tete *en route* one band, reckoned at about five thousand men, moved along the coast 'killing and eating every living thing, Men, Women, Children, Dogs, Cats, Rats, Snakes, Lizards, sparing nothing . . .'. Opposite Kilwa they not only destroyed everything but proceeded to kill and (it is

¹ Lobato, op. cit., 52, 73, 96, 101 *et seq.*, 213-17, 269-70, 311-12, 386; Axelsson, op. cit., 149, 154, Chapter XVII, *passim*.

² Rita-Ferreira, *Agregamento e Caracterizações . . .* (Lisbon, 1958), 63 *et seq.*; Boxer and Azevedo, 25.

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alleged by the journal of an eyewitness) to eat some three thousand inhabitants.¹ Only a few decades previously they had devastated the old kingdom of the Congo.² No primitive society possessed the resources to tide them over a period of drought and famine, and whenever the tribes exhausted the fertility of one region they moved farther afield. The bloody destruction of life and of the trade routes into the interior by the Zimba was followed in the north by the Muzungullos (Mosungalos) and the Galla. Kilwa and Mombasa had hardly regained their composure when they suffered a second Zimba onslaught (1585–9).³ Pockets of Swahili, notably those in Malindi, because they hated or feared their neighbours more than the Portuguese, remained loyal to Portugal, while among the independent African chiefs considerable prestige was acquired by individual Portuguese. Among the best known of these was the criminal, or *degradado*, Antonio Fernandes who carried out remarkable journeys into the interior, won the goodwill of Mwene Mutapa and other chiefs, and made valuable suggestions for canalizing the gold trade and for countering contraband and intrigue.⁴ To combat Swahili hostility, the Portuguese began to recruit and employ Arabs and Swahili as merchants to sell their goods.⁵

Zealous missionaries came out to minister to the spiritual welfare of the Africans. Among the more celebrated names are those of St. Francis Xavier, who spent six months preaching and assisting in the hospital at Mozambique (1541–2), Gonçalo da Silveira (1561) and Francesco Barreto (1569). None of these, however, was acquainted with Bantu custom which allows no member of a tribe to disagree with what is said by honoured guests and requires that everyone professes agreement with whatever is stated. Though hundreds were baptized they generally proved to be nominal believers only. The apparent success of Silveira and Barreto was short-lived and their expeditions ended in death.

¹ H.E.A., I, 158.

² Mathew, *Man*, op. cit., 67; Boxer and Azevedo, 23; Coupland, *East Africa and its Invaders*, (Oxford, 1938) 60; Strandes, *Die Portugiesenzeit* . . . (Berlin, 1899), 152–4.

³ Boxer and Azevedo, 19. J. S. Kirkman, *The Arab City of Gedi* (Oxford, 1954), 73, notes: 'The easternmost section of the Teita, a tribe living about a hundred miles from the coast and speaking a language associated with Kinyika, is settled on a ridge known as Sagala and is called Msagala; this name may have some connexion with Mosungalos.'

⁴ Lobato, op. cit., 219–25, 235–45; for a different statement, see Axelsson, op. cit., 137–45. Abraham, 'The Monomotapa Dynasty', *Nada*, No. 36 (1959), 66, 70–1, 82.

⁵ Lobato, op. cit., 111–13, 167, 199.

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from famine, disease or murder. In the next century when João da Costa went up the Zambezi to Sena he stated 'there was not a single native who was a true Christian' and 'usually their only connection with the Church was when a priest poured water over their heads'.¹

Meanwhile at sea the attempt of the Turk, Mir Ali Bey (or Bek) in 1586 and 1588 to take over all the Swahili towns, except Malindi, from Mogadishu to Kilwa was cut short by Portuguese power.² But in the Persian Gulf and off the coast of Malabar there were other attempts to overthrow the Portuguese. Although both the Mameluke rulers of Egypt and the Ottoman rulers of Turkey were occupied in their war against Shia Persia, they did make some fleeting attempts to recapture the use of African and Indian timber (1585–6 and 1588–92).³ In Goa the friendship of the Hindu Empire seems to have been of considerable value to the continuance of Portugal's authority 'after the first fifty years of her appearance in Indian waters'.⁴

Thus on land and on sea the monopoly of Portuguese power in the Indian Ocean suffered attack and even degeneration. But Portugal's tenacity of purpose never faltered and was never defeated, for the country was enslaved by a vision of grandeur. In that dream, even in the centuries of disintegration that followed, East Africa had an essential role and no unfavourable reports from that region were credited. Lisbon believed that if the Portuguese could complete their penetration of the interior, the Rivers of Sena would become the 'Rivers of gold'. In those provinces, so extensive, rich and fertile, a new empire would be born which would make the king of Portugal the 'lord of the world'.⁵ Was it not thence that King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba had obtained their riches?

To maintain Portugal's ocean empire and to fulfil Lisbon's dreams, in the first period of conquest Portuguese communications across a vast oceanic area—where not only men but the climate and the seas were hostile—were constantly kept open, replenished and reinforced by armada upon armada. Although the crews were by no means always first-rate and the wastage of life from disease and shipwreck was enormous, this remarkable

¹ Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600–1700* (Johannesburg, 1960), 190. During the eighteenth century missionary enterprise was abandoned.

² Boxer and Azevedo, 21–2. ³ Boxer and Azevedo, 20.
⁴ Panikkar, 39. ⁵ Axelson, op. cit., 108, 113–14; 102, 46, 101; 99.

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organizational achievement, which even by twentieth-century standards stands out as one of the epoch-making landmarks of history, was accomplished.

[3]

RETURN TO OBSCURITY

The Portuguese Indian Empire was one of the greatest gains of Spain in 1580, and the Dutch in their struggle with Spain naturally attacked this, her most vital asset, and thus destroyed the source of her wealth. The overthrow by the Dutch in the first half of the seventeenth century of the monopoly of Indian Ocean power built up by Portugal is one of the best-known aspects of the history of the period. But little attention, usually, is paid to the fact that in the beginning of the struggle Dutch activity in East African waters was an essential part of their military schemes; for although they destroyed Portuguese power in the East, the importance of the East African coast as the western key to the control of the Indian Ocean could not be ignored.

Almost the first military action of the Dutch was directed against the East African ports of their traditional rival and enemy. In 1601, two years before the blockade of Goa, two Netherland's pinnaces appeared off Sofala.¹ In 1604 and again in 1607² and 1608³ Mozambique was unsuccessfully attacked and this even though the Portuguese India Armada had gone to the help of Malacca. In Mozambique, it was feared that the French were building vessels in Holland to sail to Madagascar, and from that island would pass to the Portuguese mainland and the empire of the Monomotapa. In 1603 and 1604 two English vessels which visited Pemba and one which called at Lamu were 'soon sent on their way', and in 1608 actual hostilities were resorted to against the *Ascension* and the *Union*.⁴ Despite this show of bravado Portuguese power was already on the decline and their hold north of Cape Delgado was soon to be lost.

In 1609 the Dutch wrung from Philip III of Spain the recognition of their right to trade in the East Indies.⁵ Rumours of more

¹ Axelson, 1600-1700, 15.

² Theal, op. cit., 212-13; Axelson, op. cit., 16 *et seq.*

³ Wilmet, *Monomotapa* (London, 1896), 195.

⁴ Axelson, op. cit., 78.

⁵ Newton, *The European Nations in the West Indies, 1493-1688* (London, 1933), 228.

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attacks from the Dutch continued in 1619 and 1621. In 1622 the Portuguese with difficulty broke an Anglo-Dutch blockade of the Mozambique coast and Mozambique was reinforced.¹ Feverish plans were made for restoring Quelimane and the fortress of Sofala, and for winning the friendship of African chiefs against Portugal's enemies from Europe.² Meanwhile, the loss of Portugal's Eastern possessions had deprived her of the wealth necessary to equip fleets to recover them. Portugal was doomed from the moment her Eastern Empire was lost. But an empty treasury, crisis in the Persian Gulf and difficulties in Ceylon in 1631, and even Spanish domination, were not enough to break the Portuguese monopoly of power in East African waters down to the middle of the seventeenth century. In 1636 Goa found the means to equip an armada to restore order in Mombasa when a Portuguese protégé Jeronimo Chingulia (better known as Yusuf-bin-Hasan) was deposed.³ Mozambique was protected and Portuguese prestige in the Bajun islands re-established. The fact that Philip III recognized the importance of Mozambique as a calling station for his fleets and armies on the way to the East⁴ may partly have accounted for Portugal's tenacity of possession. For, by this time a change in the sea routes to the East had robbed the East African coast of some of its importance.

The Dutch abandoned the route along the Mozambique channel, or inner passage, and steered south-east of Madagascar. This outer route was known to the Portuguese, and in 1594 a book embodying Portuguese maritime practice recommended that it be followed when contrary winds and dangerous currents make navigation in the Mozambique channel hazardous.⁵ The island fortress continued to serve as the principal port of call, and in spite of the changed route the importance of Mozambique was not lost. A Frenchman, visiting Goa in 1608–10, observed that 'Moçambique is a place of great importance to the King of Spain both from the advantage which he derives from it and also because it is very useful to his different colonies and navigation. It is an island, a fortress and a port very suitable for ships which go from Portugal to Goa to shelter after they pass the Cape of Good

¹ Axelson, 1600–1700, 61–7.

² Op. cit., 73–4.

³ Op. cit., 182–4, 85; Boxer and Azevedo, 34, 38.

⁴ *Documentos remetidos da India ou livros das Manjões*, I, 91.

⁵ *Rotários . . . da India*, edited by Monte Pereira (Lisbon, 1898), 21, 170.

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Hope . . . we can say that it serves as a sentinel and shelter to the entrance of India.¹

The Dutch were determined to control this sentinel to the gateway of their Eastern Empire. Though not on the main route to the Spice Islands, they envied its famous legendary gold resources and, perhaps like the Portuguese before them, they realized that to maintain Batavia a victory in Mozambique or Malacca was necessary to safeguard the route to the spiceries. In 1641 they captured Malacca, but a ten years truce between Portugal and the Netherlands saved East Africa from an attack by sea. Eleven years later the Dutch secured the western entrance to the Indian Ocean by occupying the Cape of Good Hope and thus acquired not only a refitting station for their ships but also an excellent strategic base. Portugal had lost her position as chief European power in Southern Africa. But the continued importance that the Netherlands attached to Mozambique is apparent from the attack they launched in 1662. Again the Dutch failed to displace the Portuguese from East Africa.²

Whether the rivalry in the Eastern seas had a part in inspiring the Portuguese to throw off the Spanish yoke it is impossible to say. In 1668 the war against Spain which had dragged on for twenty-eight years was successfully concluded, while in 1648 Portugal managed to reconquer Angola³ and six years later Brazil was taken from the Dutch. But the nation was exhausted by the efforts it had put forth and the chief sources of wealth in the East were for ever lost to the Dutch and the English. The peasantry in the southern provinces of the motherland had become degraded and Portugal sank into a languor which affected her dependencies overseas. The wars had reduced the Portuguese Navy, and in 1648, to make things worse, a hurricane destroyed or drove ashore all the shipping on which Goa depended for its very existence. The once great and much envied prestige of Portuguese Indiamen had fallen so low that a contemporary remarked in 1650 'not one Portugal ship of three returns safe from that voyage, whilst not one in ten of the Hollanders ever miscarries, the doubling of the Cape of Bonna Esperanza being only dangerous at some seasons in the year, which season they never avoid (by their own confession) so unwise men, or so ill mariners are they, not better to know to time their voyage or trim their ship'. In that very year

¹ Pyrard, *Voyage . . . as Indias Orientales*, 1607-15, Part II, Chapter 17.

² Theal, op. cit., 216.

³ Boxer, *Salvador de Sá* (London, 1934), 263-70.

the galleon *Nazare* 'went and put into Angola, thinking it was already in the Indian Ocean, for such was its pilot's ineptitude'. Owing to the high wastage from disease, Portuguese ships in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea, particularly on the return voyages, were forced to use an even higher proportion of Asian and African seamen than their Dutch and English contemporaries.¹

On the East African mainland, although some of the Swahili settlements still seem to have been relatively prosperous,² deterioration and decay were growing everywhere. To make things worse, a great upsurge of the Galla, as far as Kilip Creek north of Mombasa, ravaged the Islamic settlements and drove whole peoples before them.³ These in turn probably displaced other peoples, like the tribe the Portuguese named Muzungullos, identifiable as the Nyika,⁴ who appear to have had their centre in the Teita hills.

Farther south the 'Rivers of Gold' were rapidly becoming 'the Rivers of Tears'. By the middle of the seventeenth century many chiefs were complaining about the rapacity and cupidity of the Portuguese, and the Monomotapa was deeply concerned about the detribalization of his people.⁵ Significantly enough, the Asian immigrant community was no more welcome. When the chief Changamire was invited by the Monomotapa to expel the Portuguese he proceeded to kill not only the Europeans but the Asians as well. At the fair of Dambarare all the Indians and Portuguese were killed, including two friars who were flayed and their skins displayed at the head of the army as proof of Changamire's power. In 1695 he swooped down on the fair of Macequece in Manica and an attack on Sena seemed imminent when his death saved the city.⁶ In other parts of the country conditions were no better.

On the coast facing Mozambique, the Portuguese controlled an area of no more than two leagues square and did not dare penetrate the land between Mozambique and the Zambesi

¹ Boxer, 'The Carreira da India, 1650-1750' (*Mariner's Mirror*, vol. 46/1, February 1960), 35-6, 40.

² Boxer and Azevedo, 44-5, 55.

³ Kirkman, *The Arab City of Godi*, 74-5; H.E.A., I, 89, 114.

⁴ Boxer and Azevedo, 127, 133. The word *Nyika* means wasteland, cf. Kirkman, *ibid.*

⁵ Axelson, 1680-1700, 125, 138, 154, 186, 191.

⁶ Axelson, *op. cit.*, 182-3.

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River. Here the indigenous Makua had come under the domination of the kingdom of Maravi who also controlled the Bororo, the people most feared at Quelimane, where the four thatched Portuguese houses were ever fearful and ready to withstand a Bororo attack.¹

The progressive decline among the Portuguese inhabitants and soldiers affected the ports, which dwindled in importance and population. At the port of Mozambique—'the cornerstone of the Conquest'—where bilious and malarial fevers are still endemic, passing ships suffered from much more than climatic troubles. The harbour, which had been easily accessible to the smaller, 'more manoeuvrable and better captained vessels of the sixteenth century, presented difficulties to the larger galleons and *nau*' of the seventeenth'.² More than that, despite the efforts of the friars of St. John of God,³ there was, it seems, a complete lack of medical attention, as the funds allotted to the hospital were quite inadequate.⁴ Drinking water had to be brought from the mainland, and in any event was insufficient to cope 'with crowded Indiamen for weeks on end'. All of which probably helps to explain the high death rate, especially among visitors, which in 1608 reached six hundred in a few weeks.⁵ But that was not all. When the galleon *S. Bento* was wrecked in 1643, boats full of residents from Mozambique Island flocked to the scene 'not to aid the ship-wrecked but to plunder the vessel'. In that same year, the Viceroy of Goa recommended that 'vessels *en route* from Portugal to India should be prohibited from calling at Mozambique at all', because of 'the hazards of the bar and the malignancy of the island and its inhabitants'. A year later the Governor kept vessels waiting three days in the road before providing a pilot. 'He refused to supply food, or to admit the sick to hospital, declaring that the royal funds did not permit of such charity.' Ships' crews were 'reduced to begging outside the churches, until the monsoon permitted the survivors to sail on to India'.⁶ Little wonder that a clerical visitor in 1691 was moved to comment: 'Moçambique is not so repulsive as it is painted, but the

¹ Axelson, 1600-1700, 133; Changamire was a warrior chief of the Rozvi group of Shona. At the end of the seventeenth century 'he became the paramount ruler of the region between the Zambezi and Sabi Rivers', cf. Livingstone, *African Journal*, II, 312-3; Posselt, *Fact and Fiction* (Bulawayo, 1935), 137-9.

² Axelson, op. cit., 118.

³ Boxer, op. cit., 47.

⁴ Axelson, op. cit., 117-18.

⁵ Boxer, op. cit., 46.

⁶ Axelson, op. cit., 118-19.

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Portuguese with their concupiscence and gluttony fill the burial places.'¹

The *regimentos* of 1672 and 1673 warned outward-bound Indian-men that 'they were to call at Mozambique Island only in case of unavoidable necessity'. Other instructions for the India voyage went so far as to add that, if food or water was needed after rounding the Cape, ships were to put in for fresh supplies at St. Augustine's Bay in south Madagascar, at Zanzibar or one of the other islands off the Swahili coast. 'If the Cape was rounded before the end of July, they were to take the "inner course" through the Mozambique channel, but after that date they must take the "outer course" east of Madagascar.'² In practice, the island of Mozambique continued to be used particularly when ships lost the tail of the South-West monsoon for Goa. But the East African towns ceased to be regular ports of call *en route* to the East.

It was at this time when the loss of sea power and the superior attractions of Brazil had reduced the East African coast to this sorry state, that the Omani Arabs took advantage of Portugal's weakness to recapture Muscat, to harass the Portuguese coastal towns and finally to capture Fort Jesus and Mombasa.

With the fall of Muscat (1650)—the bastion of Portuguese power in the Middle East—the Omani Arabs in response to appeals from their co-religionists on the Swahili coast sacked Zanzibar; while many other East African coastal towns threw off their Portuguese allegiance. In 1660 Pate, Faza and nine other towns all welcomed a small Arab raiding party.³ But the Omani were too fully occupied nearer home to attempt more than sporadic raids upon the towns claimed by Portugal on the Malabar coast and in East Africa. Fortunately, too, for Portugal, Dutch power had been weakened by the wars against Spain, and both the English and the French regarded Asia as a richer field for trade and conquest than the uninviting African coast, where gold dust and ivory were an inadequate reward for the dangers involved. Thus it was left to the Asians to resume the contest with Portugal for ascendancy in East Africa.

In 1670 Arabs from Muscat attacked Mozambique, but the

¹ Boxer, 'The Carreira da India, 1650-1750' (*Mariner's Mirror*, vol. 46, February 1960), 46.

² Boxer, *ibid.*

³ For details, see Boxer and Azevedo, 47-61, 74-9; Axelsson, 1600-1700, 139-55.

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Portuguese drove them off. In 1694 the Swahili in Pemba called in the aid of the Omani at a time when Pate seemed to be preparing a combined offensive with Muscat against Mombasa.¹ A Portuguese punitive expedition reduced Pemba to obedience and expelled the Arab intruders, but within the year the Omani without opposition occupied the island.

Then began the siege of Mombasa—‘one of the most remarkable sieges in history’.² The siege lasted from March 1696 until December 1698. Both the Omani and the Portuguese tried unsuccessfully to obtain as allies the Bantu Nyika on the mainland. So long as the Portuguese supplied them with cotton textiles the Nyika smuggled in fresh provisions at night. But their allegiance wavered according to whichever side appeared to be winning. The Queen of Zanzibar, on the other hand, sent supplies from 1696 and continued to do so for ‘as long as the siege lasted’. But most of her help was intercepted by the Arabs. Finally they sacked her own city of Zanzibar, she and the inhabitants escaping into the bush.

After the fall of Mombasa, the Swahili islands and coastal towns successively acknowledged the suzerainty of Oman. But the Omani’s power in most places was only nominal and not popular. Certainly Arab opposition as a political force no longer counted in the gold-bearing regions around Sofala.

Thirty years later, in 1724, the Sultan of Kilwa applied to Mozambique to rid him of the Arab intruders,³ and at the request and with the help of the ‘Great’ Swahili Sultan of Pate the whole coast once again submitted to the Portuguese who re-established factors in some of the former trading centres such as Zanzibar. But the misbehaviour of the tactless Portuguese Governor of Mombasa antagonized the Nyika and the Swahili townspeople who again called in help from Muscat. In April 1729 most of the Portuguese in Mombasa outside Fort Jesus and also in Pemba, Mafia and Zanzibar were killed. At Pate the pro-Arab party fired a part of the town, but again the Swahili Sultan’s loyalty saved the Portuguese Governor who finally decided to obtain help from Goa. Three months later Fort Jesus was evacuated by the Portuguese. In January 1730 an armada of five ships from Goa arrived at Pate, but on hearing that Fort Jesus had capitulated and that Arab reinforcements had arrived in Mombasa they made no

¹ Boxer and Azevedo, 57.

² Op. cit., 59 *et seq.*; Axelsson, 1600–1700, 153 *et seq.*

³ H.E.A., I, 156.

serious effort to co-operate with the still strong pro-Portuguese party, and arriving at Mozambique they finally decided to refit in Goa before attempting to reconquer Mombasa. Their 'navigation was badly managed' and the whole expedition ended in disaster. Trouble in Western India, with the growing power of the Maratha, did not permit another effort on the part of Goa.

Thus, in effect, by 1730 the coast north of Cape Delgado was lost to Portugal. Had the Portuguese been in a stronger position this could have been avoided, for the Swahili intermittently continued to appeal to them for help against Omani oppression. In 1745 Mozambique reported to Goa that, because of civil war in Oman, some of the principal ports on the coast—Pate, Malindi, Pemba, Zanzibar, Mafia and Kilwa—virtually recognized the Portuguese as their legitimate overlords. In 1759 the Sultan of Kilwa assured the Governor of Mozambique of his friendship and reported that Mombasa and Pate were at war with Oman. In 1765 he complained again of Omani oppression, but the Portuguese were too weak to take advantage of his invitation to return.¹ An ill-organized attempt by the Governor of Mozambique in 1769 ended in failure,² while in 1780 another Portuguese expedition to Mombasa likewise proved abortive.³

Thus in the mid-eighteenth century the coastline and most of the islands north of Cape Delgado were under the sway of the Imam of Muscat. This sovereign, whose name was unfamiliar to European ears, ruled the rich, commercial town of Muscat near the entrance to the Persian Gulf and 'Omon [sic] and other provinces of Arabia'.⁴ At one time or another he was also in possession of Ormuz, Gombroon, part or the whole of the island of Kishm and other territories on the Persian coast which he held 'in form and by sufferance from the Persian government'.⁵ On the East African coast the Imam left the mainland rulers in possession of their authority, but exacted most of their revenue. Soldiers from Muscat garrisoned the fortresses at Kilwa and Zanzibar, and even in Portuguese territory at the Bay of Tungi the Imam had a customs house. The predominant influence of the Imam along the desert and tropical shores from Cape Guardafui

¹ H.E.A., I, 156–7.

² Boxer and Azevedo, 83.

³ H.E.A., I, 157. For further details on Mombasa, cf. Chapter Six/1.

⁴ Prior, 68.

⁵ I.O.R., Bombay P. & S. Proc., Range 383, vol. 9, 8285, Warden to Wainwright and Smith, Bombay Castle, 7 September 1809.

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to the northern limits of Portuguese territory has been compared by a Portuguese historian to that of Portugal itself in an earlier era.¹ The hardy pirates of Oman so dominated all the trade routes of the Indian Ocean that even Dutch and English merchantmen learned to dread the sight of them. The richest and largest centre of the Imam's colonial commerce and power was at the island of Zanzibar.²

The Crown of Portugal retained the coast from Cape Delgado in the north to Delagoa Bay in the south—a vast area larger than France and Portugal together—which is our main concern in this study. The coastline stretches for some 1,600 miles and is considerably longer than that of the sister province of Angola.

With the partition of East Africa between a European and an Asian power that coast became much more than a frontier between Europe and Asia. East Africa was henceforth a meeting ground for West and East. The struggle evoked by the Portuguese resulted in religious, economic, social and political fusions which ripened Swahili culture and the spirit which animates it. The Portuguese contribution to this amalgam was small. 'Altogether some sixty words of Swahili have a Portuguese origin.' Of greater importance was the introduction of certain crops and trees,³ while Portuguese heroism has left its mark on Swahili literature and bullfighting still flourishes in Pemba. 'Considering how few Portuguese there were in this region' north of Cape Delgado 'the wonder is that the traces of their stay lasted as long as they did'.⁴

Against this, in the opinion of at least one authority, 'the Arabs were antagonized by the insolent effronteries and the barbaric cruelties that characterized European dealings with them';⁵ 'the hatred of the whole of Islam was aroused by the Portuguese injustices and barbarities';⁶ and in so far as the Africans were concerned 'a surge of common feeling overcame the tribesmen's sense of inferiority in arms, and the Portuguese reduced in numbers and without leadership were defeated piecemeal'.⁷ On the other hand, other authorities believe that the defects of Portuguese rule 'were certainly no worse than that of the Omani'.⁸

¹ Bordalo, *Ensaios sobre a Estatística das Possessões Portuguesas no Ultramar* (Lisbon, 1859), 51.

² Mansur, *History of Syed Said, Sultan of Muscat* (London, 1819), 29.

³ H.E.A., I, 167-8. + Boxer and Azevedo, 84-5. ⁵ Axelson, *South-East Africa*, 161.

⁴ Op. cit., 78.

⁷ Axelson, 1600-1700, 194.

⁸ Boxer and Azevedo, 83.

and that when the Swahili welcomed Omani intervention to rid themselves of the Portuguese they found 'that the Omani were no less grasping and oppressive'.¹ It has been emphasized that the Portuguese, like the Arabs and Swahili before them, lived alternately at peace and at war with the tribes and that the loyalty of the East coast to Portuguese rule could hardly have lasted as long as it did if some Swahili 'had not been on terms of sincere friendship and understanding with some at least of their Portuguese contemporaries'. 'The scarlet thread of battle, murder and sudden death which runs through so much of Swahili history was equally if not more in evidence before and after the Portuguese period than it was during that particular time of troubles.'²

Certainly if the Portuguese helped to create barriers of mistrust and hatred of the Europeans, which in Africa are matched only by nature's barriers, the Indians and the Arabs, as we shall see elsewhere, did the same for the Asian. The fruits of that bitterness and hostility have taken over four hundred years to ripen and are being reaped only in the twentieth century. But the miracle is that for all those hundreds of years the fortunes of Bantu, Swahili and Asian became closely interwoven with that of the Portuguese and form an important experiment in co-existence.

Neither for the coastal folk nor for the people of the interior did this contact with Europe presage an immediate or intimate understanding of the many facets of European civilization. The wealth of the East was the main objective of the competing European powers. French and English traders representing their East India companies had become acute rivals for power in India and the waters East of the Cape, and until the nineteenth century the East African mainland received none of Europe's attention, for it ceased to be on the direct sailing routes of the world.

The previous naval importance of the Mozambique coast had, by the mid-eighteenth century, passed to the île de France—later to be known as Mauritius. The île de France lay astride the route which inevitably became the main traffic-way from the Cape to Bombay, Ceylon and the Coromandel coast.³ Except during the fair season the Mozambique channel is dominated by

¹ H.E.A., I, 156–7.

² Boxer and Azevedo, 86.

³ The île de France lies south of the monsoon belt, but in its vicinity is what has sometimes been called a northerly monsoon productive of hurricanes, especially between December and March, cf. Hotspurgh, I, iv, 209.

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light and variable winds;¹ access to its shoal-endangered ports was difficult. Not only was the mainland coast disease-stricken and stagnant but it had never been surveyed, and Portuguese navigational tradition of the 'inner passage' had been lost. In 1728 the Portuguese flagship for the reconquest of Mombasa was furnished with Dutch charts of the Indian Ocean for want of accurate Portuguese charts.² The result was that only in the Atlantic Ocean did the new comers to the East follow in the early tracks plied by the Portuguese. The route lay via Madeira.³ Thence, by means of the North-East Trade, the Equator was crossed at about 20° West longitude and, once the tedious passage through the equatorial calms was over, the ships made their way south-westward almost to the coast of Brazil. This was necessary in order to pick up the westerly winds by means of which they 'ran down their casting' to the Cape. Sometimes they overshot their mark and had to beat back with the aid of the Agulhas Current.⁴

After the middle of the eighteenth century some English ships called at Rio de Janeiro, while nearly all Portuguese navigators continued to touch there. Even though by 1655 Portuguese Indiamen could cover the voyage from Lisbon to Goa—known as the *Carreira da India*—without a stop in five or six months and Portugal made strenuous efforts to prevent Indiamen from calling at the Brazilian ports, instructions were increasingly disregarded.⁵ Thus Brazil was always closely linked with Portugal's Indian Ocean Empire and, in dispatching men or allotting supplies, the home government had to try and strike a balance between the needs of Brazil, India and East Africa. This link between Portuguese East Africa and Brazil gained a special importance in later years.

Once in the Indian Ocean a number of routes were possible. The two main ones were described in the nineteenth century by Horsburgh as follows:

The route by the Mozambique channel is more direct than any other for ships bound to Bombay, Ceylon or the Coromandel coast when

¹ For details, see Horsburgh, I, 148–96.


² Boxer, 'The Careira da India', 44.

³ It was customary at least in the early years for Portuguese ships to call at Cape Verde or the Canagua River.

⁴ For details of the return route, cf. P.R.O., F.O. 63/59, No. 13, Strangford to Canning, Rio, 14 September 1808.

⁵ For details, cf. Boxer, op. cit., 42–3.

2. SAILING ROUTES TO THE INDIAN OCEAN



D

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the South-West monsoon prevails on those coasts, for it predominates in the Mozambique channel at the same time. This route is generally preferred in time of peace, but in war-time many navigators have adopted the passage to the Eastward of Madagascar where they are not so liable to light winds nor to fall in with shoals as in the inner passage. The passage outside Madagascar, although the distance is greater, may by these advantages be made as quickly as the other and instances have occurred of ships separating to the Eastward of the Cape, some adopting the inner passage and others the outer passage, the latter arriving first at Bombay.¹

By the end of the eighteenth century when the French were committed to an imperialist policy in the East, the Île de France, with its large commodious port at Port Louis, served as a base in East African waters. Its value for this purpose may be summed up in the words of certain French officers: 'As Gibraltar is the key to the Mediterranean, the French consider the Île de France as the key to the Indian Ocean.'²

Especially in war-time Mozambique became isolated. When they could not call at the Île de France, ships preferred to call at the navigationally safer port of Johanna in the Comoro Islands³ which lay only slightly westward of the direct mid-channel route. Inevitably however, as we shall see, the story of the Île de France leads back to East Africa. But for nearly two hundred years—from the time when Portugal fell under the domination of Spain and Muscat ousted the Portuguese north of Cape Delgado until the end of the eighteenth century—the East coast of Africa, which at the beginning of the sixteenth century had formed so important a link in a prosperous Portuguese Empire, was forgotten by Europe and relapsed into that 'profound state of obscurity' in which it was found by Vasco da Gama.⁴ But experience always bears fruit. Europe and Asia had met in Africa and had glimpsed, if not its potentialities, at least some of its many personalities. Certain truths were implicit in that meeting. The creation of a Portuguese Empire in the Indian Ocean for a time diminished

¹ Hornburgh, I, 209–10.

² I.O.R., Home Misc. Series, vol. 153 (E.I. Series 61), 403. Extract from letter to Chairman of the E.I. Company by a person (not named) employed by the Chairman to obtain such intelligence as could be procured from French officers on parole at Corke, Beaufort and Kinsale, sent by Chairman and Vice-Chairman to Sir Stainer Postor, E.I. House, 9 August 1781.

³ J. S. Kirkman, *Men and Monuments . . .* (London, 1964), 203; 'The Comoro Islands . . . were originally peopled by the same stock as the inhabitants of Madagascar.'

⁴ Prior, 24.

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Asia's commercial influence in East African waters, but certainly did not replace it and in later years the Portuguese became dependent upon Asian co-operation. The new Empire did more than renew Europe's ancient if forgotten contact with East Africa. Because of it the Swahili coast once again became an East-West frontier and found a niche in world affairs. In an age of sea power, no nation aiming at dominion in Asia could permanently ignore it.

Chapter Three

THE PORTUGUESE POSSESSIONS

[1]

THE COLONY AND ITS DEFENCES

Gibbon wrote, 'In political institutions are the embodied experiences of a race.' Never was this truth more clearly exemplified than in Portugal and her East African colony during the early years of the nineteenth century. Just as the prosperity of the East African coast had once reflected the heyday of Asia, the territory claimed by the Portuguese now mirrored and echoed the state of Portugal. The power which had once made Lisbon the dépôt of Asiatic treasure and the emporium of Eastern trade had declined to comparative insignificance. The kings and nobles and their life of almost Eastern pomp had squandered the wealth of the state as well as their own. Financial corruption, endemic even in the later parliamentary system, was rife in every department of state, while only the British alliance saved the country and its colonies from the threatening designs of France and Spain.

The limits of territory claimed by Portugal in 1800 were still marked by Cape Delgado in the north and Delagoa Bay in the south, while the inland boundaries were much the same as at the end of the seventeenth century. It should be observed, however, that the exact limits had never been defined. Since the sixteenth century, vague ideas of frontiers had been handed down to map- and chart-makers, without alteration. The interior was almost as unexplored as in the days of Almeida. This lack of definition caused acute controversy between England and Portugal in later years.¹

On its separation from India in 1752, the colony of Mozambique was divided into five administrative districts or captaincies—

¹ Cf. Chapter Six.

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Cape Delgado, Mozambique, Rivers of (Rios de) Sena, Sofala and Inhambane. At the head of each district there was a head captain (*capitão mor*).¹

Captaincies were granted by the King of Portugal as a favour, reward or dowry to deserving noblemen, their widows or daughters who married an approved suitor. An award could take years, even decades, to arrange as there was generally a long waiting list for the office. To know 'the right person' was usually sufficient to secure the post. Many of those who received the awards never took office, preferring to sell the favour, sometimes by public auction in Goa, to the highest bidder. In return for a monopoly of some trading rights and for the freedom to use his captaincy for his own benefit, the captain paid the treasury through the royal factor at Mozambique an annual money fee for his three years lease of office and had certain financial obligations within his district.² His functions were administrative, military, commercial and sometimes judicial. The head of a fortress or factory (*feitoria*) was usually known as the *feitor*—a factor in the employ of a commercial establishment. Captains were expected to have certain qualities and in the beginning were usually men of character. The Governor-General (*Capitão* or *Governador Geral*) resided at Mozambique, the capital from which the whole colony was governed and still takes its name.

At the height of her power Portugal never had sufficient resources nor people to settle East Africa even had the climate been favourable. The Portuguese came to East Africa for purposes of trade and to guard the security of the route to the East. Consequently, the early community was formed of seamen, traders or administrators, not of farmers. Cut off from Portugal by distance and forced to rely mainly upon themselves, the settlers' interest in the *mae patria* had died and was not replaced by a local patriotism: There was no need for them, as for the *Voortrekkers* at the Cape in later years, to escape from government control and seek their fortunes farther afield, nor were they, except in certain parts, strong enough to take advantage of the disunion of the natives and to establish their own supremacy as the British had done in India. Brazil offered fuller scope for the adventurer, and its

¹ J. J. Teixeira, Botelho, *História Militar e Política dos Portugueses...* (Lisbon, 1934), I, 393–403; A.H.U., Moz., 66, Jozé da Boamorte Lobo to Prince Regent, Moz., 22 October 1807.

² Strand, 169–70; Axelsson, 1600–1700, 2.

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colonization was the greatest imperial achievement of the Portuguese.

According to an English visitor the first view of the colony revealed a strange mixture of Indian, Arabian and European custom not blending very harmoniously together. Even the meat at the Governor's table was 'dressed partly after Indian and partly after European fashion'.¹ A census of 1807 analysed the population of the town of Mozambique as follows: whites and half-castes (baptized), 419; slaves, 5,860; free Negroes, 20; 'Moors', 211; Banians, 254; total, 6,764.²

Since the sixteenth century most of the coastal folk or Swahili—described in the census as Moors—have been a deeply Africanized racial amalgam containing varying proportions of African, Arab, Persian, Indian and Portuguese blood.³ Even if the Islamic faith and Arabic costume were not actually accepted, their culture, fashion and thought, as far as the Portuguese knew, had always been deeply influenced by Islam. Its precepts and its sense of brotherhood, which easily accommodate local ways of life such as polygamy, dancing and harvest festivals, had for centuries been familiar to everyone. Probably as early as the mid-fifteenth century even the peasant cultivators and cattle breeders, as far removed as South and South-Western Rhodesia, who lived in small stockaded villages and practised an ancestor cult introduced from the Great Lakes, had been in contact with Islam.⁴ By the nineteenth century the so-called 'baptized half-castes', like many of the Portuguese, particularly in the Zambezi valley, adopted native superstition, custom and manners, but the coast never lost its Islamic flavour.

On all sides the Portuguese were neighbours to independent native states. From north of Mozambique to the Zambezi delta lived the Makua tribe who, according to an Englishman, Henry Salt, had never forgiven the early slaving raids of the Portuguese.⁵ Free passage to the coast through Makua country was essential to the valued Yao ivory and slave trade. But peaceful relations with the Makua seem to have existed only when the Portuguese had the upper hand and certainly after the mid-eighteenth century the

¹ Henry Salt, *A voyage to Abyssinia . . .* (London, 1814), 23, 27.

² A.H.U., Moz., 66, Jozé da Boamorte Lobo to Prince Regent, Moz., 22 October 1807. Livingstone, *African Journal*, 1853-6, II 459, notes that at Tete in 1856 the free population numbered 348 and the slaves 4,030.

³ Mathew, *Maw*, op. cit., 65.

⁴ Abraham, 'Maramuca . . .', 211-12.

⁵ Salt 58.

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Portuguese were often forced to take up arms against unruly Makua chieftains. Trouble usually arose over the robbery of trade goods sent by the Portuguese to the interior and because the Makua harboured fugitive slaves.

In their stand against the Portuguese the Makua were assisted by fire-arms from Arabs and, even before 1787, when to trade fire-arms became legal, from the Portuguese who valued gold, ivory or slaves higher than their own security. After 1735 French and Brazilian slave traders increased the Makua's supply of fire-arms and gunpowder. In the Querimba Islands Portugal's tenuous hold was harassed by sporadic raids from both the Makua and the Makonde. To add to the disorder the competition to trade with the Yao and the Makua at Mossuril and the Cabaceiras, on the coast opposite Mozambique Island, increased the cost of ivory and lowered the margin of Portuguese profit. The result was a continual state of petty warfare which disrupted trade and agriculture and often caused the Makua to withhold provisions from the Portuguese.¹

For years at a time in the eighteenth century and particularly in the early nineteenth century there was warfare interspersed with periods of uneasy peace. In 1807 the Makua obliged the Portuguese to evacuate the Cabaceira peninsula, captured Fort Mossuril and spread destruction and death far and wide. Three years later in a crushing expedition the Portuguese utilized field artillery for the first time. After that time periods of peace appear to have been longer. But again in 1820, in 1833 and in the 1850s trade was interrupted by fighting.² The Portuguese were able to maintain themselves by dividing the Makua and the Yao, by taking part in Makua court intrigues and by calling for assistance upon loyal Swahili and independent chiefs. These coastal Makua, sometimes grouped with the Swahili,³ still retain, despite their Islamic affinities, the matrilineal succession of their Maravi ancestors.

The Maravi and the *munhaes* (soldiers) of the Monomotapa are said to have formerly dominated the territory claimed by the Portuguese. In the 1830s the war-torn state of the Maravi was one of the largest native states in this part of Africa. In the west it is said to have bordered on the Cheva or Cewa people, and on the

¹ Alpers, Chapter III.

² For details of unrest and wars, cf. Alpers, Chapters II-VI.

³ Salt, op. cit., 38, describes the Swahili as 'certain tribes on the coast' ruled by sheiks 'who speak the same language as the Makooa but who early fell under ... the Arabs'.

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east on the Portuguese country round Tete¹ and the left bank of the Zambezi. The people living along the lower Zambezi were offshoots of the Maravi, whose habits and customs they inherited. They included, in addition to the Makua, Cewa and Zimba, the Bororos, Mang'anjas, Nsenga, Tumbuka and Manyika. Also related were the Yao,² as yet not Islamized, and the Nguru or Lomwe. As traders the Yao were to become particularly well known at the height of the slave trade, but their service to the ivory trade seems to have been equally devoted.³ They and the Nguru sometimes worked together with the Bisa,⁴ the Nyamwezi and farther north with other tribes such as the Kamba. Along winding irregular footpaths known as 'routes' the trade of the peoples of the hinterland threaded East Central Africa and adapted itself to meet the demand at the coast.⁵

In 1860 an Englishman remarked that 'the most active and intelligent traders among the cafres of this part of Africa are the Bisa' also known as the Muviza, Muiza and Inviza—who were cultivators and merchants.⁶ Their trading with Zumbo probably began between 1700 and 1730 on their migration eastwards from their Congo homelands.⁷ A Portuguese explorer claims that Bisa land extended as far as the great Lunda kingdom of Central Africa, that in 1831 the Bemba drove them from their well-watered and fertile highlands and, landless, they were obliged to rely more on their commerce in order to maintain their old customs and habits.⁸

South-west of the Zambezi, from a short way above Tete and

¹ In fact, Tete's native name of Nyungwe, or Nyungwi, derived from a Maravi tribe 'living in the immediate vicinity and westwards', cf. Livingstone, *African Journal*, II, 421.

² Gavitto, *King Kazembe*, I/63–66. The Yao, it seems, had not yet spread beyond the Lujeuda and Ruvuma Rivers. The congeries of people, whose culture include the Makonde, the Yao and the Makua-Lomwe, now live in the region between Lake Nyasa and the east coast, the Lukuledi River in the north and the Zambezi in the south. The Makua occupy the area between the Lujeuda and Lurio Rivers and the coastal strip from the mouth of the Lurio nearly to Quelimane. The Yao region is between the Ruvuma, Lujeuda and Luchilingo Rivers, and also extends into Malawi and Tanzania, cf. Mary Tew, *Peoples of the Lake Nyasa Region*, Part I/1 and Posselt, 13–15.

³ Alpers, *The role of the Yao . . . , passim.*

⁴ Gavitto, 2/169–70; H.E.A., 265–6.

⁵ H.E.A., 266–7, 227; Alpers, Chapter I.

⁶ R.H. MS. Afr., s. 53, Thornton Collection, Copies of articles from scientific periodicals, 23b. (The nation Muizar was named after the chief Muzura, paramount chief of Bororoland.)

⁷ Alpers, Chapter III.

⁸ Gavitto, I/201–8, 165.

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reaching as far as Portugal's precarious base at Zumbo, was the shrunken enclave of the once great empire of the Monomotapa—the territory of the Chedima. This Barozwi Empire seems to have originated under Arab instigation after the middle of the fifteenth century.

The Rozvi kings of the Vakaranga—a group of Shona—it seems then conquered a vast area bounded by the Limpopo and the Zambesi and extending from the Kalahari Desert to the shores of the Indian Ocean.¹ In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Monomotapa (Mwene Mutapa) controlled much of modern Mashonaland (Rhodesia) and the adjoining portions of Mozambique, south of the Zambesi.² Many tribes and clans fell under the control of this vast Bantu military domain and empire which continued to be referred to by the Portuguese, following Arab tradition, as the empire of the Monomotapa or *Imperio de Manamutapa*.³ However, even in the late fifteenth century there had been a lack of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. By the time of the Portuguese arrival the eastern and southern provinces had been lost⁴ and the custom by which the princes usurped or fought for the seat of the empire gradually helped disintegration.⁵ By the middle of the nineteenth century there was no longer a paramount chief to whom everyone showed loyalty. Most of the land was claimed by Portugal, to whom the chief privileges afforded by Mwene Mutapa seem to have been the right of access to Zumbo, on the left bank of the Zambesi, and a free passage for trade with the Zezuru to the south-west.⁶

The valley and delta of the Zambesi still constitute a meeting-ground for the northern matrilineal and southern patrilineal

¹ Abraham, 'Maramuca . . .', 212–13. For a different statement of facts which claims that the Vakaranga were not a martial people nor the paramount race of Mashonaland, that the Barozwi were the dominant people for more than a century until overthrown by the Swazi about 1830 and a decade later by the Amandebele under Mzilikazi, cf. Posselet, 10–11, 137; Cf. also J. Desmond Clark, *The Prehistory of Southern Africa*, (Pelican, London, 1959), 297.

² Livingstone, *African Journal*, II, 445. 2.

³ For details of how term arose see Lobato, *A Expansão Portuguesa em Moçambique, 1498–1530*, 19–20 and Axelson, *South-East Africa*, 109.

⁴ Abraham, *ibid.*

⁵ Gamitto, 2/175–77.

⁶ Thornton, op. cit., 18b; Abraham, 'The Monomotapa Dynasty', article in *Nada*, No. 36, 1939, 66–82; Almeida de Eça, *Guerras no Zambeze* (Lisbon, 1953), I, 256, 325.

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cultures such as the Shangaan, Shona and other groups of Thonga¹ between the River Sabi and the Zambesi. Called Karanga by the Portuguese their present appellation derives from the mid-nineteenth century when the region was invaded by a branch of the warlike Zulu (or Ngoni) fleeing from incorporation in the empire of the tyrant Shaka.² The name Landin or Landeen (courier) is also applied by the Portuguese to all the tribes of Zulu origin or who have come under Zulu influence.³ About 1825 these Zulu had moved into Portuguese East Africa between the Limpopo and Sabi Rivers. By 1834 their leaders formed one of several groups dispersed among the Shangaans of Lourenço Marques and the Matabele of Rhodesia. Two years later they plundered and destroyed the country round Sofala.⁴ Zulu tactics, military training and social discipline produced such cohesion that, by 1835 when the invaders crossed the Zambesi nearly opposite Zumbo, the force included survivors of eve people plundered or defeated during the 2,000-mile trek. The newcomers soon incorporated many Yao groups and finally settled as a ruling class in Matabeleland, Southern Tanzania (north of the Upper Ruvuma) and at Cape Delgado. This was the last large-scale invasion into Portuguese territory.⁵

The greatest traders in the colony were the Indians, the majority of whom were Banians, and the 'Moors'—as the Swahili and the Arabs were called. The Banians never intermarried into other castes and seldom made their homes in Africa. Originally their ancestors had been expelled from Cambaia into Guzerat and Mecca, where the majority remained. Others had established

¹ For details on the Thonga (Toka or Tonga), subjugated by the Kololo, now known as Lozi, cf. Livingstone, *African Journal*, I, 2, 1, 3, 1.

² For details, cf. Rita-Ferreira, 27, 33, 51 *et seq.*; Tew, 93–9; H. A. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, 2nd edn. (London, 1927), I, 15.

³ Manual of P.E.A., 101; cf. also Livingstone, *African Journal*, II 436. 2.

⁴ For details, see D. G. Lancaster, 'Tentative Chronology of the Ngoni', *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, vol. LXVII, 1937, 77 *et seq.*; Bryant, *Olden Times in Zululand* (London, 1929), 446–58; Bordalo, *Mozambique* (Lisbon, 1859), 129–30; Livingstone, *African Journal*, II, 436. 2, 448. 1. About 1825 the Ngoni of Soshangane, known as Manukuza, entered Mozambique through Tongoland and Lourenço Marques. After 1828, the year of Shaka's assassination, Mzilikazi beat Zougendaba or Zwagendaba who—before moving to what are now Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia—united with Manukuza who had established 'the Gasa Empire' between Inhambane and the Zambesi and massacred the Portuguese garrisons of Lourenço Marques, Inhambane and Sofala. In 1836 Sena was attacked; fifty-four Portuguese and half-castes were slain and the rest driven away. Manukuza died in 1856, but his 'empire' was not destroyed by the Portuguese until 1896.

⁵ H.E.A., I, 208–9.

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themselves as merchants at Damão and Diu. To these latter the Viceroy of India—as if recognition were needed of their ancient role as middlemen—had granted in 1686 the exclusive mercantile traffic between Mozambique and Diu.¹

Their commercial acumen, hard bargaining, excellent memory for figures and sober economical way of living speedily made them the principal merchants, and the Portuguese were ousted from the bulk of the commerce of the colony. The Portuguese called them usurers, liars and Jews of Asia, and complained that they drained Mozambique of its wealth for their own advantage.² Not all the Indians, however, were Banians. Nor did they all call themselves traders. Some were Goanese and Canarins, many of whom were Roman Catholic and, whether half-caste or not, considered themselves as Portuguese subjects. These served as officers and sergeants in the army.³ Unlike the Banians they often made their homes in Mozambique and married African women.

It has been aptly remarked that, until the closing years of the eighteenth century, if 'the ivory of the Yao sustained the economy of Moçambique from one side, the trade of the Indians nourished it from the other'.⁴ Indians in the seventeenth century had fought in defence of Mombasa. They kept trade alive in the deepest part of the 'bush', they discovered and opened up mines, took great risks and performed a great service. But in the eighteenth century resentments and hatreds against them were stimulated by the Holy Office of the Inquisition at Goa. The King in 1720 ordered that Muslims should no longer be allowed to serve as captains, pilots and sailors of boats sent to Mozambique. In the 1740s and 1750s there were restrictions on the right of Indians to hold property and boats, to trade with the Yao and other natives of the interior, even to pass to the mainland except by passport or with a licence from the local commission of the Holy Office. To curtail the trade and carrier facilities of the Banians they were sometimes prohibited from holding slaves. At other times slaves of Banians

¹ Bordalo, *Ensaios . . .*, 19; Botelho, I, 596; A.H.U., Moz., 51, Ant^o J. de Maraes Durão to ? Lisbon, Moz., 22 April 1783, enclosed in D. de Souza to Pinto Souza, Moz., 23, October 1796.

² A.H.U., Moz., I, Representation by merchants and inhabitants against Banians, Moz., 20 June 1834.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 86, José Fr^o de Paula Cav^o de Albuquerque to Barca, Moz., 12 September 1817.

⁴ Alpers, Chapter III.

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had to be registered with the Holy Office and sold within six months. In fact, every type of restriction seems to have been tried, then modified or abandoned.¹

Despite the King's decree of March 1755, which freed the trade of Portuguese East Africa 'to all the inhabitants of Goa, and of the other ports and lands of Asia, subject to my Royal dominion',² the Portuguese continued to pile abuse and restrictions upon Indians. Obsessed with fear and jealousy the Portuguese tried to prevent the Banians from obtaining provisions from the Makua, recalled them from the subordinate ports and for three years from 1780 to 1783 fixed maximum prices for ivory purchased by the Indians from the Yao.³ They were accused of corrupting the Africans, making them 'exceedingly artful in their negotiations' and of using them and the Swahili as agents. They were blamed for cultivating 'the respect' of the Africans by means of large presents to the Makua chiefs, 'so that these chiefs should direct to them not only the produce of their own lands but also the Yao'; for sending out their trading agents half-way along the route only to induce and forestall the Yao from going to the Portuguese; and for generally making the Africans think that not the Portuguese but the Indians were the real masters of the valued shipments of Asian cloth sold in Mozambique.⁴ Yet without the regular supply of beads, 'strange painted cloths' from India, not to mention 'the fashionable wide-sleeved tunics, caps and shoes with new colours, which they (the Banians) especially order to come from Diu',⁵ the African would certainly not have hurried to trade at the Portuguese ports on the East coast.

Portuguese restrictions and bad relations with the Indians caused high prices and, particularly in the eighteenth century, sometimes irregular supplies of cloth for trade. Once European cloth had captured a large share of the African market, Indian cloth became less important, but the credit facilities and other services the Indians provided remained essential to the peoples of East Africa. Nevertheless, to the Portuguese and Swahili they were competitors, and perhaps among the Africans the idea had already taken root that, like the Europeans, they were foreigners and not to be trusted. Although several governors of Mozambique

¹ For details, see Alpers, Chapters II and III.

² Alpers, Chapter III.

⁴ Alpers, Chapter III.

³ Alpers, Chapter IV.

⁵ Alpers, Chapter IV.

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described the Banians 'as the economic mainstay of the colony',¹ the Portuguese generally claimed that the Indians made the formation of a white middle class difficult, and that because of their rootlessness they retarded civilizing influences.² In every century many attempts were made to evict them, but without success.³

While the Mozambique Banians were generally petty traders or artisans, the Arabs were mostly hardy seafarers,⁴ although later many of them journeyed into the interior in search of trade. Among the Arabs there was sometimes detected 'a degree of estrangement if not jealousy' between the earlier traders from the Mrima coast and the apparently more pure-bred newcomers whose arrival they resented.⁵ A contemporary described the Arabs in Tabora as 'a set of avaricious unprincipled men, whose acts of extortion both on natives and poorer Arabs have for some time back been complained of'.⁶

The bulk of the Europeans were transported criminals and political exiles known as *degradados*. Each year a shipload of human flotsam and jetsam arrived from Portugal. Beggars embittered by hardship, thieves, assassins, incorrigible soldiers and sailors, together with a sprinkling of respectable men suffering for their political offences, were dumped in the colony. Sometimes these men were accompanied by their 'wives', girls from orphanages or reformatory schools whom they married at the moment of embarkation from Europe.⁷

These unfortunate people, already degraded in mind and body by imprisonment at home and the rigours of the voyage, merely added to the misery and inefficiency of the colony. They came to Africa to take and not to give.

The unhealthy climate, lack of sanitation, ignorance of the druggist and the surgeon,⁸ drunkenness and dissipation which

¹ Boxer, 'The Colour Question in the Portuguese Empire, 1415-1825', *Proceedings of British Academy*, XLVII/1961, 123.

² James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 81.

³ A.H.U., Moz., I. Representation by merchants and inhabitants against Banians, Moz., 20 June 1834. For complaints against the Indians in the seventeenth century, see Axelson, 1600-1700, 151, 174; 181, 194 and Alpers, Chapters III, IV and V.

⁴ Salt, op. cit. 74.

⁵ H.E.A., I, 270-1.

⁶ N. R. Bennett, *Studies in East African History* (Boston, Mass., 1963), 3.

⁷ A.H.U., Moz., 85, Jose Fr^{ro} de Paula Cav^{al} de Albuquerque to Thomaz Antonio da Ville-Nova, Moz., ? February 1818.

⁸ A.H.U., Moz., 83, M. C. d'Abreu e Menezes to Barca, Moz., 16 December 1816; Moz., I, Jose Gregorio Pegado to Fr^{ro} Sim^{ao} Magiochi, Moz., 24 June 1835.

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had a close connection with ghee, *aqua ardente*, *badwa* or other strong brews and native seraglios, all sapped the vigour of even the most healthy and speedily ended the suffering of those who arrived weakened in health. Cut off from the world and the culture they knew, with scarcely a companion but the tribal Bantu, some, especially in the remote parts, no doubt died insane from loneliness. Others, particularly the political exiles, consolidated and increased an important nucleus of anti-royalist opinion in the colony.

From the beginning of the century, when the ideas emanating from revolutionary France started to filter across the Portuguese frontier, many unfortunate suspects paid for their liberal fervour by transportation to East Africa. French refugees from the United States or Bordeaux were sometimes taken by American ships to the French islands.¹ At Port Louis, a powerful Jacobin club had been formed in 1793. Despite a temporary reaction when the National Convention abolished the slave trade a revolutionary movement continued.² In 1801 the French government banished 132 'wretches who had acted in the most atrocious scenes of the Reign of Terror'.³ They were prevented from landing on the Île de France, but were conveyed to the Seychelles, whence they or their ideas might easily have found their way to Mozambique.

As early as 1800 the Governor of Mozambique received instructions to discover or trace any converts to revolutionary concepts and to prevent subjects of the Portuguese monarchy from being contaminated by them. But as these ideas spread with irresistible force through the metropolis increasing numbers of agitators were thrown into Mozambique. Unlike other immigrants and fellow prisoners these men, even though they often lacked education, had at least the culture acquired in the secret masonic lodges, where they had been initiated into the ideas of popular sovereignty and other principles of the Rights of Man. In this manner, despite the opposition of the Governor, a liberal atmosphere favourable to the growth of ideas then rampant in Europe was created among the military and those people in Portuguese East Africa who were not too rude to be interested in such subjects.⁴

¹ Toussaint, *Early American Trade with Mauritius* (Mauritius, 1954), 9.

² Coupland, *In invaders*, 194.

³ McLeod, *Travels in Eastern Africa* (London, 1860), II, 215.

⁴ Botelho, I, 623-45; A.H.U., Moz., 98, Private Letter, Domingos Lynch to Lacc, Rio, 27 May 1821.

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Republican ideals were also imported from Brazil where they flourished in both Pernambuco and Bahia. To prevent the contamination of Mozambique, a Court Order in 1817 declared the Province of Pernambuco in a state of blockade and forbade all communication from Portuguese East Africa with its inhabitants on penalty of conviction for high treason.¹ But to obtain slaves the order was defied.²

Consequently, each of the revolutions in Portugal and Brazil had an echo in East Africa. The first movement, inspired by the news of the 1820 revolt in Portugal, was directed against the arbitrary and despotic acts of the Governor, who, in consequence, was deposed by the army and replaced by a Provisional Governing Council chosen from the people.³ In the revolts that followed the Governor was a party and sometimes even acted as 'the principal agitator'.⁴

The most serious upheaval and the one of greatest importance was that caused by the desire, when Brazil declared its independence in September 1822, to unite with that country and with Angola to form what was spoken of as a Brazilian Confederation. The idea appears to have originated in Brazil;⁵ it found great favour in Mozambique, principally because East Africa's commercial connections were by that time with Brazil⁶ rather than with Portugal, while the greater part of the military came from that country. The rebels included many slave dealers who were opposed to the efforts of the Crown, under pressure from Britain, to abolish the slave trade. The liberty which these men cherished was not an indigenous growth that sprang out of the experience of white colonists in contact with non-white peoples and did not extend beyond themselves and their group. In 1857 the Imperial government was so intimidated by them that some of the cannon were removed and returned to Portugal 'so as to reduce the strength of the fort and afford a better chance to the Portuguese government to retake the place' if the slave dealers attempted to

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 85, Barca to J. F. de Paula Cav^{ta} de Albuquerque, Rio, 6 March 1817.

² Cf. 223, 226-7.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 98, Brito Sanches to the Provisional Government, Moz., 26 June 1821; Moz., 88, J. Ant^{ao} Ribeiro, Fr^{ao} de Paula, B. M. de Souza e Britto to Arcos, Moz., 7 July 1821; Moz., 93, F. J. Nic^{ao} de J. M. Pegado to Arcos, Moz., 1 August 1820.

⁴ Botelho, I, 629.

⁵ Botelho, I, 631.

⁶ For some Brazilian influences on Africa, cf. Rodrigues, José H., 'The Influence of Africa on Brazil and of Brazil on Africa', *J.A.H.*, III/3, 1962.

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drive out the new Governor.¹ But this did not mean that these men were opposed to miscegenation. More than that; the whole Portuguese colony depended on slave merchants for their livelihood and numerous decrees tried to enforce a policy of racial non-discrimination and to weld a diversity of cultures into one nation² but without success.

Achievement of European status has always been based not on colour or race but on the acquisition of Christian culture. In East Africa, unlike in Portuguese India and Brazil, Portugal practised no active policy of miscegenation, but the lack of Portuguese women made intermixture inevitable. Crown policy is summed up in the following words:

It is to the credit of Portugal that, slaves and Jews apart, she made no distinction of race and colour and that all her subjects, once they had become Catholics, were eligible for official posts.³

To promote the growth of this cultural equality both in Mozambique and in Goa, a Decree of 1761 provided for the re-establishment of the priesthood and the missions which had seriously suffered from the expulsion of the Jesuits. In Mozambique, the House of St. Francis Xavier could be used as a college or study seminar. 'Whites, half-castes' and free 'Negroes' of good character who had been enfranchised and 'instructed in arts and sciences' could qualify as clergy and 'for all honours and dignities'. The need for black clergy who, as in 'Angola, the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe', would be 'better accepted' by their people was particularly stressed.⁴ But two centuries later no 'native priest' had yet been ordained in Mozambique. 'Some Negroes of East African origin were ordained at Goa in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries', but they remained in Portuguese India and it seems that the 'coloured clergy of Mozambique were exclusively Goans and Indo-Portuguese'.⁵

That race prejudice existed throughout Portuguese Asia is shown by the Decree of 2 April 1761, which declared that 'Christians' in Portuguese Asia were 'in every way the equals of

¹ McLeod, I, 290.

² Ant^o Alberto de Andrade, *Many races—One Nation* (Lisbon, 1961), Doc. 1, 27; Doc. 4, 41.

³ E. Prestage, *Portugal, Brazil and Great Britain*, Inaugural lecture delivered at King's College, London, 8 October 1923 (Oxford, 1923), 22, quoted also by Boxer, 'The Colour Question . . .', 113.

⁴ Andrade, Doc. 3, 37-8.

⁵ Boxer, op. cit., 122-3.

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Portuguese' and that anyone who 'despised or makes distinction in his treatment of and civility towards the natives of India' by calling them 'blacks or half-breeds or other similar hateful and contemptuous names' was to be deported to Mozambique for five years.¹

A marriage of cultures is not acquired by paper regulations and obviously the black sheep who practised their prejudices in India were not likely to help towards bridging cultural differences when exiled to Mozambique. There are many telling examples to show that among the Portuguese the 'colour problem assumed different forms at different times'; that their reaction to Muslims and Africans was different from that to Indians, Chinese and Japanese, but that in effect everywhere in India, Eastern Asia, Latin America and in West and East Africa the Portuguese 'despised' these peoples of a foreign culture; that in Goa 'the mulattoes hate the Negroes mortally, even their own mothers, that bore them, and do all they can to equal themselves to whites'.²

It was inevitable that white men in East Africa could not live up to the lofty, social, political and economic ideals implicit in western culture at its highest. Their black and brown neighbours expected more from the whites than they were capable of giving. Both coloured and white found that practice fell far below idealism. Thus already in the seventeenth century a common way for the Portuguese colonists to express a miscarriage of justice was to protest that they were being treated 'just like Kafirs'.³ Each group naturally projected its disappointments and disillusionments on the other. This had probably been true even before the arrival of the Europeans in that pre-colonial Mecca which has so sympathetically and artistically been described.⁴

It is, in fact, unlikely that men in East Africa have ever been very different from men in other parts of the world where practice has so often been the very antithesis of that 'genuine liberal spirit'⁵ whereby a man values liberty not only for himself and his particular group but for all human beings.

Nevertheless, Portugal's policy of assimilation, not without reason, has been associated with the mystique of a civilizing

¹ Andrade, Doc. 2. ² Boxer, op. cit., 121, 114. ³ Axelsson, 1600-1700, 186.

⁴ Basil Davidson, *Black Mother* (London, 1961), 159.

⁵ For a discussion on the 'genuine liberal spirit', see Alfred Hoernle, *South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit* (Johannesburg 1945).

The Portuguese Possessions

mission. Livingstone noted that because of their 'kind deportment to children and inferiors' 'a kindly feeling' 'found nowhere else in Africa' 'is kept between natives and the authorities'.¹ Liberalism has always been the theoretical cornerstone of Portuguese colonial policy. In the words of a Portuguese dignitary, the 'Portuguese have the vice of history'. They 'take refuge in the past' and invoke it 'not as a remembrance of dead things but as a source of inspiration for the future'—this has been taken to mean that the practice of Portuguese colonial policy displays a certain schizophrenia and falls far short of the ideals presumed to motivate it.² Had the idealistic aims codified in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries been implemented, then by the nineteenth century not only the towns along the coast, with their superficial veneer of European culture, but the masses, too, might have been brought within the Portuguese polity. A plural society as in Brazil might have exemplified the concept of Portuguese colonialism—that the sea should not cut off the overseas territories from the mother country but create a dominant Portugal and an extension of the Portuguese way of life.

In practice, in Mozambique the main political concept acquired from Europe was anti-authoritarian except when the assistance of government was desired. Consequently—despite all the efforts of the Government in Lisbon—not their liberalism but, as we shall see, the economics of the Portuguese colonists was to have the most telling effect on the peoples of Africa.

From an invader's point of view Mozambique was the only Portuguese port on this coast capable of any resistance. Mozambique is an island not more than 3 miles in circumference, low-lying, rocky and arid. It was never chosen to be a town, but a fortress. It was intended as a sentinel to guard the entrance to India and was regarded as a well-situated point to act as the emporium for the wealth of Africa. It fulfilled all these requirements. Situated mid-way down the East African seaboard its harbour was one of the best on the whole coast and ships could shelter there during the winter season. It was admirably placed to be an intermediate commercial and refreshment port between

¹ Livingstone, *African Journal*, I, 130; cf. also *Missionary Travels*, 371.

² Louis Kraft, in an unprinted paper entitled *The Portuguese view of their mission in a worldwide Lusitanian community*, quoting Arminio Monteiro, Minister of Colonies in the 1930s.


The Colony and its Defences

Europe and the East. The harbour is formed by the islands of S. Thiago, or Sena, and S. Jorge, or Goa, to the southward of the entrance and that of Mozambique about 3 miles north-west of the others. Ships generally anchored by S. Jorge's Island and waited for a pilot to guide them to the proper anchorage.¹ Originally every approach was strongly defended. On the southward side there was a small fort erected on a rock about 500 yards from that side of the island, but by 1800 it was so much in decay that some shoals formed a much better protection. And, indeed, the principal danger to be feared from an enemy on this side was from troops effecting a landing.² On the western extremity a small deteriorated battery, with gun-carriages broken, marked the remains of the fortress of Santo Antonio.³

The only defence at all useful was on the north-eastern extremity of the island. This 'Grand' fort of S. Sebastian, neglected though it was, might have been made formidable. 'Neither the Dutch nor the French,' wrote an English naval officer in 1812, 'have a fortification equally good, and except for the three presidencies perhaps few of our own. When we consider that it was erected in the infancy of fortification and with resources that could not be of the most extended description, it will be admitted to constitute a splendid and honourable monument of enterprise of the first adventurers.'⁴ He might have added that each squared stone had been cut in Lisbon.⁵ Indeed a remarkable achievement. The entrance to the fort was by a single gate, the approach to which was along the foot of part of the western curtain or bastion wall commanded by guns and every species of missile. The interior was spacious, but there were marks of neglect and decay in almost every part. On the land side, the height of its wall exceeded 50 feet; towards the sea the foundation gradually descending to the water rendered it considerably higher, while every approach by land or sea was perfectly commanded. Though capable of a protracted defence, its miscellaneous armament injudiciously placed, lack of ammunition and the consequences of neglect rendered its situation of less consequence. In 1812 there were about sixty mounted guns and nearly twenty embrasures. The guns were of all calibres, and if not eminent for service were at least reverend from age. Even during the French wars there did

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 49, Ant^{6o} José de Cunha to Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 9 October 1800.

² Prior, 34. ³ Bordalo, *Ensaios . . .*, 189. ⁴ Prior, 37. ⁵ Bordalo, op. cit., 50.



4. TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP OF THE ISLAND OF MOZAMBIQUE WITH PROJECTED PLANS OF ITS FORTS, 1714



5. CAPTAIN W. F. W. OWEN'S CHART OF MOZAMBIQUE ISLAND AND HARBOUR, 1824

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not appear to be any preparation; an Englishman noted 'a few sentries, some confined felons and two or three old women with cakes to sell seemed to constitute the whole garrison'.¹

The town of Mozambique was an agglomeration of badly constructed buildings which had grown up round the fort. Many of the houses were of wood, but the palace of the Governor-General, the customs house, the monastery of St. John of God and other public buildings were spaciously designed and most of them well built of stone. Southward of the main town was a typical collection of wattle huts comprising the native quarter.²

Adjacent to the island on the mainland (*terra firma*) at Mossuril were more houses belonging to the Governor-General and wealthy citizens (*moradores*) who wished to escape from the heat of the island. There were also some estates and one at least was well run and had cattle and pigs. Several villages of Makua and Moors (called *Mujujos*) or Swahili, provided the daily bread.³ But with little effort, sufficient might have been produced on the coast for the inhabitants of Mozambique as well as for calling ships. As it was, however, the primary necessities often had to be bought for ready money from the Swahili and Arabs—subjects of various independent chiefs and of the Imam of Muscat. A fair quantity of provisions was also imported from other parts of the captaincy and from Madagascar.⁴ The only fortress on the mainland to which the inhabitants might flee in time of danger was that of S. Joseph of Mossuril,⁵ defended by a few rusty cannon which to do any service stood greatly in need of the patron saint's assistance.

The military was always hopelessly below strength. Occasionally efficient soldiers of good physique and character had been sent out,⁶ but with the ever-increasing pressure of the French wars Portugal had none to spare. A convention was signed with the King of Sicily whereby Neapolitan convicts were sent to replenish the garrison,⁷ but they proved worthless. Thus, in spite of the hundred or so recruits obtained annually, Bantu

¹ Salt, 24.

² Prior, 33–6; Bordalo, op. cit., 188.

³ In the 1630s it was proposed that the Portuguese should build two forts on Madagascar so that its provisions could make Mozambique independent except for oil, wine, sugar and gunpowder, Axelson, 1600–1700, 101.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Jozé da Boamorte Lobo to the Prince Regent, Moz., 22 October 1807.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Botelho, I, 446.

⁷ A.H.U., Moz., 96, Arcos to João da Costa de Brito Sanches, Rio, 5 August 1820; Borges de Castro and Biker, *Collecção dos Tratados . . .* V, 30, Convention between D. João VI and Ferdinand I, signed at Naples, 11 December 1819.

The Colony and its Defences

(usually slaves) were enlisted in vain attempts to maintain the effective manpower.

The paper strength of the garrison in the Mozambique cap-taincy in 1807 was 223 infantry, 83 artillermen, 110 sepoys and 407 militiamen. One-half of this force was on the island. In addition, 450 regulars from Mozambique garrisoned the outlying forts.¹ But the actual strength of the province could not be measured by the number of soldiers. Desertion, poor discipline and sickness reduced the effective forces to about one-half. By far the majority of these were Africans of the Makua tribe who had been enslaved in early youth. But sepoys from India were preferred to the Bantu because they were said to stand the climate better, to be more amenable to discipline and training and to have more soldierly characteristics. Americans were sometimes employed.²

Such being the state of affairs at Mozambique, the centre of government and the chief port, it is almost superfluous to add that conditions at the other stations—Sofala, Inhambane, Quelimane and Rios de Sena—were as bad or worse. A mud or decayed stone fort without guns or defences, a few wooden huts forming a town, some African, Swahili or Indian traders, and a few black or Creole Portuguese soldiers without discipline constituted the elements of the other settlements. In the Sena Rivers, Mozambique's most important dependency, the boldest villain among the convicts was chosen as a non-commissioned officer to overawe and outwit his comrades.³ The soldiers, condemned to a miserable

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Jozé da Boamorte Lobo to Prince Regent, Moz., 22 October 1807.

² P.R.O. Ad. 1/63, R. 122a, Tomkinson's Report, 7 June 1809, enclosed letter Bertie to Croker, Table Bay, 20 March 1810; A.H.U., Moz., 75, A. Manuel de Mello Castro e Mendoça to Galvás, Moz., 28 December 1810; Moz., 43, enclosure in Fr^o Guedes de Carvalho e Menezes da Costa to Lisbon, Moz., 29 November 1797, list of Europeans and non-Europeans serving in Infantry of Mozambique in 1797:

Classes	Soldiers	
	In Mozambique	In other Captaincies
Europeans	189	234
Americans	3	17
Asiatics	23	32
Africans (white)	4	17
(mulattos (half-caste))	9	18
(blacks)	24	38
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	252	356
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³ McLeod, I, 198-9.

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² Prior, 33–6; Bordalo, op. cit., 188.

³ In the 1630s it was proposed that the Portuguese should build two forts on Madagascar so that its provisions could make Mozambique independent except for oil, wine, sugar and gunpowder, Axelson, 1669–1700, 101.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Jozé da Boamorte Lobo to the Prince Regent, Moz., 22 October 1807.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Botelho, I, 446.

⁷ A.H.U., Moz., 96, Acos to João da Costa de Brito Sanches, Rio, 3 August 1820; Borges de Castro and Bicker, *Colégio dos Tratados...*, V, 50, Convention between D. João VI and Ferdinand I, signed at Naples, 11 December 1819.

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¹ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Jozé da Boamorte Lobo to Prince Regent, Moz., 22 October 1807.

² P.R.O. Ad. 1/63, R. 1222, Tomkinson's Report, 7 June 1809, enclosed letter Bertie to Croker, Table Bay, 20 March 1810; A.H.U., Moz., 75, A. Manuel de Mello Castro e Mendoça to Galvés, Moz., 28 December 1810; Moz., 43, enclosure in Fr^o Guedes de Carvalho e Menezes da Costa to Lisbon, Moz., 29 November 1797, list of Europeans and non-Europeans serving in Infantry of Mozambique in 1797:

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³ McLeod, I, 198-9.

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pittance and to carry a musket for the rest of their lives, often broke out of the fort at night to rob and continue the crimes for which they were condemned in Portugal.

At Inhambane in the 1850s there were about seven hundred persons, including Portuguese, Canerins, Swahili and 'free' blacks. The sixty soldiers for its protection were picked from those who misbehaved at Mozambique and the garrison consisted of the refuse of the convict regiments of Goa, sent to Mozambique for punishment.¹ Communication between the main ports, some hundreds of miles apart,² was limited by sea to an occasional trading vessel and on land to Bantu carriers, and even they were often barred by warfare, hostile tribes, disease, famines, superstitions and crocodile-infested rivers where navigation was impeded by falls, rapids and sandbanks.³

By the nineteenth century the posts of subaltern governors, like those in the church, the customs house, the hospital and treasury were too often given to men whose sole qualification was their ability to read and write.⁴ Many of the officials were Indians.⁵ In 1817 the Governor of Mozambique complained that in the whole captaincy he was unable to find a man capable of being made Governor of Cape Delgado or a priest for that place 'who will not think of anything but his own sordid interests'.⁶

The whole colony was poverty-stricken, demoralized and stagnant. The young had no qualified teachers even to show them how to read and to write.⁷ There was no public money put aside for education, and when private individuals wished to offer instruction at their own expense no one bothered to see that the children

¹ McLeod, I, 198-9.

² Distances between the main ports by sea are as follows:

Delagoa Bay to Inhambane	240 miles
Inhambane to Sofala	250 "
Sofala to Quelimane	200 "
Quelimane to Mozambique	390 "
Mozambique to Ibo	170 "
	<hr/>
	1,250 miles

³ For details of difficult conditions in Africa, see A. M. Costa, *Ultramar Português em África* (Lisbon, 1949), 71.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 93, J. de Costa e Brito Sanches to dos Arcos, Moz., 8 January 1820.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 89, José Fr^{as} de Paula Cav^{as} de Albuq^{as} to Aguiar, Moz., 7 February 1817.

⁶ A.H.U., Moz., 84, Cavalcanti de Albuquerque to Barca, Moz., 16 September 1817.

⁷ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Report by Lobo.

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attended. The Dominican priests, 'who should have taught evangelical morals at least to the Europeans' since they were in charge of the parishes in the captaincy, set so bad an example, 'turning their professions into a mere speculation of commerce, selling the sacraments and not going a single step without interest', that no one would listen to them. The formalities and obstacles imposed on marriages, even on the poor and the iniquitous practice of extorting money by all unfair means 'caused many to live in debauchery and immorality'. Unable to pay the charges, the majority of people never married, although many possessed vast Crown territories and might have established large legitimate families.'

In 1797 the Governor of Mozambique summed up the situation as he saw it: 'I find myself . . . bearing the rigorous effects of the climate, administering the government of a decadent state, with no funds for its maintenance, without income . . . and without sufficient troops for its defence, almost without capable men with sufficient knowledge for legal or financial posts, without any white or Christian people, populated with Caffres, Moors, Gentiles, and suchlike, surrounded with enemies and finally with everything in disorder . . .'² In the words of an Englishman, 'the richest country in the universe by nature has fallen into decay. Its cities in ruins and its inhabitants brutalized.'³ It was not unjustly that young men of the mother country regarded East Africa as a forlorn hope for, as a contemporary remarked, 'twenty years residence there is equivalent to not less than forty in another country'.⁴ Yet the country, though swampy and fever-stricken, was capable of development, and in many parts the climate was enervating rather than deadly. It was remarked in 1812 that there was no specific disease peculiar to the province of Mozambique except ennui. 'Were I to remain here,' wrote an Englishman, 'I should die of it in three months.'⁵

In the middle of the eighteenth century, it is true, Pombal's administration had seemed likely to inaugurate a new era for the Portuguese in Africa. That despot, the most autocratic and one of the most active statesmen Portugal has ever known, attempted to

² A.H.U., Moz., 66, Report by Lobo.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 45, Fr^o Guedes de Carvalho e Meneses da Costa to Lisboa, Moz., 26 November 1797.

⁴ P.R.O., Ad. I/4269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, 6 March 1822.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 47, Bishop of Bengoconha to the Queen, Moz., 3 November 1774.

² *Primer* 22

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resuscitate moribund enterprise and to liberate Portugal and her colonies from dependence on the foreigner.¹

There is much difference of opinion about the merits of Pombal, but, whatever may be said against him, his able administration stands out in an era of decadence and frivolity when 'warlike impulses had been succeeded by courtly effeminacies'. He planned reforms for East Africa which were to be similar to those he had already introduced in Portugal and Brazil.² He was responsible for the famous colour-blind decrees of 1761 and 1763. But in East Africa these reforms did not go beyond projects. It is true that in 1752 the territory under the Governor of Mozambique was separated from Goa and made into an independent state as it had been for a short time in 1569, and several other times through the succeeding centuries.³ Some excellent administrative regulations were also formulated: the Governors were to receive salaries for their services and no longer be allowed to trade for their own profit, while commerce was to be made free to every subject of the Crown. To encourage productive exports and increase trade large commercial companies were to be organized.⁴ Had these as well some less vital improvements which were suggested been carried into effect, the colony of Mozambique might have become a valuable appendage to the Crown. But unfortunately too many of these measures were stillborn. Pombal, fully occupied elsewhere, did not attempt to put these fundamental changes in practice, nor was there money in the home treasury to finance them.

It was no easy task to excite healthy activity in settlers who had for so long languished under an oppressive lethargy. While, therefore, the administrative history of the colony as a separate entity dates from 1752, in practice there was no real change in the internal conditions until long after the fall of Pombal. Letters dated 1776 were copied twenty years later and enclosed in the Governor's dispatches to describe the current state of the colony.⁵

¹ Smith, *Memoirs of the Marquis of Pombal* (London, 1871), I, 85-6 and 112-18. For a brief sketch of Pombal's life, cf. *La Grande Encyclopédie*, XXVII, 177-8.

² Freitas, *Collecção Chronologica*, III, 427-65, 541-82.

³ For administrative changes in Mozambique, see Lobato, *Evolução Administrativa e Económica de Moçambique, 1752-63* (Lisbon, 1957), 23-49, 96-7, 288 *et seq.*

⁴ Freitas, III, 427-65; Smith, *op. cit.*, I, 297-9.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 51, Enclosure II dated 15 August 1776 in letter Diogo de Souza to Luis Pinto de Sousa, 23 October 1796. As late as 1816 the judge at Mozambique pointed out that his judgments had always been approved by Goa, implying sub-serviency to that port, see Moz., 83, Carlos Manuel de Sousa to ?, Rio, 20 May 1816.

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In 1823, when an English ship's captain visited the coast, his report on the Portuguese possessions was the translation of a Portuguese memorandum dated thirteen years earlier.¹ In 1860 either the Portuguese officials found it better to be ill-informed or reticent or there was still so little change that many of these early reports were again translated by British visitors to show the state of the colony.²

The Portuguese neither made anything of East Africa themselves nor opened it up for others. Mozambique remained in a state of inertia and decay. Despite this stagnation, Portugal, since the beginning of the eighteenth century, had lost no territory on the East African coast. This was due to the climate, to British protection and the lack of any serious attempts on the part of other European nations rather than to any particular merit of the Portuguese.

Perhaps the most remarkable point revealed by this tale of woe is that, although Portuguese occupation was essentially maritime and extended, except on the Zambesi, only a few miles from the coast, military force alone was now used in its defence. By 1835 Portuguese ships stopped at Mozambique only 'every other year'.³ Experience was to prove, as it had done in the great imperial age, that an adequately armed warship was sufficient to keep the population in awe⁴ and even the Bantu in subjection, but until the forties Mozambique had not a single ship of war, while the Arabs and Banians were in control of the coastal trade. Hence, although East Africa in 1752 had been made technically independent of Goa, in practice it continued to depend politically, as it did economically, on India.

It was indeed fortunate for the Portuguese that the French at the île de France (Mauritius) feared an English attack and were consequently unable to dispatch a force of any strength against them. A single frigate could have rendered untenable any of their establishments except Mozambique, and the force at Goa was too small to have rendered any assistance. But good fortune alone

¹ P.R.O., Ad. I/2269, Terra's Memoir on Senna, 1810, enclosed in letter Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lynx*, Simon's Bay, 15 April 1823.

² R.H., MS. Afr., s. 53, copies of articles from scientific periodicals.

³ A.H.U., Moz., I, Theod^o José de Abrechus and José Ignacio de Anacade to Secretary of State and Colonies, Moz., 26 February 1835.

⁴ This is emphasized in A.H.U., Moz., II, No. 40, Juntas of Mozambique (3 signatures) to Minister and Secretary for Ultramarine Territories, Moz., 22 October 1836.

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could not have saved Portugal's colony. 'It is a fact not a little extraordinary,' wrote an English captain, 'that both the Imam and the Portuguese have taken advantage of their alliance and friendship with the British nation to obtain dominion, to secure it,' and, he might have added, to retain it. Thus, although Portuguese East Africa had slender military and economic resources and practically no power of resistance, its independent existence, at least during the wars, was maintained by the prompt energy of a few of the local governors, the fidelity of some of the Bantu, Swahili and Indians to the Crown of Portugal, the mutual benefits of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, French preoccupation, ignorance of the country's potentialities, fear of the deadly climate and in later years the firm ability of diplomatists like King Peter V and de Sá da Bandiera.

[2]

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(a) *Traders all*

By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Portuguese forts had ceased to have any military value. They were retained solely for purposes of revenue and trade. Despite this, the number of Europeans in Mozambique who called themselves merchants was trifling, and most of these were not Portuguese but Frenchmen, and, after 1807, Spanish or Italian slave dealers.¹ By the 1850s there were thirty or forty Banian traders from Cutch, Goa and Bombay, a few Arabs and one German merchant.²

Yet all the Portuguese, men and women, whether they lived in the so-called towns, on the Crown estates or on the gold diggings, made their living from trade. This did not interfere with their duties as soldiers, government officials, estate holders or housewives, for the trade was in slaves, and slave trading demanded no work on the part of the principal contractors; they kept no records of commercial transactions, nor did they need to risk any personal funds. By participating in the trade the slave-owner could spend his days sleeping, smoking and tea-drinking. If he came out at all it was after sunset, on a palanquin borne by four miserable slaves.³ Hence in a tropical climate, where love of work

¹ A.H.U., Moz., V, No. 113, Marinho to Bomfim, 6 April 1841.

² McLeod, I, 296.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Report, Boamorte Lobo to Prince Regent, Moz., 22 October 1867; Bendala, *Emaser* . . . , 33, Gaminetto, 1/12.

Economic Conditions

is not a strong human quality, all the inhabitants were drawn into this trade. From Portuguese officials to their women, from enterprising Indian trader and cunning Arab or Swahili to the important Bantu chief, all had some share in its ample rewards.

If the profits from the slave trade were so great that everyone was a slave trader why was this not reflected in the revenue of the colony? The answer is to be found in the economic organization of the province. The revenue of Mozambique consisted of customs on trade and rents from estates and mines or '*bars*'. None of the subordinate ports had customs houses so that all articles imported were required to go first to Mozambique, where duties were paid.¹ All exports, too, except those to Brazil after 1811,² were to be taken first to Mozambique where, unless they were destined for some other part of the province, they were subject to export duties. This measure was designed to make Mozambique the emporium of East African trade and was much cherished at the capital and resented by the subordinate ports. By it the life of the officials at the capital was both simplified and complicated. Simplified because they were given virtually free rein to charge whatever duties they wished or to demand a share in the imported goods or profits from their sales. The complications arose mainly from two sources: the jealousy of officials in other stations who did not co-operate with those in the capital and their dependence upon Asian middlemen. This situation was aggravated by a lack of boats which made it virtually impossible to patrol the coast and, after 1807, by the anti-slave-trade measures of the British Navy which made it increasingly difficult to convey goods in Portuguese vessels to special friends or accomplices in the subordinate ports.

Until 1801, rates of duty on imports were frequently changed to encourage trade or to provide revenue. Thereafter, until 1846, goods at Mozambique were supposed to be charged 10 per cent and a further re-export duty of 30 per cent. Practice, however, seems to have varied to suit the Governor-General. In 1821 the Governor of Quelimane complained that Mozambique demanded 25 per cent.³ By 1842, goods imported from Damão and Diu were

¹ A.H.U., Moz., VI, No. 59, R. L. d'Abreu de Lima to the Secretary of State for Marine and Colonial Affairs, Moz., 12 December 1843.

² A royal *alvará* of 4 February 1811 opened the subordinate ports of Mozambique to direct trading by Brazilian vessels; cf. Alpers, Chapter VI.

³ Ajuda, 32/x/2; José Fr^r Alves Barbosa, *Análise estatística . . . da Capitania de Rio de Senna*, 1821.

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charged 10½ per cent at Mozambique, and a further duty of 3½ per cent when transhipped to other ports of the province. Yet the colony was always bankrupt.¹

The Portuguese were no more avaricious than other men, although the English generally seemed to think they were. Indeed, a new Governor of Mozambique once prayed that he might not be afflicted by that malady—the thirst for gain—which seized all men east of the Cape of Good Hope.² The explanation for this affliction lay chiefly in the small pay received. Salaries were partly in cloth or food. An ensign received less than 10s. a month, a bushel of rice, another of flour, two flagons of coconut or fish oil, some firewood.³ Payment was usually at least seven months in arrears⁴ and sometimes even two years or more;⁵ soldiers of equal rank received varying salaries.⁶

Outside the larger towns, beads, shells and trinkets were the usual currency, and later in the century English and American unbleached cloth was frequently used. Even in the 1830s there were no shops. Food was obtained from the Bantu or Arabs generally in exchange for cloth or beads. The best cloths were retained by the officials in Mozambique for their private trade. Hence ‘treasury’ cloths, handed out in lieu of salary, though nominally of the same value as those of the merchants, differed in quality. In addition, these lost half their value by being cut into small pieces. Distribution was in small lots, and measurement was in *panos* which varied in each area; a *pano* of cloth depended upon the length of the man’s arm who was measuring it. Beads came in packets at the rate of one packet for ten *panos*. In Quelimane each *pano* was the equivalent of forty strings, in Sena thirty, and in Tete twenty. Different tribes preferred different colours. Consequently, various colours could change value by

¹ A.H.U., Moz., VI, No. 55, da Costa Xavier to Secretary of State and Colonies, Moz., 12 January 1842.

² A.H.U., Moz., 89, José Fr^{co} de Paula Cav^{al} de Albuq^{ue} to Thomaz Ant^{ónio} da Villa-Nova, Moz., 20 September 1818.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 73, A. M. de Mello Castro e Mendoca to Galveas, Moz., 28 December 1810.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 93, Petition from soldiers of Sofala to Cavalcanti d’Albuquerque, 14 April 1818, enclosed in Britto Sanches to dos Arcos, Moz., 9 January 1820.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., I, Izidro Manoel de Carrezedo to Fr^{co} Simoes Magiochi, Moz., 17 October 1834; Livingstone, *Travels and Researches*, 617.

⁶ A.H.U., Moz., VI, Private R. L. d’Avreu de Lima to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moz., 1 March 1844.

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being taken from one place to another.¹ A *peso* of food varied according to the size of the bucket, the mood of the seller and the education or astuteness of the buyer.² The coinage value of a *peso* was complicated by the monetary system, or rather lack of system.

Until 1852 there was no uniformity in currency regulations. The value of money was not only different in each province of Mozambique but bore no relation to that in Portugal,³ and the rate of exchange between the Portuguese and colonial currencies was subject to frequent alteration. Colonial currencies were heavily discounted in Portugal, and consequently came to be known as 'weak' money, as compared to the 'strong' money, or *dinheiro forte*, of the mother country.⁴ Salaries earned by officials in the colony were stated in terms of Portuguese money, but were actually paid in colonial coin. Thus, in 1798, the Governor nominally earned a salary of 12,000 crusados (about £1,200), but the money he actually received would have been worth less than 4,000 crusados in Portugal; for, in addition to a loss of 50 per cent on exchange, there were further heavy charges imposed for the negotiation of the money orders by means of which payments were generally made.⁵

In the very first years of the French war when the coasting trade suffered considerably from the depredations of French cruisers, Mozambique had to resort to inflation, and the Governor complained that his salary was worth no more than £200 a year.⁶ After 1809 when the seat of the monarchy had been moved to Rio de Janeiro and the Prince Regent, D. João VI, desired to people his estates with many slaves in exchange for little money, he sent for their purchase a large sum of copper coins to Mozambique which he decreed were to circulate at double their nominal value. A coin containing an ounce of copper in this way attained

¹ Ganimotto, 2/197-8, 1/26-8; Lacerda notes 'when cloth for the Treasury is bought at auction from the lowest bidder, the sellers send in superior samples and make the bad pay for the overgood'; cf. R. F. Burton, *The Lands of Cazembe, Lacerda's journey to Cazembe in 1798* (London, 1873), 36.

² Ajuda, 52/x/2¹, Barboza, *Analyse statistica*; Eça, I, 318.

³ A.H.U., Moz., I, Gregorio Pegado to F. Magiochi, Moz., 18 February 1835.

⁴ For description of currency in Portugal and colonies, cf. Aragão, *Descrição geral Histórica das Moedas . . .* (Lisbon, 1880), III, 413.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 47, Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 10 November 1798.

⁶ A.H.U., Moz., 45, Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 10 December 1797.

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a value equal to twelve times its intrinsic worth.¹ The detrimental effects of this measure in Mozambique never appear to have been considered nor, it seems, were they any concern of the Royal government. There were other causes of inflation and of the debased currency.

Silver coins known as *patacas* and a few gold coins were also made in Goa for Mozambique, where there was no mint.² This money was of a varying quality, for it seems that anyone who desired could order money to be stamped. The usual procedure was to arrange with the director of some factory to mix alloy of lead or copper with the coins,³ thus any desired quantity of money could be obtained. Goods imported from East Africa were frequently paid for in this inferior coinage and sold in Bombay. Hence Mozambique acquired a great deal of debased and practically worthless coinage which, for want of any better, continued to circulate in the colony at a reduced rate. Goanese merchants, on the other hand, were generally financed from Portugal and obtained good English money for the goods which they bought with bad Portuguese coin.⁴

From Portugal's point of view this method of paying the salaries of officials in the colonies was a useful form of economy at a time when the country's finances had already started down the slippery slope towards bankruptcy.⁵ To the Governor and many of the officials, the consequences were well nigh disastrous for they had to live as befitted representatives of a western power in the East. The Governor's appointment was only for three years, at the end of which period, unless he was extremely fortunate and appointed to Madeira, he would have to return to Brazil or to Portugal a poor man. In the words of one of the Governors:

The people of Asia and Africa only show the respect they should to the government officials by their appearance and mode of living. If the Governor-General does not live in a sumptuous manner he cannot offer his table to his officers or to foreigners or even receive them in his house. How then can he know of their movements which is so necessary for the good fulfilment of his post and good administration of his government. How can he inspire in them

¹ A.H.U., Moz., IV, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 16 October 1840.

² A.H.U., Moz., 87, Undated, no names of receiver or sender (probably about 1818).

³ A.H.U., Moz., IV, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 16 October 1840.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Almeida, *História de Portugal* (Coimbra, 1928), II, 17.

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sentiments which he may deem necessary and civilize them, or instill in them that spirit of luxury so necessary to create the ambition of wealth and consequently the efforts to attain it, not only by means of commerce, but also by agriculture, especially since many of the people who are today in these positions perhaps may have arrived in this country without the slightest principles of education. Indeed, some who have attained the rank of officers, if they were not compelled to sit at the table of the General, would not know how to dress or eat as etiquette demands. All these methods (tactics) are adopted by the Government of England in their establishments in the East Indies, and that Government gives to their Governors and even to their military officers higher salaries than any other nation; consequently their establishments develop out of all proportion to ours.¹

Because of the small salaries received, the Governors resorted to trade and became the chief merchants in the colony. To some this brought wealth and power; for others ambition ended in war and disaster. The experience of Dr. Antonio Norberto de Barboza de Villas Boas Truão may be described by way of example. A man of education and some importance, he determined, upon his arrival as Governor of Tete in February 1804, to establish morality and social discipline. But his criticism of the Crown estates, the Dominicans, the inefficient administration and the lack of education, industry, commerce and security² merely aroused the hostility of the immoral inhabitants who saw in him an obstacle to their ambitions and vices.³ He was, in fact, the instigator of the war of Chicova in 1807 which first earned notoriety for the da Cruz family, who were to become bitter slave-trading rivals to the Pereiras, mentioned later in this chapter.

To dispose of the goods (*fazendas de lei*) he received as salary, in the interior he frequently employed a soldier of Tete and a criminal under life sentence who spoke the Maravi language and was said to understand the African tribes. On this particular occasion the agent's return was well overdue. Truão, whose period of office was drawing to a close was trying to build up a fortune in Brazil for his retirement. He was particularly disturbed

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 47, Menezes da Costa to Souza Coutinho, Moz., 10 November 1798.

² Ant^ºº Norberto de Barboza de Villas Boas Truão: *Estatística da capitania das Rias de Seme no anno de 1806*, quoted by Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), 63.

³ Eça, I, 86.

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when he found that his agent had sold his cargo and, despite many messages, continued to live in Maravia, the land of the sub-chief Chirnutanga about 45 leagues from Tete. Against the wish of the citizen council, the *adjunto de moradores*, who feared reprisals and the blocking of the caravan route, the Governor, who knew neither the interior nor the Maravi language and was not supposed to use the state coffers except in a defensive war, rashly decided personally to head an expedition to retrieve his fortune.

At the expense of the state, he managed after two months to round up a contingent of some 150 Europeans, Indians and Brazilians, with their numerous slaves. Before crossing the Zambesi, the interpreter, Antonio José da Cruz, of Indian or Zambesian and Siamese origin, betrayed the Governor and brought the expedition into a clash with the Monomotapa Chaufombo, or Chofoombo, whom he persuaded to slay all the Europeans except himself and his brother. After a strict inquiry the Monomotapa was exonerated and Antonio spent five and a half years in a Mozambique prison and was then executed for treason. Afterwards the Canarins and Spaniards were said to have wanted Truão's fortune and were blamed for the Governor's rash action.¹

As the demand for slaves rose and despite the pitfalls in this spoils system, officials jealously resented any others taking part in the trade, and vied with each other in an attempt to attract the greatest number of slave dealers to their particular port. While that trade flourished, the amount of pay a soldier or public official received was a matter of trifling importance. In proof of this the Governor in 1810 pointed out that one of his subordinates who received a salary only a quarter of the amount of his own was much wealthier than himself.² The Governor, Antonio de Mello Castro e Mendoça, 'a personage of no less consequence than the length of his name would imply', had himself not done badly. In that year when the slave trade was comparatively dead, it was said he had realized a fortune of £80,000.³ But while, from the officials' point of view, the slave trade was much the most lucrative, the state gains bore no proportionate relation to the total profits.

¹ For details of the war of Chicova, cf. Eça, I, 100-3, Doc., 11-18.

² A.H.U., Moz., 47, Menezes da Costa to Souza Coutinho, Moz., 10 November 1798.

³ Prior, 38.

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The selling of slaves to foreigners was forbidden, and this is exactly what made it so profitable to the officials. Before the slaves could be shipped it was necessary to ensure that either the Governor, the vicar, the curate, the commander of the troops, the judge or some other official had sufficient interest in the transaction to look the other way.¹ In addition, it was profitable simply not to enter the transaction in the customs book.² This largely explains the recurring budget deficit and why, even at the height of East Africa's importance as a source of slaves, the governors still complained of the lack of funds and the deplorable state of the finances. Clearly, therefore, corruption and an empty treasury were not causes but effects of the spoils system. Conditions on the estates—which should have been Mozambique's other main source of revenue—did nothing to improve the colony's finances.

By far the greatest number of mines and estates from which the government should have received rents were in the badly defined Zambesi area known as the Rivers of Sena. Except that most of these estates were in a more wretched state of disrepair than those on the mainland opposite Mozambique and in other parts of the colony, a description in 1809 by Henry Salt of trade on the Mozambique estates is representative also of those along the Zambesi:

We walked to the house of one of the planters about a mile distant in the village of Mesuril for the purpose of seeing some native traders from the interior of a nation called Monjou (Yao) who had come down with a *cafila* of slaves (chiefly female) together with gold and elephants' teeth for sale. I was informed they had been upwards of two months on their journey.³ A kind of fair . . . was held in the neighbourhood for the purpose of bartering with traders lately arrived.⁴

This Yao fair (*feira dos Mujaos*) had been especially encouraged in the 1780s by the Portuguese governor, Balthazer Pereira do Lago, to induce the Yao and the Makua to bring goods particularly ivory to the mainland opposite the capital.⁵ But, Salt remarked:

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 43, extract from letter Martinho de Mello e Castro to (?) Moz., 19 April 1795.

² P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Terro's Memoir on Sena, 10 July 1810 and Note by Owen, enclosed in Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lemn*, Simon's Bay, 15 April 1823; A.H.U., Moz., 66, Fr^o de Paula d'Albuq^r do Am^o Card^o to Anadia, Moz., 8 November 1806.

³ Salt, op. cit., 32-3.

⁴ Salt, op. cit., 33.

⁵ Alpers, Chapter III.

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The slave trade has rendered planters vicious, indolent and careless of improving their property . . . The proprietors might now have possessed indigo, cotton and sugar for sale instead of being surrounded by wretched assemblages of slave huts, woods of cocoa-nut trees and unprofitable plantations of manioc.¹

The estates in the Rivers of Sena are of particular concern to this study since they proved to be a running sore sapping the strength of the whole colony. This lotus land along the broad turgid waters of the Zambesi River extended some 450 miles from the mouth to beyond Zumbo and in later years was given its more appropriate title of Zambesia.

The Rivers of Sena was divided into three great districts of Quelimane, Sena and Tete.² But, as in the seventeenth century, the richest areas south of the river were under independent kings who had either broken away or were still under the Monomotapa. The most important of these were in the land of the Quiteve peoples, and also to the south-west in the great kingdom of Batua.³ From the earliest times some of these or their sub-chiefs were often hostile and blockaded or demolished a Portuguese outpost and murdered its inhabitants. To make things worse for Crown revenues Portuguese officials had always engaged in illicit trade,⁴ so that even in the sixteenth century the revenues of the state were in large part provided by Indian traders, and at least one viceroy at Goa wondered if there was a *fidalgo* (nobleman) of the East sufficiently honest to be entrusted with the royal treasury.⁵ These general characteristics persisted into the nineteenth century except that, as we shall see elsewhere, the ivory trade had been superseded by that in slaves.⁶ In the territories of the independent chieftains Portugal still held various dependencies known as fairs and mines (*bars*) from time to time reoccupied by the natives. Zumbo, Manica and Mano marked the farthest points of Portuguese advance inland.

¹ Salt, op. cit., 74.

² For full description, see Gamitto, 2/185-7; Botelho, 613-15; Livingstone, *Travels and Researches* (London, 1905), 615-16; R.H. MS. Afr., s. 55, Thornton Collection, 27, copies of articles from scientific periodicals.

³ Posseitt, 5. The kingdom of Batua adjoined that of the Monomatapa. For details about chiefs and limits of Portuguese territory in the hinterland of Sofala, see Lobato, *A Expansão . . .*, III, 239-45; R.H. MS. Afr., s. 27, Thornton, *Letters*, 1853-63, Boletim 3, 4 February 1860.

⁴ Axelson, *South-East Africa*, 159, 163-4; Lobato, op. cit., 393-7.

⁵ Axelson, 1650-720, 98.

⁶ cf. 87-103.

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Some of these *bars*, or gold diggings, were owned by individual Portuguese who, by giving presents to the local rulers, had obtained ascendancy. As in the capital, the *bars* and the estate owners kept a supply of Indian goods nominally to sell to their slaves. But prices were so exorbitant that slaves preferred to buy from passing merchants.¹ Ivory, gold, a little iron, copper, elephant tusks, honey, raw cotton, skins and cattle were exchanged by African traders for arms, gunpowder, cloth and beads brought by the Swahili, the Arabs, the Banians and slave merchants from Sena and Quelimane.

In 1821 the Governor of Sena complained that because of the lack of armed forces the Portuguese had been thrown out of the fair at Batua. At Manica and elsewhere, he said, the native chiefs mined only enough gold and other minerals to buy from the whites what they needed.² When their ire was roused hostile chiefs and their people, like the highwaymen of Europe, robbed caravans and killed merchants,³ and made continual incursions into Sena and Tete, demanding clothes and threatening their existence. Hence the habit, wrote a Governor, 'of giving tribute of one part of the trading goods in order not to lose the whole . . .'.⁴ The sufferings of traders at Zumbo are notorious. Throughout the nineteenth century they were frequently overwhelmed. Despite the bravery of the Portuguese, who on one occasion held out for four years against siege and starvation, by the 1850s Zumbo consisted mainly of the ruins of some two hundred stone houses. Boats generally stayed only to sort goods and dispatch trading parties in various directions.⁵

The districts of Quelimane, Sena and Tete were subdivided into lands which—as in other parts of the colony—differed in size from a few thousand acres to a respectable kingdom. On these estates all of which were known as *prazos da Coroa*, wealth lived side by side with disease, vice and bankruptcy.⁶

¹ Ganimto, 1/58; Livingstone, *Narrative* (London, 1865), 20.

² Ajuda, 52/x/2¹, Barboza, *Analyse statistica*.

³ For details, cf. Lobato, *Evolução Administrativa . . .* op. cit., 42–9.

⁴ Eça, *História das Guerras no Zambeze* (Lisbon, 1934), I, Documento, No. 4, 404–5.

⁵ R.H. MS., Afr., s. 53, Thornton Collection, 18b.

⁶ Ganimto, 2/18; R.H. MS. Afr., s. 53, Thornton Collection, Copies of articles from Scientific Periodicals, *passim*; MS. Afr., 47, Journal, I, 53. For description of estates in Brazil, see Dias, *História da Colonização Portuguesa do Brasil* (Porto, 1921), III, 178 *et seq.* In Brazil duration of gifts varied, some for one or two lives, while some were hereditary. The powers of the *prazo-holders* also varied; they could rent out some of their land but not dispose of it without Royal sanction.

Crown estates, like the captaincies, were originally granted by the Crown as rewards for services rendered. Some, however, were acquired by Portuguese adventurers by force or purchase direct from the chiefs.¹ In the earlier centuries *prazos* had been granted to daughters of Portuguese officials who, having served in Africa, married Portuguese women of European origin. Succession was through females for three generations² on condition that the holder married a Portuguese of European birth and resided on her estate; no one was allowed to accumulate more than one estate, and while the owner had the right to nominate the immediate successor, males were excluded if females were available. But these customs lapsed when, in the absence of eligible husbands, women of mixed blood were allowed to hold *prazos*; and subaltern governors with permission from Mozambique, redistributed the estates to the highest bidder without reference to sex. This was usually done by auction. Many estates were accumulated by the same person who lived sometimes in Goa, in Mozambique or in Brazil. The absentee landowners never visited their estates, 'but simply collected fat revenues'.

The holder of a Crown *prazo* paid a quit-rent in kind of one-tenth the yearly income.³ Until 1843, no *prazo* could be sold or partitioned without consent from Lisbon.⁴ By the time this permission was received, the buyer had often died or moved away. The state was thus deprived of the duties from the sale of land, while some families remained without subsistence and others possessed all.⁵ The impositions on all estates were levied without rule or regularity by the factors of the Royal treasury in the three towns. They sequestered goods of debtors, arbitrated on fines to be paid and delimited all boundaries. The twenty-seven Crown *prazos* near Sena yielded more than double the revenue of the forty-eight near Tete.⁶ But in the absence of an effective official-

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Report by Lobo.

² A.H.U., Moz., 45, Copy of application by Ag^o da Costa for the lands possessed by his deceased wife—extracted from the Book of Registration, Tete, 4 June 1794.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 45, op. cit.; Thornton, op. cit., states that the quit-rent was usually paid in the form of slaves, food, cloth, game and/or elephant tusks. Whenever an elephant was killed the tusk that fell into the ground—which was usually the heaviest—was considered the property of the *prazo*-holder or his tenant; the other one, that of the hunters, which was sold to the master at a fixed price paid according to the weight in cotton stuffs, beads, spirits, muskets or powder.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 63/568, No. 242, Report of the proceedings of the Cortes enclosed in a de Walden to Clarendon, 30 November 1843.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Report by Lobo.

⁶ Ajuda, 52/x/2³, Barboza, *Analyse Statistica*.

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dom along the Zambesi the benefits received by the Crown were negligible.

Theoretically the *prazo*-holders (*prazeros*) were responsible for the development of the land and the protection of its inhabitants and they knew that they were expected, like the chiefs, to help police Crown lands and to repel invaders. In practice, life on an estate differed little from that on a *bar* and in the so-called towns. Every estate had 400 or 500, even 1,000 slaves; every house in the towns had 15 to 30. Many owners lived in pomp and sensuality, surrounded by young native concubines and virtually independent of the Portuguese authorities; they had a passion for gambling and, as with their Arab counterparts farther north, their blood mingled extensively with native women. As their land was held for three generations only with an ever-present risk of forfeiture or fine they usually had little interest in the territory. Even if they had, the task of administration and cultivation on the vast areas was beyond the power of individuals.¹

To make a profit they let their lands to tenants, mostly exiles and convicts, who showed even less interest in developing the resources of the soil. This was left to the free Negroes (*colonis*) who lived in small native villages, as they do today in the unindustrialized regions of Africa, ruled by a chief who paid an arbitrary tribute in kind to the *prazo*-holders. There might be ten or fifteen thousand such *colonis* on a large estate, but the numbers were never stable owing to the slave trade and the nomadic habits of the people.² Their methods of cultivation were primitive and wasteful and if the tax could be paid without cultivation this was done. The tenant, having but a life interest was intent only on extorting heavy taxes, fines and forfeitures from the *colonis*.³ To the development of agriculture and the improvement of the land he was quite indifferent.⁴ He even denuded the land of its vital labour by selling the *colonis* as slaves, whereupon the remainder often fled to escape a like fate. Rice and maize were the principal crops grown by the *colonis*, and coarse cotton cloth was

¹ Gamitto, 1/112, 113, 36, 54; A.H.U., Moz., 66, Report by Lobo; P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Terrião's Memoir on Sena, enclosed in letter Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Simon's Bay, 15 April 1823.

² A.H.U., Moz., 66, Report by Lobo.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 49, P.A. José da Cunha to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 9 October 1800.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Lobo, op. cit.; see also Moz., 85, d'Abreu Meneses to Governor of Sena, Moz., 29 April 1817.

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woven; coffee, cotton, tobacco, manioc and indigo could have been produced in large quantities, but hardly sufficient was grown to meet the requirements of the Europeans; the tenants despised the cultivation of 'Kaffir' crops and confined their attention mainly to raising wheat and sugar.¹

Despite this ruinous state of agriculture the Europeans were able in good years to buy plenty of provisions from the *mujigos*, or Swahili and Arabs, from the Banian gardens, from the *colonis* or from the surrounding independent chiefs. The Maravi, for example, grew wheat especially for the whites.² Prices were ridiculously low, and a certain amount of wheat and other supplies were even sent to Mozambique port and to the Île de Franc. But when a drought occurred or the Swahili were prevented³ bringing in their supplies or the chiefs were hostile, Europeans, like their Bantu neighbours, were reduced to the verge of starvation.⁴ And this was the most self-sufficient district in Mozambique colony! No wonder that many a far-seeing governor in the Sena Rivers noted that these estates were incompatible with trade and agriculture and 'entirely opposed to civil liberty, to individual security and to the property rights of the Negroes'.⁵

The effect of this lack of system in land tenure and trade was that between the delta of the Zambesi and Zumbo complete anarchy reigned and the law of the strongest prevailed. The Portuguese authorities were recognized but not obeyed. More than that: like the great Arab plantation owners of the Upper Congo, around Kassongo and Nyangwe, the *prazeros* developed an imperialist character.

Their tributary retainers—mostly Bantu—were taught to use fire-arms, so that the power and authority which the *prazeros* wielded over tribal societies was very different from that of the chiefs whose land and villages they usurped and who often feared and appeased them with presents. Nevertheless, they could often maintain their position against marauding chiefs only by alliance with Bantu leaders.⁶

As early as the seventeenth century they waged wars and imposed tribute and the Monomotapa complained about the

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Lobo, op. cit. In 1798 Lacerda noted that most of the sugar consumed in Mozambique came from Rio de Janeiro and Batavia, cf. Burton, 62.

² Ajuda, 52/x/2¹, Barboza, *Analyse Statistica*.

³ Ajuda, 52/x/2¹, Barboza, op. cit.; Livingstone, *Travels and Researches*, 615-16.

⁴ Gashito, 2/187.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Report by Lobo.

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detrabilization and harm they caused 'killing natives, wounding others, stealing their sons and their daughters and the cows of their herds so that each day I have complaints in this my Zimbabwe'. At that time, in order not to excite the rapacity and cupidity of the Portuguese, many natives moved away from the gold-producing areas and the chief of the Quiteve went so far as to kill anyone suspected of revealing a gold mine. The viceroy reporting these events to Lisbon said '... those who possess many kaffirs and have power are guilty of such excesses that the Kings and Princes offended break out in disorders. Everybody in the Rivers wants to govern.'¹ In the later nineteenth century disorder was accentuated by the arrival of caravans of Arab merchants from Zanzibar in search of slaves and ivory.² Thus with the coming of the European and the return of the Arab, 'the more or less static iron age culture of the interior and the political patterns associated with it'³ were invaded by the sale of gunpowder and fire-arms. What is more, the need to seek trade forced some of the 'white mulatto' traders (generally Goans and Mozambique half-castes)—acclimatized and trained to travel—who were called *sertanejos*⁴ and were generally also *prazo*-holders and gold-diggers to go into the interior and to ally themselves with native chiefs or to take over their functions. Africa's contact with Europe, in some measure therefore, made the Portuguese and Asians responsible for the beginnings of a social and technological revolution which was to weaken the traditions of the native and to help to detach him from the land.⁵

Portugal abolished the *prazo* system in 1832. Significant changes to promote expansion and settlement along the Zambezi were decreed in 1838, 1841 and again in 1854. But these laws were still-born and proved no more effective than the abolition of the slave trade or the attempt to force the Dominicans to cultivate their lands and 'to conduct themselves like servants of the Lord'.⁶ Only sovereign force could have deposed these 'war lords',

¹ Axelson, 1600–1700, 125, 184.

² Carlos Wiese, 'Expedição Portugueza a Mpesene (1889)', article in *Boletim da Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa*, Serie 10A, Nos. 6 and 7, Lisbon, 1891.

³ Alison Smith, unpublished paper, *The Significance of the East African Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century*.

⁴ Burton, 25.

⁵ The wars which the *prazeros* waged in the mid-nineteenth century are described in some detail in Chapter Seven.

⁶ Duffy, 85.

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fixed the Bantu population to the land and perhaps enabled the Crown to obtain some benefit from the estates.

The characteristics of the *prazo-holders* were developed in defence of trade. For, essentially, every Portuguese and mulatto colonist, whether an estate holder, a gold-digger or an official, was a trader. Livingstone points out that to bring slaves demanded ingenuity and energy. Why therefore did the Portuguese officials and housewives not need to have a direct part in the task of collecting slaves?

Among his many slaves an owner employed one or more as agent or merchant (*patamar* or *musambashe*). Swahili, *degradados* and at least on one occasion a Dominican were also thus employed, particularly in later years when slave trading made it necessary to work in collaboration with *prazero* bandit 'war-lords'. But generally the slave merchants who went into 'the forest' were Bisa or other African middlemen.

A slave employed as a *Musambashe* or merchant and who goes to the interior to buy gold, ivory and other slaves, usually had as his first care the purchase of slaves for himself. This he did with goods his master gave him, or with what he steals. A good *Musambashe* collected a large retinue of slaves, as well as women who also were mostly his slaves.¹

To finance this trade the owner of a *musambashe*, or his wife, needed only to take on credit from the Banians the sort of imports that were likely to find a ready market in a particular part of the interior. If, as frequently happened, the hawkers traded on their own account, were plundered, returned with no ivory or slaves or not at all, then the Portuguese failed to pay the Banians. To default with a Banian was regarded as a means of getting even with the crafty Asians; a just recompense for the high prices they charged. The Indians had no redress and in any event were not paid for their goods given out on credit until the gold, ivory and other African exports brought back by the *musambashe* had been sold.²

The law demanded that this be done at Mozambique. Therefore, if the owner of a *musambashe* lived in the Sena Rivers or in

¹ Gammie, 1/112.

² A.H.U., Moz., IV, Report by Marinho, Palácio de S. Paulo, Moz., 24 September 1840.

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a subordinate port it was necessary to put these exports on a boat going to Mozambique. The colonists, scattered along a coastline of 1,250 miles with the ocean and the Zambesi River as their main means of communication, found that sending goods to market and obtaining Asian and foreign necessities in exchange was no easy task. The journey from Mozambique to Zumbo took a month. At Quelimane, situated at one of the mouths of the Zambesi there was a dépôt for merchandise and a small Portuguese garrison. Here vessels transferred their cargoes to pinnaces and boats called *pangaios*. Passage for larger ships was only possible during the new or full moon. Even if the moon and the wind were favourable, the left arm of the Zambesi was navigable only for six months during the winter floods.¹ The need to open a canal which would have kept the Zambesi navigable for 120 leagues from Tete to Quelimane had been under discussion for centuries. As an alternative the Luabo mouth of the Zambesi, known as the Lindy Bar, was often used.


Exports were taken by lightcraft and part of the way by African carriers to Quelimane or the Luabo. There they would await the small vessels that each year left Mozambique in February or March carrying foreign necessities to the subordinate ports and returning in June or July with ivory, gold dust, grain and other provisions, but above all slaves.² Once in Mozambique the goods would await the buyers, the slaves being herded with little or no comfort in their owners' yards or gardens and huts.³ The difficulties in the way of commerce were accentuated by risk of piracy, privateers and shipwreck and, after 1807, by the intervention of the British Navy.

Asian traders from overseas on reaching Mozambique for the auction sale would expect to find awaiting their arrival payment (in the form of slaves, ivory and other African exports) for goods they had given out on credit the previous year. If a Banian *dhow* had to wait at Mozambique for the coastal traders to arrive—and there was always the danger that they might be late or not come at all—it might miss the South-West monsoon and the September sale of the English East India Company at Bombay. For a Banian to miss the return wind would mean defaulting upon

¹ *Ajuda*, 52/x/2², Barboza, *Analys statistica*.

² A.H.U., Moz., 66, Report by Lobo; Livingstone, *Travels and Researches*, 389.

³ A.H.U., Moz., IV, Report by Marinho, Palacio de S. Paulo, Moz., 24 September 1840; Moz., 49 Pedro Ant^o José da Canha to R. de Sousa Coutinho, Moz., 9 October 1800.



6. ENTRANCES TO THE ZAMBESI

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his own debts for goods taken on credit in India by his family and agents. To prevent such a catastrophe the Banian merchants in Damão, Diu, Surat, Cutch and Goa, would leave agents permanently in Mozambique, Quelimane and the other ports to collect goods for export, and have them ready at Mozambique when the auction sale opened. Some of the payments for Banian goods would not come by sea but from the residents in and around Mozambique itself. Even here, the Portuguese, having received their slaves, ivory and gold from the *musambashe* or direct from native traders, would not pay the Banians until they had disposed of these goods at the auction.

By the middle of the century European traders occupied an all-important part in Indian Ocean trade, but the Portuguese in Mozambique found it easier to leave the risk and the complications of distribution by sea more and more to the Banians or, less frequently, to the Arabs. These sea-faring Banians became especially useful when Britain began to suppress the slave trade. The part played by Asians in the history of East Africa and indeed in that of the Indian Ocean, since the coming of the European, has not yet been fully investigated. As early as 1801, the mercantile community of the port of Mozambique possessed fourteen topsail vessels varying in size between 8 and 400 tons. Seven of the owners had Portuguese names. The others were Banians or Omani with names such as Rafbai, Rassulby and Velgi Darse & Co. None of the Portuguese-owned ships in this year were employed in trade with India but were carrying slaves to America or engaged in the coasting trade, whereas six out of the seven Indian and Arab vessels were *en route* to Damão, Diu and Bombay.¹

Up and down the coast the Banians trafficked in ivory, cereals, cattle and slaves. Changing their flag as danger and opportunity demanded, they became the very backbone of the East African economy, particularly after the first years of the nineteenth century. From them, the Portuguese in Mozambique derived their main revenue. The Banians were bankers and the main source of supply of Asian spices and merchandise. Through them and the Arabs the commerce of the East African littoral, like its politics, remained essentially part of the Indian Ocean arena. As late as 1856 the recognized channel for obtaining British goods

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 43, F. G. de Carvalho e Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 18 August 1801.

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was the Banian.¹ As the officials and the other inhabitants of Mozambique became increasingly dependent upon sea-faring Asians untoward incidents were bound to occur and no doubt provided some outlet to the Portuguese for their pent-up rage at their dependence upon the infidel.

It was easy for Portuguese officials or Portuguese vessels to seize a heavily laden dhow arriving at or leaving a subordinate port. The hatches could be forced open and the plunder removed. In 1818 the Governor of Bombay, Sir Evans Nepean, drew the attention of the Governor at Mozambique to a complaint he had received from an Arab chieftain, that one of his sons had been plundered in 1809 while on a trading expedition to Mozambique colony for slaves, gold and ambergris.²

Much later (in 1857) when a Banian dhow, the *Ari-passa*, at anchor at the entrance to one of the bays, was seized and pillaged by order of the Governor-General, the British Consul protested only to be told that it was with regret that a vessel under the protection of Great Britain had been caught attempting to smuggle contraband. How many *Ari-passas* had been seized without redress no one will ever know. The consul noted that the Banians were so intimidated by the Portuguese that they were afraid even to disclose such incidents to him.³ And no wonder.

They knew that the Arabs, like the Portuguese, resented their competition. Not only in Mozambique but also in the Arab dominions along the African coast it was not uncommon for a customs official to seize what he desired of their cargoes at his own valuation⁴ or to fix the tariff exorbitantly high. To circumvent this difficulty in Mozambique, Arab and Banian imports might be distributed among the members of the crew and taken ashore as personal effects.⁵

Banians had at least two other well-known ways of overcoming high customs duties and losses. One was to bribe the officials which was a heavy burden on their fair gains.⁶ Another was to render services which no one else would undertake, and thus to

¹ McLeod, I, 158.

² A.H.U., Moz., 87, Nepean to J. F. de Paulo Cavalcante d'Albuquerque, Bombay Castle, 2 November 1818; Moz., 86, Same to same, Bombay Castle, 4 November 1817; Moz., 86, Translation, Abdorub Nukub of Mukulla to Nepean, Mukulla, 12 September 1817.

³ McLeod, op. cit., II, 41, 51, 54, 45.

⁴ Coupland, *Intruders*, 182.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., I, Report of the Junta of Administration and of the Public Treasury of Moz., 23 August 1834.

⁶ McLeod, op. cit., II, 41.

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make the colony dependent on them.¹ Financing and giving goods out on credit to the Portuguese officials and colonists was one such service. Another, which became more and more important, was to take charge of the coastal trade in slaves.

To meet the risks, all Asian prices were calculated with one eye on the wind and another on the many exactions and even injustices that might sabotage trade. If a Portuguese or a *musambashe* in a subordinate port missed the wind and the coastal craft from Mozambique were late, say in leaving Quelimane, then the Banians added 10 per cent 'security risk' to the next year's price of their goods given out on credit.² Thus the Banians harnessed the Portuguese to the demands of the auction mart in the capital and the Europeans in Africa, like the Africans before them, became dependent on Asian coastal traders.

The Portuguese, especially in the Sena Rivers, complained that they remained perpetually in debt to the Banian 'monopolists', who transported their goods to and from Mozambique 'little by little, at whatever price suits them and at the risk of the inhabitants of the Rivers . . .'; that until the difficulties of navigation at Quelimane had been righted the goods to be transported to the auction would invariably be late. 'The officials in Mozambique,' wrote the Governor of Sena Rivers in 1821, 'are the country's worst enemies and commit the worst atrocities. They are like leeches.' Why, he asked, could the port of Quelimane not be open to 'the gentle heretics' of Asia and their trade not come straight to the Sena Rivers?² Why indeed? Everyone in Mozambique and many in Lisbon knew the answer to that question; it had been asked for centuries, and the officials in Mozambique, determined to protect their profits, were probably the first to resent it.

The Mozambique auction mart was opened by the arrival of the North-East monsoon that brought the buyers. Each year between April and August, Banians, Arabs and Swahili in dhows and buggalows from India, the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and African ports north of Cape Delgado, Frenchmen from the *Île de France*, British and other Europeans brought English cloth and woollens, handkerchiefs, painted taffetas and various silks, spices, beads and trinkets from India or the *Île de France*, tea from China, American cotton cloth—later known as *merikano*—and hats,

¹ *Ajuda*, 52/x/23, Barboza, *Analis Statistica*.

² *Ibid.*

sugar, soap, Constantia wine and other provisions from the Cape of Good Hope. There were also iron bars and hoops, wire, cutlery, stationery, prints, boots and household furniture. Some dhows were from 200 to 400 tons burden and to this day many of the men of Asia speak of these ships by the Portuguese name, *Nau*.¹ The harbour of Mozambique, like that of Zanzibar, then presented an animated scene. From Goa, a Portuguese brig of about 200 tons annually brought piece goods, spirits, oil, fish, China goods, wheat and silver coins, known as *patacas*² as well as Mozambique's chief supply of gunpowder and military stores.³ In the eighteenth century the French had sometimes traded direct with the Yao and the Makua, who thus received supplies of firearms and gunpowder.⁴ But until 1819, when, it seems, a lucrative trade was done by the Arabs in powder and muskets available from the Americans at Zanzibar and the ports of Madagascar,⁵ military stores were not obtainable from any other source, except for small quantities received from the French islands⁶ and from Brazil in return for slaves. Mozambique and its dependencies manufactured none. The British would not sell munitions of war even to their allies,⁷ and Portugal was unable to spare any. To undercut prices Banian ships brought to Mozambique the refuse of the European goods sent to the Indian markets.⁸ China and glassware, metals, toys, bangles, trinkets and sundries, were procured by the masters or wives and families of the Mozambique Banians in Surat, Damão and Diu.⁹ Inferior English cloth obtained clandestinely through their families or other agents from the weavers of the English East India Company¹⁰ was also imported. No doubt during the wars the Banians found a way of

¹ Alan Villiers, 'Prince Henry, the Explorer who stayed home' (*National Geographic Mag.*, November 1960), 622.

² B.M., Add. MSS. 13/703, 95-6, Copy of an answer to some queries on the trade of Goa, left with Dillon by Brown, Reporter General of External Commerce, enclosed in letter from Clark to (?), Bombay, 15 February 1802.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 79, d'Abreu e Menezes to Prince Regent, Moz., 8 October 1813; Moz., 81, Royal Order, Rio, 11 July 1814.

⁴ Alpers, Chapter III.

⁵ Coupland, op. cit., 365.

⁶ A.H.U., Moz., 46, Menezes da Costa to Souza Coutinho, Moz., 2 November 1798.

⁷ A.H.U., Moz., 43, F. G. de Carvalho e Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 18 August 1801.

⁸ McLeod, II, 40.

⁹ A.H.U., Moz., VII, No. 182, R. L. d'Abreu de Lima to Secretary of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs, Moz., 15 March 1845. For details on Company's sales, see Milburn, I, 60 *et seq.*

¹⁰ For details, cf. 143-4.

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cashing in on the cheaper prices at the île de France, like their Arab, Swahili, French and American competitors.¹ Beads of the best quality at Mozambique were brought by the Banians who there sold them to the Swahili or Arabs of Zanzibar or disposed of them by means of the Yao traders throughout the interior.² Directly the southerly winds set in the buyers and their ships turned away to the north.

This yearly auction was the only occasion on which the interests of all the colonists in some measure converged. After it, the town of Mozambique was drained of ready money. The local Banians were paid, and the 'contractors' kept what was over to live on until another such transaction.

(b) The export trade

Next in importance to Mozambique's human exports was that which was always referred to with pedantic inaccuracy by the English East India Company as 'treasure'. Under this heading the chief items were ivory and gold dust. Small quantities of black-and-white ambergris (a wax-like substance, obtained from the sperm whale, used in perfumery), rhinoceros tusks, tortoise-shell, colombo root, cowries (small shells), abnooswood (ebony), orchilla-wood, pearls, hides, copper, wax, honey, oil and shark fins were also exported.³ Rhinoceros ivory was preferred by dentists to elephant ivory, because it was harder and less liable to turn yellow. Colombo root was in great estimation among all the Africans, even those far removed from the Portuguese settlements, for the cure of dysentery. Cowries were an article of trade at Bombay and passed as currency in Bengal and in parts of East Africa, while considerable quantities were formerly imported into Europe for the slave trade.⁴ But the importance of these sales to the state revenue, compared with those of elephant ivory and gold, was so small that in 1805-6 no mention of them was made in the Mozambique Customs List.⁵

Milburn, writing in 1813, asserts that more than £1½ million sterling of gold was mined annually near Sofala.⁶ This estimate seems to be grossly exaggerated, for according to the Mozambique

¹ For details, cf. 146.

² Burton, 98.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Report by Lobo to the Prince Regent, Moz., 22 October 1807; Moz., I, J. G. Pegado to Margiochi, Moz., 13 December 1834; I.O. Bombay Com., E. & I. Reports, Range CCCCXIX, No. 45, 1802/3, List of Imports into Bombay.

⁴ Milburn, I, 62, 60.

⁵ Cf. 88, 3.

⁶ Milburn, I, 58.

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Customs List during the ten years 1781–90 gold dust to the value of not more than a few thousand pounds was annually exported.¹ For the same period ivory worth six times as much left the colony. It has not been possible to ascertain the quantity this represents, nor what amounts were sold to various markets. The price of ivory varied according to the size of tusk, weight, texture and colour.² There is no doubt, however, that India was Portuguese East Africa's most important ivory market,³ and in 1805–6 was the only country of destination to be specifically mentioned in the Customs List.

Until the turn of the century, it seems clear, Mozambique's trade, like its politics, was still very much confined to the Indian Ocean arena. Nothing could illustrate this better than the copy of a typical request (of which there are many in the Portuguese archives) from a Mozambique merchant asking permission from the Governor to go on a trading expedition. Leave is begged to make a voyage to the 'Île de France or that of Bourbon, and from either of these ports to Mocha or others near India, to India and within the Cape of Good Hope'.⁴

Mozambique's chief markets were its own subordinate ports, the Arab ports north of Cape Delgado, Arabia, Persia, India, the Mascarene Islands—particularly Île de France and Bourbon—Madagascar and Brazil. In addition, a small trade was done with Port Natal which, until the twenties, it seems, was the only part of the coast between the Cape and Delagoa Bay frequented by Europeans, exclusively Portuguese, who in return for piece goods, iron, beads, tobacco and spirits received elephants' teeth, cattle and sometimes ambergris. Although the Portuguese did occasionally visit the Cape, the trade connection was slight. Until 1807, after which date the anti-slave-trade vigilance of the British authorities on that station would almost certainly have prevented the landing of a slave cargo,⁵ trade was carried on in

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 51, Royal Incomes and Expenses, 1788–93, Moz., 1 September 1796.

² In Mozambique there were three recognized grades of ivory based on weight: *gross* (9 kg. or more), *meio* (7–9 kg.) and *miúdo* (3½–7 kg.), cf. Eça, II, 504 n.; Bordalo, *Mozambique*, 83 n.

³ A.H.U., Moz., VI, R. L. d'Abreu de Lima to Secretary of State for Marine and Colonial Affairs, Moz., 12 December 1843.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 64, Request from A. de Cruz Almeida, merchant of Mozambique and owner of ship *Perserverance*, 25 April 1806.

⁵ Edwards, *Colonial Policy and Slavery in South Africa, 1806–26* (Thesis Oxford), 83; Theal, *Records of Cape Colony*, IX, 285, Bathurst to Cradock, 16 December 1813.

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slaves which were exchanged for flour, butter, cheese, dried fruit and brandy, also Constantia wine regarded as a great luxury at Mozambique.¹

During the wars much of the trade with British India was of an indirect nature² and based upon Damão, Diu and the Ilé de France. That a fair amount of exports went to Goa may be assumed from the fact that in 1806 that town ranked third among Mozambique's Indian markets mentioned in the Customs List.³ At both Surat and Cutch elephant tusks from Mozambique were preferred to those from India and Siam; they were larger, 'esteemed as being of closer texture and less liable to turn yellow than those from the East Indies'.⁴ By the second and third decades of the nineteenth century ivory was entering upon an unprecedented phase of popularity in Europe and America. Much of the ivory exported from Mozambique came from Delagoa Bay where it was obtained from the south, the land which in 1824 was held by the young Zulu chief Shaka.⁵ Zanzibar and Mozambique ivory, resold by the Banians in India, found its way 'to Europe and America as the best Indian transparent ivory'.⁶

In this Indian Ocean commerce slaves from East Africa, serving as household eunuchs, concubines, agricultural labourers, soldiers and protectors to the Arabs, had been an important item of trade even long before commercial currents from the outside world touched the West African coast. In fact, Sir Reginald Coupland believed that the European slave trade was never comparable in volume or duration with that of the age-old 'Arab' trade. More recent scholarship has not questioned Asia's responsibility for the duration of the trade in the Indian Ocean. But it is believed that the trade never assumed the magnitude reached after the mid-nineteenth century, when more than ever Africans provided the manpower for work on plantations and portage of ivory. Why, then, during the first decade of the nineteenth century were the Portuguese dependent upon slaves as their main export? At first sight this dependence upon the slave trade is all

¹ Prior, 45; A.H.U., Moz., 49, Menezes da Costa to Chauvalon, Moz., 3 October 1800.

² Cf. 139-46.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Customs Income Report for Captaincy of Mozambique in 1803 and a part of 1806 ordered by Amaral Cardozo, Moz., 8 November 1806.

⁴ Milburn, I, 62.

⁵ F.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lewin*, Mauritius, 19 June 1824.

⁶ McLeod, I, 121.

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the more remarkable since not slaves but ivory, we are told, was the product most valued by the Portuguese. In practice, the trade in ivory and slaves was interconnected in the sense that commerce in one stimulated demand for the other.¹ Hence a discussion of one necessarily embraces the other. But as the slave trade is discussed elsewhere, here it will only be of concern in so far as it helps to illuminate the point under discussion.

There were, it seems, two distinct but interconnected reasons why the Portuguese in Mozambique during the first half of the nineteenth century were forced into dependence upon the exportation of slaves as their main source of revenue. One is to be found within East Africa, where a number of factors caused first the ivory trade and then the slave trade to be diverted away from Mozambique;² the other was the result of events upon the sea where Britain's measures for the abolition of the slave trade caused an increased demand for slaves on the East coast.³

There are no exact figures for the number of slaves exported in these early years and whatever estimates are quoted must always allow for the fact that slaves were usually grouped with other commodities in the export lists.⁴ More than that, according to a number of Portuguese *alvaras* (decrees) of 1751⁵ and of much earlier date, the sale of slaves to foreign ships was forbidden. In the supposed interests of the colony the King winked at the infringement of these regulations and various governors actually encouraged their contravention. But while the law was there it was more expedient to appear to obey it and for such transactions simply not to be recorded among the exports of the colony.

In 1785 the King himself authorized the admission of foreign slavers following a particularly corrupt and chaotic period in the colony's finances. During the next six years Martinho de Melo e Castro, the Secretary for the Navy and Overseas Dominions, arranged that his nephew, while Governor-General of Mozambique, be given the prerogative to admit foreign ships at the island and capital, Mozambique, provided the Crown was informed of each permit granted. 'No French-traders were allowed to leave the island for the mainland and all export trade outside slaves and provisions was completely forbidden.' But as the head

¹ Cf. 259-60.

² Cf. 93-4, 97-103.

³ Cf. 89-91, 226 *et seqq.*

A.H.U., Moz., 83, M. C. d'Abreu e Menezes to A. d'Anayo d'Azevedo, Moz., 7 February 1816.

⁴ *Heralds, Commercial Treaties*, V, 412, Decree of 22 October 1751.

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tax on the export of slaves was increased, local Portuguese traders seem to have taken large numbers of slaves 'through customs on their own account to deliver them to French slavers with whom they had previously struck a bargain'. Nevertheless, the policy seems to have proved so successful that in May 1793 the new Governor was allowed to restate it, but this time with a proviso forbidding the traders, whether French or of any other nation, from raising a flag on Portuguese territory.¹ Following this expression of fear and enthusiasm for French slavers, which Lisbon shared with many governors, the ban on foreign vessels entering in Portugal's African ports was again nominally in force.

The temptation to trade with foreigners increased after the French began to develop the Mascarene Islands. In 1717 coffee was introduced into Bourbon, soon to be followed by cotton, indigo, sugar and manioc plantations. With the extension of the War of the Austrian Succession to the East this transformation in agriculture and financial development was accelerated by the appointment of a remarkably active and imaginative Governor-General, la Bourdonnais. By 1740 'Mozambiques' as slaves had proved preferable to those obtained in Madagascar and the French were well-established traders at the Portuguese capital and the Querimba Islands.

Despite some setbacks, attempts to promote this promising trade were made again in 1752 when Dupleix became Governor-General of the *Compagnie des Indes*, and by various Portuguese governors, among them Balthazer Manuel Pereira do Lago, who became Governor-General of Mozambique in 1765 and 'nurtured the slave trade from there to the French islands in Portuguese and Brazilian vessels'.² In addition to the demand for slaves to feed the growing prosperity of the Île de France and Bourbon, a remarkable expansion of the East African slave trade with French America seems to have followed the conclusion of the American War of Independence and the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars. Slaves on the Guinea coast had already become difficult to procure, while prices compared with those in East Africa were exorbitant and amply justified the longer voyage.

Between 1786 and 1795 well over 14,000 slaves are recorded as having been exported aboard Portuguese ships while 34,000 were shipped in foreign vessels, presumably French.³ Other evidence for the ten years 1781-90 shows 23,714 slaves entered as being

¹ Alpers, Chapters V and VI.

² Alpers, Chapter III.

³ Alpers, Chapter V.

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exported in foreign ships as against 23,151 carried by nationals.¹ After 1793, when trade with the French in coastal waters was sometimes under fire from French corsairs, the slave trade to Brazil, too, was actively pursued, and in 1803 the official figures for slaves exported from Mozambique are 2,335 on Portuguese ships and 2,904 on foreign vessels. Between May 1805 and 1808, seventy-five ships, forty-six of which were Portuguese, had entered Mozambique.² During the year 1805, the customs dues collected at the port of Mozambique on slaves exported in foreign ships, which would have been mostly French, were nearly three times as great as on those in national ships.³ By 1806 two-fifths of the population of the Île de France came from Mozambique.

These estimates, of course, do not include slaves exported from the subordinate ports. After 1802, to prevent illicit trade at those ports where the Portuguese had Residents, a guard was placed on board any vessel that called,⁴ but, by gaining the favour of the commandant, trade could usually be transacted. It was more prudent to pay duties in this form than to risk touching at those parts of the coast less frequented by Europeans, for the natives were much prejudiced against them and not without cause. Both French and English vessels were said to have visited the coast at different places, and, after enticing the natives on board, carried them away to be sold as slaves. A vessel from the Cape of Good Hope which used to procure slaves southward of Sofala is reported to have perfidiously carried off a chief and several of his subjects in this way.⁵ Even in these early years of the century Brazil, as a Portuguese possession, had considerable advantages over the American seaboard states and the West Indian islands in its slave-trading connection with Mozambique; its money went farther and duties payable by national ships were lower than those payable by foreigners.

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 51, Unsigned, dated Moz., September 1796.

² Alpers, Chapter V.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 66, Customs Income Report for Captaincy of Mozambique in 1805 and a part of 1806 ordered by Amaral Cardoza, Moz., 8 November 1806:

(in escudos)	1805	1806, 1 Jan.- 8 Oct.
On exports of ivory to India	11:549	\$162
On exports of gold in powder	2:261	\$280
On exports of slaves in national ships	7:416	\$000
On exports of slaves in foreign ships	18:630	\$400

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Copy, Owen to Croker, Lambeth, 12 October 1826.

⁵ Milburn, I, 58.

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North of the Portuguese colony, prices were soon found to be lower than in Mozambique and in the 1790s 'a prodigious number of blacks' were exported, particularly from an almost unknown river called Mongallo, which was said to be nearer to the mountains inhabited by the Makua, the Makonde, the Ndonde and the Yao, all different people continually at war, solely to make each other prisoners'.¹ The growth of the slave trade at Zanzibar and the Kilwa coast was later to be one of the reasons for Sayyid Said of Muscat taking up residence there, but the full effect of Sayyid's initiative in encouraging free trade and Indian traders in his dominions, pushing trade with the interior and developing cloves and other plantations, was to come only in the second and third decades of the century.²

In 1806 a cargo of slaves was purchased at Mozambique by a merchant from Charleston.³ In the early nineteenth century the Portuguese seldom refer to American ships fetching slaves, but American contacts with Mozambique and the Indian Ocean (particularly Madagascar) began in the late seventeenth century and the first recorded cargoes of slaves taken from Mozambique to Massachusetts are said to date back to 1680.⁴ An American consul was appointed to Cape Town in 1799 and off the East African coast Americans as traders, freebooters and pirates were well known. American whalers were active off the coast of Delagoa Bay in the late eighteenth century and, if their behaviour in later years is any indication, slaves and merchandise were probably obtained.⁵ Except for trade and adventure it is difficult to know why Americans in the early years remained in the Sena Rivers and Mozambique. Did the American whalers supply some of the ambergris which figures in Mozambique's export list?⁶

The extent of Mozambique's dependence upon slaves before 1807 is shown by the fact that, already in the 1790s, the Governor of Mozambique, while trying to obstruct the French trade at subordinate ports, such as Ibo, thanked the French for making 'the exportation of slaves the most flourishing' of trades, and it

¹ Alpers, Chapter V.

² Cf. 102, 262, 265.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 64, Receipt from American ship *Dolphin*, Moz., 11 April 1806.

⁴ Clendenen and Duignan, *Americans in Black Africa up to 1865* (Stanford, 1964), 16; Bennett, 'Americans in Zanzibar, 1823-45' (reprinted from Essex Institute, *Historical Collections*, XCV, July 1959, 239-62), 93.

⁵ Salt, op. cit., 79-80, refers to English ships before 1809 flying American colours and transporting slaves from Mozambique to the West Indies.

⁶ For further discussion of American activities, cf. 145-6.

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was noted that 'whereas gold and ivory had once paid for virtually all the Mozambique imports from India and Portugal they now barely accounted for a third of these'.¹ By 1805/6 customs duties on slaves accounted for 66 per cent of the revenue from the export trade of the colony.² But the greatest stimulus to obtain slaves on the East coast came when England abolished the slave trade. After 1807, when the British Navy set about suppressing the trade on the West African coast, the East coast became the main source of supply for all the slave markets of the world.

In 1810, when the presence of British cruisers, engaged in the attack on the Ilé de France, temporarily checked the trade, the Governor-General complained that the loss of the slave trade contributed to the depreciation of the value of money, and that the inhabitants obtained only 'one-sixth of a measure of food for the same price'. Taxes became so high that fishermen, forced to pay a small tax to the Royal Treasury, went away rather than submit to the new exactions. Salaries were too small for soldiers to obtain proper food, and even as late as 1818 many appear to have died of starvation.³ To add to these difficulties administrative evils which in prosperous times went unnoticed now emerged. Brevets were so costly that soldiers were unable to obtain promotion.⁴ The slaves were the first to suffer from this new state of affairs, while the native chiefs and all the Europeans and Asiatics are said to have regarded it as a calamity. 'The pestilent atmosphere,' wrote the Governor, 'which has prevailed in this island for the last few years makes it impossible to live here.' Some idea of the international character of the slave trade may be inferred from his words:

The English have abolished the slave trade and English America can no longer send for our slaves; the Dutch, French and Spanish colonies also no longer demand our slaves and our only hope is that the Ilé de France will retain slavery (*escravatura*) for that would restore a small measure of prosperity to this colony which will die unless a remedy is found.⁵

¹ Alpers, Chapter III.

² A.H.U., Moz., 66, Customs Income, Report for Captaincy of Mozambique in 1805, and a part of 1806, ordered by Amaral Cardoso, Moz., 8 November 1806.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 92, Brito Sanches to Arcos, Moz., 11 October 1819.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 75, A. M. de Mello Castro e Mendes to Galveas, Moz., 28 December 1810. Similar conditions prevailed in 1840, cf. Moz. IV, Marinho to Benfim Moz., 9 October 1840.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 75, *Ibid.*

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Here then, was one of the reasons for Mozambique's dependence on the export of slaves: the increased demand both outside and inside the Indian Ocean. But why was the province so completely dependent upon the sale of slaves? What had happened to the trade in ivory?

That the export of ivory was highly valued by the Portuguese is vouched for by the diaries and documents of three expeditions into the interior, those of Francisco José Maria de Lacerda e Almeida in 1798-9, of the pombeiros¹—two half-caste merchants from the Angolan interior, P. J. Baptista and Amaro (or Anastacio) José—in 1805-11, and of José Manoel Correa Monteiro and Antonio Cândido Pedroso Gaminho in 1831-2. All these expeditions were undertaken in pursuit of a dream, the revival of a plan which had been abandoned in 1663 for lack of funds,² to establish commercial treaties with the native chiefs and to develop a transcontinental trade route.

In the eighteenth century there was transcontinental trade, but Portugal had no share in it. What is more, in 1795 the British occupation of the Cape threatened to outbid the prior claims of Portugal to the interior. To prevent this and to hasten the achievement of their dreams, the administrations in Lisbon, Angola and Mozambique hoped to intrude by means of treaties upon the central portion of the northern caravan trail across the present Eastern Angola, Southern Katanga and Zambia. Suzerainty over these areas belonged to two great Lunda kingdoms: Mwata Kazembe in the east and his senior, the 'father' of the western Lunda, Mwata Yamvo. Through Bangala and Bisa middlemen, and perhaps other tribes that intervened on each side of them, these two Lunda potentates were indirectly trading with both Angola and Zanzibar.³ Recent research shows that they had also been trading with Mozambique.

Long-distance trade 'routes' or paths from the interior to Kilwa and Mozambique, it seems, had been forged in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.⁴ About 1698 the Yao

¹ Travelling agents, from the Angolan-Portuguese word '*pombo*' meaning road, not to be confused with '*pombo*' meaning native beer from Guinea corn, cf. *The Zambezi Papers of Richard Thornton* (London, 1963), I, 51.

² Gaminho, 1/64.

³ Ian Cannison, 'Kazembe and the Portuguese, 1798-1832' (*Journal of African History*, II/1, 1961), 61-2.

⁴ Alpers, Chapter I.

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apparently dominated both these routes. But after the disruption and decline of the towns on the coast, the Portuguese withdrawal from Mombasa and because of Omani disturbances which impeded and practically killed trade in the Kilwa region, most of the Yao trade seems to have shifted to Mozambique.¹

To reach Mozambique the Yao had to traverse the country of the sometimes hostile Makua who were skilled elephant hunters and are said to have obtained their ivory 'in their own country around the middle and lower reaches of the Luangwa'. The Yao were primarily traders not hunters; they seem to have obtained their ivory in the upper valley of the Shire River and to the annoyance of the Portuguese as far afield as the 'Marave, Bive' and other peoples 'bordering the lands of our jurisdiction of Rivers of Sena'. Their journey to Mozambique took two to four months, so that they only came to the coast between May and October.²

Some of the Makua, too, were long-distance traders, but most of those who traded with the Portuguese seem to have been close neighbours, which should have enabled them to trade at Mozambique throughout the year. Despite Makua proximity to the Mozambique market, by the first half of the eighteenth century, Yao traders were dominant in the overland trade to the port of Mozambique. In 1760, 90 per cent of ivory at Mossuril and the Cabaçeiras and half of all the ivory which entered Mozambique Island was brought by the Yao from the Rivers of Sena, Sofala and Inhambarane.³ They and the Maravi also traded to Zumbo, where Bisa traders, forty days journey from the north-west, were familiar figures. To the Zumbo fair, and occasionally even to Quelimane,⁴ the Bisa carried ivory and large copper bars undoubtedly obtained at the court of Mwate Kazembe, who established his rule over the Luapula valley about 1740,⁵ and to whom many of the Bisa owed tribute.⁶ Clearly then, the Bisa, the Maravi and the Yao were trading along an important, regular and well-established route to the Kilwa coast and to Mozambique from Kazembe's court. 'Small parties of individuals probably also succeeded in travelling beyond the Luapula to the coast of Angola.'⁷

Hence in the early eighteenth century when the French were

¹ Alpers, Chapters I and II.

² Alpers, Chapter III.

³ Idem.

⁴ Lacerda e Almeida, F.J.M. de *Travessia da África* (Lisbon 1936) 388.

⁵ Alpers, Chapter II.

⁶ Gamitto, 1/202, 208; Burton 89.

⁷ Alpers, Chapter III.

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seeking slaves for the development of their Indian Ocean islands, trade in Mozambique was predominantly in ivory brought by African traders of whom the more important were the Yao, the Makua and at Ibo, north of Mozambique, the Makonde tribesmen.¹ By the middle of the eighteenth century Mozambique is described as 'the primary market for ivory from the far interior'.² In 1758, as if the Portuguese were singing the praises of the doomed, ivory was eulogized as the 'unique commerce by which the people of that island (Mozambique), Mossuril and the Cabaçeiras and environs sustained themselves'.³

Virtually all the ivory at Mozambique was bought by Indians. The Portuguese complained that the Yao obtained a better price for their ivory at Mossuril, where they then bought their cloth to advantage from the Banians—sometimes at cost or two-thirds the price charged to the Portuguese—and carried it overland to the Rivers. In this way they avoided the 30 per cent re-export tax always imposed at Mozambique on goods sent to the subordinate ports as well as the duties (which in the 1760s rose to 41 per cent), the cost and risk of sea and river transport to the Zambesi settlements. By the 1760s the Portuguese were grumbling that the Yao were carrying the duty-free cloths, obtained at the capital, hundreds of leagues inland and selling them to chiefs 'in order to introduce them to our fair at Zumbo'. The Yao were accused of threatening to take over the gold trade from Batua, the Rhodesian gold-fields.⁴

In fact, the Portuguese seem to have been so preoccupied with the dwindling resources of the Rhodesian region that only after the mid-eighteenth century does it become apparent that the authorities were haunted by another fear, the danger of losing the ivory trade.

In 1765, after an abortive Portuguese attack on Mombasa, the Governor of Mozambique reported that the Kilwa coast had a greater quantity of ivory than was brought to the Portuguese capital by the Yao and the Makua. By 1784 the 400 to 500 *bares*⁵ of ivory which the Yao had been known to take to Mozambique twenty years earlier had dropped to 100 or 130.⁶ By 1795 the Governor of Mozambique noted that, whereas in the time of his predecessors the Yao used 'to convey 200 to 300 *bares*' of ivory

¹ Alpers, Chapter V.

² Alpers, Chapter II.

³ Alpers, Chapter III.

⁴ Alpers, Chapter V.

⁵ A *bare* or *bares* weighed between 518 to 650 lbs.

⁶ Alpers, Chapter IV.

to Mossuril, since 1780 they brought 'scarcely thirty or forty'.¹ At the turn of the century the Governor of the Querimba Islands reported: 'All lands within Portuguese jurisdiction are surrounded by the Makua.' Trails run through their territory to Mozambique and to Zanzibar. The 'considerable trade' in 'ivory, rice, maize and oils which were exported every year in great quantities is extinct'. 'The kaffirs of the interior' go to Zanzibar 'for they find there greater profit and better clothes than ours'. Evidence suggests that by this time not only the Yao but also the Makua, the Makonde and other peoples—among them possibly the Maravi—were redirecting their trade from Mozambique to Kilwa.² No wonder, then, that the Portuguese were sending out expeditions in an effort to revive the ivory trade!

All three Portuguese expeditions to Kazembe (mentioned above on page 91) have been fully described.³ What has not been shown is the impact of the failure of the trade negotiations and changing pattern of trade in the interior upon Portuguese exports and, therefore, upon Mozambique's dependence on the slave trade. To show this, some of the facts already known about the expeditions must be briefly repeated.

How little contact there had been with the Kazembe until Lacerda's arrival in January 1798 is clear from the excitement that was caused among the *prazo-holders* (*prazeros*) five years previously in 1793. The story is well known. Bisa merchants in trade with the Yao at Kazembe called on Gonçalo Caetano Pereira, a gold washer and trader, one of the many *sertanejos*⁴ who existed throughout the explored interior on both sides of the continent. The Bisa informed Gonçalo that 'their Lord' Kazembe III desired his friendship. Having successfully followed up this information, Gonçalo spread the tidings of this 'new' opening for commerce among the *prazeros* some of whom sent their slave porters in the charge of his son, young Manoel, to manage his father's third venture.⁵

On his return Manoel confirmed that the ivory which the Yao had once brought in great quantity to Mozambique was being diverted by the people of Zanzibar who were outbidding the

¹ Alpers, Chapter V.

² *Ibid.*

³ Cunnison, op. cit., 61–76.

⁴ Gonçalo, known by the Maravi, as *Dombo Domba*, the Terror, lived some five days' journey north of Tete and was afterwards to act as guide to Lacerda.

⁵ Cunnison, op. cit., 62, quoting *Tavassia*, Doc. B., 384–5.

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Portuguese for the inland trade.¹ But this disturbing information in some degree must have given way to encouragement, when Kazembe made a second overture to the Portuguese for direct trade with the government of Tete. His real purpose seems to have been to impress and perhaps compete successfully against Mwato Yamvo, Kazembe's overlord.² In February 1798, a month after Lacerda took up his appointment as Governor of the Sena Rivers, Kazembe's ambassadors arrived to assure the Portuguese of friendship. More than that Kazembe offered to assist in the clearing of the route so that Portuguese merchandise could collectively be sent him. He also recommended a Portuguese settlement on the Luangwa River.³

Thus Lacerda's arrival in Southern Africa seemed to come at an opportune moment and to promise a great revival of activity. A Brazilian by birth and a graduate in mathematics from the University of Coimbra, Lacerda had previously been appointed astronomer to the King. In 1780 he returned to Brazil to survey and lay down the western limits of the great Luso-American dependency. Ten years later he published the results of his long and weary wanderings, a record remarkable for correctness in every detail. In 1796 he had accompanied an expedition to explore the Cunene River in West Africa. When this proved a failure, he determined, with the backing of the authorities in Lisbon, on a second and southern overland expedition through Southern Africa, anticipating Livingstone by fifty years. The proposal to erect a chain of *presidios*, or fortified posts, along the Coanza River, in order to explore the copper mines of Angola and to communicate with Mozambique, was made before Dr. Krapf and the 'Apostles' Street' were born. It was with this idea that Lacerda accompanied the newly appointed Governor of Mozambique to East Africa at the beginning of 1797. The new and time-saving line of communication between East and West Africa was to serve many purposes: to obviate the delay and danger involved in the long passage round the Cape; to prevent the constant leakage of trade from Mozambique to the British and Americans in Zanzibar; to tap the sources of wealth in the African interior; to offer a refuge for the Portuguese colonists of Mozambique and Angola if either were attacked; to court the favour of chiefs; and to give Portugal a prior claim to the possession of

¹ *Tresoriss.*, 587-9; Cunnison, 64; Burton, 37.

² Cunnison, 65.

³ Burton, 46; cf. also Cunnison, 64.

the interior and its natives 'who would be more securely subjected to Portugal if they knew that Mozambique and Sena could aid Angola and Benguela and vice versa'. Thus the plan Lacerda was to carry out involved much which Rhodes later attempted to accomplish for Britain. More than that, he predicted that Portugal's lack of energy would result in the creation of a great British Empire in Africa following Britain's seizure of the Cape.¹

Lacerda's perception and depth of understanding marks him as much the greatest of the Portuguese explorers to set out from Tete. In July 1798, with much difficulty, he organized his expedition to Kazembe. Reporting on the loss of Portuguese trade to Zanzibar Lacerda notes: 'The African has no objection to walking 150 miles if he can get for his slaves more and better cloth than can be afforded by our traders; whilst the latter here make smaller profits than their rivals.'² Significantly enough he remarks also that 'the Cazembe sends his chattels to his "father" who remits them to Angola, . . . in barter . . . they do not sell their captives to the Portuguese who hold them of little account compared with ivory'.³ Commenting upon the necklace of velorio, or cowries, worn by the Makonde tribesmen, Lacerda says: 'This last is of the best quality and passes not through Sena where an inferior sort is current.'⁴

Lacerda's trained eye soon realized what was wrong in the province of Mozambique. He lamented that 'despite the favourable accounts of trade brought by Manoel . . . our people would do nothing to win the good opinion of the Cazembe', and the caffres being suspicious 'still sell to the Majao' (Yao).⁵ 'In Quelimane and Sena,' he wrote, 'as at Mozambique people know nothing of what has happened since 1793, and their information cannot be relied upon.'⁶ To the Prince Regent, he commented on the laziness of the inhabitants, the whites who adopted 'native superstitions and abominations which added to their own render them truly detestable', the 'lack of policy' of the Governor, the need for able craftsmen and the great handicap to communication between the different ports caused by the weak construction of the boats which, because of the abundance of timber and the

¹ Burton, Introduction, *passim*; and *Travessia*, *passim*; Raphael, *The Cape to Cairo Dream* (New York, 1936), 26.

² Burton, 21.

³ Burton, 41; cf. also *Travessia*, 390, and Cunnison, 63.

⁴ Burton, 78.

⁵ Burton, 57.

⁶ Burton, 46.

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small wages of the Bantu, could easily have been replaced by new ones.¹

The Governor of Mozambique was vexed that the post of a subaltern governor should have been filled by a man whose criticism was valued by the King and one, moreover, who was directly responsible to him. But the Governor's bitter flow of accusations to Lisbon was cut short by the sudden death of Dr. Lacerda on 18 October 1798. Worn out by fever, fatigue and annoyance, he died a victim to his own exertions.

The efforts of Lacerda's successor, Francisco João Pinto, to proceed farther were thwarted by Kazembe III, who resented or probably feared the intrusion of Europeans into his hinterland and that of his rival Mwata Yamvo. In 1810 Gonçalo declared that Kazembe's people had ceased to come to Tete. Some attributed this to the misbehaviour of the Portuguese who accompanied Lacerda into Kazembe's territory; others to the war between Kazembe and the Bisa.² Meanwhile, Lisbon's interest in Africa waned before the life and death struggle with France in Portugal itself.

In 1802, at the request of the Captain-General of Angola, two half-caste traders, or *pombeiros*, were entrusted by a Portuguese official at the fair of Cassanga with a letter addressed to the commandant of Tete. They were delayed first by Mwata Yamvo and then for four years by Kazembe IV.³ They arrived in Tete in February 1811 and confirmed 'that the Cazembe's people understand that ivory is of more value in Tete than slaves'.⁴ After a short stay they returned by the same route to Loanda.⁵ According to the diary kept by one of them, the Bisa were 'the first travellers who ever traded with the Kazembe'.⁶

To restore the ivory trade with the Bisa the Governor of Sena Rivers in 1827 bought the land of Marambo on the Luangwa, intending to establish the settlement projected since 1798. But Bisa trade with the Zambezi towns had been irretrievably diverted to the Zanzibar coast. Nor did it return to the Portuguese after 1826, when Bisa territory seems to have been attacked and perhaps conquered by the Bemba tribe jealous of the Bisa's good cloth and

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 48, Lacerda e Almeida to R. de Souza Coutinho, Villa de Quilimane, 12 November 1797; Burton, 77.

² Burton, 168.

³ Cunnison, 70.

⁴ Burton, 229.

⁵ Cunnison, 65, 70-2; Paul Barre, 'A Prioridade dos Exploradores Portugueses nas Travesseias Africanas', article in *Revista Portuguesa Colonial e Marítima*, I, 143.

⁶ Alpers, Chapter V.

the monopoly of their trade with the Europeans.¹ Thereafter the Bisa are said to have emigrated and dispersed among the neighbouring peoples, mainly in Cewa and Senya land. Since they could not themselves venture north, according to Richard Thornton, they appear to have entered into a treaty with the Anguros, or Nguru, a tribe of Maravi who inhabited the shores of the great lake Nyasa.² The Nguru then carried the Bisa ivory to the Zanzibar Arabs, who passed it on mainly to English and American merchants whose trading establishments on Zanzibar Island gave in return woven materials superior to that of the Portuguese. Even the Portuguese merchants in the interior preferred selling to the Nguru 'who bought with fine merchandise', which was more valuable in the Sena Rivers than in Nguru country.³ Lacerda had told that a Bisa chief sold his ivory to the 'Manguro'—possibly Mang'anja—living on the Shire River, who in turn passed it on to the Yao.⁴

In 1830 the task of following in Lacerda's footsteps fell to Gamitto—a young cadet from Lisbon who in 1825 had come out to Tete as commander of the garrison. Gamitto—who was later to become a national figure—pleaded that commerce with the land of the Zezurus (also known as the Muzuzuros), a district under the Monomotapa rich in gold, should be restored in preference to continuing to court Kazembe. But the proud, despotic Governor of Mozambique, flattered by the arrival of a caravan of ivory from Kazembe, requesting powder, weapons, soldiers, beads, crockery, glass and fine cloth, would brook no opposition. The most influential citizens were excused from marching on the expedition to Kazembe.⁵ Monteiro, the leader of the expedition, after suffering great privation died and finally leadership devolved on Gamitto. Upon his return he recommended that no commercial treaty should be made because of the 'thievery and barbarism of Kazembe in whose state there is no security',⁶ and also for three other reasons: he had 'no goods like ivory, copper or greenstone' since he had ruined 'through his wars, the lands from which these came'; secondly, 'not to excite in any future

¹ Gamitto, 2/161.

² R.H., MS. Afr., s. 55, Copies of articles from Scientific Periodicals, August 1854, 24b.

³ Gamitto, 2/169-70.

⁴ *Transmissio*, 208, 385-6, quoted by Alpers, Chapter V.

⁵ Gamitto, 1/19.

⁶ Gamitto, 2/98: 'When he (Kazembe) offers goods he already has the price fixed and this has to be paid . . . otherwise he trumps up a charge and kills people . . .'

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government of the Sena Rivers who may be blinded by ambition the desire to send another expedition'; and because Kazembe had no need of Tete since he could obtain cloth from Angola as well as the Zanzibar coast.¹

Thus the explorers endeavouring to establish a trans-continental trade route confirmed that the ivory trade was being diverted away from Mozambique. They realized that Portuguese dreams for crashing in upon what seems to have been known as 'the Asian trade across the interior'² were foredoomed to failure. But this was a bitter pill for Lisbon to swallow, and various other attempts to induce Europeans to go overland to Zanzibar were made especially from Angola.³

By 1835 the effect of the leakage of the ivory trade to Zanzibar was showing practical results, so that that island was becoming much more prosperous. If this is true, as the evidence seems to indicate, then no wonder that a statement that 'in the mid-1830s Zanzibar's trade with the outside world is very trifling' by the Commander of H.M.S. *Imogene*, which visited Zanzibar in 1834, puzzled the British consul in Zanzibar, Lieutenant-Colonel Rigby. In 1860, with obvious surprise, he quotes the Commander's words and concludes that as 'Zanzibar is now the chief market in the world for ivory, gum, copal and cloves the trade must be entirely the growth of the last few years'.⁴

Certainly the Americans so jealously guarded their trade with Zanzibar that they resorted to many subterfuges to keep it secret. A commercial treaty with Muscat signed in 1833 and ratified in 1834 was not printed in Salem newspapers until July 1837. An English naval officer, Captain Hart, reported in 1834: 'Last year the Imam sent a letter to one of the American captains to be published in America inviting the citizens to come and trade; but the owners said—"No . . . if we allow this to be published, everybody will hear of this place and we shall lose our trade." Reporting that Americans were carrying Zanzibar goods to London from the United States an English magazine noted 'but

¹ Gmitto, 2/87, 98, 99.

² Note from Governor-General of Angola to Minister of Marine and Overseas, 10 May 1832, quoted in Gmitto, Appendix II, 2/200.

³ Cf. 307.

⁴ I.O.R., Letters and Enclosures from Aden to Zanzibar, Secret Dept., 3 of 1860, Rigby, British Consulate, Zanzibar, to Rt. Hon. Charles Wood, India Board, London, 1 May 1860.

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the quarter whence they came was kept profoundly secret by American exporters'. In 1836 the American consul, Captain Waters, and others recently returned from Zanzibar replied to a Boston newspaper's inquiry by asserting that the island was 'on the western coast of Africa . . .'. The *Essex Register* reprinted this article with no comment.¹ It was at this time that, despite opposition from Waters, New York merchants were making a determined effort to displace the dominance of well-established Salem firms. Their competition, soon to be followed by the intrusion of the famous Hamburg merchants—among them Herz and Sons, William O'swald & Company, Messrs. Henzing and Messrs Müller—drove Zanzibar prices to new heights.²

A British captain in the Royal Navy in 1835 estimated that the annual export of ivory from Zanzibar amounted to £300,000. This was probably an exaggeration. The annual export to America, it seems, was between £60,000 and £90,000 and was in part an extension of the Madagascar trade of the Salem merchants. It appears, on reference to the British Custom House returns, that America for three or four years had been sending ivory into Great Britain, which, there seems no doubt, they obtained in Zanzibar and much of which originated in the Portuguese settlements. Extensive consignments of this article were also sent to India and Persia, and directly to England in British vessels. Zanzibar produced cloves and coconut oil, and an abundance of the best description of sugar-cane went waste because the inhabitants were ignorant of its manufacture. The Imam's East African capital was also the coast's emporium for gums, hides, aloes, beeswax, myrrh and tortoise-shell.³ Much of this produce, like ivory, came from Mozambique, while a great deal of the European manufactures sold at Zanzibar were carried, as we know, for hundreds of miles on Bantu heads through the African wilds to be sold in the province of Mozambique at lower prices than if imported by sea and subjected to the Portuguese customs charges. Under the twin stimuli of trade from Mozambique and Sayyid's wise rule Zanzibar became so prosperous that in 1840 the Imam practically took up permanent residence on the island. What is more, it seems that even as early as 1828

¹ Bennett, *Americans in Zanzibar*, 99–101; Clendenen and Duignan, *Americans in Black Africa*, 29–34.

² Clendenen and Duignan, 35–6; Coupland, *Invaders*, 382–3.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 34/2, Copy, Cogan to Gordon, Oriental Club, 9 June 1838, enclosed in Gordon to Backhouse, India Board, 11 June 1838.

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Sayyid was wealthy enough to make some believe that he actually contemplated the use of 'bombs and shells' from the United States to oust the Portuguese provided 'the English Government should not know of his designs'.¹ But this appears to have been a blind to secure aid against the troublesome inhabitants of Mombasa.

Meanwhile, even during the peak of the East African slave trade, the Portuguese never ceased to lament the loss of the trade in ivory. But African middlemen particularly the Yao and the Bisa continued to divert ivory and thus to dictate the nature of the Portuguese export trade. Speculating upon the Portuguese failure to recapture the ivory trade in a region where the Arabs and the Yeke were soon to succeed a commentator has cited their formal approach, their political aims and their social aloofness.² He quotes the words of Gamitto who declared in 1853:

Voyages of exploration in these interior districts of Africa have always suffered opposition from residents of the province interested in the slave trade. Their spirit of intrigue, ambition and rapacity has determined them to raise up all kinds of opposition to anyone who would take on such an exploration, with the aim of discouraging him and making him desist from his intention. These people, living in sloth and indolence, which their wealth effortlessly acquired enables them to do, have been indefatigable in making useless any government measure, or any individual enterprise, which they imagine could influence directly or indirectly their speculative arrangements. As a suitable means of prosecuting this aim they have always taken care to destroy confidence and sow discord among the various superior authorities, with the idea that this state would produce circumstances from which they could profit for the aim they have in view. These people are the main cause of the decadence of Mozambique province; and so long as the slave trade is not completely dead in the territories which constitute it, the province will never be able to enter upon the road of prosperity.³

Gamitto's conclusion therefore was 'that it was the slave trade that made us lose the ivory trade' and he noted that the Bisa 'do not like trading in slaves'.⁴

¹ Bennett, op. cit., 96, 98.

² Gamitto, I, 15, Ian Cunnison notes: The Portuguese 'went there [to Kazembe] not primarily as merchants whose amount of personal gain would be the measure of their success; but they travelled as explorers and diplomats, entering formal negotiations but socially remaining aloof . . . The Arabs . . . created discord and took from it any advantage they could, while the Portuguese were hampered by their wider political aims, their more formal approach and their cumbersome expeditions'.

³ Gamitto, 2/195.

⁴ Gamitto, 1/205.

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Livingstone attributed the pull northwards to the greed of the captains and soldiers and the constant haggling over prices. Lacerda and others had referred to this in the statements: 'In Zanzibar they get more for their ivory' and 'the cloth is better'¹ and the Governor-General of Mozambique in 1816 averred that at Zanzibar the Africans were sure of a fairer deal. In 1819 and 1820 the Governor-General excused himself for not enforcing Lisbon's anti-slave trade measures by avowing that these would increase the pull of trade to the ports southward of Mozambique and to the Arab possessions where a better price was enticing both the Yao and the Bisa to carry not only their ivory but also their slaves.²

Clearly then, even the increased demand at Mozambique and the improved price that followed accentuated and did not stop the flow of trade to Zanzibar. Yet just how low were the prices paid by the Portuguese in comparison with those that could be obtained in Zanzibar is gleaned from the fact that the Arab customs officials at Brava and probably elsewhere were often able to charge higher duties than those decreed by Sayyid. At Zanzibar between 1837 and 1840, the price was dictated by a Banian custom's master, Jairam Sewji and the American consul, Captain R. P. Waters, both of whom paid for the posts they held and were thus entitled to trade. By cornering the market they had been able 'to keep foreign goods scarce' and 'the prices of local goods low through lack of demand',³ though not to the extent of damaging their position in competition with the Portuguese ports.

The redirection after 1760 of ivory and, by the second decade of the nineteenth century, of slaves⁴ from Mozambique to traditional markets at Zanzibar and the Kilwa coast was hastened by many factors. The British measures against the Portuguese slave trade and their delayed action against that of the Arabs cut down the supply. At Zanzibar Sayyid Said's liberal trade policy encouraged better prices and better exchange value. Foremost among the many factors prejudicial to trade in the Portuguese possessions, particularly in the eighteenth century, was friction with the Indians and war with the Makua which disrupted agri-

¹ Burton, 93; A.H.U., Moz., 44, D. de Souza to M. de Mello e Castro, Moz., 22 August 1795.

² A.H.U., Moz., 93, Brito Sanches to Arcos, Moz., 12 January 1820; cf. also Moz., 96. Same to same, Moz., 10 October 1819.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 54/4, Secret, R. B. Nowsworthy to Hamerton, Zanzibar, 7 June 1841; Bennett, op. cit., 104-5. ⁴ 225, 229.

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culture, created famine and prevented traders from the interior from reaching Mozambique. In 1784 it was reported that the Yao 'turned around and took the route to Mombasa and Mafia' with their ivory, slaves, rice and other goods when they heard of the new campaign against the Makua. Hostilities between the Portuguese and the Makua persisted with intervals of uneasy peace even after the 1850s.¹ Restrictive trade practices, high customs dues, jealous reprisals against Indian and African traders and poor quality of cloth at high prices² offered for sale by Portuguese officials were all aggravated by the spoils system. Thus on land the spoils system and at sea the increased demand for slaves, despite the British measures against that trade, helped to make everyone in Mozambique primarily a slave trader.

Mozambique colony was unable to meet its expenses and Portugal received none of the anticipated profits, but East Africa's resources were never questioned. It was firmly believed that if Portugal had the money and manpower to develop the country, untold advantage could result. Meanwhile, the main object of Portuguese policy was to maintain dominion and prevent anyone else from acquiring the hidden treasure. In this task she was encouraged by Britain, who, not without advantage to herself, successfully prevented the intrusion of other powers.

¹ For details on factors prejudicial to trade in Mozambique, particularly in the eighteenth century, cf. Alpers, Chapter III; cf. also 45-7, 76, 80.

² Cf. 144-5.

Chapter Four

THE FRENCH AND THE EAST COAST

East Africa's fate during the series of wars between France and Britain from the middle of the eighteenth century until 1815, was decided not by Portugal and Muscat—the two powers which ruled or claimed to rule the East African shore—but by the outcome of the European war at sea. The contest raged not only in European waters and the Atlantic but also on the Indian Ocean. East Africa was necessarily part of the setting. But the Portuguese, Arabs and Swahili on the coast, like the Bantu in the unknown interior, could not see the French and British warships fighting beyond the horizon. Nor could any of them—except perhaps a few Portuguese in authority—be expected to connect the constant attempts to woo and to win their friendship with the European contest at sea. Unbeknown to its people the fate of Africa was at stake.

Then, as now, most people were wont to regard the vast expanses of ocean as separating and dividing them from other countries rather than as connecting them. But by the strategists of the past, whether Portuguese, Dutch, French or British (as much as by the Germans and Japanese during the Second World War), the sea was seen correctly as one whole with islands and encircling coastlines providing military and commercial bases to guard and feed the traffic routes of the ocean. Among Frenchmen, La Bourdonnais, sent out in 1735 as Governor-General of the Île de France and Bourbon,¹ appreciated the ocean as a strategic link between East Africa and India and both Suffren and Napoleon based their strategy in the East upon it.

[1]

LA BOURDONNAIS

La Bourdonnais was a farseeing strategist and immediately realized the potentialities of the Île de France, the largest of the

¹ Austen, *Sea Fights and Corsairs of the Indian Ocean* (Mauritius, 1934), 2-3.

La Bourdonnais

Mascarene Islands, with an excellent harbour at Port Louis. There he made his headquarters and by his untiring genius converted the island into a great naval base with storehouses, dockyards, fortifications and a reserve of able seamen. He realized that in India itself the French East India Company was less well established than the English Company but that at sea France held the initiative. Since both the Cape and Ceylon were still in the hands of the Dutch, Britain's nearest base on the long route from Europe was at St. Helena. La Bourdonnais determined to exploit this advantage and to open the French offensive in East African waters. He soon proved the island's strategic potentialities. From past experience in the Portuguese service¹ he knew their weak points and was now near enough to Africa to exploit them. 'The Mozambique coast,' he wrote in 1740, 'is one of the richest and most beautiful that exists. If Frenchmen could have it, it would be a Brazilian coast for them.'²

Immediately after his arrival trading relations were opened with the Querimba, or Cape Delgado, Islands and with Zanzibar.³ Indeed, the wealth of Zanzibar at this time appears to have derived from the trade of the French merchants and pirates in slaves and ivory.⁴ La Bourdonnais soon showed that the Île de France could serve another and more immediately useful purpose. In 1740, when war between France and Britain appeared imminent, he obtained from the French East India Company a squadron with which to attack British commerce. Later, the privateers who used the island as a secure base and refuge became the terror of British merchants in the Indian seas.

In 1744, when war actually began, La Bourdonnais received orders not to attack the English as the French Company in India—which, like the English Company, administered both government and commerce—hoped that neutrality could be maintained in Indian waters. The offer of neutrality was of course gladly accepted by the English in India who, however, made it clear that they could bind neither the British government nor the Royal Navy. The arrangement for a local neutrality in the midst of war was in no way unusual, but it killed the French advantage won by La Bourdonnais' forethought. Meanwhile, the British Admiralty

¹ *Biographie Universelle, Ancienne et Moderne*, XXVI, 158.

² *La Bourdonnais, Mémoire des îles de France et de Bourbon*, edited by A. Lougnou and A. Toussaint (Paris, 1937), 78.

³ *Bordalo, Ensaios*, 22.

⁴ Prior, 81.

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sent out a squadron and began to seize French ships between India and China. Not till then did the French Company awake from its illusions. In July 1745 a British squadron appeared off Pondicherry—the political capital of French India where Dupleix, the Governor-General, was stationed. La Bourdonnais immediately seized his opportunity. In 1746 an indecisive action against Commodore Peyton left him the control of the sea, whereupon he attacked Madras, forced it to surrender and to pay a ransom. But his initial success was lost through a bitter quarrel with Dupleix and by a violent gale which wrecked two of his ships, dismasted the rest and forced him back to Port Louis.¹

Dupleix personified the policy of his government and believed in a technique which has become familiar in twentieth-century Africa, namely: that trade and influence, kindness and intimidation, are necessary preliminaries in a struggle to obtain bases and resources. La Bourdonnais, on the other hand, realized that 'the kernel of the question now before Dupleix was not how to build up an empire out of the Indian provinces and races, but how to get rid' of their rivals the English.² Therefore, he aimed at sea supremacy, at dominion based upon free and certain communication with the home country instead of the shifting sands of Eastern intrigues and alliances. He realized that the naval situation in the Indian seas demanded first the disabling of the hostile fleet and next the capture of certain strategic ports. Discord between the two men was inevitable; both were men of genius and both were aiming at the same end but by different methods. The short term result for both men—as for France—was failure.

La Bourdonnais, discredited, spent three years in the Bastille and died an ignominious death. But in the long run his vision was appreciated and Suffren and Napoleon used the base he had created. Yet both realized that not only the Ile de France but the East coast of Africa was necessary to the maintenance of dominion in the East.

[2]

ILE DE FRANCE

Subsidiary to, and yet essentially part of, the Anglo-French contest at sea were the relations of the Ile de France with the mainland

¹ Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* (London, 1890), 273-6.

² Op. cit., 273 *et seq.*

Île de France

of East Africa where the French energetically strove to gain control. In 1754, when France was forced to withdraw for a time from any share of the contest for power in India, she concentrated on rendering the *Île de France* impregnable.¹ This plan was a revival of La Bourdonnais' ideas which had never been entirely abandoned. But while Port Louis was an admirable naval base, the *Île de France* had one great drawback: it was economically dependent on the African mainland for most of its supplies, especially for wheat and slave labour.²

In the early years (1638–1710) when the Dutch occupied the island and named it Mauritius (after their *stadholder* Mauritius von Nassau) they rightly realized that Madagascar was their nearest and richest source of supply. In 1648 the French sent reconnaissance groups to Madagascar. Soon after 1776 they talked of erecting an 'establishment' there.³ But the climate was bad and the inhabitants, not without cause, were persistently hostile. After 1685, and until the beginning of the nineteenth century, Diego Suarez in the north was used as a base by a celebrated group of English, American, Irish, Jamaican and French pirates. In 1700 it seems their trading operations, known as the 'grand round' were organized from New York, Rhode Island, Boston and Philadelphia. Until 1800 their mulatto descendants directed their activities mainly against the Comoro Islands,⁴ and no doubt inspired the Sakalava raids to capture slaves.

Swift Sakalava boats assembled biennially at some northern port, such as Nossi Bé Island off the North-West coast. In the years of great expeditions their boats are said to have carried 15,000 to 18,000 men. Until the mid-1820s when, for a long while, their power was broken, they attacked Portuguese, Arab and French vessels. During the first decade of the nineteenth century a horde of some 10,000 warriors overran Mohilla and Mayotte Islands. In 1808 they struck south and finally attacked the Portuguese settlements at Ibo, the Querimba Islands, and from Tungi even penetrated some distance inland. The alarm for their

¹ I.O.R., Home Misc. Series, vol. 100 (E. Indies Series 8), 209, Extract of letter from the President and Select Committee at Bengal to the Court of Directors of East India Company, 13 September 1768.

² A.H.U., Moz., 46, Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 16 February 1789; Moz., 44, Diogo de Souza to Pinto de Souza, Moz., 28 September 1796.

³ R.H., *Mém. Afr.*, 367, *Manuscrits provenant de Louis de Cart* (J.V. 1804 f. A3), No. 33, *Mémoire sur Madagascar*, undated.

⁴ Toussaint, *Histoire de l'Océan Indien* (Paris 1961), 146–9 and *Early American Trade with Mauritius*, 5; Clendenen and Duignan, 16.

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barbarous hit-and-run raids was sometimes sounded from Zanzibar and was the one unifying factor among Arab, Makua and Portuguese.¹

A certain quantity of foodstuffs was grown on the island of Bourbon. But here, as at the little settlements on Rodriguez and Seychelles, the French were dependent on slave labour from Mozambique or the coast north of Cape Delgado. Inevitably, therefore, the île de France looked for a means to establish better contact with the mainland.

By 1758 maps of Mombasa had been obtained.² In the ensuing years, despite Lisbon's disapproval, the commerce of the whole coast from Mombasa to Kilwa and even southwards at Ibo, Mozambique and other ports, was appropriated by the French based on the islands. But the area between Kilwa and Cape Delgado was badly known and since landings were supposed difficult this part of the coast was left entirely to the Swahili traders who, according to the French, drew 'a prodigious quantity of blacks' from there.³

The Portuguese officials, who failed to enforce their government's embargo on the sale of slaves to foreigners, excused themselves to Lisbon by pointing out that when the French were prohibited from trading at Mozambique and, it seems, expelled from Lourenço Marques, they revenged themselves by disposing of goods to the Bantu at low prices and sold gunpowder and shot — a traffic which was prohibited in the Portuguese establishments for fear of native risings.⁴

Gradually the commercial tie between the French islanders and the mainland became more frequent and profitable. In 1777 a French interloper from Port Louis, by name Morice, boldly submitted to the French authorities a detailed scheme for the commercial exploitation of the whole coast, including Madagascar. Morice's ultimate purpose is well known. It was nothing less than the acquisition of a French empire in East Africa. By the establishment of a base at Kilwa, the appropriation of trade and tolera-

¹ Alpers, Chapter V; cf. also 268.

² A.H.U., Moz., 44, Copy 'Fr^{co} de Cunha e Menezes to Martinho de Melo e Castro, Goa, 10 January 1787, enclosed in Diogo de Souza to Pinto de Souza, Moz., 18 September 1796. For details of French plans based on the Mascarenes, cf. Tous-saint, *Early American Trade with Mauritius*, 4 *et seq.*

³ R.H., *Micr. Afr.*, 367, *Louis de Curn*, No. 31, Observations presented to de Curn to be sent to Mgr. Le Marechal de Castries, Ministre de la Marine, undated, but clearly soon after 1778.

⁴ Bordalo, *op. cit.*, 29.

tion towards Arab religion and customs he planned a great slave trade company operating on a basis similar to that long established between Europe, West Africa and the West Indies.

The French authorities sympathized with the project and said that the Sultan and greater part of the inhabitants desired French protection and that the port of Kilwa at the exit to the Mozambique channel was well placed 'for war' against English ships.¹ But the plan was abandoned for the same reason that Britain—some forty-five years later in the 1820s—refused to consider an almost identical proposal by Captain Owen. Owen's purpose was to help Britain to abolish the slave trade, while Morice aimed at its promotion. But each made the point that the Oman rulers were hated by the Swahili along the coast. However, the main reason for France's and England's refusal to consider the annexation of East Africa, north of Cape Delgado, was the fear of offending the Imam of Muscat and of compromising their good relations with him. He might be only in nominal control of the African coast but he was the gatekeeper to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. The most the French government felt at liberty to do was to take advantage of Morice's arrangements for a regular supply of slaves from Kilwa to the East and West Indies.²

In 1781 Admiral Suffren was sent out with orders to secure the Cape of Good Hope before sailing towards India, his principal goal. At the same time he kept in mind the need for obtaining strategic points on the coast and maintaining alliances with the rulers of the territories enclosing the Indian Ocean. But, like La Bourdonnais and the Portuguese strategists of the sixteenth century, his first step was to defeat the enemy naval forces so as to ensure the uninterrupted passage of his squadron towards the Cape. This he accomplished by the defeat of an English squadron under Commodore Johnstone, not at the Cape but at Porto Praya in the Cape Verde Islands. Thus, in his own words, 'he cut off the root of all the plans and projects of that expedition'.³ With the same object in view the Dutch a century before had attacked Mozambique to ensure the security of their eastern

¹ R.H., op. cit., No. 31; cf. also No. 30, *Observations sur Quilao*, following upon a series of undated communications *sur la navigation de l'Inde*, presented to M. de Curt, *Commissaire du Roi*.

² Coupland, *Invoaders*, 76–83.

³ Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, 424, 427–8, 444–51; Hennequin, *Essais Historiques sur la Vie et les Campagnes du Bailli de Suffren* (Paris, 1824), 34.

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possessions and Almeida had won the Portuguese control of the Indian Ocean by first defeating the Arabs on the African seaboard.

On arriving in Indian waters, Suffren found that the Île de France was the only base left to the French, since by 1779 all their posts in India had fallen to England. When the peace of 1783 defeated his design for obtaining a base in India itself he was once more forced to concentrate attention upon the French islands, and to look to East Africa to render the islands more independent. In 1784 a trading depot or 'factory' was established at Kilwa.¹

The economic dependence of the Île de France upon the neighbouring coasts should have made the island very vulnerable to a power in command of the sea, but the English were very loath to attack, chiefly because of their ignorance of the actual state of the island and the ocean around it. They were continually sending out cruisers from India to gauge the strength of the enemy forces on the Île de France and they jealously watched for any attempt at French expansion on the western side of Madagascar.² The French, for their part, kept a vigilant eye for a possible British project for obtaining a foothold on the smaller surrounding islands.³

The economic connection with East Africa persisted even throughout the French Revolutionary wars, when the coast of Africa acquired added importance as a source of supply. Spasmodic attempts at partial blockade were made by Britain in the early stages of the wars, but on more than one occasion the forces were withdrawn for more urgent business elsewhere. Particularly in the first years the demand upon the British forces in Europe and the West Indies was so great that little protection could be spared for the Eastern seas. For over a year, from September 1793 to October 1794, a single sloop-of-war was all that England

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 44, Copy, Martinho de Melo e Castro to Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque (at Goa), Moz., 5 September 1783, enclosed in Diogo de Souza to Pinto de Souza, Moz., 18 September 1796; Bordalo, op. cit., 29.

² I.O.R., Home Misc. Series, vol. 155 (E.I. Series 63), 126, Directors to Lord Hillsborough, East India House, 8 November 1781; Home Misc. Series, vol. 103 (E.I. Series 11), 13-29, Lindsay to Weymouth, 5/4g, Table Bay, 27 October 1769; 93, Lloyd to Weymouth, Hawke, St. Augustin's Bay, 26 March 1770.

³ I.O.R., Home Misc. Series, vol. 153 (E.I. Series 61), 403, Extract from letter to Chairman of the E.I. Company by a person (not named) employed by the Chairman to obtain such intelligence as could be procured from French officers on parole at Corke, Bandon and Kinsale, sent by Chairman and Vice-Chairman to Sir Stainer Porter, E.I. House, 9 August 1781.

was able to send to the Indian Ocean. Fortunately for the English many of the East India Company's trading vessels were convertible into ships of the line.¹ The *Île de France* was finally captured in 1810 by blockade, the most effective means of injuring it. Up to that time the losses of the English traders in the Indian Seas were enormous. During the first sixteen years the losses were computed by millions, and during the five years from 1793 to 1797 inclusive the French privateers captured 2,266 English merchant ships, while the English captures were only 375.² It was not without reason that an Englishman at this time described the island as the 'spectre' which haunted the counting house, 'the one black spot in the clear blue of the Indian Ocean'.³

[3]

LOCALISM

Cutting across the Anglo-French conflict were the attitudes of the Portuguese and French inhabitants in East African waters.⁴ Like the French, Dutch and English in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, business not nationalism was their primary concern. Collusion between agents of the English East India Company and the corsairs at the *Île de France* was not uncommon.⁵ Because of the small salaries received gain from trade, rather than political considerations, were of first importance. In that distant region of tropical calm and stagnation there was no place for the sentiments of individual liberty and nationalism which in the nineteenth century were animating men in Europe. The vision of the vast majority, whether European, Swahili or African, in so far as they were aware that anything new was happening, was limited by the vastness of the scene and dulled by ignorance, self-interest or sleepy localism. The facts of the situation—that the French base at Port Louis lay, as the gull flies, only 1,150 miles from Mozambique and 1,170 miles from

¹ Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812* (London, 1892), 11, 214-15.

² Malleson, *Final French Struggles in India and on the Indian Seas* (London, 1878), 81, note.

³ Malleson, 155; Norman, *Colonial France* (London, 1886), 45-50.

⁴ These facts are compiled almost entirely from the Portuguese archives; 'There is practically nothing in the Mauritius archives in the way of correspondence between the *Île de France* and Mozambique', letter to author from A. Toussaint, Archives Office, 52, Sir Wm Newton Str., Port Louis, Mauritius, 16 March 1961.

⁵ Toussaint, *Histoire de l'Océan Indien*, 172-3.

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Zanzibar, as against 2,100 from Colombo and 2,500 from Bombay; that the French Navy had developed the base for the express purpose of attacking British trade routes; that the route through the Mozambique channel was second only to the Cape route south of the Île de France and to the northern route from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to Bombay and the Far East; that the Anglo-Portuguese alliance linked Portugal to the enemies of France—all these realities made no difference to the local Portuguese or French colonists. Trade was the very essence of their livelihood and self-interest clashed with patriotism and with the wishes of the corsairs or privateers.

At the outbreak of war in 1794 the Portuguese governor, D. Diogo de Souza, proposed a local neutrality to the French governor, Malartic.¹ De Souza reported to Lisbon that, although no ship of French nationality had called at Mozambique from March 1794 until the beginning of 1796,² no open rupture had occurred and that letters of friendship had frequently been exchanged with the Île de France.³

But not all French opinion sided with Governor Malartic; the corsairs finding plunder more profitable than trade wished for the maintenance of a state of war between the islands and the mainland. From 1794 to 1802 the corsairs captured thirteen Portuguese prizes and twelve in the period 1804–10.⁴ As neither Portuguese East Africa nor the Île de France received any assistance from Europe for at least the five years prior to 1796,⁵ the East African Portuguese were helpless to thwart the corsairs, while Governor Malartic was powerless to interfere with Letters of Marques granted in France. Many corsairs obtained arms in the Seychelles or in neutral Omani or Swahili ports and sold their prizes without even taking them back to the Île de France. On the rare occasions when they were caught even those which were legally punishable escaped since the judge himself, it was said,

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 43, D. D. de Souza to Malartic, Moz., 25 January 1794, enclosed in D. D. de Souza to Pinto de Souza, Moz., 20 September 1796.

² Ibid., and other enclosures. The Colonial Assembly of the Île de France recognized the war between France and Portugal by the decree of 22 Mensidor.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 43, Copy, Malartic to D. D. de Souza, Île de France, le 9 Thermidor l'an 3 de la République Française (27 July 1795), enclosed in D. D. de Souza to Pinto de Souza, Moz., 20 September 1796.

⁴ Figures compiled from Declarations of ship-masters made to the Tribunals acting as *Cours d'Amiraute* before 1810, by A. Toussaint, Archives Office, Mauritius.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 44, D. D. de Souza to Luis Pinto de Souza, Moz., 28 September 1796.

shared in their spoils.¹ Their captured goods were exhibited together with slaves from the mainland and sold at fairs and auctions in the île de France. Omanis, Swahili and Americans frequented the sales and, to the detriment of the English Indian trade, saved themselves the longer voyage by buying cotton, brandy, sugar and other natural products.²

Hence the French islands obtained the best of both worlds—peaceful trading was possible with Portuguese East Africa³ and hostile action could always be disavowed as the work of the privateers. In September 1796 the Colonial Assembly of the île de France affirmed that supplies and ships from the enemy would be welcomed and protected,⁴ and at the same time corsairs attacked Inhambane, Ibo, Pangane (in the Isles of Querimba) and Delagoa Bay.⁵ These attacks were repulsed, but a second assault on the Portuguese factory at Delagoa Bay succeeded. The force was greater than usual and the slaves joined with the French against their Portuguese masters.⁶ The factory was destroyed and the Portuguese dispersed into the interior. The French made no attempt at permanent occupation and the Portuguese reoccupied the place soon after. Such corsair attacks caused the Portuguese governor considerable alarm. At least on one occasion he started inquiries in Lourenço Marques to find the most suitable place for building a fortress, the state of the militia was investigated⁷ and an appeal for ships to protect the coast was made to Goa and to England.⁸

Many years later the Portuguese governor claimed that the

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 46, Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 2 November 1798.

² For some interesting details of conditions and trade in the île de France, cf. R.H., Micr. Afr., 367, Luis de Curt, No. 31.

³ Dr. A. Toussaint is compiling trade statistics from the *actes d'amirauté* which contain references to ships, mainly slavers, plying between the Mozambique coast and the île de France.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 44, Proceedings, *Comité de Sureté Publique de L'île de France, Séance du 29 Prairial, Matin*, enclosed in letter Malartic to D. D. de Souza, île de France, 23 September 1796.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 44, D. D. de Souza to Malartic, Moz., 26 October 1796; Moz., 49, Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 5 November 1800.

⁶ A.H.U., Moz., 45, Letter (undated and unsigned) written by soldiers who were driven out by the French, enclosed in letter from Menezes da Costa to de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 12 December 1797.

⁷ A.H.U., Moz., 46, Baltazar Manoel Pereira do Lago to D. D. de Souza, Tete, 8 January 1797.

⁸ A.H.U., Moz., 45, Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, 2 September 1797.

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French had abandoned their attempt to obtain a foothold in East Africa because he had persuaded them that their forces were insufficient to defend it.¹ This assertion may have been no mere idle boast. In spite of the local fear of a British attack or blockade the French government was at that time withdrawing forces from the Ile de France² and what better moment could the colonists have chosen to ignore their orders from Europe, to take the law into their own hands and to try to obtain a footing on the East African mainland? Their rebellious temper, spurred on by the prevailing differences of opinion between the Governor, the colonists and the corsairs, was further aroused at this time by orders from the home government. The abolition of slavery in the fourth year of the French Republic (1796) produced a riot in the islands. The two commissioners, Baco and Burnel, sent out from France to enforce the decree fled for their lives.³ The colonists, in their fury at this threat to their chief source of labour and trade, were ready for vigorous action and prepared to expatriate themselves or even to surrender to some foreign power.⁴ The Governor of Mozambique believed that Portugal could thus have acquired these islands had she been able to protect them. He emphasized to Lisbon how strong were the economic bonds between them. As it was, he lamented that Portugal's weakness would leave the French 'a prey to the English' whom, significantly enough, he described as 'masters of the Cape of Good Hope'⁵ and not as 'Portugal's allies'—thus betraying where his real sympathies lay. Actually the abolition of slavery was not enforced and thus France did not lose her valuable strategic base through rebellion.

Running counter to these considerations of local neutrality in East African waters was the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. English vigilance for its enforcement in the shape of watchful cruisers

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 50, Menezes da Costa to the Prince Regent, Lisbon, 5 February 1840.

² Ibid.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 44, Pamphlet, *Déclaration des Commissaires de l'Assemblée Coloniale de l'Ile de la Réunion, Port Nord Ouest, Ile de France; le 6 Thermidor l'an 4*. Another printed pamphlet, *L'Assemblée Coloniale de l'Ile de France au corps législatif, Port Nord Ouest, l'Ile de France, le 3 Thermidor, l'an 4*; A. Toussaint and H. Adolphe: *Bibliography of Mauritius, 1502-1956* (Mauritius, 1956), 36-7, No. 5, 264-6, 267.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 45, Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 10 December 1797.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 44, Diogo de Souza to L. Pinto de Souza, Moz., 28 September 1796.

was ever active. No sooner had the Portuguese Governor resumed peaceful relations with the île de France by tactfully assuming the corsair depredations to be 'untoward incidents' than the English Navy produced proof that the Portuguese officials were not playing the game by their ally.¹ To disprove this charge the Governor of Mozambique seized some French trading vessels in the harbour and alleged to the British that he had frustrated a French attack on his territory. A plan for such an attack seems in fact to have been in the air.² This virtual state of war caused the Colonial Assembly of the île de France to send an envoy to Mozambique to negotiate a peace.³ The envoy returned in July 1797 with a draft truce for two years, but the wily French Governor and his advisers refused to commit themselves to a written agreement.⁴ The most they would say was that for the sake of pacific relations and to replenish the supply of agricultural labourers, whose number had been decreased by the war-time interruption of the normal slave traffic, the Governor and the Committee of the Colonial Assembly agreed that no permission would be given for privateering on the Mozambique coast,⁵ that offenders would be punished and prisoners exchanged. In return traders were to continue to obtain foodstuffs and provisions from Mozambique. In this way the administrators boasted that they had shown obedience to the instructions from France and that they had reconciled these with the interests of the colony and the laws of war with the 'Principles of Humanity'.⁶

The Portuguese, on their side, had come to distrust the French. Undoubtedly, wrote the Governor, they would refrain from privateering against Portuguese ships so long as they were convinced that by trading they would derive greater profits. Yet they would not commit themselves in official declarations which might be contrary to the interests of their National Assembly except when it was 'convenient to their interests', and

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 44, D. D. de Souza to Malartic, Moz., 29 October 1796.

² A.H.U., Moz., 45, *Diario do viagem que fago do Porto de Moçambique, a Ilha de França . . . de tratar buona regua entre este e aquela colonia*, enclosed in letter Meneses da Costa to R. Coutinho, Moz., 10 December 1797.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 45, Meneses da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 10 December 1797.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 43, Malartic and du Puy to L. de Souza, île de France, le 15 Brumaire l'an 6.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 45, *Diario do viagem . . .*, op. cit.

⁶ A.H.U., Moz., 47, Malartic and du Puy to Meneses da Costa, île de France, 27 August 1798.

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the facts could be hidden or the 'meaning inverted'. 'They promise a thousand things but always on the understanding that they can find some subterfuge with which to satisfy the National Assembly.'¹ In these circumstances Mozambique decided to match duplicity with cunning and to take all the benefits the French offered 'without compromising' the Portuguese colonists.² Portuguese ships were no longer sent to the French islands for fear 'of any possible repercussions and jealousies on the part of the English'. But French ships, especially slavers, were allowed into Mozambique under neutral colours, and their papers were given only perfunctory examination.³

To explain such incidents away the Governor could claim to encourage trade with the French would give even the pirates an interest in seeing that nothing detrimental befell Portuguese East Africa. Whereas if the weak Portuguese outposts made enemies of the French, in revenge they could incite to mischief the Bantu and the Swahili,⁴ both of whom were unfriendly at times.⁵ Secondly, French vessels at Mozambique were useful since they could always be used to serve as hostages to satisfy the British.

To a second or third generation of Portuguese East Africans, most of them only partly Portuguese, personal gain naturally outweighed national interest. Distance, the lack of news and communication made Portugal seem part of a legendary European world. Seldom did more than one or two brigs from Lisbon call at Mozambique in a year. Since the war made it unsafe to send letters round the Cape of Good Hope, they were usually sent via Goa to Bombay, and from there they joined the English mail to Bussora and were carried overland to London. The Portuguese Plenipotentiary in London then communicated with Lisbon.⁶ News from Portugal by the same route took six months or more to reach Mozambique, and from there it again took some weeks to

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 45, Menezes da Costa to R. Souza Coutinho, Moz., 10 December 1797.

² In September 1797 it seems, according to the Mauritius archives, one Joaquile Moures, described as 'an agent of the Portuguese nation sent by the Governor General of Mozambique to represent Portuguese interests in the French island', arrived at Port Louis. No such person is mentioned by the Portuguese.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 45, Menezes da Costa to R. Souza Coutinho, Moz., 10 December 1797; see also Moz., 46, Same to same, Moz., 16 February 1798, and 2 November 1798.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 46, Lacerda e Almeida to Governor of Moz., Tete, 30 June 1798.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 45, Diogo de Souza to (?) Lisbon, Moz., 28 September 1796.

⁶ A.H.U., Moz., 46, Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 16 February 1798.

Localism

reach the subordinate governors. Understandably, therefore for the average citizen, whether French or Portuguese, the wars in Europe aroused little sentiment or patriotism except where their individual interests might be affected. Even at the Cape of Good Hope, a direct point of call on the route to the East, this indifference prevailed. As late as 1812, an English visitor to Table Bay remarked that 'from what I can learn the Boers, so long as they can sell their cattle to advantage and remain exempt from strict legal restraints, care little whether the English or Chinese possess the town'.¹ People in a new country were too busy striving with the difficulties inherent in carving a future to worry about authority thousands of miles away. Moreover, to follow the intricacies of Portugal's political relations was hardly possible in what was then darkest Africa and the colonists could rightly claim that they did not always know when they were actually at war with the French.

Torn between England's battleships and Napoleon's armies, Portugal herself constantly wavered in her policy towards England. A strong pro-French party and a thicket of intrigue surrounded the decadent court in Lisbon, where Queen Maria I hovered between lucid intelligence and complete insanity. Her son, D. João, soon to become Prince Regent, small, fat, silent and irresolute, apparently happiest in the company of his servants, appears to have been the one person at Court who continually favoured England. But he was only too glad to escape from the unpleasant realities around him.² In 1793 Portugal joined Spain in an invasion of France, but, by reason of her English connections, was excluded from the Franco-Spanish treaty of 1793.³ The next year the pro-French party secured a treaty⁴ with Talleyrand which closed Portuguese ports to Great Britain, but England obliged the Portuguese government to abrogate the treaty, and in 1797 hostilities threatened once more between Portugal and France.⁵

In that year the Governor of Mozambique, Menezes da Costa, believed the French were unaware that he had any express commands to consider them as enemies.⁶ Again, when instructions

¹ Prior, 11.

² Fugier, *Napoléon et l'Espagne, 1799-1808* (Paris, 1930), Part I, 143.

³ Treaty of Aranjuez (see Martens, *Recueil*, V, 475).

⁴ Martens, *ibid.*

⁵ Fugier, Part IV, 57-64.

⁶ A.H.U., Moz., 43, Menezes da Costa to de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 10 December 1797.

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from Lisbon specifically commanded the adoption of a hostile attitude towards the French, paper instructions could easily be avoided; to stave off a possible rebuke there were a number of excuses and stock practices. The Governor's appointment was for only three years and if he asked for an explanation on a particular instruction it took most of that time to receive a reply.¹ Mozambique had strict injunctions not to molest neutrals; on at least two occasions the Governor had been seriously rapped over the knuckles by Lisbon for seizing neutral ships, and both the Consul-General for the Duchy of Tuscany and the American Vice-Consul at the Ille de France had been vexed.² The Governor found it convenient to utilize this reprimand. This was easy because the problem was further complicated by the occasional arrival of enemy ships flying neutral colours. These were often indistinguishable from genuine neutrals, so that in fact the Portuguese themselves were sometimes taken in.

The admission of foreign slavers, forbidden by the laws of Portugal even in peace-time, was of course a little trickier to handle. But the Governor and his subordinates circumvented the law by pleading that 'the exigencies of state required it'. In this way they could ingeniously fall back upon their right to exercise their 'legitimate discretion' and refrain from examining cargo lists. In 1799 the King again granted the Governor permission to trade with the French provided he assumed full responsibility for the security of the state.³ Thus, finally, opportunism and expediency prevailed over policy and theoretical considerations.

This local neutrality between Portuguese East Africa and the French islands illustrates the limitations imposed on men's minds by local conditions. Then, as now, personal considerations were uppermost. Portuguese and French alike were too far removed from the main centres of the great events remodelling the world and were without the inspiration or leadership of any outstanding figure of imaginary vision.

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 46, Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 2 November 1798.

² A.H.U., Moz., 45, Hill (American Vice-Consul) to J. Moraes Rego Lisboa (envoy from Mozambique), Ille de France, 23 October 1797 and Rego Lisboa to C. de Belgrom (Consul-General of Tuscany in the Indies), Ille de France, 28 October 1797, both enclosed in Menezes da Costa to Souza Coutinho, Moz., 12 December 1797.

³ Cf. 86.

More Designs on Portuguese East Africa?

[4]

MORE DESIGNS ON PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA?

In 1798 Bonaparte startled the world by his arrival in Egypt. No one in Whitehall anticipated this attempted seizure of Egypt, still less the plans for a French conquest of India.¹ Ireland and Portugal had been deemed in jeopardy, but this new move shifted the centre of European attention from West to East. The Indian Ocean and its comparatively unknown and forgotten western coasts acquired new political significance. Bonaparte's realization of the strategic requirements for his plan, indeed, recalls the projects of La Bourdonnais and Suffren, which so closely resemble those of Almeida and Albuquerque nearly three hundred years before. It was still true that control upon the land, at least in regions distant from Europe, depended upon control of the sea, and this Bonaparte tried to achieve by a slightly different method of approach.² He attacked British naval power, not in the waters to the east of the Cape of Good Hope, as Suffren had done, but in the Mediterranean. Conquest of Egypt, which faced both the Mediterranean and the Eastern Seas, would mean control of the great overland commercial route. That route had lost most of its value by the discovery of the way round the Cape and more by the unsettled and piratical conditions of the seas through which it lay, but with a really strong naval power occupying the key position, it might be restored. Leibnitz had proposed this plan to Louis XIV a century before.³ 'Whoever has Egypt,' he had warned, 'will have all the coasts and islands of the Indian Ocean.' It was logical that now, thirty-five years after the humiliating terms of the Seven Years War, France once more surveyed the strength and resources of Egypt and soon looked farther to Arabia, the cutting of a canal through the Isthmus of Suez and even to a commercial system radiating through the Indian Ocean, as a means of retrieving her losses of 1763 in Asia and America. Ever since that time French agents in an almost constant stream had passed to and from Egypt, and in 1785 a secret Treaty of

¹ Rose, *William Pitt and the Great War* (London, 1911), 368.

² Dr. Holland Rose, in a personal communication to the writer, suggested that the resolve of the French in 1793-5 to control or conquer the Dutch Netherlands turned largely on their owning South Africa and the Spice Islands.

³ Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, 106-7, 141-2.

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Amity was concluded with Cairo 'to undercut British trade pursuing the longer route round the Cape'.¹

Bonaparte hoped to accomplish the complementary part of this vast plan, namely, the control of strategic points on the Indian Ocean's western seaboard, by the co-operation of the Arab sultans, whose sympathies he tried to win for the French. This broad outline of Bonaparte's schemes is in the main well known, but it is not generally realized that French control of the East African coast formed a necessary part in the wider scheme of displacing the newly consolidated British power in India.

In January 1798 Tipu Sahib, the warlike ruler of Mysore, planning to drive the British from South India by French help, appealed to Governor Malartic of the île de France, to send to the Malabar coast a 'mighty force of French, Malagasy and Africans'. Clearly, if such a plan were to be realized French control of East Africa was essential, for presumably slaves from there—however ineffective as soldiers—would have been the chief source of the invader's manpower. Moreover, the strategic links uniting the Western coast of the Indian Ocean into a political unit still retained their significance and may best be illustrated by the following quotations from British and Portuguese communications of the time.

The first, written in code at some date between 1799 and 1804, is taken from a letter suggesting measures which should be taken by the troops at Goa to defend the port against a French attack. 'Your Lordship,' it says, 'wishes me to state without reserve any measure which appears to me likely to frustrate the supposed designs of the French.' Then, after pointing out the political and commercial significance of gaining control of Goa and perhaps of Damão and Diu, it continues: 'Should there be any appearance of the French attempting to come down the Red Sea, it may become a matter of question whether the Portuguese fort of Mozambique should also be reduced, an enterprise which might early be accomplished from the Cape.'²

The second quotation is from a letter of August 1799 from the Governor of Mozambique to the Portuguese Foreign Minister in Lisbon:

It is true that, if the Coast of Malabar fell into the hands of the French, they would immediately think of taking possession of the

¹ Coepland, op. cit., 86-7.

² B.M., Add. MSS., 13, 703, part of an undated, unsigned and unaddressed letter in code, possibly written immediately after Napoleon's expedition to Egypt.

More Designs on Portuguese East Africa?

Portuguese establishments on the East Coast of Africa, as they depend entirely on these for their commerce in the two principal products, ivory and gold, which these colonies furnish in exchange for their goods.'¹

The next quotation is from a letter from Thomas White of the Bombay establishments. Writing to the Bombay government in May 1799 he says:

The principal object of my address is to intimate the suggestion leading to the cession of Goa to the English, an event which I conceive to be highly important to the interests of the Company . . . assuming, therefore, our possession of Goa in a political point of view, we should in all human probability be masters of the Malabar coast, which would render abortive the attempt of any foreign nation to obtain any influence and benefit from or to afford any assistance to those native powers so contiguously situated to our dominions.²

Bonaparte himself had unwittingly reminded the British of the importance of maintaining the friendship of the native rulers of these coasts. On his return to Cairo in 1799 he dispatched letters which were intercepted by the British agent at Mocha and in due course were read with more than usual interest in Bombay, Calcutta and London. To the Imam of Muscat and Tipu Sahib in India he wrote assuring them of French friendship and offering them 'delivrance and alliance from the iron yoke of England'; to the Sheriff of Mecca he declared friendship and paved the way for an eastern move. Nor did Napoleon's schemes end there. His plans were cast with a perception that strategically the Middle East was not to be seen in isolation from the shores and islands of the Indian Ocean. There was a letter to the île de France, informing Governor Malartic of the occupation of Suez by a French garrison. About this time Malartic confirmed by a gift of artillery and ammunition the old entente with Muscat.

The great French plot against Britain stood revealed. It needed a shock no less violent to open British eyes to their danger. Muscat was close to the Red Sea and commanded the entrance to

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 47, G. Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 12 August 1799.

² B.M., Add. MSS., 13, 703, Papers and letters relative to the Portuguese affairs in East Indies, 1798-1804, 3 vols. White to Duncan, Resident and Governor in Council, Bombay, 30 May 1799.

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the Persian Gulf. The friendship of the Imam, whose influence as we have seen was predominant on the East Coast of Africa north of the Portuguese settlements, was of considerable importance to British interests in India. The British in India and the Portuguese in East Africa could not know that at that moment the silent continuous pressure which sea power applies was sapping the strength of the French designs. They heard of Nelson's victory at the Battle of the Nile in August 1798 because the news of the French disaster spread like wild-fire across the Indian Ocean.¹ But the decline in French naval power was not immediately apparent. Since France could not send regular forces to the Eastern seas, added importance attached to the privateers to carry on French designs² so that to the men on the spot in those distant regions French activity actually seemed to be on the increase. Not only did the privateers continue to prey upon British and Portuguese merchant ships so that the Governor of Mozambique had to apply to the Cape for assistance,³ but rumours of plans to attack the surrounding coast were constantly reaching Mozambique. Whether because of these or because of the evidence that the Portuguese were continuing their practice of receiving French trading vessels, the vigilance of the English increased, and in 1799 *L'Oiseau* from the Cape was sent to cruise against the privateers in the Mozambique channel.⁴

The records of these early French activities are difficult to find. Although of no great service to France, they were an added annoyance to England. That they existed even on the East Coast of Africa there are definite indications. Admiral Rainier in September 1799 informed the Bombay Council that 'about the 10th of July a ship privateer sailed, mounting twenty guns, commanded by Mulraux; she was bound for Delagoa Bay for the purpose of taking the whales there, and from that she would attempt to take a Portuguese port in the Mozambique channel and if they succeeded they would oblige the inhabitants to garrison

¹ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 75, No. 42, Duncan to Secret Com^{tee}, Bombay, 3 November 1798.

² I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 75, No. 42, Duncan, Pirett and Page to Secret Com^{tee}, Bombay, 29 January 1799 (describes French intrigues at Muscat, etc.).

³ A.H.U., Moz., IV, Menezes da Costa to Major-General Dundas, Moz., 3 July 1799.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 48, Ross to Menezes de Costa, Castle of Good Hope, 5 September 1799; Linne to Governor of Mozambique, H.M.S. *L'Oiseau*, Moz., 5 July 1799.

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the place'.¹ This news was immediately imparted to the insurance offices in Bombay²—the pulse which recorded war pressure.

Lisbon warned the Governor to be ready for a sudden attack by the French or Spanish, as it was feared these two nations were working together.³ Local rumours of French designs on Inhambane, Sofala and Delagoa Bay, 'with a view of taking temporary possession', increased the Governor's fears, and he appealed to the Cape for assistance to convoy Portuguese merchant ships to India.⁴

These attacks did not materialize. But the fact that they were contemplated illustrates how closely the fate of Portuguese East Africa was bound up with the European struggle. These plans set the île de France as a centre of action and intrigue within the strategic unit of the Western Indian Ocean and link the African seaboard, as a part however unimportant, to events in the Middle East and to the wider setting of Napoleon's vast eastern schemes.

The signing of the preliminaries of the Treaty of Amiens in October 1801, and the peace that ensued, left the situation in East African waters practically unchanged. Britain, it is true, when the Revolution triumphed in the low countries, had seized the Cape, Ceylon and Malacca, but now the British at the Cape were again preparing to evacuate in favour of the Dutch, while the île de France in the western Indian Ocean and Java in the East still lay at Napoleon's disposal. In India, France regained Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Mahé and two or three Bengal villages: of these the first was the seat of the French government and their only fortified town. Thus France regained her military base in India itself. The news of the ratification of the treaty in March 1802 was quickly followed by rumours of war. But subsequent events did not directly affect East Africa because Bonaparte's dream of an eastern empire was shattered. While Bonaparte was determined on this project, whether as an object of immediate conquest or with a view to the ultimate destruction of Britain's Indian interests,

¹ I.O.R., Bombay P. & S. Proc., Range 381, VI, 5186, Extract of Intelligence from Mr. Ferguson, who was an officer on board H.M.S. *Endeavour* captured by *La Forte*, enclosed in letter from Rainier to Bombay, 2 September 1799.

² Ibid., note on letter.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 47, Meneses da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 12 December 1799.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 47, Same to same, Moz., 10 November 1798.

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the political history of the Indian Ocean and its seaboard was determined by the situation in Europe. The outcome of the European wars was necessarily decisive in determining the future of India, the Cape of Good Hope and the East Coast of Africa. This wider issue was admirably illustrated by the British Secretary of State for War and Colonies, Lord Castlereagh, in a review of the 'Relative Political Situation of Great Britain and France', written after the definitive Treaty of Amiens. Since then the names of the combatants have changed, but his reasoning is not inapplicable to the period just before the Second World War and even to the present time.

If the policy of France should be to aim at an extension of both her continental, maritime and colonial authority [he says] it threatens equally the safety of the continental and maritime powers, and though her mode of acting may affect the one description of interest more immediately, at any particular time, than the other, yet both will be affected in their turn. This consideration and still more, the importance of not suffering France to separate the continental from the maritime contest in point of time, ought to make both England and the continental powers desirous of accommodating their views . . . If . . . France, more jealous of our maritime and colonial importance, should by annexation of territory in Europe to that of her own, or by placing Bonaparte at the head of the government of Holland, or by separate treaties with those states dependent upon her, endeavour to get a more direct control over the navies, ports and colonies of Spain, Holland and Portugal, than she at present possesses this operation could not be a matter of indifference to the continental powers, even with a view of their own safety. Can we rely, however, on their acting with us in such an event? Or can we afford to postpone the maritime struggle till we can obtain a continental co-operation?¹

The strength and foresight of Castlereagh's reasoning is revealed by the First Consul's secret instructions, dated 15 January 1803, to General Decaen who, with Admiral Linois, set sail from Brest in March 1803, destined for the Eastern Seas via the Cape, ostensibly to take possession of Pondicherry.² According to these instructions, issued while England, Central Europe and France were officially at peace, 'one of the first cares of the Captain General' was 'to gain control over the Dutch, Portuguese

¹ Letters and Dispatches of Viscount Castlereagh, 2nd series, V, 29-32.

² Rose, *Life of Napoleon*, I (London, 1913), 376.

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and Spanish establishments and their resources'.¹ The First Consul, as Castlereagh divined, had become emboldened to grasp at maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean by the hesitancy of Addington's weak ministry.

Bonaparte's term 'Portuguese establishments', although not clearly defined, must have included the East coast of Africa—a surmise which would seem to be confirmed by a report written by Talleyrand to Napoleon in 1802 in which, describing the importance of Muscat to the greater French scheme, he emphasizes that Muscat also had territory 'on the coast of Mozambique'.² Compared with Macao and the Portuguese possessions in India, this coast, it is true, held no particular attractions to the merchants of Europe. But to the strategist there were other and more important considerations than trade: while the monsoons in the Indian Ocean could render the dispatch of fleets in certain directions impracticable for months at a time, it was essential to have a dispersal of strength—a reserve of mobile forces which could be utilized with the change of season—and so ultimately preserve superiority wherever needed.³ The Portuguese admirals Almeida and Albuquerque, at the very beginning of the sixteenth century, had been the first to realize this. And indeed, the First Consul's design of occupying strategic points in the Indian Ocean might well have been based on Almeida's or Albuquerque's scheme. The library which he studied on his voyage to Alexandria shows the strong trend of his thoughts towards history.⁴ It has not been possible to find out whether the books included accounts of the early Portuguese exploits. But just as the Portuguese generals in the sixteenth century had realized the strategic value of Muscat, so now Bonaparte's emissary, M. de Cavaignac sailed with General Decaen and Admiral Linois' expedition for the express purpose of winning the Imam's friendship for France and, if possible, remaining there as French resident—a matter of considerable importance to East Africa because of the Imam's possessions in those waters. Soon there was positive proof that both La Bourdonnais' dreams for the role of the *Île de France* and Morice's plans for the African mainland had their place in the broader French scheme for the whole of the Indian

¹ Prentout, *L'Île de France sous Decaen* (Paris, 1901), 29.

² Coupland, op. cit., 102.

³ Ballard, 125.

⁴ Rose, op. cit., 185; Taffanel de la Jonquiére, *L'Expédition d'Egypte, 1798-1801*, I, 663; *Correspondance de Napoléon I* (Paris, 1838-69), No. 2458; unfortunately none of these gives a complete list of Napoleon's library.

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Ocean. From the Cape, de Cavaignac wrote to Malartic's successor, Governor Magallon at the Île de France, and inquired about the openings for trade at Kilwa, Mombasa and Zanzibar, and he asked 'could the Imaum be induced to grant a French concession on the East African coast?'

Meanwhile the British at Bombay had spared no effort to keep abreast of what was happening. Only two months after the French expedition left Brest the Bombay Council reported that the French frigate *Atlanta*, one of Linois' squadron, had attempted 'to plant' a confidential agent and establish a factory in the Imam's territory, that there was another French agent on board destined for Persia and one for Bushire, and that a large French vessel had arrived off the coast of Guzerat²—again proof that the French never lost sight of the whole western seaboard as a strategic unit. Rumours of French activities poured in and were finally confirmed by the Imam himself.³

On arriving at Pondicherry, Linois found that the news of the renewal of war between England and France had already been received. The English commander consequently refused to hand over the town to the French admiral, and thus the longed-for base for the renewal of the struggle in Indian politics was lost to the French—a result which was of far-reaching importance not only to India but to the whole of the Indian Seas. Admiral Linois quarrelled with Decaen, the new Governor of the Île de France and, since he could not use that island as a base, he was compelled to retire to the Cape,⁴ which was still in the hands of the officials of the Batavian Republic, for the second British occupation had not yet taken place. Decaen, therefore, was left to win the East African littoral by diplomacy rather than by force. In this he was naturally encouraged by the businessmen in Port Louis to whom the maintenance of the French trade, and of the slave trade in particular, along the coast was as vital as ever to the economic life of the Île de France. That the people of Mozambique were partial to the French was no secret, but during the peace

¹ Prentout, 335; Coupland, op. cit., 103.

² I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, Vol. 93, 341, Bombay Council (three signatures) to the Secret Committee, Bombay Castle, 14 May 1803; *Letters and Dispatches of Viscount Castlereagh*, V, 191, Megson to Lovett, Muscat, 4 October 1803.

³ Castlereagh, op. cit., V, 203, translation of a letter from Seyud Sultan to Seton, Muscat, 22 October 1803.

⁴ Parkinson, Edward Pellow, *Viscount Exmouth, Admiral of the Red* (London, 1934), 330.

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of Amiens French traders had been outrivelled at Mozambique by American, Dutch and British so that some French merchants were once more recommending a station north of Mozambique, in Kilwa or Zanzibar as a first step towards the acquisition of the whole coast. But for fear of arousing the suspicion of his enemies Decaen did nothing openly.

Like his predecessors he pursued a delusive policy of fostering friendship. In October 1803 he informed the Governor of Mozambique of his desire to maintain amicable relations during the war between France, Holland and England which had just been renewed¹—a policy which he was compelled to continue even after hostilities between France and Portugal had been resumed in Europe. With Lisbon's consent and orders the Governor, though suspecting French motives, reciprocated this friendliness and at the same time took what precautions he could against an attack.² He was often uncertain whether Portugal and France were at war, for the tension between the two countries increased or lessened according to the varying complications of European diplomacy.

A brief description of these complications is essential to an understanding of the situation in East Africa. In 1800 Lebrun told João, now Prince Regent ruling in place of his demented mother, that France would conquer Portugal. The next year, the replacement of the Francophil Czar Paul by Alexander I, whose neutrality gradually gave place to hostility, rendered it less necessary to respect Portuguese independence in deference to Russian opinion.³ The strategic position of Portugal in the peninsula and its trade with England could no longer be overlooked. Moreover, the conquest of Portugal would be some compensation for the Egyptian failure.⁴ Consequently Napoleon peremptorily demanded an indemnity, the cession of the Guianas and the exclusion of British ships from Portuguese harbours.⁵ These demands were rejected. Spain, at Napoleon's request, then waged a 'war of oranges' upon her neighbour and by the Treaty of Badajoz

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 57, Royal Decree of 3 June 1803.

² A.H.U., Moz., 58, Izidro d'A^{ss} Souza e Sá to Anadia, Moz., 12 November 1803; Moz., 59, Izidro d'A^{ss} Souza e Sá to Felix Lambert de Sá Bandeira, Moz., 24 October 1803.

³ Grant and Temperley, *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London, 1933), 122–3.

⁴ Fugier, I, 255.

⁵ Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, VI (Paris, 1921), 106.

in June 1801, compelled Portugal to close her ports against the English.¹

The terms were not severe enough for Napoleon, who insisted on a second treaty promising an increased indemnity, further territorial cessions and French military control of Portugal.² England, fully occupied with Egyptian and Indian affairs, was unable to do more for her ally than contribute towards the payment of the indemnity.³ By the Treaty of Amiens the integrity of Portuguese territory was guaranteed by England, but without any practical effect; the French did not return the gains in Guiana, nor did Spain relinquish the territory won by the Treaty of Badajoz.⁴ The news of this treaty would hardly have arrived in Mozambique when the rupture between France and Britain in 1803, again raised the problem of Portuguese neutrality, which was proclaimed by João in June of that year.⁵ In addition, remembering the outcome of the 1801 affair, João prohibited the entrance into Portuguese ports of privateers, war vessels and prizes—a stipulation detrimental to England's interests.⁶

In September 1803 Spain under the influence of Talleyrand proposed to force Portugal to send a large subsidy to France. This and other demands were debated for months. Finally, it was announced that João would prefer war if he could count on the aid of Great Britain. But French diplomacy finally triumphed over England when in December 1803 João secured the guarantee of France to Portuguese neutrality by signing a convention whereby the former agreed to convert the obligation of the Treaty of Madrid (September 1801) into a subsidy of 6 million francs.⁷ Lannes, the French minister, wrote: 'I have buried the English influence in Portugal.'⁸ Quite sure that his country had escaped the war, João dismissed the 'affairs of Europe from his mind, and the Portuguese nation rejoiced in the prospect of peace'. In Mozambique the Governor was less certain of the colony's fate, but two things allayed his fears—the Prince Regent's concurrence on the question of the trade with the

¹ Sorel, op. cit., VI, 153; Martens, Recueil, Supp. 2, 340; Rose, op. cit., 311.

² Sorel, op. cit., VI, 175; Martens, op. cit., 539.

³ Manchester, *British Pre-eminence in Brazil* (Chapel Hill, 1935), 55; Cobbett Debates, XXXVI, Speech by Hawkesbury, 665, and Addington, 667-8.

⁴ Martens, Recueil, Supp. 2, 566. ⁵ Martens, Recueil, Supp. 3, 536. ⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Sorel, VI, 527; Pereira da Silva, *História da Fundação do Império Brasileiro* (Rio, 1864), I, 57-61.

⁸ Fugier, 258.

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French islands¹ and General Decaen's continued declarations of friendship.²

While Decaen was pretending to be so friendly to the Portuguese, the French did not relinquish their designs on the East Coast of Africa. Of these the British were informed by the agents of the East India Company stationed at Muscat, Mocha and other important points on the sea and land routes to India. Reports of the French intrigues were received at Bombay and transmitted to the head offices in India House, Leadenhall Street. In 1804 a private communication from Kilwa stated that H.M.S. *Dedaigneuse* had captured *L'Espegli*, a French privateer from the Île de France.³ Of the Île de France itself constant reports were forthcoming, for in 1805 Admiral Pellew, in charge of the British naval forces east of the Cape, had arranged a cartel with General Decaen for an exchange of prisoners.⁴ The French at the end of 1805 were reported to be 'throwing supplies of provisions' into the island 'much beyond the stock of its ordinary garrison'.⁵ This information corroborated previous news to the same effect received from the British Consul at New York.⁶ A letter from Mocha showed fears of a French attack and stated that the Île de France was 'expecting seven sail from Europe and that their government had consequently bought up all the cordage, canvas and naval stores'.⁷

In May 1806 the French from the Île de France were reported to be attempting to form a permanent establishment in the Arabian Gulf.⁸ Sayyid Mahomed Akil, 'thought to be a French agent', previously engaged in trade between the Île de France and the Red Sea, purchased the island of Cameron. This island was

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 58, Izidro d'A^{da} Souza e Sá to Anadia, Moz., 12 November 1803.

² Ibid.; also Decaen to Izidro d'A^{da} Souza e Sá, the Île de France, 28 Ventose, d'an 12; Moz., 70, Same to same, the Île de France, ? Germinal, l'an 12.

³ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 96, 1, Bombay Council (three signatures) to Secret Committee, Bombay, 10 January 1804.

⁴ Parkinson, *Pellew*, 334.

⁵ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Bombay Council (three signatures) to Secret Committee, Bombay, 7 September 1805; vol. 96, Same to same, 1 October 1805, 227; 28 November 1805, 235; 11 January 1806, 265.

⁶ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 96, 227; Bombay Council (four signatures) to Secret Committee, Bombay, 1 October 1805.

⁷ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Bombay Council (four signatures) to Secret Committee, Bombay Castle, 1 October 1805.

⁸ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 96, 317, Bombay Council to Secret Committee, Bombay, 10 May 1806; 11 July 1806, 333; 12 August 1806, 347; and 27 December 1806, 403.

considered by the British Agent to be the most eligible site for a commercial settlement in that region.¹ In August the French were known to be intriguing at the Persian Court.² In September the Île de France was said to be preparing an attack on Bombay, third in rank among the presidencies of the East India Company, and the principal British naval station in the Indian Ocean. Further, the French and Spanish were reported to be contemplating a combined attack on Bombay, Goa and Ceylon,³ while the Sultan of Muscat lent colour to the rumours by sending an agent in December to ascertain how far he might rely on the British government against the French. In these revised French schemes Decaen, upon Napoleon's advice, had tried to incorporate Madagascar. Might that huge island not become a centre of trade with Mozambique, Muscat and Surat, providing the timber for ships and the warlike Malagassies forming an army against India? A fleet based on its ports would cut British communication with the East.⁴ But again the climate and the suspicious attitude of the natives often at war with each other were persistent obstacles to the growth of closer relations and to permanent French settlement.

All these rumours, in the year of the Trafalgar campaign, indicate that the rendezvous of Villeneuve in the West Indies and the attack on England was not the only plan considered by the French strategists. They suggest an alternative to the invasion of England—a possible plan for bringing an overwhelming naval force to crush British power in the East. The Bombay authorities were certainly thrown into a state of consternation which at first sight seems unfounded. The English naval forces in the Indies were, compared with those of the French, overwhelming. They were designed to encounter not what the French actually had in those seas but what they might be expected to send there. It was anticipated that, since Napoleon's Indian design through Egypt had been frustrated, he would send a naval expedition via the île de France and Bourbon. Britain, it is true, was in control of the

¹ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 96, 317, Bombay Council to Secret Committee, Bombay, 10 May, 1806.

² I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Bombay Council (four signatories) to Secret Committee, Bombay, 29 September 1806.

³ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Bombay Council (four signatures) to Secret Committee, Bombay Castle, 28 November 1805; Same to same, 11 January 1806.

⁴ For details, cf. Coupland, op. cit., 122-3, and Prentout, 459-60.

More Designs on Portuguese East Africa?

Mediterranean and could check any French attempt made by land. If, however, an expedition of eight or ten thousand men sent via these islands met no interruption in its progress from Europe, once the troops landed the British would have insufficient force to combat them.¹ In addition, if the French could win the friendship or support of the native rulers on the western seaboard the dangers to the British position in India would be very grave.

There were other sources of disquiet as well. Quarrels and jealousies in the government at home had resulted in a division of the East India command which temporarily endangered the whole of the British possessions in the East.² In India itself the Marquis of Wellesley was employing a great number of troops against two Indian Princes who were said to be intriguing through the Portuguese at Goa with the French against Great Britain. Bombay complained that 'owing to the absence of many troops on service in the north of India and that of the King's fleet in the Eastern seas' their numbers were too small to protect more than one settlement at any time.³ Would the attack fall on Goa or on Bombay? It was impossible to safeguard both at the same time. The Bombay government was distracted. Whenever rumours of imminent attack were received orders were issued for the removal of troops from Goa to Bombay or *vice versa*; when the attack failed to materialize these orders were countermanded and the uncertainty persisted.⁴

In the interval history had provided another example of a naval battle in one part of the world closing or opening far distant areas to conquest. Admiral Horatio Nelson's great victory against the Spanish and French fleets at Trafalgar off the coast of Spain, re-established British control of the traffic-ways of the sea and therefore frustrated the French designs for occupying Portuguese territory in East Africa and for gaining control of the Cape and India. The effect of Trafalgar and the resultant pressure which the British were able to exert were not realized at the time because

¹ *Letters and Dispatches of Viscount Castlereagh*, VIII, 162, Boyle to Melville, Berkeley Square, 19 March 1803.

² Parkinson, *Pelorus*, 326.

³ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Bombay Council to Secret Committee, Bombay Castle, 11 January 1806, para. 2.

⁴ I.O.R., op. cit., Same to same, Bombay Castle, 28 November 1805, para. 3. It is interesting to note that these fears about the French activities in the Ile de France and in the Red Sea, as well as the complaints against the Marquis of Wellesley arrived in England at the very time when his policy was warmly discussed in Parliament and might well have helped to fan feeling against him.

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men's vision was blinded by the dazzling victories of Napoleon's armies, which like those of Hitler in 1940-1, were overpowering Europe. Pitt, the great British statesman, bid his contemporaries roll up the map of Europe, since it would 'not be wanted these ten years'.

As each country fell an easy prey to the French, Napoleon's triumph seemed to become more complete until within five years of Trafalgar practically the whole of Europe was under his sway. But in the East dominion still depended upon the command of the seas and victories on land without control of the ocean routes which feed the land were bound to be short lived. At the time it was not realized either in London, Bombay, Port Louis or Mozambique that, by Nelson's victory, command of the Indian Ocean had fallen to Great Britain. The pressure of British naval power in Europe and elsewhere prevented France, so long as the war lasted, from attempting to carry out the Eastern dreams of her great strategists, La Bourdonnais, Suffren and Napoleon, which so closely resemble those of the great Portuguese generals before them.

Chapter Five

THE BEGINNINGS OF BRITISH INTEREST IN EAST AFRICA

The course of events in Europe during the period 1806-10 awakened official British interest in East Africa and gave explicit recognition to the importance of that shore in British foreign policy. With Napoleon's armies marching from victory to victory only a few thinkers and patriots remained confident that the storm, which started as a battle for liberty but had led to the subjection of nations and peoples to an autocratic ruler, would pass. In England at the beginning of 1806, Pitt, who had resumed power in 1804 as Napoleon's most determined and most capable enemy, was on his deathbed. General concern at the 'dangerous state of public affairs' was reflected in Parliament where the topics of the day most warmly discussed were the need for improving Indian commerce, the policy of the Marquis of Wellesley who, to the immediate detriment of the East India Company's finances, was making new conquests rather than safeguarding existing territory, and finally the abolition of the slave trade. These different and seemingly disconnected issues were intermixed and the passing of the years was to fuse them into one great movement resulting in ideas of territorial expansion and colonization. The British government was not, however, bent on imperialist designs in East Africa. The Home government consistently refused to extend colonial rule and the acceptance of increased territorial responsibilities was slow, haphazard and unpremeditated.

Since the loss of the American colonies the balance of British interest had been shifting from West to East. More and more the strength and wealth of Britain was thought to depend on the maintenance of a foothold in Asia. With the markets of Europe in jeopardy the expansion of overseas trade was daily becoming more essential. The finances of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies were in a precarious state,

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owing chiefly to the unexpected prolongation of the wars. Already there were those who argued that the British share of Indian commerce was an inadequate recompense for the manpower and wealth annually expended for the support of dominion in India.¹ Abolition of the slave trade was, of course, a completely different issue. But, because the trade of the African coast east of the Cape fell within the Company's monopoly and because some of the India House officials not only were interested in but also actively concerned with the humanitarian movement, these two problems, so diverse in nature, necessarily became linked. To try to separate them is like trying to unscramble an omelet. To say that trade came first and the influence of powerful evangelical and humanitarian ideas came second is to underrate the sincerity of an influential and growing section of the British conscience of that day. Pitt had preached as earnestly as the Clapham Sect and numerous other bodies of zealots—such as the Wesleyan and Calvinist Methodists, the Baptists, the Evangelical Clergy and the Laity to mention only a few—that legitimate trade was the sovereign remedy for the slave trade. If opportunities for legitimate commerce were afforded the slave trade would die. Hence, here was an instance where God and mammon could be served simultaneously.

The Chairman of the East India Company in 1805 was Charles Grant. He was an humanitarian and the intimate friend of Wilberforce, Henry Thornton and other philanthropists.² Grant had constantly laboured for the evangelization of India. He was one of the founders of the Society of Missions to Africa and the East, and as early as 1799 had become one of its governors. During eighteen years service for the Company in India he had acquired an intimate knowledge of the people and believed that only by embracing Christianity could they attain real happiness.³ Although perhaps not 'the real Ruler of the Rulers of the East',⁴ Grant exercised a powerful influence in Leadenhall Street and in political circles. He was the only person to be taken into consultation by

¹ Cobbett, *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. VI, 25 February 1806, 212; 14 March 1806, 434; Anon., *Tracts relating to the East Indies, 1784-1807*, No. 4, 83-8 (Letters intercepted on board the *Admiral Aplin* captured by the French . . .).

² Morris, *The Life of Charles Grant* (London, 1904), 168; Memoir by Thomas Fisher (*Gentleman's Magazine*, July-December 1823), 561-9; Higginbotham, *Men Whom India Has Known* (Madras, 1870), 152.

³ Morris, 192, 213.

⁴ Kaye, *Administrators of the East India Company* (London, 1853), 632.

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Pitt and Dundas in 1792 over the revenue settlement in Bengal, and his hand drafted the all-important dispatch on Indian revenue, which was sent from the Board of Control and signed by Dundas as President.¹ In 1805, when parliamentary discussion of the Company's trade threatened its very existence, Grant was one of its staunchest defenders.²

Grant's influence was of considerable importance to East Africa. British interests in East Africa were nominally controlled by the Court of Directors of the East India Company who retained authority in commercial affairs within the area of the Company's activities.³ Political matters were dealt with by the Board of Control—a committee of the Privy Council whose communication with the Governor-General (appointed by the Cabinet) was through the 'Secret Committee' of three directors of the Company. Until 1834 the Court was divided into twelve major committees, one of which, concerned mainly with shipping, was known as the 'Committee of Secrecy'. The Secret Committee was closely in touch with the government through the Board of Control and had considerable influence on government decisions and framing of policy, though it was not always in complete agreement with the Board. It is important for our purpose to note that Castlereagh, when he was head of the Board, frequently gave way to the Secret Committee and that there were occasions (such as between 1806–7) when the conduct of the Secret Department was left to the Committee.⁴

Associated with Britain's political, economic and philanthropic interests were those of science and the exploration of the African interior. In 1787 the Emancipators themselves, with Granville Sharp at the head, had created the colony of Sierra Leone. A year later the Association for the Discovery of Interior Parts of Africa was formed. Men such as Ledyard, Hornemann and Mungo Park were to make historic the Society's achievements in exploration, but never for a moment was the encouragement of British commerce forgotten. By the turn of the century the need for economic expansion and the desire for opening up and civilizing

¹ Morris, 170.

² Cobbett, VI, 25 February 1806, 212; *Tracts relating to the East Indies, 1784–1807*, No. 3 (Sir Philip Francis, *Observations on present state of East India Company*), 30–1, 36.

³ Auber, *An Analysis of the Constitution of the East India Company* (London, 1826), 188–91.

⁴ C. H. Phillips, *The East India Company, 1784–1834* (Manchester, 1940), II.

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Africa had become part and parcel of one movement, and had given birth to colonies of commercial and military value in West Africa. In East Africa the same influences were at work.

No one has explained with greater clarity than Sir Reginald Coupland the growth of this multiplicity of influences affecting British policy at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But he fails to show that already in 1807, at a time when, as he says, 'East Africa was a backwater, its political importance secondary . . . the resources of its hinterland unknown', that coast, nevertheless, had become a part of British Indian policy. He describes the rumours of the possibilities of trade with East Africa and he records that in 1792 there had been some clamour at a public meeting in Liverpool, presided over by the local Member of Parliament, when a series of resolutions protested against the continuance of the East India Company's monopoly in the East because, among a number of weightier reasons, the Company had done nothing for 'opening new sources of traffick on the Eastern Coast of Africa'.¹ He concludes that 'these Liverpool business-men, eager to beat the Company with any stick they could lay hands on, probably knew nothing of conditions in East Africa or of what the value of its potential trade may be'. He continues, 'there seems indeed to have been practically no British trading in East Africa at all—at Zanzibar or Kilwa or Mombasa or Pate'.² Commenting on the years until 1811 he says, 'there seemed to be no political interest involved, no need for new strategic acquisitions, no tempting prospect of commercial expansion . . .'. But perhaps because he was mainly concerned with the coast north of Cape Delgado he failed to find the correspondence containing plans for the reduction of Portuguese East Africa in 1807.³ Nor had he consulted the East India Company's annual reports written by the Reporter-General on External Commerce both at Bombay and at Surat or the seventy-six volumes of the Commercial Proceedings of the Bombay Council on matters affecting trade covering the years 1786–1836. These reports cast new light on the whole picture of the British Indian trade connection with East Africa.

¹ Coupland, *Invasions*, 160.

² Coupland, *op. cit.*, 161.

³ Cf. 151–3.

Trade between British India and Portuguese East Africa

[i]

TRADE BETWEEN BRITISH INDIA AND PORTUGUESE
EAST AFRICA

Bombay's position half-way down the Indian Ocean seaboard gave it both commercial and strategic importance. The East India Company stationed its navy there, so that observation could be kept on French activities in the western Indian Ocean. The port was also the distributing centre to the East coast of Africa, Arabia, the Red Sea and Persia. The correspondence from Bombay to the home authorities is therefore voluminous and important in considering events in these regions.

Prior to 1773, when the Austrians were ejected by the Portuguese,¹ it seems the English had carried on a valued trade with the Portuguese ports particularly with Delagoa Bay. Gold dust and elephant tusks, received in exchange for piece goods generally in the form of coarse blue cloth, brass bangles and common glass beads, quickly enriched the merchants of Bombay and Surat. Thereafter the Portuguese tried to keep exclusive possession of the trade at the Bay by constructing a fort. How much the English at Bombay resented the Portuguese measure to guard their government's monopoly is shown by the words of the Reporter-General on External Commerce at Bombay who reported, 'they [the Portuguese] then began to perceive the great advantage of that trade [with East Africa] . . . and thus, as it were, in an instant was Bombay deprived of a most valuable branch of her external commerce'.²

As we shall see elsewhere, at the end of the eighteenth century the Portuguese were temporarily ousted from Delagoa Bay first by the French and then by the Bantu. The English at Bombay at once used the occasion to send a vessel to trade there.³ No further attempt by the English appears to have been made until after the Napoleonic war, but Parsees from Malabar continued to trade English manufactures for East African products at Delagoa Bay and elsewhere on the East African coast. At the Bay, these were generally sold or bartered at shops or stations on the shores and

¹ Cf. Chapter Six/2.

² I.O.R., Bombay Com., E. and I. Reports, Range 419, vol. 40, 1802-3, Report on External Trade, 40, 1 September 1803.

³ Cf. 190-1.

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banks of rivers in the territory of the several Bantu chieftains.¹ English and American whalers also frequented the coast² and presumably carried on some trade. Later on, it was common for slavers, especially from Brazil, to disguise as whalers. To prevent this foreign trade, plans were discussed, and the king actually authorized the Portuguese to train Africans as whalers and manufacturers of whale oil. But fifty years later in 1840 the project had still only reached the discussion stage.³

The value of the trade connection between the British settlements in India and Portuguese East Africa is impossible to gauge, partly because by far the greatest section of it was of a clandestine and indirect nature. Compared with the British China trade or even with the imports from the Red Sea into Bombay and Surat (which on an average of four years ending 1805–6 amounted to £331,175 and the exports to £174,339)⁴ the East India Company's trade with East Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century was of course a mere trickle. In the Bengal accounts the trade with the Portuguese East African ports was so small as to be included with that of other places on that coast. At Fort St. George (Madras) and at Bombay, according to one contemporary, the trade was large enough to warrant the keeping of a separate account.⁵ He gives figures according to which in 1805 these two settlements imported approximately £17,530 worth of goods from Mozambique, while £5,392 worth of goods were exported from St. George to Mozambique and £36,866 from Bombay.⁶

But in the India Office papers now available trade with Mozambique formed a separate heading only in the Surat accounts. At Bombay the trade with the whole of the East coast of Africa was

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 85, Woodhouse to Warden, Bombay, 11 June 1816; Milburn, I, 36.

² A.H.U., Moz., 44, D. de Souza to M. de Mello e Castro, Moz., 22 August 1795.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 49, F. G. de Carvalho Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 19 October 1800; A.H.U., Moz., 96, Royal Letter, Rio, 25 June 1818; Moz., IV, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 2 October 1840.

⁴ I.O.R., Home Misc. Series, vol. 494, 519, Ramsay to Fawkester (Lords of Council for Trade and Foreign Plantations), E.I. House, 24 December 1807.

⁵ Milburn, I, 60.

⁶ *Ibid.*:

Imports into Bombay and Fort St. George from Mozambique	140,285	sicca rupees
Exports from Fort St. George to Mozambique	45,134	" "
Exports from Bombay to Mozambique	294,924	" "
(1 sicca rupee equalled approx. 2s. 4d.).		

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grouped together.¹ The Portuguese, it seems, preferred to trade with Surat—higher value was placed on Mozambique ivory,² the monetary exchange rate seems to have been more favourable than at Bombay³ and Portuguese goods carried in Portuguese vessels were charged a reduced duty of 2½ per cent.⁴

Milburn describes this direct trade as being ‘carried on by vessels under Portuguese colours and Anglo-Indian or English country ships’.⁵ His statement is confirmed by an examination of the Mozambique, Bombay and Surat shipping lists which show that the vessels engaged in the trade were mostly under British colours, and that of the few Portuguese vessels the majority were not from Mozambique but from Goa, Lisbon or Brazil. At the same time a closer study of these shipping lists reveals some interesting subterfuges and peculiarities in trading practice. It soon becomes clear that the number of British ships at anchor in the harbours of East Africa was no indication at all of the amount of trade carried on between British India and East Africa. For example, between 1802 and 1817 at least three, and sometimes five or six vessels under British colours were annually mentioned particularly from Surat, as going to or coming back from Mozambique.⁶ Nevertheless, the Mozambique shipping lists hardly ever recorded the entry of a British ship.⁷ During the same period only four vessels under Portuguese colours were recorded as calling at Bombay or Surat. For these discrepancies there were two reasons: the first and less obvious explanation is that many vessels which traded in British Indian ports under British colours were actually owned by Omani, Swahili or other Indian Ocean folk. These ‘English Arabs’, as they were called had found in the course of their trade connection with the British ports that British shipping enjoyed certain legal advantages which were withheld from foreigners. In order to share in these privileges, these ‘Arabs’ came to reside in a British port, took out

¹ I.O.R., Bombay Com., E. and I. Reports, Range 419, vol. 40, 1802-3, statements on total merchandise exported from Bombay and from Surat.

² Milburn, I, 62.

³ I.O.R., op. cit., vol. 41, 1 September 1804.

⁴ F.O., 63/1080, Saidanha to Granville, Lisbon, 23 October 1872, discusses ‘Pirman privilege’ granted by Emperor of Delhi to Portuguese factory at Surat.

⁵ Country ships or *wallabs* usually built at Bombay or Calcutta, were engaged in the ‘country trade’, i.e. from one coastal port to another, from the African coast to China. Cf. Toussaint, *Histoire de l’Océan Indien*, 170-1.

⁶ I.O.R., op. cit., vol. 40, 1802-3, and vol. 54, 1817-18.

⁷ A.H.U., Moz., 92, List of vessels entering and leaving the port of Mozambique, Moz., 31 December 1817 and 1819.

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a British pass for their ships, hoisted the British colours and thus assumed for themselves and their ships a psuedo-British nationality. They were encouraged and protected by the English Company in the belief that their commercial wealth would benefit Great Britain.¹ But because they were never truly domiciled they had great advantages over British merchantmen. In time of peace they sailed at less expense, and by that means frequently deprived British ships of their freight by underbidding. In time of war they alternately used the British and 'Arab' flags, as interest and circumstances dictated.² Thus an Arab ship flew a British flag in Bombay and an Arab one in Mozambique. Hence, it would be British when it left and Arab when it arrived at Mozambique where, naturally, the latter flag was found more convenient owing, during the war, to the proximity of the French islands; after the abolition of the slave trade, to the unpopularity of the British colours. Still today Arab ships do not like to be identified too closely and their names vary from time to time depending on where they are.³

The second reason for so few British merchantmen calling at the port of Mozambique was that, although it was contrary to law, they preferred to trade with the subordinate ports where 'duties' in the form of bribes were preferable to the exorbitant customs toll enforced at Mozambique—a practice which was encouraged by local officials. It seems, and this is particularly interesting in the light of later Anglo-Portuguese negotiations, that Delagoa Bay was particularly preferred. A general report of September 1803 on the external commerce of Bombay discusses under the heading 'Mozambique' no other trade than that which had been carried on at 'De la Goa' Bay, clearly illustrating that it was the trade with this port that was most valued. The report emphasized that if 'there existed no legal exclusive right with the Portuguese, or that no treaty with that nation directly excluded British ships from trading there', it would be valuable to the trade of Bombay 'that the existing difficulties were removed'.⁴

In addition to the direct trade carried on by vessels under British and Portuguese colours, much of the merchandise from

¹ I.O.R., Bombay Com., E. and I. Reports, Range 419, vol. 40, Report on External trade, 1 September 1803; see also vol. 41, Report for 1804.

² I.O.R., op. cit., vol. 40, 67.

³ Alan Villiers, 'Sailing with Sindbad's Sons', *National Geographic Magazine*, vol. XCIV, No. 5, November 1948.

⁴ I.O.R., Bombay Com., E. and I. Reports, Range 419, vol. 40, Report for 1802-3.

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British India bought through the Company and nominally said to be destined for Zanzibar, Muscat, Damão, Diu and Goa, in reality did not go there at all or if it did these places were used only as transit ports *en route* to the Portuguese East African coast and its hinterland. This indirect trade with East Africa was facilitated by the capture of the *Île de France* in 1810, after which date British exports from India to that island showed a remarkable increase.¹ There is no doubt that a large part of these goods sent to the *Île de France* found their way to Mozambique. The most important export from the *Île de France* to the West Indies and the coasts of the Indian Ocean was in slaves from Portuguese East Africa purchased with goods obtained from British India. This indirect trade again was not carried on by Portuguese or British merchantmen but by what the Bombay Reports describe as 'Arabs'. These seem to have been chiefly Omani, Banians and Swahili, the latter being in the reports described as 'Zanzibar Arabs'. These goods for this indirect trade were not purchased openly from the Company; they were bought clandestinely from British officials or weavers in the employ of the Company.

The indirect Omani-Swahili and Banian trade was commonly carried on in small craft called *dhows* or *dingeys*, which came with cargoes to the market at Bombay. There the owners purchased the produce of Bengal and the East with which to supply the whole coast of Arabia.² During the French wars this 'Arab' trade was greatly extended. The Imam, perceiving the advantage of his neutral flag, purchased captured British prizes from the French; and the British, anxious to retain his friendship, gave his subjects the protection enjoyed by Britishers, and permitted them to build ships in British ports equal to their own.³ Previous to the wars Muscat possessed only two or three old ships purchased in British ports, but by 1803 the Imam owned fifty fine ships of 300-800 tons. The Arabs no longer bought the bulk of their merchandise from Bombay, but direct from Bengal or Madras, where dates and other Arabian goods, obtained by them at no expense, were exchanged for Bengal grain and British merchandise. In consequence—so the Reporter-General on External Commerce at

¹ I.O.R., Bombay Com., E. and I. Reports, Range 419, vol. 48, 1 September 1812, vol. 49, 1 September 1813, vol. 34, 1817-18.

² I.O.R., Bombay Com., E. and I. Reports, Range 419, vol. 40, Report on External Trade, 1 September 1803, 33.

³ *Ibid.*

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Bombay lamented—Muscat, which was destitute of manufactures and had scarcely any produce, bid fair by 1803 to become the ‘most considerable port of Western India’, a proud pre-eminence long since enjoyed by Bombay. As the shipping of the Imam’s subjects increased, the British gradually lost all the advantages of the carrying trade and these ‘Arabs’, says the report, ‘even come to our ports and take the freight of our own trade from us as they can afford to do it at one-third of what a British ship can’. Muscat and its colonial port Zanzibar threatened to grow rich on the ruins of British commerce and to become not only the entrepôt for the Gulf but ‘the mart of the whole Erythrean Sea’, that is, from the ‘stop of the gulphs’ to the islands of Ceylon and gascar.¹

In this way the subjects of the Imam became the _____ of British piece goods and other articles from British India. Although by 1809 the political power of Muscat had been considerably reduced by the pirates in the Persian Gulf,² there is no reason to suppose that the Arab commercial monopoly on these coasts had been diminished. For some time the British did nothing about it, but in 1809 one of the avowed purposes of the agents on the Red Sea was to break the ‘maritime Arab’ monopoly of the flourishing trade in the Arabian Gulf, for it was found that the ‘Arabs’ were purchasing a great deal of their goods from the île de France, to the detriment of the British trade.³

These ‘Arabs’ controlled most of the coasting trade of East Africa north of the Portuguese settlements, as well as an extensive commerce with Mozambique and its subordinate ports. The slaves, ivory and other East African merchandise, obtained in exchange for British Indian goods, were frequently taken by them, tightly crammed in *pangaios* (small vessels in which the planks were fastened with ropes instead of nails),⁴ to Muscat’s colonial dépôt, Zanzibar. This place was acquiring importance as a foreign mart, partly because of the exclusionist policy of the Portuguese and partly because navigators, by going there, were able to avoid the

¹ I.O.R., Bombay Com., E. and I. Reports, Range 419, vol. 40, Report on External Trade, 1 September 1803, 55; also vol. 41, 59.

² I.O.R., Bombay P. & S. Proc., Range 383, vol. 5, 3340, Seton to Malcolm, 50 March 1809.

³ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Bombay Council to Court of Directors, Bombay, 14 October 1808.

⁴ Owen, *Narrative of Voyages to Explore the Shores of Africa, Arabia and Madagascar* (London, 1853), I, 74.

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difficult currents and variable winds which, during certain months, were met in the Mozambique channel.¹ The French from the île de France, busily engaged until 1810 in antagonizing the inhabitants north of Mozambique against the British, were frequent visitors there.² As noted elsewhere the Bantu from the hinterland of the Portuguese ports also often chose to make long journeys to Zanzibar.³ The goods thus purchased at Zanzibar would not appear in the East India Company records as exports to Portuguese East Africa.

The importance of this indirect 'Arab' trading connection between British India and East Africa was probably only exceeded by that of the trade carried on by the Banians. These Indian traders were responsible for most of the activity in the British Indian settlements and were important ship owners both in Muscat⁴ and in Mozambique.⁵ The British, indeed, preferred selling to Banians rather than to Turks or Arabs, since if a Banian became bankrupt his friends would help to pay his debts to prevent his imprisonment or torture, which neither the Turks nor the Arabs would do for their countrymen.⁶

The Banians in Mozambique, involved in the network of clandestine trade, were usually servants of Banian merchants from Portuguese India especially from Damão and Diu or less frequently from Goa, who in turn were commercial agents for other Banians or Indians and 'Arabs' born or established in the British possessions and, consequently, considered as 'vassals' of Britain. Bombay Castle seems to have been thoroughly aware of the illegal activities of the Banian agents in British India who were supposed to buy their cloth through the Company's agent at Bombay and Cutch. In practice, he was often by-passed and the goods were obtained clandestinely. In 1800 Bombay Castle took active steps to stop the leakage of goods through indirect channels. The Company's commercial resident at Surat was given authority 'to place peons upon' weavers failing to deliver by a stipulated

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 44, D. de Souza to Pinto de Souza, Moz., 25 October 1796.

² Ibid.; Prior, 69–81; P.R.O., Ad. I/63, R. 122a, Remarks by Tomkinson, H.M.S. *Calicut*, enclosed in Bertie to Croker, H.M.S. *Boadicea*, Table Bay, 20 May 1810; Ad. I/62, R. 74, Report by Fisher, H.M.S. *Racibras*, Kilwa, 8 October 1809, enclosed in Bertie to Pole, Table Bay, 11 January 1810.

³ Cf. 94; also A.H.U., Moz., 44, D. de Souza to M. de Mello e Castro, Moz., 22 August 1795.

⁴ I.O.R., Bombay Com., E. and I., Reports, Range 419, vol. 41, Report on External Trade, 1 September 1804, 54.

⁵ Cf. 79. ⁶ Milburn, I, 100.

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period the cloths for which they had engaged and 'to prevent their disposing to others either the labour or the produce engaged to the Company'. This was intended to stop, as much as active interference could effect, 'the prejudicial and unfair competition of the Portuguese', who were said 'but seldom to enter into contracts with the weavers and manufacturers or to advance much of their money, but generally to go to market with cash in hand', or to make agreements 'with Parsees and Banians residing at Surat'. The Surat Indians then employed underbrokers to buy up the piece goods and convey them clandestinely to their warehouses.¹

To prevent the 'scandalous' practice of rendering the cloth unfit for the Company's investment, to which the manufacturers were tempted by the high rates paid by the Portuguese agents, as well as to prevent the debasement in 'the fabric of the cloths' in general within the towns of Surat, an officer of police appointed to make a daily inspection of the looms of all manufacturers. But the practice went on and the officials of the Company continued to express their perplexity that the Portuguese could afford to give such high prices for inferior goods and yet carry on their trade to such advantage while 'our Company would seem by the latest advices from England to lose by their commerce in several of these fabrics'.²

The explanation was really quite simple. The Parsee and Banian underbrokers sent these inferior goods overland, together with other sundries procured by the masters or the wives and families of the Mozambique Banians, to be loaded at Damão and Diu (which were closer to Surat than to Goa and Bombay), whence Banian ships took them to East Africa. Transmitted to Mozambique in March, at the end of the North-East monsoon, probably after the East India Company's March sale, they were bartered at exorbitant rates with the Bantu of the interior or given on credit to the Portuguese, whose *musambashe* or native commercial agents usually resold their purchases to the Bantu for ivory, the best Mozambique money (usually in the form of Spanish silver coins), slaves and other African exports.³ The consumers or buyers of these foreign goods were the Bantu, who paid the high

¹ I.O.R., Bombay Com. Proc., Range 419, vol. 66, 1347, Duncan, Carnac and Page to Seton and Commercial Board at Surat, Bombay Castle, 24 December 1800.

² Op. cit., vol. 67, 7 January to 26 June 1801.

³ A.H.U., Moz., VII, No. 182, R. L. d'Abreu de Lima to Secretary of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs, Moz., 15 March 1845. For details on Company's sales, see Milburn, I, 60 *et seq.*

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prices and were the real losers in these transactions. Consequently they often preferred to buy at Zanzibar.¹ The Banians received their ivory payment in August or September, probably in time for transmission by the South-West monsoon to Damão and Diu and from there to the Company's September sale. The only part of this wealth, therefore, which remained in Damão and Diu was the commission due to the agents, the main sum being forwarded to British officials. The Company itself gained little or nothing from this trade, while Damão and Diu remained as poor as the Portuguese East African towns.²

The Banians, Swahili and Omani Arabs were not the only neutrals who, during the wars, benefited from captured British goods. The most serious competition faced by the British export trade was that of the United States. The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation with the United States, signed in 1794 and renewed at the end of twelve years,³ granted reciprocal reduced duties. Owing to the state of war, which had been almost continuous throughout the whole period of the Treaty, the Americans benefited most by this arrangement and their trade increased rapidly after 1793. Like all neutrals trading from Britain's East Indian ports with Europe and America they had great advantages over the Company and British traders engaged in Indian commerce.⁴ In addition to enjoying greater safety, the Americans owned vessels of exceptional speed and until 1807⁵ they had the added advantage which accrued from their war-time role as receivers of the booty pillaged by French privateers.

Their voyage to China was nearly always round the Cape of Good Hope⁶—those who crossed the Pacific were mostly fur traders or pirates—and it usually led them near the île de

¹ Cf. 93–4. ² A.H.U., Moz., IV, No. 28, Marinho to Bomfim, 3 October 1840.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 93/8, 3A, 19 November 1794; 3B, 31 December 1806, Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 63/59, No. 19, Board of Trade to Canning, 3 August 1808, enclosed in Canning to Strangford, F.O., 6 September 1808; Cobbett VI, 14 March 1806, 434. According to Toussaint the first regular American expeditions to the Indian Ocean and China commenced in 1784. They first touched at the île de France in 1786; cf. *Histoire de l'Océan Indien*, 179–80. Clendenen and Duignan, 16, records that 'A New York merchant named Frederic Philips is said to have outfitted ships for slaving and piratical voyages to East Africa and to Madagascar and other Indian Ocean coasts and islands during the later years of the 17th century and the early part of the 18th.'

⁵ Toussaint, op. cit., 180. In 1807 President Jefferson proclaimed an embargo on American ships trading with the Mascarene Islands.

⁶ Quincy, *The life and Journals of Major Samuel Shaw* (Boston, 1847), 118–19.

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France. When they did not call there, they generally called at Batavia. During the war they often found it more profitable to stop at the Île de France than to go farther eastward. The French privateers were always overstocking the market at Port Louis with their plunder, and consequently East Indian goods were usually far cheaper there than at Calcutta or Canton. This necessarily followed from the fact that goods found in English prizes were often quite useless to the colonists and, even where the cargoes would have been valuable in France, there was often no way of sending them there. This was where the Americans drove their bargains. They bought up the plunder at anything from a third to two-thirds of its cost price and saved themselves the trouble of going farther afield. The goods were sometimes sold in East Africa, but more usually they went to the United States or Hamburg.¹ Sometimes they reached their original destination—London—where the United States scored the added advantage of low custom duties. The Americans, it will be seen, played an essential part in the French privateering activities. Without their purchase of the plunder, privateering would hardly have paid. More than that, their trade during the early years of the war enabled the Île de France to defy both England and France.² But even after the capture of the Île de France, they had for a time the advantage of greater safety than the British. And indeed, through the whole century, although they had no territory in the East, their ships were to be found everywhere. Britain's ever-increasing desire was to thwart their rivalry.

Not only the Americans were attracted to East African waters. There are indications that by 1807 the profits of European trade with East Africa and the potential markets in the deep interior were being increasingly sought after by other foreign merchants. No wonder then that British merchants were again resenting the East India Company's monopoly which prevented them from taking their chance in this little-known continent. Might not the needs of the unseen consumer in the African interior prove a heaven-sent opportunity, especially at a time when Napoleon's continental system had added the economic conflict to the European contest on land and sea and boycotted British goods on the continent? That the Directors of the East India Company even

¹ Parkinson, *War in the Eastern Seas, 1793-1815* (London, 1934), 46; J. R. Spears, *The Story of the American Merchant Marine* (New York, 1910), 106-17.

² For details, cf. Toussaint, *Early American Trade with Mauritius*, 2 et seq.

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at this time prized their connection with East Africa was clear. In 1807, when a London merchant, William Jacob, applied for leave to open up trading relations 'to Abyssinia and the Eastern part of Africa',¹ the application was at first opposed on the grounds that it would interfere with the Company's monopoly in East Africa and also with the trade carried on between the British Indian settlements and the Portuguese ports on the South-East coast of Africa.² Finally, however, in December 1807, the Bombay Council under pressure from the government³ agreed that William Jacob should receive a private licence 'to open a new branch of trade from England to the Eastern part of Africa'. Such an infringement of its monopoly was, of course, unknown in the annals of the Company, and the Directors did not fail to stress this fact. But their consent was given because of a desire not to oppose any measure which had a slight probability of giving a new opening 'to . . . trade'.⁴ On this particular occasion, Jacob's application was not only timely but the arguments used were extremely cogent. Jacob stated that the trade was chiefly in the hands of Arabs and that no less than twelve American vessels had visited some of the ports in the year 1804-5.⁵

A plea by a British merchant to counter the competition of neutral ships was bound to receive sympathy at Whitehall. It met both a short- and a long-term necessity. Britain was concerned not only to relieve the depressed state of her export trade but also to make some provision for the time when the blockade of Europe would end and competition from other nations would have to be met in Brazil and the East. The East India Company had goods in its warehouses worth millions which, as one of the Company's champions explained, it was 'unable to sell in the peculiar circumstances of the time'.⁶ To counter the Company's

¹ I.O.R., Home Misc. Series, vol. 494, 509-16, Jacob to Rose, Dartmouth Street, 1 December 1807 and 12 December 1807; also P.R.O., B.T. 1/37, M. 49, Enclosure in letter from Jacob to Rose, Dartmouth Street, 18 December 1807.

² I.O.R., op. cit., 319, Ramsay to Fawkener, Lords of Council for Trade and Foreign Plantations, E.I. House, 24 December 1807.

³ I.O.R., op. cit., 505, Fawkener to Chairman and Deputy Chairman of E.I. Co., Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade, Whitehall, 17 December 1807.

⁴ I.O.R. op. cit., 525, Ramsay to Fawkener, East India House, 24 December 1807.

⁵ I.O.R. op. cit., 509-16, Jacob to Rose, Dartmouth Street, 1 December 1807 and 12 December 1807; also P.R.O., B.T. 1/37, M. 49, Enclosure in letter from Jacob to Rose, Dartmouth Street, 18 December 1807.

⁶ *Treats relating to the East Indies* (Sir Philip Francis, 'Observations on the present state of the East India Company and considerations on the trade with India', 3, 7).

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debts the Directors were concentrating on increasing investments and sales. War losses were a further source of embarrassment. Between 1803 and 1809 French privateers operating from their base in the *Île de France* and Bourbon sank 15,000 tons of the Company's shipping in the Indian Ocean.¹ In return for reduction of loans the Directors agreed to place their ships at the service of the Navy and to allow direct trade between Africa and North and South America and also between the Cape of Good Hope, New South Wales and Ceylon.² The rapid growth of American trade between India and Europe and the alarming decline in the Company's home sales had long been observed with increasing dissatisfaction. The whole question of the merits of this trade were being investigated. Charles Grant maintained that the Americans had violated the spirit of the Jay Treaty of 1794 which had aimed at excluding a circuitous conveyance of Indian products in American ships to Europe. This pact had lapsed in 1806 and had not been renewed.³ Grant claimed that for the remainder of the war, the Americans' East India trade ought to be subjected to extra duties to enable the Company and British merchants to compete on equal terms. This policy, carried out in a high-handed manner, had alienated the United States.

There were those who opposed Grant's policy and attitude 'at a most critical moment when it was doubtful whether peace could be maintained with America'.⁴ But, however much they argued and abused him, what Grant said at this time was usually carried. In 1807 he was the dominant figure at India House. He described himself as possessing 'unbounding influence in the Court of Directors', and between 1804 and 1809 he was elected to chair one or other of the important Committees five times.⁵ In April 1807 he demonstrated his power by utilizing his personal influence to return two of his own nominees as Directors. And this at the very time when the policy of the Secret Department was practically left to the Secret Committee.⁶

While the Directors were quarrelling over Grant's proposals against the American carrying trade he revealed that his main aim was to recapture markets taken from the Company by the Americans and to wrest from them their share of the carrying trade from India.⁷ It so happened that politics in Europe seemed to play into Grant's hands. In the European situation he saw an

¹ Philips, 155.

² Philips, 156.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Philips, 157.

⁵ Philips, 154.

⁶ Cf. 155.

⁷ Philips, 151.

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obvious opportunity for combining his 'main aim' with another purpose dear not only to him but to his Deputy Director, Edward Parry. Parry, like Grant, was not only a member of the Clapham Sect but also a man whom a fellow-director described as having 'infinite kindness in his character and mad only upon one subject — religion'.¹

How much Grant and the Liverpool businessmen knew about trade between British India and Portuguese East Africa is a matter for conjecture. Certainly it seems reasonable to suppose that Grant would have read some of the reports from Bombay and Surat. Moreover, it must have been clear that slavers were moving eastwards. Something of the eighteenth-century French schemes for converting East Africa into a great slave mart and centre of supply for the East and West Indies may have been known in Bombay, if not in London. Was American rivalry or the call of 'simple humanity' the reason for Grant's next step? Probably there was a little of both. Political forces were joining with economic to push East Africa into the orbit of British foreign policy.

[2]

BRITAIN PLANS TO TAKE PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA

In November 1807 Napoleon, then at the zenith of his power, had prepared a revised text of his great eastern schemes. One after another the three great military monarchies of Austria, Russia and Prussia had been overthrown and, having arranged Europe to suit his aims, he once again turned to the Indian Ocean. By the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia was converted from enemy to ally and Napoleon, who never forgot his eastern dreams, saw immediately that these European triumphs might be used to oust Britain from the East. He pictured an army of fifty thousand French, Russian and perhaps also Austrian, marching upon Asia by way of Constantinople. He believed that 'once they reached the Euphrates England would sink prostrate at the feet of Europe'.²

For this Persian Gulf operation to be successful naval co-operation from the *Île de France* would be essential. The agent at Teheran, General Gardane and Governor Decaen were ordered to work together. It must have seemed to Decaen that at last he

¹ Philips, 131, 154.

² Coupland, *Invasions*, 121 n.

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was about to have his chance to share in Napoleon's glory. Four years, without soldiers, stores or money, may not after all have been too long to wait! In the early part of 1808, when the Persian scare was at its height, Decaen sent his brother René to urge Napoleon to revive the schemes of 1801 for a direct attack on India from the Île de France. René's mission delighted the Emperor and it was after his visit, and as a result of his personality, that Napoleon came nearest to accepting a scheme for a campaign against India based on the Île de France. René gave such comprehensive answers to all Napoleon's questions about ships and how the troops could be fed on a voyage to India (since the Cape had fallen) that he went away thinking the matter settled and the expedition decided upon.¹

Lord Minto, who arrived at Calcutta in July 1807 as Governor-General of India, was convinced, like René Decaen, that a land and sea attack on India was imminent. To confirm Minto's fears came reports of swarms of French agents at the courts of Indian princes. News of the French advance into Portugal reached India through the French agent at Baghdad before the receipt of instructions from Leadenhall Street.² This presented a new difficulty at Bombay. The Governor of Bengal had been previously instructed not to attack the Portuguese settlements without sanction from England.³ But the advance of Napoleon's forces against Portugal threatened the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. If Portugal were taken by the French, the British in order to preserve their safety in India, would be forced to seize the Portuguese settlements on the Malabar coast. To guard against a surprise attack a British force under Captain Schuyler had for some time been stationed, by arrangement with the Viceroy, at Goa, the most important of the Portuguese towns and from which Damão and Diu were governed.⁴ Admiral Sir Edward Pellew at once declared his intention of proceeding to actual hostility against the

¹ Parkinson, *War in the Eastern Seas*, 310.

² I.O.R., Bombay, P. & S. Proc., Range 382, vol. 43, 3639, Schuyler to Bombay Council, Goa, 5 March 1808; 3634, Bombay Council to Schuyler, Bombay, 20 March 1808; Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Bombay Council to Court of Directors, Bombay, 14 October 1808, para. 46.

³ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Bombay Council to Court of Directors, Bombay, 14 October 1808, para. 47.

⁴ I.O.R., Home Misc. Series, vol. 688, 1-5, Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore, to Uththoff, 5 July 1799, sent with Lord Wellesley's letter to Secret Committee, 26 October 1799; P.R.O., F.O. 63/74, Memo respecting the introduction of British troops into the Portuguese settlements in India and China.

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Portuguese trade in India.¹ The Bombay Council strongly opposed such a rash move for they feared that it would immediately apprise the Portuguese of the rupture of peace relations between Portugal and England and precipitate a crisis requiring decisive action.² The Admiral accused the Council of indecision and the Council complained of his lack of understanding of their difficulties.³ Meanwhile, the fate of the Portuguese possessions in India and in East Africa hung in the balance.

On 10 December 1807, in the very month that Jacob's application for a private trading licence in East Africa was being discussed at India House, the Commissioners for India authorized the immediate occupation of the Portuguese settlements and territories in India either by arrangement with the Viceroy at Goa or by force of arms.⁴ Two days later Robert Dundas wrote from the Board of Trade to Castlereagh, Secretary for War and Colonies, that 'the taking possession of the Portuguese settlements of Mozambique and Delagoa Bay on the East coast of Africa' had been suggested to him by the Deputy Chairman. Lord Hawkesbury, Secretary of State for the Home Department, Mr. Perceval, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Rose of the Board of Trade had also spoken to him on the subject. Castlereagh's immediate opinion was required, for if orders were to be sent to Bombay they would have to go by the fleet sailing in seven days. Dundas was satisfied 'with all deference to the East India Company' that the possession of those places would not be so generally useful to British trade as if they were held by a small regular force 'like other settlements of the same description' and were open to all British ships. But, he added, true to the attitude of his day, 'perhaps as long as the Company has the exclusive trade in those seas, it is more fair that they should have the expense of those

¹ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Bombay Council to Court of Directors, Bombay, 14 October 1808, para. 50; Bombay P. & S. Proc., Range 382, vol. 44, 4586, Pellew to Bombay Council, *Culloden*, Bombay Harbour, 27 April 1808, and 4300, Pellew to Schuyler, *Culloden*, Bombay Harbour, 17 April 1808.

² I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Same to same, para. 51; also Bombay P. & S. Proc., op. cit., 4234, Rickard's minute as to propriety or otherwise of directing the immediate occupation of Goa, 16 April 1808.

³ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Same to same, paras. 52-61; also Bombay P. & S. Proc., op. cit., 4300, Pellew to Schuyler, *Culloden*, Bombay Harbour, 17 April 1808, 4347-59, Correspondence between Schuyler and Bombay Council, 26-27 April 1808.

⁴ P.R.O., R.O. 65/38, Robert Dundas to Geo. Canning, Whitehall, 23 December 1807.

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acquisitions'. He discussed in great detail the possibility of affecting the capture of Portuguese East Africa, particularly of Delagoa Bay, from the Cape rather than from Bombay, pointing out that the French from *Île de France* might forestall an attempt from India.¹

Castlereagh agreed that it was impossible for the government to attempt any invasion of the Company's jurisdiction in that quarter without their consent. From the statement about the trade of those stations which showed that the total annual exports 'to the continent of India' did not exceed £30,000 or £40,000, he could hardly believe that it would be very profitable to the Company at that time. He 'could not but think' that the suggestion was brought forward by their friend, Grant, 'on grounds of anti-slave trade and not commercial policy'. For this reason, Castlereagh realized that considerable thought must be given to the military aspects of the problem. Suppression of the lucrative slave trade and the consequent alienation of the European population would be the inevitable result of British occupation. Moreover, since the coast was out of the normal track of British cruisers and inconveniently near the *Île de France*, an adequate naval force would be required for its permanent protection if any commercial benefit was to be derived from its possession. Ignorance of the strength of the Portuguese garrisons prevented Castlereagh from estimating the number of troops requisite for their reduction. Some of his other remarks show that he was imperfectly informed about the economic dependence of the *Île de France* on East Africa, for he believed that the colony had slight commercial value and therefore offered little inducement to the French to lay hold of it. If the British, on the other hand, were to take possession with means insufficient for its defence, it would then become French policy to expel them and plunder the place.

Castlereagh suggested that, if the 'service' was to be undertaken, it should be left entirely in the hands of the Company to be executed from Bombay under the protection of some of the lighter cruisers on that station, rather than delay troops destined for Ceylon that season. He thought that native regiments from India might be used to garrison Mozambique and Delagoa Bay, as had been done in the case of Penang, and even if it were more expedient to use troops from the Cape for the initial capture, these

¹ *Letters and Dispatches of Viscount Castlereagh*, VIII, 93, Robert Dundas to Castlereagh, Wimbledon, 12 December 1807.

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should be relieved by native troops from India at the first opportunity.¹

It must be noticed that the taking possession of the Portuguese settlements in East Africa, like the capture of the Cape on behalf of William of Orange in 1797, would have been based on a multiplicity of interests. Apart from any commercial and philanthropic reasons which with Grant were major considerations, strategically the East Coast of Africa, in subordination to France, would have been highly dangerous to Britain. North of Mozambique there was, as a result of active anti-British propaganda from the île de France, considerable sympathy with the French,² and, since that territory was either directly or indirectly under Muscat, French conquest might have jeopardized the carefully fostered British friendship with the Imam. Moreover, if the ports of that coast were turned into bases for French cruisers, the Mozambique channel would be closed to British trade in the same way as the Straits of Sunda had been closed by the Dutch alliance with France.

The British scheme was still under discussion when Portugal's adherence to the British alliance rendered it superfluous.³ The Portuguese royal family, on the advice of England, fled to South America, and the transfer of the Portuguese government to Brazil shifted the administrative centre of the Portuguese Empire, for the *Conselho Ultramarino*, which since 1642 had administered colonial affairs, went with the Prince Regent, if not with that name under some other designation. In the famous royal letter of 2 January 1809, the Prince Regent expressly declared the former *Conselho Ultramarino* in Lisbon to be a registry issuing certificates from its archive; no administrative functions were to be exercised until his return to Portugal, since 'the seat and centre of the Empire is necessarily the place where I am and live'.⁴ Henceforth, therefore, the African colonies were governed from a sister colony in the new world. Rio de Janeiro became the centre from which Mozambique took its orders.

The removal of the Portuguese royal family to Brazil signified

¹ *Letters and Dispatches of Viscount Castlereagh*, VIII, 94, Castlereagh to Robert Dundas, Brighton, 13 December 1807.

² Prior, 66.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/58, Secret Committee to Governor-General-in-Council at Bengal, Whitehall, 21 December 1807, enclosed in letter Robert Dundas to Geo. Canning, Whitehall, 23 December 1807.

⁴ Toriano, *Historia de Guerra Civil*, 2d Epoch, V, 1st part, document No. 47.

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the triumph of British influence at the Portuguese Court over the strong party with French sympathy. The Prince Regent's action rendered abortive British military schemes based on commercial, strategic and humanitarian aspirations. But commercial policy continued to direct attention to the East African shore.

Britain was determined to utilize the advantage to her export trade which the rescue of the royal family had given her. D. João, by a decree of 28 January 1808, opened the ports of Brazil to the trade of all friendly nations.¹ While the war lasted the benefits of this decree, as far as Europe was concerned, accrued entirely to British produce and manufactures. This was true both in Brazil and the adjacent Spanish settlements, the markets of which—it was hoped—would greatly relieve the depressed British export trade.² But a trade agreement alone was not enough. Public opinion demanded that any treaty permanently settling relations between the two countries must contain an article dealing with the slave trade. It will be remembered that Grant was believed to have had also this purpose in mind when he suggested the British occupation of the Portuguese colony in East Africa. Wilberforce, with the same end in view, had discussed with Canning in October 1807 the possibility of obtaining a cession of Bissau on the West African coast.³ Thus, at a time when the economies of Brazil, Portuguese East Africa and Angola depended upon the slave trade, public opinion forced British statesmen to place the cause of abolition in the very forefront of their policies.⁴

Confronted by this complicated situation the British Government in April 1808 appointed the skilful and energetic Viscount Strangford, as Envoy Extraordinary to the Prince Regent of Portugal. He came fresh from his triumphs in Lisbon, where his influence seems to have been largely instrumental in saving the Anglo-Portuguese alliance at the time of the French declaration of war in 1807.⁵ On the same day full powers for enabling him to conclude a general Treaty of Friendship and Alliance as well as a Treaty of Commerce with the Brazilian Court were issued.⁶ Strangford was instructed to inform the Portuguese Court that

¹ Manchester, 71.

² P.R.O., F.O. 63/64, Turnbull to Perceval, Guildford Street, 7 January 1808.

³ Wilberforce R. I. & S., *The Life of William Wilberforce* (London, 1838), III, 349.

⁴ Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh* (London, 1925), 454.

⁵ Webster, *Britain and the Independence of Latin America* (Oxford, 1938), I, 55.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 63/59, Nos. 1 and 2, Canning to Strangford, F.O., 17 April 1808.

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any new treaty must include an article dealing with the slave trade.¹

While Strangford was journeying to Brazil, with detailed instructions from George Canning, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Bombay Council in India were spurred to activity by the Directors' instructions of the previous November. Those instructions requested the Bombay Council to increase 'by every practical endeavour the vend of woollens and other European staples'.² Political agents were told to collect information about conditions in Arabia, the opposite coast and the country of Abyssinia.³ In fact, as early as 1803, a mission had been dispatched through Massawa to Abyssinia, and in May 1809 Captain Rudland, the Company's agent at Mocha, formally opened up trade with Ras Welleta Selassi, Emperor of Abyssinia.⁴ Warlike stores, metals, glass, chinaware, broadcloth and woollens were the chief articles of export, and from India, raw cotton, piece goods, sugar, rice and timber. By June a permanent British commercial agent was stationed there.⁵ Attempts were also made to gain information about the people beyond and to the west of Abyssinia.⁶

From the Cape, too, efforts were put forth to know more about East Africa. In May 1809 the Earl of Clarendon recommended to the protection of the Government of Mozambique, 'two gentlemen of science Doctor Cowan and Lieutenant Donavan', to whose expedition the Prince Regent had given his consent.⁷ This, the first of the many pseudo-scientific expeditions, recalls the German effort in later years when Dr. Peters was sent out, ostensibly for purposes of scientific investigation. The expedition set out from the Cape 'to plant trees and improve the knowledge

¹ Manchester, 80.

² I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Bombay Council to Court of Directors, Bombay, 15 April 1809; also Bombay P. & S. Proc. Range 383, vol. 2, 2731, President's minute proposing revival of British Agency in the Arabian Gulf, 16 March 1809, para. 6.

³ I.O.R., Bombay P. & S. Proc. Range 383, vol. 2, 2731, President's Minute, 16 March 1809, paras 6 and 7.

⁴ I.O.R., Bombay P. & S. Proc., Range 383, vol. 9, 8842, Rudland to Selassi, Mocha, 18 May 1809, para. 4; 8850, Same to same, Mocha, 28 July 1809, and Selassi to Rudland (undated).

⁵ I.O.R., Bombay P. & S. Proc., Range 383, vol. 9, 8860, Pearce, in service of Selassi, to Rudland, Adowa, 16 June 1809.

⁶ I.O.R., op. cit., 8876, Questions to and replies from Pearce re Abyssinia.

⁷ A.H.U., Moz., 70, Caledon to A. M. de Mello Castro e Mendoza, Castle of Good Hope, 19 May 1809; Moz., 73, Same to same, 1 July 1810.

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of Natural History'. According to the Governor of Quelimane, it was composed of 'fifty officers and a hundred sepoys'.¹ It seems that the party intended to reach Tete, but after arriving in the vicinity of Sofala, rumour has it, they were attacked by a warlike tribe from the Monomotapa. No expense was spared in seeking for the men and a handsome reward was offered for any papers or instruments which could be found—but no trace of the expedition was ever discovered.²

In 1811 two ships under Captain Smee and Lieutenant Hardy were fitted out from Bombay 'for exploring and collecting information relative to the inhabitants and trade on the eastern coast of Africa from Cape Guardafui southward'.³ This expedition Coupland mistakenly describes as Britain's first sign of interest in East Africa. His words are: 'This is the earliest evidence to hand of the link which, however ignorant of East Africa and disinterested in it the British authorities in India might be, had connected them in some degree with its coast from the moment when the merchant-folk of western India, who from time immemorial had gone trading there, were brought under British rule'.⁴ In reality it seems that by this time Britain was on the point of reaping positive results from her determined policy to increase legitimate trade as opposed to the slave trade in East Africa. After 1812, the trade reports of Bombay and Surat show an increase in exports to the East coast of Africa.

Mozambique customs revenue also showed a slight upward trend over the whole period from 1808 to 1816, although the duties remained unchanged. The Mozambique figures challenge particular attention for, while the slave trade may have been responsible for maintaining these revenues up to 1810, the period following was one of particular hardship for slave dealers in Mozambique, when all the correspondence from the colony emphasized the economic distress resulting from the temporary cessation of the slave trade.⁵

There must, therefore, have been an increased sale of other

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 73, Mello Castro e Mendoça to Anadis, Moz., 25 January 1810.

² A.H.U., Moz., 77, Mello Castro e Mendoça to Galveas, Moz., 11 December 1811; Moz., 75, Mello Castro e Mendoça to Ribeiro dos Santos, Governor of Quelimane, Moz., 11 December 1810.


³ B.M., Add. MSS. 8958, f. 50, Report on the East Coast of Africa by Capt. Smee and Lieut. Hardy of brigs *Sylph* and *Fornate*.

⁴ Coupland, op. cit., 183.

⁵ Cf. 90; 220-1.

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commodities—commodities whose sale was not so profitable to the Portuguese officials as to the colony of Mozambique. Since ivory and gold dust were, after slaves, Mozambique's most important exports and British India was the largest market for these, it may be assumed that it was as a result of the conditions created by the Continental System in Europe and the loss of the United



7. GRAPH ILLUSTRATING THE EXPORTS FROM BOMBAY AND SURAT TO THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA, AND CUSTOMS REVENUE OF MOZAMBIQUE, 1808-16

States market, caused by the declaration of war on England in June 1812, that the trade with East Africa temporarily increased. The East Africa-India arena was, therefore, commercially as well as politically linked with events in Europe. The fact that Portuguese East Africa was specifically mentioned in the Anglo-Portuguese commercial treaty of 1810 further substantiates this contention.

Events proved, as we know, that the East Indies, despite the efforts of the Company and the triumphs and annexations of the Marquis of Wellesley, counted for little compared with the West Indies in the commercial war with Napoleon. But for Africa the more important issue was the gradual growth of the idea that its eastern shores were not a mere barren coastline and that if more were known of the interior and its people a new and important mart for British manufactures might there be found. Though

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Britain's plans in 1807 for taking possession of Portuguese territory in East Africa proved unnecessary, not only trade but also war continued to direct Britain's attention to that shore.

[3]

WAR IN EAST AFRICAN WATERS

The Governor of Mozambique, happily for his peace of mind, knew nothing of the British plans in 1807 for the capture of Mozambique. In October 1808 the subordinate governors of the captaincy were notified that the Prince Regent had established his court in Brazil and that all Spanish and French ships were to be regarded as enemies, while British ships were to be given every hospitality.¹ Although the British Navy was sometimes treated with particular courtesy² and every attempt was made by the Governor to trace the lost expedition from the Cape,³ the attitude of the Portuguese to the British and their 'thirst for knowledge' was quite naturally one of suspicion and jealousy. Information about Mozambique was given with reserve,⁴ not because the Portuguese were not interested in furthering the 'cause of science' but because they feared this might be the beginning of a threat to the tradition of centuries and to their hold on a land which they had discovered and regarded as their own preserve. Therefore, what the British sometimes interpreted as the disinterested indolence of the governors in the affairs of their country, was often no more than a polite pretence covering an aversion for meddling foreigners. For the Portuguese were afraid rather than fond of the British. As early as 1801 considerable unpleasantness had been caused when the fort at Mozambique actually fired on an English ship which was attempting to capture a French trader under Danish colours on the grounds that the ship had originally been British.⁵ But now at last the Portuguese in East Africa were forced by the stark realities of war to recognize the British as allies.

The Persian scare had not yet subsided when the British in

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 68, Junta (three signatures) to subordinate Governors of Captaincy, Moz., 28 October 1808.

² Cf. 161.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 75, Mendoça to M. R. dos Santos, Moz., 11 December 1810.

⁴ Prior, 38.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 52, Hogue to F. G. de Carvalho e Meneses, *Matilda* at sea off Mozambique, 30 April 1801, enclosing affidavit of Shean and Hogue.

War in East African Waters

India learned, from intercepted correspondence, that the French agent at Mocha had been directed 'to demonstrate to the several chieftains in the Gulf in the strongest possible terms the regard and attachment which the French nation bears towards the interests of the Arabian states'. They learned also that the agent had orders to conciliate by every means in his power the 'Arab' navigators in order to establish a new direct intercourse between Egypt and the *Île de France* by means of trading vessels sailing from Aden and other ports in the mouth of the straits to the Isles of Socotra and Zanzibar and 'others more in the vicinity of Madagascar'.¹ Another intercepted letter assured the Sultan of Mocha that all French men-of-war had orders from Governor Decaen not to molest any 'Moor or Arab ships' met at sea.²

The news added to Minto's fears. Like his predecessor, the Marquis of Wellesley, Minto was more than a tactician. He was a man of vision. He saw clearly that, even after the land route seemed to have been secured by a change of front in Persia and by the turn of the tide in Europe, protection of the frontiers of the British position in India demanded full control of the sea routes in East African waters as much as in the Persian and China Seas. Minto of course knew that the Imam of Muscat had recently signed a treaty of commerce with the French.³ He was thought to be loyal to British interests,⁴ but could he be counted upon? Commercially and politically the independence of Muscat was of first importance to Britain and even if the Imam were loyal Minto knew that the Arab chieftains could not be relied upon since by 1809 a great deal of the territory of Muscat had become practically tributary to pirates from the Persian Gulf.⁵ The Arabs, Minto suspected, were working in company with the *Île de France* and piling up goods in Egypt—probably munitions from the British Indian settlements.⁶ To stop this indirect trade in

¹ I.O.R., Bombay P. & S. Proc., Range 383, vol. 8, 7931, Rudland to Adair (Envoy Extraordinary, Constantinople), British factory, Mocha, 30 May 1809.

² I.O.R., op. cit., vol. 9, 8827, Arnaud to the Sultan of Mocha, French sloop of war, *L'Etoile*, 9 July 1809.

³ Coupland, op. cit., 116.

⁴ I.O.R., Bombay P. & S. Proc., Range 383, vol. 8, 7922, Manesty to Bombay Council, Bussora, 1 July 1809, para. 3.

⁵ I.O.R., op. cit., 7924, Manesty to Bombay Council, Bussora, 8 July 1809; Range 383, vol. 2, President's Minute, Bombay, 16 March 1809, paras. 8, 11 and 12; Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Bombay Council to Court of Directors, Bombay, 20 January 1809, para. 6.

⁶ I.O.R., Bombay P. & S. Proc., Range 383, vol. 2, 2822, Rudland to Government of Bombay, Mocha, 27 February 1809.

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arms without the capture of the French islands was clearly impossible. The Arabs of Muscat had habitually traded with the Île de France. During the war the intercourse afforded them the most likely means of negotiating the occasional restitution of such part of their shipping and mercantile property as was liable to fall a prey to French cruisers; it enabled them to purchase English prizes.¹ To avoid the frequent attacks and depredations of the French cruisers, Indian merchants followed the practice of making their returns of specie in country vessels to Muscat whence it was sent to India. If Muscat fell a prey to the pirates the outward-bound trade of that season and the returns of the last would be endangered.² Political agents from Bombay emphasized that British interference was necessary to keep open the entrance to the Red Sea and thus 'avert the great augmentation of evil which would be occasioned by the addition of the ports, the shipping and the population of Muscat to . . . those already powerful marauders'.³ Although the British sent expeditions from time to time against those pirates, they could not, while the French held the Île de France, afford to antagonize anyone on the coast.⁴ Minto, therefore, was being forced into decisive action against the French outposts off the coast of Africa.

As it was the intermittent blockade of the French islands by the British was having its repercussions in Mozambique. French corsairs infested the coast, took many prizes and even blockaded the port for some time, so that in December the Junta, or Governor's Council, wrote to the British at the Cape emphasizing the importance of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and begging that ships blockading the Île de France and Bourbon should make a small digression to protect Mozambique, which was still without warships to repel 'the sudden and unexpected aggressions' of the French corsairs.⁵ In May 1809 a cruiser from Simonstown was sent to protect Mozambique and to obtain a more particular

¹ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Bombay Council to Court of Directors, Bombay, 14 October 1808, para. 115.

² I.O.R., Bombay P. & S. Proc., Range 383, vol. 3, 3540, Seton to Malcolm, Muscat, 30 March 1809.

³ I.O.R., Bombay Secret Letters, vol. 76, Bombay Council to Court of Directors, Bombay Castle, 14 June 1809, para. 9.

⁴ I.O.R., Bombay P. & S., Proc. Range 383, vol. 3, 3285, Edmonstone to Warden, Fort William, 13 March 1809.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 68, Junta (three signatures) to Government of the Cape, Moz., 3 December 1808.

account of the nature and extent of the French activities.¹ The officers were treated with particular courtesy by the Governor.²

The capture of valuable Portuguese Indiamen had aroused the concern of the Portuguese government in Brazil, who were repeatedly proposing an attack upon the French islands 'by the combined forces of Britain and Portugal'.³ Strangford constantly wrote to Canning emphasizing the necessity for reducing the islands by interrupting all communication with the adjacent Portuguese possessions and cutting off their supplies.⁴ But Minto realized that the East African scene was only part of the picture and could not be considered in isolation from the other shores of the Indian Ocean. Already in the spring of 1809 he had sent out two small expeditions. One went east to seize Amboyna and the other to occupy Rodriguez, the most eastward outpost of the Mascarene group. From this latter base the blockade of Bourbon and the Île de France could be more closely and continuously maintained.

One of the chief motives for this 'mopping up' process was, according to Minto, to prevent the French from building up a dominion in the Dutch East Indies.⁵ In the East, as in the West Indies, the desire to secure a monopoly of tropical products as a set off to Napoleon's attempted exclusion of all British produce from the Continent probably played its part.⁶ If the Île de France were captured it would be easier to suppress the pirates from the Persian Gulf and British trade in the eastern seas would benefit. But to capture the island proved no easy matter. It took years of reconnaissance to collect the necessary information and to dispel the belief that barrier reefs prevented access except to skilled pilots,⁷ that no proper landing-place for troops existed and that transports could not anchor safely.⁸ The British Navy, fully aware of their scanty knowledge of the island's coast as well as of

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 70, Bertie to A. M. de Mello Castro e Mendoça, H.M.S. *Raisonnable*, Simon's Bay, 19 May 1809.

² A.H.U., Moz., 70, Fisher to A. M. de Mello Castro e Mendoça, H.M.S. *Rasborra*, Johanna Roads, 2 October 1809; Bingham to Mello Castro e Mendoça, H.M.S. *Sceptre*, 2 July 1809.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/60, No. 24, Strangford to Geo. Canning, Rio, 24 October 1808.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 63/59, No. 4, Strangford to Geo. Canning, Rio, 31 July 1808.

⁵ I.O.R., Bengal Secret and Separate Cons., vol. 236 (No. 10, 7 January 1811), Minto to Abercrombie, 3 September 1810.

⁶ C.H.B.E., vol. II, 106.

⁷ Parkinson, *War in the Eastern Seas*, 363 et seq.

⁸ Smyth, *The Life and Services of Captain Philip Beaver* (London, 1829), 207.

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the mainland, believed that any additional information, however imperfect, could hardly fail to be acceptable and made every effort to find out what they could. Permission was obtained to copy charts and plans of the coast and places in and near Mozambique from Portuguese government papers.¹

The news of the final blockade of the Île de France was conveyed to Mozambique in a letter not from India but from Admiral Bertie at the Cape station.² The Portuguese were informed of the Prince Regent's decree interdicting all trade with the French islands, and their assistance was solicited in the release of any English prisoners the enemy might have landed.³ In July 1809 two corvettes were sent from the Cape to the aid of Mozambique.⁴ Despite these events no active partisanship was expressed by the inhabitants of either East Africa or the Île de France. In fact, in 1810 Mozambique proposed to the Prince Regent that a ship under the guise of a merchantman to ransom Portuguese prisoners should go to the Île de France to ascertain the island's strength. This, the proposal noted, would be easy for a Portuguese whereas for an Englishman it would be impossible.⁵ In other words, the blockade of the Île de France met with no opposition, except from General Decaen and his few regulars. In December 1810 the French islands passed to Britain.⁶

Shortly afterwards several French frigates under Roquebert, destined to reinforce the Île de France with troops and arms escaped from Brest.⁷ Finding the island in British possession they decided to take Mozambique.⁸ Before doing so, the squadron put in for refreshments at Foul Point, Madagascar, where they en-

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 83, Fisher to A. M. de Mello Castro e Mendoça, H.M.S. *Cornwallis*, Port Louis, 26 December 1810.

² A.H.U., Moz., 70, Notification of blockade, H.M.S. *Raisonnable*, Cape of Good Hope, 22 March 1809, enclosed in letter, Caledon to A. M. de Mello Castro e Mendoça, Castle of Good Hope, 19 May 1809.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 70, Bertie to Mendoça, H.M.S. *Raisonnable*, Simon's Bay, 19 May 1809.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 57, Bertie to Governor of Moz., H.M.S. *Rasborne*, Simon's Bay, 16 July 1809.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 75, Copy of project proposed by inhabitants of Moz. to Prince Regent in 1810 (undated).

⁶ W. James, *The Naval History of Great Britain* (London, 1886), V, 144, 205; A.H.U., Moz., 77, A. M. de Mello Castro e Mendoça to ? Rio, Moz., 20 December 1810.

⁷ *Naval Chronicle*, 1811, XXVI, 388-94.

⁸ P.R.O., C.O. 77/37, Schomberg to Stopford, H.M.S. *Astrea*, at sea off Madagascar,

⁹ June 1811; Ad. 1/151, B. 1007, Enclosure in letter from Beaver to Croker H.M.S. *Nina*, Port Louis, 28 June 1811. This point does not appear in the account given by the Captain of the French frigate.

Britain Obtains the Right to Trade

countered Captain Schomberg of the Cape station.¹ Two vessels were captured and a third escaped and returned to France.² The event drew the attention of the British government to the defenceless situation of Mozambique,³ where constant rumours of these French activities circulated. The alarm caused in East Africa may be judged from the gross exaggeration of the events. Only one incident need be related.

It was said in Mozambique that in 1810 occurred what was referred to many years later as the 'bloody invasion of the French on Mozambique'.⁴ Three French frigates under English colours approached and fired two or three shots at the fort.⁵ It has been difficult to trace whence these ships came, for according to the hazy accounts from Mozambique the venture appears to have been undertaken to obtain slaves. When some inhabitants of Mozambique willingly offered these, the French accepted fifty, took their leave by means of a polite letter and at the same time landed forty-four English and North American prisoners.⁶ It may be that these three frigates were a part of Roquebert's squadron. The Mozambique incident is worth mentioning, as the Governor had been forewarned of the attack by the English ship *Caledon*,⁷ which shows that the Cape squadron was carefully watching the East African coast. Moreover, it is interesting to note that one of Roquebert's ships captured the *Swallow* Jamaica packet within a week's sail of Barbados,⁸ illustrating that French privateers continued to harass British trade at a time when it is usually considered that France had no ships in those seas.⁹

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BRITAIN OBTAINS THE RIGHT TO TRADE

Meanwhile the official British attitude to the East African coast was given expression by Strangford's actions in Brazil. In

¹ P.R.O., C.O. 77/37, Schomberg to Stopford, H.M.S. *Astrea*, at sea off Madagascar,

² June 1811; James, V, 283-95.

³ *Naval Chronicle*, XXVI, 335.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 63/121, No. 8604, Croker to Hamilton, Admiralty, 14 November 1811.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 97, Britto Sanches to Arcos, Moz., 21 November 1820.

⁶ A.H.U., Moz., 75, A. M. de Mello Castro e Mendoza to Galveas, Moz., 8 November 1810; Prior, 36; two of these frigates were the *Belona* and *Misra*.

⁷ A.H.U., Moz., 75, Mendoza to Galveas, Moz., 8 November 1810.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Naval Chronicle*, op. cit., 336.

¹⁰ Austen, 205, discusses other French activities in East African waters at this time.

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February 1809 he obtained the Prince Regent's consent to two treaties which, after various alterations proposed by the British Foreign Office, were finally signed at Rio on 19 February 1810, and ratified in London four months later. One, a political treaty of alliance,¹ reaffirmed the guarantee of British protection against attack by foreign powers which had existed ever since the seventeenth century.² In return, Portugal agreed to co-operate in bringing about a gradual abolition of the slave trade; Portuguese subjects were forbidden to take slaves from any place in Africa except from the actual possessions of the Portuguese Crown and from those parts of Africa where other nations had not yet declared the trade illegal.³ In addition, Britain received various privileges which were partly abandoned when the treaty was recast in Vienna by Castlereagh in January 1815.⁴ The other, a commercial treaty,⁵ gave Britain a specially favoured position.⁶ Among other privileges the duties on imports of British goods into the Portuguese possessions in Europe, America, Africa and Asia were never to amount to more than 15 per cent.⁷ Preference against other countries was not insisted upon, but the duties on their products were in fact higher for the sake of revenue.⁸ British merchants were to be protected by a judge conservator,⁹ and their commerce with the Portuguese dominions was not to be restrained, interrupted or affected by the operation of any monopoly; they were given unrestricted permission to buy and sell 'from and to whomsoever' they wished. But it was distinctly emphasized that Portugal was to retain within its own dominions the exclusive right 'to farm for the sale of ivory, brazilwood, urzela, diamonds, gold dust and tobacco in the form of snuff'.¹⁰ The special point of the treaty, however, which is of importance to this study and to which attention has rarely been paid, is contained in clause twenty-four. This confirmed and secured to British subjects all trade with the Portuguese possessions

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 94/165, Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; for detailed summary cf. Manchester, 90-1.

² Articles I, II, III.

³ Article X.

⁴ Webster, *Britain and the Independence of Latin America*, I, 53; Manchester, 171, footnote 30.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 94/166, Portugal, Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation; *Naval Chronicle*, 1811, XXV, 307.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 63/83, No. 17, Translation of opinion of Galveas, enclosed in letter from Strangford to Wellesley, Rio, 12 March 1810.

⁷ Article XV.

⁸ Webster, op. cit., I, 33.

⁹ Article X.

¹⁰ Article VIII.

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situated upon the eastern coast of Africa (in articles not included in the exclusive contracts possessed by the Crown of Portugal) in the same manner as that permitted to Portuguese subjects in the British ports and seas of Asia.

The insertion of this last clause, in addition to the other which already mentioned Africa, threw South-East Africa into particular prominence. Moreover, the clause assumes added importance as the first mention of East Africa in an international commercial treaty. Viscount Strangford, remarking on these two clauses, observed of the first that 'this important stipulation', which prevented the Court of Portugal from returning to its ancient colonial policy of excluding foreigners from trade with its Brazilian and African possessions, had been obtained by the cheap expedient of engaging that the subjects of Portugal shall be permitted to traffic in the ports and seas of Asia to the same extent as had hitherto been permitted by treaty on the footing of the most-favoured-nation. This clause, he continued, which in reality did not grant any new advantage to Portuguese commerce, was 'again brought forward in the twenty-seventh clause (original treaty of 1809¹—twenty-four in the final form) as the equivalent for permission to trade with the possessions of Portugal on the eastern coast of Africa . . . as it was formerly allowed previously to the administration of the Marquis of Pombal'.² Strangford's view was shared by Canning.³ Moreover, it was considered as an indication of the high value Portugal set upon East African trade.⁴

The Treaty is the practical outcome, the cumulative result of the gradual growth of British interest which had been awakened in East Africa partly because of the slave trade and partly for strategic and commercial reasons. The commercial potentialities, particularly of Delagoa Bay, had been emphasized as early as 1802–3 by the Reporter-General on External Commerce at

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 63/68, No. 8, Copy, Strangford to Canning, Rio, 28 February 1809. (Original Treaty signed at Rio on this date.)

² Ibid.; for further discussion see unaddressed and undated letter from Peppitt on his conversation with the Chevalier de Souza (Portuguese Ambassador in London). Note on this letter states that Portuguese sugar should not be allowed into the Cape or other African ports unless British merchants are granted permission to trade to the Portuguese settlements in Africa and Asia.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/73, Canning to Committee of Privy Council for Trade, F.O., 24 July 1809.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 63/73, Remarks by Harrowby on the Brazilian Treaty, undated (enclosed in volume, July–September 1809).

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Bombay. To what extent these reports influenced the terms of the Treaty must remain a matter for conjecture. But it is well to remember that Canning afterwards asserted that the negotiations for the Treaty 'had been forced upon him by the Board of Trade'.¹ George Rose, Vice-President of the Board of Trade, was closely concerned with Grant's schemes for East Africa, and Grant himself had been Chairman of the East India Company. Castlereagh and Robert Dundas, who had prepared plans for the conquest of Portuguese East Africa in 1807, had intimate connections with the Board of Control, while Thomas Wallace had been a member of the Board throughout. All these, therefore, would have had official connection with India and the Board of Trade during the period 1802-7. It may be, therefore, that the government policy regarding East Africa, resulting in the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1810, was hatched in India (probably in Bombay), nourished by Grant, the Board of Trade and the Humanitarians and reared by Canning and Strangford.

In the light of these facts and of Strangford's remarks on the articles of the Treaty concerning Portuguese East Africa, the fact that Canning's instructions do not specifically mention East Africa is of no importance. But it is possible that the British merchants in Brazil and Buenos Aires, who had terrified the Conde Aguiar, Minister of the Portuguese Home Department, by their clamour for the abolition of Portuguese slave trading,² may have given Strangford an exaggerated opinion of the importance of developing legitimate trade with Portuguese East Africa.

The fact remains that the Treaty of 1810, which was negotiated before the attack on the Île de France, is a confirmation of the awakening British interest in East Africa—a portent that it was no passing phase. It lifts East Africa out of the region of tentative schemes into that of explicit official British policy and shows that the coast was beginning to emerge from the haze of obscurity in which it had been enshrouded for nearly two centuries. Henceforth East Africa is a definite and persisting factor in British foreign policy.

¹ Webster, *op. cit.*, I, 54.

² P.R.O., F.O. 63/83, No. 2, Strangford to Bathurst, Rio, 16 January 1810.

Chapter Six

EAST AFRICA BECOMES AN OBJECT OF BRITISH OFFICIAL POLICY

As far as East Africa was concerned the capture by Britain of the French islands—the Île de France and Bourbon—in 1810 marked the end of the European conflict. As late as 1818 French pirates, who displaced the war-time privateers, were occasionally mentioned by the Governor of Mozambique,¹ but the real menace to British and Portuguese commerce in the Indian Seas had been destroyed eight years before. In East Africa, therefore, the post-war period may be assumed to start in 1810 and, in fact, the conditions then and immediately afterwards prevailing were the outcome as much of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaties of 1810 as of the Napoleonic war itself. Britain's aims, the suppression of the slave trade and the extension of markets, had been implicit in these treaties. In practice, this policy rather than political considerations occasioned and shaped ensuing events. The year 1810, therefore, not 1815, was for East Africa the end of an epoch and the beginning of a new era. All that the Congress of Vienna (and its Slave Trade Conventions) meant for East Africa was increased European interest. Bourbon (later known as Réunion), the most important slave market, was handed back to France, but the ever-watchful British cruisers based on St. Helena, Simon's Bay and the Île de France (renamed Mauritius), forbade alike the relapse of East Africa into obscurity and the continuance of its most profitable trade.

Both treaties signed by England and Portugal in 1810 failed in their purpose. The Treaty of Alliance, although it contained no clause for the abolition of the Portuguese slave trade,² indirectly stopped the slave trade and ruined East African commerce. The Treaty of Commerce, intended for the specific

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 87, João do S^o Carvalho to José Fr^oº Paula Cav^r de Albuquerque, Angoja, 31 May 1818; Sultan Anlave to Cav^r de Albuquerque, Angoja, 30 May 1818.

² Cf. 164.

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purpose of opening the ports of Mozambique, was, as far as British merchants were concerned, a complete failure. Indeed, Britishers soon found that while the Prince Regent might sign treaties laying down certain principles, their enforcement was another matter. The Portuguese in Mozambique welcomed the commercial treaty of 1810 in so far as it afforded an additional pretext for admitting French slave traders from Bourbon, when they could escape the British cruisers, but the lower tariff rates were regarded with particular disapproval. This attitude is hardly remarkable when it is remembered that at that time free trade propaganda was in its infancy even in England.

The Governor and Junta, or Council, of Mozambique, as early as 1798, 'in conformity with the practice of their predecessors', had disobeyed the Prince Regent's orders to lower customs duties on the plea that the 'exigencies of State' demanded increased revenue.¹ Indeed, it was argued in Mozambique that although the reduction of duties might, as a general rule, develop trade, the maxim was entirely inapplicable to that colony. The consumers were not Portuguese but 'Kaffirs', and the diminution of the price of supplies, if competition were allowed by freer trade, would immediately increase their laziness by reducing their need to work. Their demands never exceeded a certain fixed quantity, and in proportion to the rebate on their supplies less ivory and gold would be procured by them. Since the Portuguese were usually middlemen for the Banians who paid the duties, they would, it was argued, be robbed of the benefits of monopoly and high prices. Low prices would result in goods of inferior quality being imported, and since these were used in place of money to pay the servants of the Crown, it was held that the Portuguese population and the coffers of the State would be the only losers.² High duties in fact had shut out every private merchant even of their own nation.³

For these reasons the Portuguese government never allowed foreigners to trade directly with the natives.⁴ When, therefore,

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 45, Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 2 September 1797.

² A.H.U., Moz., 47, F. G. de Carvalho e Menezes da Costa to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 4 September 1799; Moz., 47, Same to same, 9 November 1798.

³ A.H.U., Moz., VI, No. 55, da Costa Xavier to Secretary of State and Colonies, Moz., 12 January 1842.

⁴ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Memo on Portuguese settlements and dominions of the Eastern Coast of Africa, enclosed in letter, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lewin*, Simon's Bay, 15 April 1823.

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in 1815 Thomas Ramsden, an English captain, wished to trade with the natives at Delagoa Bay he was refused permission.¹ Thus the Treaty of 1810 failed to enable the British to build up legitimate trade with Portuguese East Africa. Moreover, even though Britain, by treaties in 1810, in 1815, and again in 1817,² had forced upon Portugal increasingly stringent measures for minimizing the slave trade, in practice that trade continued to flourish. It was soon realized that however drastic were the prohibitions of the slave trade and however sincere the motives, unless there was concerted action on the part of all nations for the complete cessation of that trade, British and West India merchants would merely suffer from the unfair competition of slave-tolerating foreigners. The Act of 1807 had destroyed at one blow the great market for Manchester 'slave goods', hitherto monopolized by Britain, in the world's slave markets. Hence there was much truth in the foreigner's gibe that Britain's interest in slave trade suppression by other countries was self-interest.³

During the war the protection afforded by British naval power had secured for her merchants almost a monopoly of sea-borne trade, but the peace brought an equal opportunity to European rivals.⁴ At the same time British colonies found it more and more difficult to export to a home market increasingly overstocked.⁵ The effects of the economic and social dislocation caused by the growing use of power machinery, the wars and the ensuing peace disturbed the equilibrium between production and consumption.⁶ The problem then, as during the economic crisis after 1929, was one of increasing the consumption of goods to keep pace with the increased capacity for production. The period after 1815, therefore, was one in which many forces arising from a variety of causes came into play at home and abroad.⁷ Here only a few need concern us.

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 85, Narrative by Thos. Ramsden, Master of the British ship *Perseverance*, of the occurrences in the Bay of Delagoa, Bombay, 17 May 1816.

² Cf. 279, 221–4.

³ Coupland, *The British Anti-Slavery Movement* (London, 1933), 36–9, 156.

⁴ Hansard, New Series, IV, 426, Foreign Trade Debate, 6 February 1821, Speech by Wallace.

⁵ Hansard, New Series, VI, 1423, Colonial Trade Bill, Speech by Robinson (1822).

⁶ Halevy, *A History of the English People in 1815*, II (*Economic Life*) (London, 1937), 12, 148–64 (Penguin Edn.); Knowles, *Industrial and Commercial Revolutions* (London, 1927), 118–22.

⁷ C.M.H., X, Chapter XVIII, Chapter XXIII, *passim*.

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Vigorous efforts were made by the British government to increase markets without annexing new territories. It is true the war had extended the British Colonial Empire: in India, British influence had been increased, while in the Indian Ocean, Ceylon, the Cape and Mauritius had been obtained. But this growth of the Empire was the result of no preconceived design. The colonies that were not given up at the Treaty of Vienna were not retained for the sake of territorial expansion. St. Helena, Simon's Bay and Mauritius were kept by British statesmen simply as strategic centres or naval stations to guard the way to the East.¹

After the war an emigration movement began independently of the Government's action. The normal outflow of population, dammed up since the war with the American colonies, was released at a time when heavy taxation, increased cost of living and post-war dislocation caused it to be greatly augmented by numbers of ex-officers and professional men as well as artisans and farmers. The Ministry beheld it with anxiety, for England had not forgotten her experience in America, nor was she disposed to protect new colonists who would, naturally, look to the mother country for help against the enterprises of other colonizing nations or the attacks of native races. In 1820, it is true, Lord Charles Somerset, Governor of the Cape, after long and arduous negotiations converted the government to the idea of planting on the borders of the Colony a 'dense' population to cope with the 'savage' enemy on the frontier. Albany Settlement, therefore, was formed to guarantee the security of Cape Colony and to relieve the mother country of an onerous burden. It might also, it was hoped, check the flow of emigrants to the rival United States.² But apart from such exceptional cases the interest of the British government in new countries was activated largely by motives of trade. Closely connected with this policy was the desire to extend humanitarian ideals. The fact that humanitarians were mostly bankers, merchants and captains of industry made these two policies inseparable. Public opinion, continually instructed and directed by great societies under the leadership of enthusiastic and devoted reformers, never ceased to exercise a formidable pressure upon the Government.³ Throughout the nineteenth century, therefore, British policy was actuated by this dual

¹ Parliamentary Debates, vol. XXVIII, 462; Halevy, I (*Political Institutions*), 132.

² C.H.B.E., VIII, 219-20.

³ Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, 454.

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purpose—humanitarian considerations closely united with, and sometimes overshadowed by, commercial motives.

These conditions in post-war England stimulated interest in the outlying continents. In Africa, a period of great exploration set in. Every attempt was made to substitute legitimate trade for the slave trade. Africa became an object of study for learned societies, the intelligent public, missionary societies and the government itself. Numerous expeditions were sent to West Africa with a view to discovering the course of the Congo and the Niger. Among others Peddie and Tucker, Clapperton, Lander, Macgregor Laird, Denham and Walter Oudney increased, in many cases at the cost of their lives, Europe's knowledge of Africa.¹ On the other hand, the missionary interest in Africa was partly the continuation of a movement which had started in the last years of the eighteenth century, when various humanitarians, stirred by the evangelical revival to an energetic activity in religious and philanthropic work, had gone out to West Africa and the Cape. Of these the representatives of the London Missionary Society, formed soon after 1795, above all the Reverend Dr. John Philip, who arrived at the Cape in 1819 as superintendent, played a great part in South African history.²

Unlike the west coast of Africa the eastern littoral had been entirely neglected by philanthropists. The British at the Cape, ever since 1809 when the expedition under Cowan and Donavan was lost, had made attempts to enlarge their knowledge of those shores. And in 1811 two ships from Bombay had set out to explore part of the coast and to seek Park and Horneman, who had previously been lost on a similar expedition. At Mauritius the Governor, Sir Robert Farquhar, despite the censures of his detractors,³ appears to have made some attempt to discover the extent of the slave trade and to abolish this 'abominable' traffic, both in Madagascar, the islands round Mauritius and on the East coast of Africa. In 1817 he negotiated a treaty with the King of Madagascar for this purpose,⁴ but the closing of that market merely increased the importance of Zanzibar and the other

¹ Keltie, *The Partition of Africa* (London, 1895), Chapter VIII, *passim*.

² Clinton, *The South African Melting Pot* (London, 1937), viii; Macmillan, *The Cape Colour Question*, *passim*.

³ Coupland, op. cit., 189–93; Mathieson, *British Slavery and its Abolition, 1823–38* (London, 1926), 25; Clarkson, *Tracts and Debates on Slavery*, 69–70.

⁴ Hertslet, *Commercial Treaties*, I, 354, Madagascar Treaty for the Extinction of the Slave Trade and of Piracy, Tamatave, 23 October 1817.

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East African ports of the Imam and the Portuguese as slave marts. The Imam, incidentally, unknowingly created a basis for British negotiation on this score. In January 1821 he wrote to Mauritius expressing his gratitude to the British for the security afforded to his dominions in freeing his country and the adjoining coasts from the depredations of pirates.¹ The expedition in fact, had been undertaken by the Governor-General of India, the Marquis of Hastings, to extirpate what was regarded as a common pest of all nations trading to those seas. But since the Imam chose to interpret the action as a mark of particular friendship to himself, it occurred to Farquhar that the British might use this to exert a 'most beneficial influence' in obtaining from him an abolition of the slave trade.² A treaty to this effect was negotiated with the Imam by Captain Moresby in 1822.³ While such attempts at investigation and abolition of the East African slave trade were being undertaken a complete geographical ignorance and a good deal of commercial scepticism prevailed concerning these shores and their hinterland.

In 1812 Captain Beaver, under orders from the Cape government, had sailed along the coast from Simon's Bay to Mozambique, Johanna and Kilwa in response to an appeal from the King of the Comoro Islands for help against the periodical raids of natives from Madagascar. Prior, the ship's surgeon, published in 1819 an account of this voyage, from which we learn a good deal about the natural resources of the country, the nature of the inhabitants, the weakness of the Portuguese pretensions and the strength of Muscat. The writer points out the strong commercial influence of the French and emphasizes the need for an accurate and extensive survey of the region.⁴

A year later the republication of another volume—first published in London in 1798 and again in 1810—might have had even more influence in directing the British government's attention to East Africa. The book, entitled *The Cape of Good Hope and its Dependencies*, had a dedicatory letter to President Adams suggesting that the young United States plant an American settlement on the coast of Kaffraria. Written by Captain Benjamin Stout, master

¹ B.M., Add. MSS. 41265, f. 7, Farquhar to Hastings, Port Louis, 11 May 1821.

² *Ibid.*

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/4239, Extract, Farquhar to Bathurst, enclosed in Wilmot Horton to Croker, F.O., 15 June 1823; Hertslet, *Commercial Treaties*, III, 265, Treaty for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, Muscat, 20 September 1822.

⁴ Prior, *Voyage along the Eastern Coast of Africa to Mozambique in the 'Nisus' Frigate*.

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of *Hercules*—an American merchant-ship which had been wrecked near the Umzimvubu River—the author tells how he and his crew made their way to shore and then overland to Cape Town. He praised the friendliness of the Africans and extolled the economic value of a settlement in East Africa which would ‘amply repay American expense’ since it would provide ‘several articles essential to their commerce which they cannot find at home’. He warned that if the people of America neglected this opportunity Britain would expand up the coast from the Cape, control Madagascar and thus obtain greater profit than from all her possessions in the Indies, East and West.¹

Whether these books were read by the directors of policy is not known, but their publication is well worth noting at the very time when the extension of British markets was occupying attention and when Sir Charles Somerset at the Cape had been writing to Lord Bathurst that its ‘commerce has hitherto been the source of great profit to British merchants and manufacturers’.² Any one of these factors may have directed attention to East Africa. At the same time, it is well to remember that there was a certain continuity in official policy. Thomas Wallace, afterwards created Baron Wallace, who in the House of Commons was pointing out the changed conditions and the necessity for increased markets,³ had in the early years of the century been a member of the Board of Control of the East India Company, when the Reporter-General on External Commerce in Bombay had emphasized the potentialities of Delagoa Bay as a market. Wallace, moreover, was a member of the Board of Control in 1807 with Robert Dundas, at the very time when Charles Grant, George Rose, Vice-President of the Board of Trade, and others had suggested to Castlereagh the taking of Portuguese East Africa on ‘commercial grounds’. From 1818 to 1823 Wallace exercised considerable influence. He was Vice-President of the Board of Trade and presided over the Commons Committee of Inquiry into the foreign trade of the country. It was this Committee which in 1820 recommended the revision of the navigation acts, and in 1822, before Huskisson came to the Board of Trade, the preliminary revision was accomplished.⁴

¹ B. Stout, *Narrative of the Loss of the ‘Hercules’* (1820 edn., under first title *Cape of Good Hope and its Dependencies*), quoted by Coupland, *Intruders* 372–3.

² Theal, *Records of Cape Colony*, XI, 161; quoted by Muller, *Die Britze Owerheid en die Groot Trek* (Cape Town, 1947), 19. ³ Hansard, New Series, vol. IV, 426.

⁴ Pay, *Great Britain from Adam Smith to the Present Day* (London, 1932), 49.

East Africa Islands as Objects of British Official Policy

Whether these facts may have played some part in convincing Wallace or Castlereagh that East Africa was unexplored or whether attention was directed to that coast by the reports of the increase in the slave traffic¹ which Wilberforce had emphasized in the House of Commons,² is difficult to tell. Whatever the facts may be, in November 1821 the Admiralty informed the East India Company of their intention of employing two ships to examine and survey the East Coast of Africa from Algoa Bay northwards.³ India House, 'impressed with a sense of the importance of the survey to the safety of the Company's commerce', granted the officials employed an allowance equivalent to what was paid to officers of the same rank on the India station.⁴

This expedition, the logical outcome of the existing circumstances in England, was entrusted to the command of Captain W. F. Owen. It has traditionally been regarded as the beginning of British interest and policy on the East Coast of Africa. The occurrences which took place, especially in Delagoa Bay, must, therefore, be treated in some detail. They resulted in constant friction between Portugal and Britain, and eventually formed the basis of the Delagoa Bay arbitration in 1872.

Captain William Fitzwilliam Owen was born in 1774 of a Welsh family with naval traditions. As a junior officer he saw active service in the West Indies and European waters, showing great initiative and executive ability during the small expeditions entrusted to his command. From 1803 to 1813, Owen was in East Indian waters, and during this time he was a prisoner of war at the Ile de France from 1808-10. In addition to sharing in the expedition against Java and the Ile de France, he was able to devote much time to his favourite study of hydrography and navigation, in which he showed much accurate skill—making charts of the Maldivian Islands and part of the Sumatra coast.

On his return from the East he was, on the strength of his surveying reputation, appointed to assist his brother, Sir Edward Campbell Rich Owen, to chart the Great Lakes of North America which he did with success. Hence he was an obvious choice as commander for the service which the Admiralty had decided

¹ *Annual British Anti-Slavery Movement*, 192-3.

² *Hansard*, XXXVI, 1923.

³ *Admiralty Letters Rec'd.*, vol. 145, 182, *Letter to Dept. Admiralty Office*.

⁴ *Admiralty Letters Rec'd.*, vol. 1395, 62, *Resolution of a Court of Directors*, 22 Novem-

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upon. Owen's charts of both West and East Africa, Madagascar, Mauritius and the Asiatic coast from Aden to Cape Comorin form the basis of those in use today.¹

Owen's official instructions² were long and detailed. They contained much information about the various expedients necessary to meet the peculiar navigational circumstances in the Indian Ocean and instructions as to ports of call for refitment and provisioning. They required detailed reports of harbours and rivers, the economic potentialities of the adjacent lands, while, with a very right instinct, the harbours of most important commercial repute were picked out for particular attention. But they contained not one word indicating any desire on the part of England for acquisition of territory. Whether some points were discussed with the Admiralty which never appeared on paper is impossible to know. But it is interesting to note that Owen's instructions to his squadron, written on his arrival in English River, Delagoa Bay, end with these words: 'You will also point out the most appropriate site for the establishment of a town on some parts of its banks with reference to its healthiness and facility of navigation to it.'³

The expedition, manned and equipped at Woolwich, sailed from Spithead on 13 February with two hundred Britons on board two vessels—the *Loven* and a new ten-gun brig, the *Barracouta*. Each vessel was supplied with two additional four-oared gigs, expressly fitted for survey services.⁴ A third vessel was acquired *en route* at Rio de Janeiro.⁵

Owen was engaged on the East African survey from July 1822, until September 1825. During this time he and the commanders of the other vessels of his little squadron completed the survey and prepared charts of the whole of the East African coast from Table Bay to Guardafui, and from there to Muscat, including the fringing islands and some portions of the coast of Madagascar. During long periods the ships acted independently.

¹ O'Byrne, *Naval Biographical Dictionary*; cf. also *Dictionary of National Biography*. Owen was raised to flag rank in 1817, and in 1834 became a vice-admiral; the following year he accepted a pension on the reserve list and died in Canada on 3 November 1847.

² P.R.O., Ad. 2/1487, 309, Instructions to Owen of the *Loven*, Admiralty, 4 February 1822.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 2/1487, 74, Instructions to crews of *Travancore*, *Cochin*, *Hornby*, *Barbary* & *Orion*, H.M.S. *Loven*, Delagoa Bay, 27 December 1822.

⁴ *Journal of the Royal Navy*, p. 1, 1824.

⁵ P.R.O., Ad. 2/1487, 44, Owen to Canning, Rio, 26 May 1822.

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meeting at agreed points at stated intervals. Owen was forced, because of the sickness of his crews, to return to the Cape in the early part of 1823, where he spent nearly three months.¹ He also visited Bombay at the end of the same year, returning to the coast by way of Muscat in February 1824. The illness of his crew and the need of repairs detained him at Mauritius from 21 May² to 13 July 1824. He also paid a short visit to Mahé in December 1824,³ and again in March 1825. He carried out a further reconditioning of his squadron at Mauritius in June 1825. Like every other navigator in the western half of the Indian Ocean he found his movements affected by the winds and currents which, as in the time of da Gama, made the South-East African littoral, Mauritius and the Malabar coast the key positions for navigation in those waters.

Owen's expedition throws much light on the condition of East Africa, and it is the political import of his voyages, rather than their scientific results, which is germane to this study. Filled with a thirst for scientific knowledge and fired with a humanitarian zeal for the suppression of the slave trade and the extension of British protection over oppressed peoples, he exceeded the scope of his instructions so widely that his surveying expedition was transformed into a political mission.

[1]

THE CESSION OF MOMBASA

Two powers claimed sovereignty over the shore from Delagoa Bay to the mouth of the Persian Gulf. North of Ras Sangra, or Merka, the Imam of Muscat possessed nominal authority, but not an individual south of Ul-Ilhad acknowledged his sovereignty, so weakened was his position by pirates, slave traders and pretenders. The coast from Delagoa Bay to Cape Delgado was claimed by Portugal. Between these regions was a 'no-man's-land' where both Christian and Mohammedan overlords claimed a shadowy dominion, but which was governed either by native chiefs or by virtually independent governors of the Imam. The

¹H.M.O., Ad. 1/2269, 17, Owen to Croker, Simon's Bay, 7 April 1823.

²H.M.O., Ad. 1/2269, 68, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lever*, Mauritius, 29 May 1824.

³H.M.O., Ad. 1/2270, 42, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lever*, Mauritius, 22 January 1825.

The Coast of Mombasa

latter might easily have taken control of most of them, but he preferred them to remain independent so that they might be used as rendezvous for slave vessels; for were they a part of the Imam's territory, his treaty with Britain would not permit this.¹ Two of the chief principalities along this coast were Mombasa (or Mombas) and Zanzibar.

As we have seen in a previous chapter it was customary among the rulers of these territories, whenever there was a disputed succession, to invite the protection of the nation best able to defend them. In return they offered a share of their revenues but maintained the domestic government in their own hands.² In this way the Portuguese had an opportunity of retaking Mombasa in 1769. Some twenty-five years previously the Governor of Mozambique had suggested that they should try to acquire the island in order to prevent French, English or Dutch influence from gaining a hold there or on any of the neighbouring islands. Portugal supported the idea, but could do no more than warn Mozambique to watch closely the movements of possible rivals.³

The pretext for the peaceful acquisition of Mombasa, which presented itself to the Portuguese in 1769, arose through the arrival at Mozambique of Prince Unho-Congo, a claimant to the disputed throne of Mombasa. He magnanimously offered to Portugal the kingdom he hoped to obtain. The great majority of inhabitants were, he said, in his favour, and the Portuguese were to provide a small force more for show than for service. With the help of Unho-Congo an expedition was fitted out in Mozambique, but owing to bad leadership it was abandoned before reaching Mombasa.⁴

Twenty years later the same claimant, who had maintained a poverty-stricken existence in Mozambique, set out to plead his cause at Goa.⁵ Impressed with the 'importance of this dominion' as well as its commercial utility, the Governor of Goa promised that the *S. Anna* frigate—then engaged on an expedition to expel the Austrians from Lourenço Marques—would be sent to his assistance. But the Governor died before the expedition was

¹ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, 54, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, off Momb., 2 March 1812.

² P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, 33, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Momb., 10 March 1814.

³ Botelho, I., 429-31.

⁴ Botelho, I., 432-3; Boxer and Azevedo, 83.

⁵ A.M.U., Mop., 44, Copy, Unho-Congo (untranslated) to the Queen, Goa, 20 January 1789; enclosed in letter Diogo de Sousa to J. Pinto de Sousa, Momb., 17 September 1790.

Portuguese Domination Under British Official Policy

unification, and his successor merely promised to consult the Queen of Portugal.¹

In 1796, Diogo de Sousa, Governor of Mozambique, again raised the issue in Lisbon and Goa. Prince Unho-Congo was aged and ill and his death would take from Portugal the opportunity of regaining Mombasa. Acquisition of that island and, through it, of Kilwa and Zanzibar would prevent the latter stealing the local trade from the Portuguese and also thwart the French from the Ille de France who were intriguing for the ivory trade. Mombasa would be useful as a base and source of man power for the subjection of the neighbouring islands.² Following orders from Lisbon,³ two emissaries were sent from Mozambique in 1798 to report upon the disposition of the people of Mombasa to Portugal. And, in consequence, the schooner *Emboscada* with a small force was dispatched in that year against the Arabs upon the pretext of wishing to open commercial relations. But either the Portuguese had been misinformed or the Mombasians had changed their minds, for the expedition was not well received.⁴ After this the death of Unho-Congo and Portugal's preoccupation in the European wars caused the project to be abandoned.

These facts are particularly interesting in the light of Owen's negotiation at Mombasa and his correspondence with the Admiralty. Owen's instructions, as we know, limited the field of his survey to the East Coast of Africa. Cape Guardafui was the most northerly point mentioned. But acting on information that serious errors existed in the charts of the coast of Arabia from Muscat or Roselgate southwards, and that several French and Arab slave vessels had arrived in Mozambique, Owen felt duty bound to try and rectify these matters, even though they were beyond the scope of his instructions. He, therefore, proceeded to Bombay, where he proposed an amendment to the slave-trade treaty with the Imam and the establishment of an agent with consular powers at Mozambique.⁵ Here, Owen said, several attempts to trade both from Bombay and Calcutta had been opposed, not so much by

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 44, Diogo de Sousa to M. da Melo e Castro, and M. da Melo e Castro to P. de Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moz., 1781, both enclosed in Diogo de Sousa to L. Pinto de Sousa, Moz., 18 September 1796.

² Ibid.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 47, R. de Sousa Coutinho to F. G. da Carvalho e Moniz da Costa, Palace of Queluz, 9 January 1798.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1, 692-3.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 46, Owen to Elphinstone, H.M.S. *Lion*, Bombay, 4 November 1798.

The Capture of Mombasa

official Portuguese policy as by individual military governors who had overstepped their powers and frustrated British trade by 'outrageous ill-treatment'.¹

Bombay had no authority to appoint a consul² and consequently an appeal was sent to the Governor-General at Fort William. Owen was, however, provided with the necessary letters to the Imam and other chieftains on the Arabian coast soliciting safe conduct and assistance. At the same time Bombay could not, however anxious the officials were to do so,³ interfere with the Imam's slave-trade treaty because that had been negotiated at Mauritius. Moreover, when, in December 1823, two deputies from Mombasa arrived offering their country to the East India Company it was regarded as inconsistent with the Company's policy to extend protection there. At Muscat, early in 1824, Owen regretted that he personally had not seized the opportunity of accepting the cession of Mombasa in order to stop the diabolical traffic in slaves. If, therefore, on his arrival at Mombasa the island were offered to Britain, duty would bind him to accept it. Such an act would not be directed against the Imam's interests, but principally so that the 'hellish' slave traffic might be suppressed. Indeed, if that trade were put down in three years, Owen promised, an attempt would be made to persuade the rulers of Mombasa to place themselves under Muscat.⁴

The Imam, delighted with the present of some Arabic copies of the Bible, gave Owen full authority to punish anyone, whatever his rank, if found acting in breach of the slave-trade treaty. The desire was expressed to open a commerce with England to gain knowledge rather than wealth. With evident insincerity the Imam added that it would give him extreme pleasure to see the English dominions extended, but to put down the slave trade with 'Mahometans' was a 'stone too heavy for him without strong hand to help him'.⁵ To Britain this proved an equally difficult task for, in addition to political considerations, Muslims regarded slavery as a natural element in their social life explicitly sanctioned by their religion. But Owen was determined on his purpose. Having concluded his amicable discussions with the Imam, he proceeded to Mombasa, where the Imam resided.

¹ P.R.O. Ad. 16/1/66, Owen to Hastings, 2nd January 1824.

² P.R.O. Ad. 16/1/66, Hastings to Owen, 20th January 1824.

³ P.R.O. Ad. 16/1/66, Hastings to Owen, 21st January 1824.

⁴ P.R.O. Ad. 16/1/66, Hastings to Owen, 22nd January 1824.

⁵ P.R.O. Ad. 16/1/66, Hastings to Owen, 23rd January 1824.

East African Slaves as Object of British Official Policy

February 1824. The chiefs hastened on board with prayers and offered the voluntary and unreserved gift of their country. Owen extended British protection to them 'until the will of the King be known.' In return there was to be a complete abolition of the slave trade and England was to share in the customs revenue.¹ To maintain this authority a petty officer, a corporal of the marines, and three seamen were to remain in Mombasa. 'Prince' Mombarrok, the legitimate sovereign, was received on board to prosecute his suit to His Majesty's government through that of Mauritius and to confirm Owen's action. At Pemba, assurances were secured that the property and plantations of the people of Mombasa should go unmolested.²

Next Zanzibar was visited. The Governor was in Owen's words, 'a cunning Arab' deeply involved in exporting slaves—contrary to the Imam's treaty with Great Britain—to Mozambique and Bembatook. Notwithstanding the evidence, therefore, that Owen possessed the friendship of the Imam, he regarded the English with some sinister feeling, and his professed zeal in their service became less than apathy when their backs were turned. His attitude on this occasion was hardly remarkable. Owen had so far exceeded instructions that, in accordance with the *carte blanche* given him by the Imam, British passes were handed to all the Arabs who would accept them. In this way British men-of-war acquired the right to search Arab vessels. The Governor of Zanzibar, cleverly detecting this trap, would permit none of his subjects to accept these passes.³ Owen certainly believed that the man on the spot should never allow an opportunity to slip. When, therefore, one of Farquhar's men, engaged in stopping the slave trade, arrived at Zanzibar, he was given information about the coast, of which British cruisers seemed in complete ignorance, and was ordered to Mombasa to finish the work already begun.⁴

At Mauritius, on 21 May 1824, Owen found that both the Governor, Sir George Lowry Cole (Farquhar's successor) and Commodore Nourse of the Cape station, showed no great enthusiasm for Mombasa, but were impressed with the importance

¹ P.R.O., Ad. 1/1269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, off Ibo, 1 March 1824; ² same; Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Mca. Harbour, 10 March 1824; and Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, at sea, 3 March 1824.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/1269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, off Ibo, 1 March 1824.

⁴ P.R.O., Ad. 1/1269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, at sea, 3 March 1824.

⁵ P.R.O., Ad. 1/1269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, off Ibo, 1 March 1824.

The Crisis of Mombasa

of Mozambique to Britain as a station.¹ Owen had no doubt that from every point of view Mombasa was a place of much greater political and commercial importance save only in the single fact of Mozambique's vicinity to Madagascar—a place in which both England and France were showing increased interest. Even then, without the possession of the colony of 'Rio de Sena' and the Quiteve with the countries southward, Mozambique would be insignificant.²

The Bombay government's previous refusal to accept the cession of Mombasa, he explained to the Admiralty, was founded solely on the amity which existed between that government and the Imam. All the officers appeared as ignorant of everything concerning Mombasa and its dependencies as those in England and at Mauritius. The Imam was insecure and his throne unstable. Britain would in all likelihood find an enemy in his successor, would again be shut out from East Africa and have to contend with European enemies even for a friendly admission to its ports. The Governor at Bombay, Owen thought, had no sure means of obtaining any exact knowledge of Mombasa and had, therefore, probably never examined the political and commercial advantages likely to result from the cession.

Right and policy, Owen considered, united in dictating the propriety of Britain's possessing the necessary points on that coast, and neither Arabs nor Portuguese should regard this as an injury. The Imam's threat to destroy Mombasa if it refused to surrender was sufficient proof of this.³ The Portuguese king had received nothing from East Africa for ten years and should, therefore, gladly give up to Britain all his rights and claims to dominion on condition of a guaranteed net revenue. 'Might not in such a case,' he wrote, 'the streams of our superabundant, irritable and discontented population have their views, their enterprises, their industry and talents turned this way not only without expense to their country but to augment its power and its glory.'⁴ Moreover, the Admiralty should not be influenced in their decision regarding this coast by any criticism from the French, who would no doubt accuse Britain of an insatiable thirst for

¹ P.R.O., Ad. 1/269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Mauritius, 29 May 1854.

² P.R.O., Ad. 1/269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Mauritius, 1 June 1854. Quoted with the permission of Sir George S. Soper.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, off Rio, 5 March 1854.

⁴ P.R.O., Ad. 1/269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Mysore, 10 March 1854.

THE 'AFRICAN DILEMMA' AS OBJECT OF BRITISH OFFICIAL POLICY

despise and attribute her actions to the worst motives. 'Your friendships must pardon me for using an unfashionable argument,' Owen explained, but 'it is to me as clear as the sun that God has prepared the dominion of East Africa for the only nation on earth that has public virtue enough to govern it for its own benefit.'¹

Before returning to Mombasa Owen called at the Comoro Islands where he was horrified at the misery and depredations caused by the Malagash slave raids. 'These islands,' he wrote, 'are capable of vying with Madeira for wine and with the Moluccas for spices and with the world for cotton, coffee, sugar, oil and fruits.' When, therefore, some of the people 'humbled' themselves before him Owen assented to the display of the British flag. 'Shall we refuse,' he asked the Admiralty, 'to use this power which God has given us for the benefit of those who turn to us for protection and instruction?' To do so, Owen argued would be against the honour of God, his King, his country and all mankind.² At a time when the British Treasury was only just recovering from the effects of the wars, Owen obviously believed that 'an economy can only obtain the resources for further expansion through the creation of surplus wealth within its borders or by drawing upon the resources of other countries'.³

Early in October Owen returned to Mombasa. All the British officers left in command had died as a result of imprudent exposure at the wrong season (that is between November and the end of March). A single officer was appointed to replace them and to collect the necessary customs dues. Meanwhile supplications were received from the people of Mogadishu, Merka, Brava and other islands for the protection of the British flag against the piracy of Arabs in the service of the Imam of Muscat.⁴

It so happened that these requests came at a time when the death of Commodore Nourse at the Cape station⁵ and Commodore Grant in Indis, resulted in Owen taking upon himself the responsibility and charge in those waters.⁶ Even though he was on detached service he felt it incumbent upon him to use his

¹ H.M.O. Ad. 1/265, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lever*, Mys., 10 March 1824.

² H.M.O. Ad. 1/265, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lever*, 21 sec., 3 March 1824.

³ H.M.O. Ad. 1/265, *Commodore's Instructions in Africa*, 48.

⁴ H.M.O. Ad. 1/265, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lever*, Mombasa, 20 January 1824.

⁵ H.M.O. Ad. 1/265, Parquett to Bulwer, Port Louis, 27 September 1824; Ad. 1/265, Bulwer to Croker, H.M.S. *Lever*, Port Louis, 11 March 1824.

⁶ H.M.O. Ad. 1/265, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lever*, Mombasa, 22 January 1824.

own judgment for the benefit of putting these countries into a footing that might preserve peace, prosperity and content until the British government should determine their fate. At Pemba, the mutual claims of the Arabs of Muscat and the people of Mombasa were adjusted. At Mogadishu affairs were left in abeyance, since the chief with whom Owen previously had political dealings was absent in the country and the authorities in his stead were jealous and cautious. At Brava, apparently unconcerned whether he was encroaching on the Imam's prerogative or not, Owen gave the chief authority to hoist the British flag² and accepted the island as a dependency of Mombasa, provided it subscribed to the same terms for abolishing the slave trade.

In justification of these actions Owen protested that neither the Portuguese nor the Arabs pretended to any administrative government anywhere except at the main points of their establishments, and were too weak to fulfil any engagements they made.³ The Imam, at the time of Owen's arrival, was actually trying to blockade Mombasa with five hired *chelingas*, or small boats, in order to enforce his authority.⁴ The only reason why the Portuguese had been allowed to retain Ibo was because depriving them of it, as the Imam himself explained, would have vexed the English. The slave trade was rife. Every Arab went completely armed everywhere and was so far free that his military services could never be commanded against his will. Thus the Imam and all the Arab rulers were obliged to have recourse to slaves, and no man could be powerful who had not a numerous host of them.⁵ The power as well as the purse of the Imam, therefore, was upheld by this 'infamous' commerce. His soldiers and his servants were supplied by it, and the Red Sea and Persia, as well as some parts of North India, paid him immense sums annually for African slaves. On 'moral grounds' alone Owen, therefore, felt perfectly justified in accepting the cession of Mombasa,⁶ especially since the Mombasa chiefs wished for British protection and, even previously to Owen's arrival, had hoisted the British flag in an attempt to frighten the Imam's blockaders.⁷

² P.R.O., Ad. 1/1269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lion*, off Zanzibar, 3 March 1852.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/1270, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lion*, Mombasa, 21 January 1852.

⁴ P.R.O., Ad. 1/1268, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lion*, Mombasa, 21 March 1852.

⁵ P.R.O., Ad. 1/1266, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lion*, Mombasa, 10 March 1852.

⁶ P.R.O., Ad. 1/1267, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lion*, off the S. African coast, 20 March 1852.

⁷ P.R.O., Ad. 1/1265, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lion*, off Zanzibar, 3 March 1852.

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In addition, Owen found many political and commercial reasons why Britain should undertake the protection of this, 'one of the most commodious and defensible ports in the world'. Had it 'fallen into the hands of the French, they would have had no reason to regret the loss of Mauritius'.¹ From a national point of view, Mombasa was a place of first importance, and it should be noted how closely Owen's arguments tally with those used by the Portuguese at Mozambique in the eighteenth century. There were nearly thirty thousand men in arms within the sound of a gun, the port possessed the best timber for shipbuilding and it was of easy access with a spacious harbour heretofore unexplored. From a commercial point of view he thought Britain could not have too many ports. But there was still a stronger political reason for obtaining Mombasa, for the local princes had told him that as submission to the Imam was out of the question they intended, if Owen refused their appeal, to send to Bourbon for French protection.²

Here it is interesting to note the similarity of Owen's statement concerning the threat to India of a hostile power in East Africa with that of a politician in 1937 discussing the return of Tanganyika to Germany³ and with the views of an Indian historian, K. M. Panikkar, in 1948 that India, like every European power aiming at dominion in the East needed a base in East African waters for her own protection. Such a port in the hands of an enemy like France, Owen considered, would give ample anxiety to a future generation of Englishmen. It would be a much 'more serious thorn in the side of India than ever Mauritius or Pondicherry had been'. Furthermore, while it would cost Great Britain only a moderate 'establishment' to hold the town, she would profit in revenues, and ships' timber would be obtained at less than half the Bombay price. Mombasa in British possession, together with Delagoa Bay, would open several ports and with them the commerce of East Africa to British merchants who for so many years had been excluded from that shore.⁴ Several vessels had already been dispatched from Mauritius to Mombasa in consequence of the security felt by merchants since it was under British colours.⁵ Under her protecting hand Britain

¹ G.O., Ad. 1/2559, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, off Ibo, 1 March 1824.

² G.O., Ad. 1/2559, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, at sea, 5 March 1824.

³ *The Times*, 26 October 1937, letter by L. S. Amery.

⁴ G.O., Ad. 1/2559, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, at sea, 6 March 1824.

⁵ G.O., Ad. 1/2559, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, at sea, 7 October 1824.

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would see the surrounding towns rise from their ashes to buy her manufactures and add to her wealth and power. Another place would be gained whence religious instruction and knowledge might be diffused to the glory of Britain and the benefit of the much-abused Africans. Moreover, the retention of Mombasa was a sure means of abolishing the slave trade—an idea which was reiterated in later years by Thomas Fowell Buxton. Time was to reveal more than a grain of logic in this suggestion. Only by British occupation, and by no other means, was the Arab slave trade to be finally abolished.

Meanwhile, Commodore Nourse at the Cape Station had reported his opinion to England. He was sceptical of the value of the chiefs' protestations of loyalty to Britain. They were obviously using it as a means of furthering their interests and security.¹ So far as he was concerned, therefore, no ships would be detailed to protect Mombasa until he had heard from England, but he could offer no opinion on the policy of taking possession of the place, or of its importance from a commercial point of view, as he had not visited the coast above Zanzibar. Having observed the decline of the Portuguese establishment on the coast to the south, he had been forcibly impressed with the possibility of exterminating the slave trade there. To this end, commercial establishments or agents and a free intercourse with the numerous population along the coast would be a better means to begin with than military force. Trade was fettered by the Arabs, and the native African had comparatively little stimulus given him by their exactions. These Arab rulers forbade the natives to traffic with any other than themselves, paid them what they chose and, on the other hand, demanded so much that the casual European trader was deterred from visiting them.²

Enclosed in Nourse's letter was a report by Captain Moorson from the Mauritius station who, at Owen's command, had visited Mombasa. According to Moorson the Mombassians were disposed to act in sincerity and good faith regarding the slave trade,³ but there appeared to be considerable misunderstanding between Owen and the native and half-caste Arab chiefs who

¹ P.R.O., Ad. 1/62, R. 3, Nourse to Coker, H.M.S. *Ambuscade*, Port Louis, Mauritius, 4 June 1824.

² P.R.O., Ad. 1/62, R. 3, Nourse to Coker, H.M.S. *Ambuscade*, Port Louis, Mauritius, 25 May 1824.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/62, Moorson to Nourse, H.M.S. *Ardent*, 25/6/24, no date also enclosed in R. 3, Nourse to Coker, H.M.S. *Ambuscade*, Port Louis, 25 May 1824.

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seemed to have no notion of the nature and extent of the cession. Their object was to regain the places taken by the Imam and to gain security by British power and increased traffic from their possessions. They had no idea, however, that British subjects were to enter into competition with them for the produce of their country.

Much to Owen's disappointment, Sir Lowry Cole, then Governor of Mauritius, appeared to view the cession of Mombasa with even less enthusiasm than Nourse, and only after much delay decided to notify the Governor of Bombay of the proposed cession. They might be counterbalanced in the Imam of Mombasa's mind by the fact that Major-General Pendlebury of the Royal Engineers was allowed to remain on board the *Lion* for nearly a year after the cession. The Governor resolved on a provisional acquiescence in the cession, and the *Lion* returned to the honours

yuan to Germany and with the views of Panikkar, in 1948 that India, like every European power aiming at dominion in the East needed a base in East Africa to serve her own protection. Such a port in the hands of an enemy, Owen considered, would give ample anxiety to a number of countries in the region. It would be a much more serious threat than the bases of the French in Mauritius or Pondicherry.

* P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lion*, off Ibo, 1 March 1824.

** P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lion*, *ibid.*, 1 March 1824.

*** *The Times*, 26 October 1937. Issue by L. S. Amory.


**** P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lion*, *ibid.*, 1 March 1824.

***** P.R.O., Ad. 1/2270, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lion*, *ibid.*, 1 October 1824.

Lat: Cape Inyack - $25^{\circ}58' S$.
Long: da. " da. $-32^{\circ}56' 6'' E$.

Variation - $25^{\circ}5' W$.

High water at Shereen I. 4h.10m. ? Rises
da. da fort 5h.20m. 12ft.



8. CAPTAIN W. F. W. OWEN'S CHART OF DELAGOA BAY

This chart is reproduced by permission of the Parliamentary Library, Cape Town,
with insertions from *H.C. Accounts & Papers*, vol. 3143, 172 and vol. XXX,
166.

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Africans were not hostile and allowed them to do so.¹ From time to time, the Bay had attracted the attention of other European nations.

In 1721, the Dutch East India Company fitted out an expedition intended to take possession of the reputed gold mines in this neighbourhood. They erected a fort and trading station and remained there until 1730 with no interference from the Portuguese. The place was then abandoned owing to its unhealthiness and the lack of trading profit. In 1757 the Dutch ship *Naarstigheid* put into the Bay, but the crew stayed there only two years. Nineteen years later an Austrian expedition, fitted out with the sanction of Maria Theresa by an association called the Asiatic Company of Trieste, arrived to establish trading stations on the shores of the Bay. A small fort was erected. There were no Portuguese there at the time, but two years later when the Viceroy of Goa heard of the existence of this station he sent a protest that this was Portuguese territory. The matter was followed up by the Lisbon government, and the frigate *S. Anne* from Goa was fitted out with as strong a force as could be raised to expel the Austrians, who by this time were reduced to a few fever-stricken people. The *S. Anne* arrived in March 1781. Two unarmed vessels under the Austrian flag were seized and sent back to Goa and the few people at the fort were taken prisoners.²

At the same time, and this is a point not generally known, two English trading vessels, the *Spy* and the *Snow* were forced away. Their owners sent a memorial to the Bombay government protesting that they had traded there for the past seven years with the permission of the native 'princes', to whom they had made annual presents according to custom. They seem to have taken for granted that the Bay was under Portuguese authority and laid special emphasis on two facts. There had been no attempt to secure grants from the 'princes', but only to trade in ivory. Moreover, the Treaty of 1661 between Portugal and Britain stipulated that British ships might trade to any Portuguese port eastward of the Cape.³ In England, letters of protest were received from the Portuguese, pointing out that the English had no permission from the King of Portugal and could, therefore, not trade

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 85, Narrative by Thomas Ramsden, of the occurrences in the Bay of Delagoa, Bombay, 15 June 1816.

² Theal, *The Portuguese in South Africa*, 271-5.

³ I.O.R., Home Misc. Series, V, 173 (East Indies Series, 83), 537-80, Memorial to Bombay Govt., of Jas. Sibbald, David Fell and Stephen Iveson.

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with that port. After some correspondence through the Portuguese ambassador¹ in London, the matter appears to have ended. The actions of the *S. Amo* also caused some correspondence between the Austrian and Portuguese governments, but the former did not attach much importance to it, and ultimately without any close examination, the sovereignty of the latter over the territory enclosing the Bay was recognized. The Captain-General of Mozambique then sent a small garrison to occupy the Bay, which henceforth was regarded as part of the Captaincy of Cape Corrientes.

The French attack in 1796, as we have seen,² did not lead to permanent occupation. After their withdrawal the Governor of Mozambique sent a small force to reoccupy the fort, and reported to Lisbon that he had persuaded the French 'that from many points of view it was in their interests, that this important dominion remain with the Crown of Portugal because the English at the Cape of Good Hope had always coveted it on account of the trade, its position and its large port which they could use as a base or port of call for their vessels sailing to Asia. . . .'³

This clearly indicates that the Governor was laying claim to both the large and the small bay. In later years the British contested that the Portuguese possessed only the small bay and that the term Lourenço Marques was in no sense applicable to the whole bay.⁴ It should be noted also that the Portuguese owing to the hostility of the natives were not able immediately to re-establish themselves on the north bank of English River. And in 1799, Luiz Jozé, in charge of the detachment sent to re-establish Portuguese dominion in Lourenço Marques, consequently 'raised the flag in the land of the chief Capella'.⁵

During the temporary ejection of the Portuguese from the Bay, the English at Bombay, counting on the fact that 'it must take some time before the Portuguese re-establish themselves,

¹ *Bombay Com. E. and I. Reports*, Range 419, vol. 40, Report on Commerce, 1 September 1803, para. 41.

² Cf. 113.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 50, F. G. de Carvalho e Menezes da Costa to? (probably Prince Regent), Lisbon, 5 February 1804.

⁴ Heratlet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, III, 992.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., Luiz Jozé to the Governor of Moz., Garrison at Lourenço Marques, 6 August 1799.

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immediately on the news of the peace' (of Amiens), sent a vessel to trade there.¹ But for thirteen years after the Portuguese re-established themselves, the British made no further attempt to recover the coveted trade with the natives. This abstinence, despite their recognition of the importance of the trade, amounted to a *de facto* recognition of the Portuguese claims to the shores round the Bay.

In 1815 Thomas Ramsden, an English ship's captain from Bombay, desired to trade with the natives in Delagoa Bay. These were divided into three factions: one under Capella on the south bank of the river, hostile to the Portuguese and anxious to trade with Ramsden; another on the same bank led by Mapoot, sometimes prepared to be subservient in commercial matters to the Portuguese; and a third on the north side under Mafumo, generally allies of the Portuguese.² Ramsden refused to trade with Capella without first obtaining written permission from the Portuguese fort. This would be proof of the independent sovereignty the chief claimed. Some form of consent was indeed obtained, but the arrival of a new governor more peremptory than the first and the fear of Mapoot's hostile intervention made it unavailing. Capella confessed his unwillingness to submit the dispute to the arbitrament of arms, received a token tribute from the Portuguese and, even though he had previously asked for the British flag, allowed them to repair their fort and hoist their flag on his side of the river. Ramsden, therefore, withdrew under a lively bombardment from the fort.³

Woodhouse, Ramsden's owner, complained to the President of the Bombay Council that the Portuguese had infringed the Treaty of 1810, even admitting, which he did not, Portugal's claim to territory on the south bank of the river. He pointed out that acquiescence in Portugal's claims 'would deprive British subjects of a highly beneficial trade'.⁴ The Governor of Mozambique also laid his complaint before the Bombay President, charging Ramsden with trading without permission and en-

¹ L.O.R., Bombay Com. E. and I. Reports, Range 419, vol. 40, Report, 1 September 1803, para. 41.

² P.R.O., Ad. 1/69, Threlfall (per J. Whitworth) to Nourse, H.M.S. *Nerid*, Table Bay, 29 April 1824, enclosed in Nourse to Croker, H.M.S. *Andromache* in Simon's Bay, 1 May 1824.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 85, Narrative by Thos. Ramsden, Bombay, 27 May 1816.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 85, Woodhouse to Warden, Bombay, 11 June 1816.

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couraging the natives to resist Portuguese authority.¹ He feared the total loss of the ivory trade and was clearly sensible of the jealousy which foreigners felt over trade in the Bay.² Sir Evans Nepean's reply was intended to cause a diplomatic delay. In this he was successful, and after some months the matter, it seems, was quietly shelved.³

In October 1822, on his first visit to Delagoa Bay, under the impression that all the surrounding country and coast was under Portuguese authority and jurisdiction, Owen presented his introduction from the Portuguese ministry to Captain Jacques Casimir, then commander of the Portuguese factory and fort.⁴ These letters of recommendation from Lisbon had been considered a necessary precaution to facilitate Owen's dealings with the Portuguese officials because of the well-known jealous character of that nation where its colonies were concerned.⁵ In obedience to Admiralty orders, Owen asked Casimir for permission to survey the rivers and for his protection when necessary from the natives. According to Owen's account, Casimir replied that the whole country was free and independent, that the Portuguese had no authority beyond the precincts of the fort, that, even in his fort he was in hourly fear of an attack by the native Zulus who had already laid waste the surrounding country, and that, therefore, he had no means of furnishing protection to the boats beyond the reach of his guns. Vivid proof of this statement was afforded when about five thousand Zulus, or *vatusas*, made a night attack upon Owen's landing party. The natives⁶ were driven off and retired from the district under threat of further retaliation by the English. It transpired that the Portuguese, so far from protecting the people in the vicinity of the fort, actually purchased them as slaves from the victorious invaders from the interior—a fact which seems to have confirmed Owen's belief that the African

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 82, Copy, M. C. d'Abreu e Menezes to Evans Nepean, Moz., 15 August 1815; enclosed in Menezes to A. d'Aranjo d'Azevedo, Moz., 30 September 1815.

² A.H.U., Moz., 82, d'Abreu e Menezes to d'Azevedo, Moz., 30 September 1815.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 83, Evans Nepean to M. C. d'Abreu e Menezes, Bombay Castle, 19 August 1816; Moz., 84, Same to same, 22 June 1816.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Owen to Botelho, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Moz., 10 May 1823.

⁵ Owen, *Narrative*, I, 6.

⁶ In 1824, it seems, Shaka had all the native kings under tribute, even Mayette, Makasane, Machakane, Kolikella of Temby, Mapoota, Matoll and Moamba, cf. Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Mauritius, 19 June 1824.

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chiefs were free and independent.¹ Owen then discovered the Portuguese habit of placing black soldiers on board visiting merchant ships in order to prevent any trade with the natives except through themselves as middlemen. This, in view of the complete independence of the native kings of Temby and Mattoli, was, Owen considered, a usurpation of authority, and if practised over an English vessel was to be prevented by his squadron if need be by force.²

During Owen's temporary absence at Mozambique to show his letters of credence to the Governor-General and while the protecting British warship left in the Bay was impotent through the sickness of its crew, a new governor at Delagoa Bay seized two British merchant vessels—the *Singapore* of Calcutta and the *Orange Grove* of the Cape of Good Hope—whose crews were too reduced by disease to resist.³ One vessel was captured 12 leagues from the fort. Under pressure of Owen's threats the Governor disgorged his plunder and the vessels were sent to Cape Town. But on Owen's insistence that a fort without territory or dominion could not make a whole country Portuguese, the Governor set about making numerous national flags to plant round the shores of the Bay.⁴ Owen countered this move by accepting, 'until His Majesty's pleasure be known', the cession of Temby and its dependencies, and guaranteed British protection to King Capella and his peoples against native and foreign aggression. In doing this Owen clearly foresaw that even nominal Portuguese possession would be a serious obstacle 'if the British ministry should ever desire to meet the wishes of these deserving Africans', particularly as 'that part of the country was neither in relation or contiguity with the Portuguese'.⁵ He could not know, as the Boer Trekkers were to learn in later years, that this would not necessarily mean that Capella had not made previous grants of a similar nature to the Portuguese. Since Bantu law knew nothing of an out-and-out alienation of the land on which the life of a tribe depended, but merely the grant of hunting, trading and such other privileges as might cover the use of whatever had

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Owen to Botelho, H.M.S. *Lever*, Moz., 10 May 1823.

² P.R.O., Ad. 1/2268, W. F. Owen to R. Owen, H.M.S. *Lever*, Delagoa Bay, 20 November 1822.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lever*, Simon's Bay, 7 April 1823.

⁴ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lever*, Simon's Bay, 1 June 1823; F.O. 97/303, No. 3, Owen to Botelho, H.M.S. *Lever*, Moz., 10 May 1823.

⁵ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lever*, Simon's Bay, 1 June 1823.

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its being on that land, the King would not feel himself precluded from 'granting' this area to others subsequently.¹

The Portuguese commandant was informed that the British flag flew on the southern banks of the river and that Portugal could only hold the land on which her fort was placed so long as the annual tribute to the native king was paid. To the Admiralty Owen explained that he had accepted the cession of this territory to avoid war between the Africans and the Portuguese who had incensed King Capella by an act of wanton aggression.²

Revisiting the Bay in July 1824, Owen found two London whalers, and the schooner *Jane* from the Cape of Good Hope trading in ivory. Owing to the formidable force of the English, the Governor had made no protest, although, in his view the English merchants were infringing the treaty of 1810.³ Owen learned that the Portuguese had been intriguing with the Mapootans to secure their allegiance. He, therefore, invited the King, Makasane, to a conference and after three days concluded, on 23 August, two treaties with him. In one, a Treaty of Amity and Friendship, the King agreed 'until the will of His Majesty be known' to accept British protection for ten years, within which time he promised to give lands freely for the establishment of an English colony, if this be desired, provided a small quit rent or annual acknowledgment be paid to him and his successors. All his followers were to be allowed a free trade with British subjects, although he reserved the right to exact a customary present and to carry on a free and unrestricted commerce with people and nations not at war with Great Britain. Moreover, full provision was made that in case of the establishment of a British colony, Mapoota would be under the criminal jurisdiction of Great Britain. Slavery would be abolished. But no laws would be made without the consent of the king, while the British colony would not meddle with the Mapootans unless they were incorporated into 'one people'.

The other, a Treaty of Commerce, was for four years. King Makasane promised in return for British protection that no presents or duties would be exacted from British subjects for any other trade than ivory, and on this a present was to be given to the King according to the value of the goods at invoice price

¹ Walker, *The Great Trek* (London, 1934), 149.

² P.R.O., Ad. 1/226, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Simon's Bay, 1 June 1823.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/226, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Delagoa Bay, 27 August 1823.

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plus an extra 4 per cent.¹ Three days later Owen notified the Governor of Delagoa Bay of these treaties. He requested that in commercial pursuits undertaken in the territory of Mapoota, from which the treaty excluded no friendly nation, Makasane and his subjects were to be considered under the protection of Britain.²

The Governor of Mozambique, to whom Owen sent an account of all these proceedings as well as copies of his new charts of the coast, promised to recall the offending Governor as well as any soldiers who had engaged in robbing the *Singapore*. He transmitted the treaties to Lisbon and agreed to observe them pending instructions.³ Meanwhile Commodore Nourse at the Cape station upheld Owen's actions. On 8 May 1823, when Owen was at Simon's Bay, Nourse forwarded to the Admiralty a copy of the cession of Temby and stated that he would feel it his duty to interpose should the Portuguese attempt to prevent any British vessels trading there.⁴ In June, since merchants had applied to him to trade at Delagoa Bay, he issued a declaration in defence of British rights in the Bay which could be shown in case interference with commerce was attempted. This authorized British ships of war to take every opportunity to visit the Bay and protect British commerce.⁵

While Owen was in Bombay arranging his voyage to Arabia and Muscat, Commodore Nourse anchored at Delagoa Bay (on 3 November 1823), to check any interference of the Portuguese with English vessels that might be trading peaceably with the natives. Owen's compact with the native chiefs was ratified and the British flag hoisted in Temby. All this (Nourse wrote to the Admiralty) was executed quietly without any dispute or disagreeable circumstance—the commandant of the Portuguese fort having promised to abstain from any interference and having acquainted Nourse that the proceedings of Captain Owen had

¹ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Enclosure, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Delagoa Bay, 27 August 1823; F.O. 97/303, Enclosure 'E', Palmella to Dudley, London, 23 May 1827.

² P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Lopes de Cardinas, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Delagoa Bay, 26 August 1823.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Joao Manuel de Silva, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Moz., 7 October 1823; de Silva to Owen, Moz., 9 October 1823.

⁴ P.R.O., Ad. 1/69, Nourse to Croker, H.M.S. *Andromache*, Simon's Bay, 8 May 1823.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Enclosure, No. 5, Declaration by Nourse, H.M.S. *Andromache*, Simon's Bay, 1 June 1823, in Palmella to Dudley, London, 23 May 1827.

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been represented to his government.¹ On 17 November, Nourse quitted Delagoa Bay and proceeded up the Mozambique channel.

Shortly after the departure of the English Commodore from Delagoa Bay, the Portuguese tried to enforce their authority over the King of Mapoota. War resulted, and by means of a pretended peace negotiation the King lured the Governor and his garrison, as well as many of the Portuguese native allies, into native territory and there massacred them.² Thus, when Owen returned to English River in April 1824,³ he found a ruined countryside and a depleted garrison. He rehoisted the British flag, which the Portuguese had pulled down,⁴ and learned that the young Zulu King, Shaka, had made himself master of all the territories from the British boundaries of the Cape to Delagoa Bay; even Makassane and Mapoota were tribute to him. Apparently, the Portuguese had attempted and failed to obtain a piece of territory from him, but some British merchants trading to Delagoa Bay had recently been promised the right to form a settlement at Port Natal. This plan was in progress of execution from the Cape.⁵ When Owen passed there in 1825 a British merchant, Francis George Farewell, was found to have started a trading settlement.⁶

Early in that year Owen was on his way southward from Mombasa when at Bembatook, near Mozambique, he unexpectedly received news of happenings in Delagoa Bay from a small British trader, the *Salisbury* of Liverpool.⁷ The *Salisbury*, bound on a trading expedition to the coast of Madagascar and the East Coast of Africa, had called at Lourenço Marques at the end of October 1824. On attempting to pass up English River the Portuguese fort had fired a shot to force her to anchor, but ignoring this the brigantine had proceeded to about 2 miles above the fort. The following morning, before trade could be

¹ P.R.O., Ad. 1/69, Nourse to Croker, H.M.S. *Andromache*, 15 December 1823.

² P.R.O., Ad. 1/69, R. 25, Threfall (per J. Whitworth) to Nourse, H.M.S. *Nereid*, Table Bay, 29 April 1824, enclosed in Nourse to Croker, H.M.S. *Andromache*, in Simon's Bay, 1 May 1824, enclosed in C.O. 48/66, Admiralty to Horton, 31 July 1824.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lewin*, at sea, 3 May 1824.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, No. 3, Owen to Botelho, H.M.S. *Lewin*, Moz., 10 May 1825.

⁵ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lewin*, Mauritius, 19 June 1824; Walker, op. cit., 149.

⁶ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2270, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lewin*, Simon's Bay, 27 September 1825; C.O. 48/62, vol. I, Farewell to Somerset, Cape Town, 1 May 1824; Brink to Farewell, Colonial Office, Cape Town, 5 May 1824.

⁷ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2271, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lewin*, outer bar of Delagoa Bay, 6 September 1825.

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started with the natives, the master with some of his crew were forcibly taken to the fort to answer for their presence in the Bay to the Governor, Schmid von Belliker, newly appointed in 1824 and who, as a former officer in one of the Swiss regiments in English pay, had learnt to speak English.¹ The *Salisbury* was immediately boarded and searched by a Portuguese guard. Among other goods, glass beads, hardware and cloth, obviously intended for disposal to the natives, were found. Against this the Governor protested and held the master and his principals responsible for any damage occasioned either to the Crown of Portugal or its subjects residing in the Bay, even though no commercial intercourse with the natives had taken place. The commerce of all foreigners, they were told, was prohibited and particularly, in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty of 1810, that of the English in ivory. It was absolutely forbidden to proceed up the English, Dundas or Mattol rivers to trade, or to have any communication with any vessel or any of the natives round the Bay without a passport from the fort, and anyone doing so would be treated as a pirate. All the Africans were aware of this and had orders to secure everyone who landed without a passport. Notwithstanding these prohibitions, if the master were inclined to trade and if his passport were delivered to the Governor until he sailed, special privileges would be given him. Meanwhile, a soldier was put on board to whom the master was obliged to pay the equivalent of one shilling a day in cloth.² The *Salisbury* remained ten days in the Bay, during which time the crew traded with the natives and the Portuguese soldier was paid in accordance with the Governor's orders.

In handing these declarations to Owen, the master informed him that Schmid had spoken in the most insulting terms of the 'piratical' deeds Owen had committed and had hoisted the Portuguese flag on the Temby side of the river, though the Africans did not communicate at all with the Portuguese.³ On the way to Mozambique, therefore, Owen sent a protest to the

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Copy, No. 20, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lewin*, on outer bar of Delagoa Bay, 6 September 1825; F.O. 97/303, Copy of report by Corbett, *Salisbury*, Bembatooka Bay, 4 May 1825, enclosure I in No. 2, Owen to de Silva, H.M.S. *Lewin*, at sea, 7 May 1825.

² P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Protest by Governor of Lourenço Marques, 4 November 1824, enclosure Ia in No. 2, Owen to de Silva, H.M.S. *Lewin*, at sea, 7 May 1825.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Copy of Report by Corbett, *Salisbury*, Bembatooka Bay, 4 May 1825, enclosure I in Owen to de Silva, H.M.S. *Lewin*, at sea, 7 May 1825.

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Governor that Schmid's act, in again hauling down the British flag, must be esteemed as an insult unless he had specific orders to do so and nothing could justify it without formal notice of his intention. An explanation was required to prevent enforcement of honourable amends for insults by that 'petty factory which had too long been suffered to exist to disgrace humanity and the flag of His Most Faithful Majesty'.¹

The *Loven* entered Mozambique in May 1825, where Owen found a new Governor, who professed entire ignorance of the events in Delagoa Bay and refused to recognize any public acts of, or with, the government in the time of the Constitution and previous to the late counter-revolution in Portugal which had re-established Royal authority.

Owen, therefore, wrote to the Admiralty, giving a brief account of the happenings in Delagoa Bay since his arrival.² In doing this he was prompted by humanitarian motives so that the 'heavy iron hand and wicked despotism' of the subordinate governors might be withdrawn from oppressing the miserable but amicable Africans. The Governor was warned that unless there was redress and reparation for the repeated insults armed force would be used. At the same time a report was lodged concerning a French schooner in the port which Owen had learnt was returning to Lourenço Marques for a cargo of slaves where an agent had been left to obtain them. The Governor secured delay by replying that the difficulty of getting the letters translated would take some time, but assured Owen that Schmid would immediately be removed by his government, and that he had already given him orders not to molest any strangers engaged in peaceable traffic with whomsoever they pleased.³

On calling at St. Augustin's Bay shortly after, Owen met the very slaver he had seen in Mozambique with one hundred and thirty slaves on board from Lourenço Marques flying Portuguese colours. Despite his warning and contrary to treaty,⁴ the Governor had given a passport to what he knew was French property.

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, No. 2, Owen to M. de Silva, H.M.S. *Loven*, at sea, 7 May 1825.

² P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, No. 3, Owen to Botelho, H.M.S. *Loven*, Moz., 10 May 1825; No. 2, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Loven*, on outer bar of Delagoa Bay, 6 September 1825.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2271, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Loven*, outer bar of Delagoa Bay, 6 September 1825.

⁴ Cf. 221 and 223-4.

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The vessel was captured and taken to Mauritius for judgment by the vice-admiralty court.¹

At sunset on 27 August the *Leven* again anchored in English River to find the black garrison at the Portuguese fort training their guns on her. An officer, sent ashore to wait on the Portuguese governor, returned with a message that there was an English brig in the Bay, the *Eleanor* of London, which, the Governor desired Owen to know, had been seized and confiscated. Moreover, one of Owen's squadron, which had called eight days previously to await the *Leven*, had been ordered out of the river within twenty-four hours and the British flag had been removed from Temby.² Owen demanded full particulars to lay before the Admiralty while, in order to be able to justify himself with the British government for not enforcing immediate reparation, he assumed that the Governor had acted under some misunderstanding. He also demanded that the *Eleanor*, together with any papers or property, was to be restored within forty-eight hours. To save time a party of English seamen were immediately ordered to fit out the brig. No time was to be lost in replacing the British flag at Temby which, like the natives of the country on the south side of the river, was to be left unmolested since both Owen and the Governor of Mozambique had agreed that the matter was to be left to the decision of their respective governments. Schmid was told that he would be removed for his treatment of the *Salisbury* and that directions were *en route* from Mozambique, that the vessels of England, as well as of all other nations, which entered the Bay or visited those coasts for trade, should not be interfered with.³

Schmid protested that the *Eleanor* had been confiscated in virtue of the instructions from his government and of the eighth Article of the Treaty of 1810. His soldiers had found in the hold a great deal of ivory which had been obtained in trade from the Africans, particularly those of Maputo, without payment of the customary duties to the Portuguese. The brig was all but wrecked and all the crew were sick and thus exposed to the mercy of the natives. He refused to acknowledge any other authority in the

¹ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2270, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Leven*, St. Augustin's Bay, 3 June 1825.

² P.R.O., Ad. 1/2270, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Leven*, at Barhead of Delagoa Bay, 10 September 1825; Ad. 1/2271, Same to same, Delagoa Bay, 6 September 1825.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Copy, No. 4, Owen to Schmid von Belliker, H.M.S. *Leven*, English River, 28 August 1825.

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Bay than that of D. João VI, and under him the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique, whose orders he would scrupulously obey. Consequently, the flag of the Portuguese nation, to whom the Bay had belonged for centuries, would be rehoisted. Every individual who showed disrespect for his authority would be treated as a pirate until orders to the contrary had been received. Schmid further protested that Owen had brought no orders from Mozambique to substantiate his statements, while the King of Portugal had documents more authentic than those of Owen to disprove statements about the native chiefs with whom treaties had been made. The chiefs were there by permission of the Portuguese Government and could neither sell nor cede the land. Schmid would treat the natives of Catemby as belonging to the Portuguese nation and would shed all his blood rather than the flag of Portugal, to whom all the Bay belonged, abused. But he agreed on his own responsibility to surrender the brig upon receiving a written promise in the name of the British nation that the *Eleanor* would be condemned either in Mozambique or Lisbon, payment made to the value of the contraband and a pecuniary penalty inflicted according to the laws of Portugal.¹

Might was, however, stronger than words. Owen's superior force compelled the Governor to surrender the *Eleanor*² for adjudication in the Admiralty Courts in England³ and to agree to abandon his practice of boarding British vessels unless they anchored before the fort or desired to trade with the Portuguese factory.⁴ Neither the Portuguese nor the British flag was to be flown in Temby pending the settlement between Lisbon and London. The natives were secured from Portuguese reprisals and guaranteed freedom of trade with all-comers.⁵ All of these concessions, the Governor protested, were contrary to orders issued from Mozambique in December 1802.⁶ But these, Owen declared,

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, No. 5, Copy, von Belliker to Owen, Bay of Lourenço Marques, 29 August 1825; see also Declaration of Confiscation signed by Schmid von Belliker and Pedro Fr^o Viegas, Lourenço Marques, 25 April 1825.

² P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, von Belliker to Owen, Lourenço Marques, 2 September 1825.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Owen to von Belliker, H.M.S. *Lever*, Delagoa Bay, 29 August 1825.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Owen to von Belliker, H.M.S. *Lever*, Delagoa Bay, 1 September 1825.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Instructions, Owen to von Belliker, H.M.S. *Lever*, Delagoa Bay, 4 September 1825, countersigned by Schmid von Belliker.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Extract of instructions, Isidoro da Almeida de Souza e Sá to the Governors of the Bay of Lourenço Marques, Lisbon, 1 December 1802 written on board the *Lever*, 2 September 1825.

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had assumed as their evidence a 'most manifest absurdity'. Instructions were left for British captains visiting the Bay to submit under peaceful protests to actions of the Portuguese officials done in execution of orders from their superior officers, and to inform the Admiralty.¹ Thus, the *Eleanor*, commanded by one of Owen's petty officers and fully armed with dispatches concerning the events in Delagoa Bay, as well as charts of the coast, set sail for Table Bay on 30 August,² thence to proceed on 2 November to England.³

In justification of this conduct Owen claimed that the Portuguese had no territory other than two very small portions, one in Mafumo, where their factory stood, and a small place in Temby, which they sometimes occupied as a factory and for which they paid an annual rent to the kings of Mattoli and Temby. They had no authority beyond the range of their guns,⁴ no jurisdiction over any of the natives, and therefore no right to interfere with them or with visiting Europeans. The whole coast, therefore, was open to British trade without any interference by the Portuguese residents who were known there 'only as merchants forcing an exclusive trade on unjust principles'. The native kings in all the country round the Bay were extremely desirous of cultivating a free commerce with the English and were ready to cede them any territory required. If, therefore, any Portuguese restriction was imposed on English trade within the precincts of the Bay it could lawfully be opposed by force.⁵ The fort was for the Governor's protection and trade only, and the Governor of Mozambique admitted that his jurisdiction extended merely from Cape Delgado to Inhambane.⁶ Further, he had been forced to receive the cession of Temby by the unwearied entreaties of King Capella (or Kapell) and his people, by some inimical and piratical acts of the commandant of the Portuguese factory in English River for his own individual gain as a merchant, to

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Owen to such commanders of British merchant vessels as may be visited by officers of H.M.F. Majesty, H.M.S. *Lewin*, English River, Delagoa Bay, 4 September 1823.

² P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Owen to James, H.M.S. *Lewin*, Delagoa Bay, 30 August 1823.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2271, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lewin*, Table Bay, 2 November 1823.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lewin*, Moz., 11 October 1823.

⁵ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2268, Owen to Richard Owen, H.M.S. *Lewin*, Delagoa Bay, 20 November 1822.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Owen to Schmid, H.M.S. *Lewin*, Delagoa Bay, 1 September 1823.

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prevent war between Portugal and Capella and because otherwise he would have been unable to obtain Bantu recruits for his depleted crews, as Capella took this act for the security of their persons and to assure their return.¹ Moreover, it was perfectly clear that the natives traded with the Portuguese because they had no alternative, but they did not suffer even them to go far into their country with impunity. Trade was the only object of the Portuguese, and the petty governors, only wishing to enrich themselves, assumed a hateful tyranny.²

Above all, Owen considered that the 'shores of that vast bay' were very material to Cape Colony³ and perhaps the point of the greatest political importance to it.⁴ Merchants from Simon's Bay had already fitted out several vessels for trade to that neighbourhood.⁵ There was good country for settlers and nothing would give him greater pleasure than to see ten thousand British of any sect occupying 'this perhaps one of the finest countries in world and certainly as fine a port'.⁶ Delagoa Bay was the best port south of Mozambique, and in the hands of industrious people might be turned to good account, for it produced many valuable products in great abundance.⁷ In no part southward, or northward of the colony of Rivers of Sena had the Portuguese any dominion whatever beyond the 'muzzles' of their guns, and in most cases they were excluded by the natives unless permission to enter their territory was granted by the chiefs.⁸ Therefore, Britain could arrange treaties with those independent chiefs and thereby destroy the slave trade, as well as establish factories for commerce where she could undersell the Portuguese 'and starve them out' without 'infringing on natural or political justice'. In any case, Delagoa Bay was a place of so much importance to Cape Colony that the Admiralty should 'treat' at least for the Portuguese falling back at once to 'Inhambane, that is to Cape Corrientes'

¹ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Simon's Bay, 1 June 1823.

² P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Copy, Owen to Croker, Wilcott Place, Lambeth, 12 October 1826.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Copy, Owen to Somerset, Simon's Bay, 18 April 1823, enclosure in Owen to Croker, Simon's Bay, 6 June 1823.

⁴ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Nourse, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Simon's Bay, 15 April 1823.

⁵ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Simon's Bay, 6 June 1823.

⁶ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Delagoa Bay, 27 August 1823.

⁷ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Moa Harbour, 6 October 1823.

⁸ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Moz., 11 October 1823.

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as an equivalent to Great Britain for not forming relations with 'the nations' farther north.¹ The port was more convenient than any other on that coast for direct communication with Brazil, and even though the slave trade had never existed there to any marked extent, if the temptation to bring slaves was held out to the natives by opening a market for them, they would cut one another's throats without mercy.

The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty (of 1817)² was not in Owen's opinion a hindrance to the cession, because it did not clearly indicate whether Portuguese territory included all Delagoa Bay or merely the territory as far as the Bay. The Portuguese held out their alliance with the British nation as a safeguard against the Arabs, yet a defenceless British merchant vessel never visited them without being subjected to 'every species of vexation, indignity and violence'.³ The treaties of 1815 and 1817 had acknowledged the right of Portugal to export slaves from any part of her territories in Eastern Africa lying between Cape Delgado and Delagoa Bay, but this expression could not give the Portuguese King a title to dominion which he had not, and neither of the two places named was, according to Owen, at all subject to the Portuguese.⁴ On the whole length of the coast from Cape Delgado to Delagoa Bay, the Portuguese had actual authority only over the portion between Quelimane and Sofala and as far inland as Tete and Manica. Elsewhere the natives were independent of the Portuguese and often hostile to them. Much of the territory claimed was devastated by native wars or ruled by independent chiefs, of whom Shaka was the most influential.⁵

The Governors of Lourenço Marques had never in any instance fulfilled their instructions to protest against a foreign ship arriving in Delagoa Bay, but had merely seized vessels. Had they done so to either Nourse or himself, Owen was convinced that the transactions which took place would have been different.⁶ The specific charge against the captains of the *Singapore* and *Eleanor* broke down because the ivory found on board had been

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Copy, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Moz., 11 October 1823.

² The Anglo-Portuguese slave trade treaty of 1817 is described at length in Chapter Seven 223 et seq.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Moz., 11 October 1823.

⁴ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, off Ibo, 1 March 1824.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2271, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Simon's Bay, 21 October 1823.

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obtained miles from the Portuguese factory in whose immediate vicinity alone could the Portuguese claim any authority.¹ Although he was probably unconscious of the fact, Owen was arguing the doctrine of 'effective occupation', so important in later years. He claimed that his negotiations at Lourenço Marques were founded on even stronger proof than the independence of the native kings; proof existed in the Cape archives that the 'Bay and countries of Delagoa Bay' were formerly settled by the Dutch and considered as appendages to the Dutch colony at the Cape of Good Hope. As such they had been ceded to Great Britain.² Incidentally he warned the Admiralty that the British claims in Albany were founded on a tenure as precarious as that of the Portuguese in Delagoa Bay.³

Commodore Nourse's reasons for supporting Owen's actions were founded on wider considerations. He was concerned about the French claim to Madagascar. Britain considered that that island had been ceded as a dependency of Mauritius by the Treaty of Vienna—an opinion which was probably strengthened by the fear that the French might establish themselves on Madagascar in an attempt to compensate their loss of Mauritius.⁴ The French claimed that as there was no mention of the island in the treaty it was independent, and in 1818 a colony was started at St. Marie on the eastern littoral.⁵ Nourse feared that if the French ever obtained any hold in Madagascar they might endanger British navigation in the Mozambique channel.⁶ There was, therefore, a good deal more than at first met the eye in Nourse's attitude to Owen's actions in Delagoa Bay: a British settlement there could at least considerably embarrass, if not check, any French aggression in Madagascar.

On the other hand, Lord Charles Somerset, Governor of the Cape, evinced no particular enthusiasm on the subject. He had been unable to discover anyone capable of giving the slightest information relative to Temby or Delagoa Bay except the Reverend

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Copy, Owen to Croker, 5 Walcot Place, Lambeth, 12 October 1826.

² P.R.O., Ad. 1/2271, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Deptford, 8 September 1826.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Copy, Owen to Croker, 5 Walcot Place, 12 October 1826.

⁴ Hansard, vol. XXVIII, 443.

⁵ B.M., Add. MSS. 41265, f. 53, Farquhar to Clarkson, Port Louis, Mauritius (undated); Rouard de Card, *Les Traites de Protectorat Conclus par la France en Afrique, 1870-95* (Paris, 1897), 2.

⁶ P.R.O., Ad. 1/69, R. 16, Nourse to Croker, H.M.S. *Andromache*, Simon's Bay, 7 September 1822.

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Dr. John Philip, the Superintendent of the London Missionary Society in South Africa. He was suspected of having drawn his information from Captain Owen, who, during his visit to Simon's Bay in 1823, had discussed the question with him. Consequently, he would not, Somerset thought, add to the information in hand.¹ A Wesleyan missionary had gone with Owen to collect information preparatory to a proposed extension of missionary enterprise in the region of Delagoa Bay.² He returned a year later, ill and full of the 'barbarous and gothic' deeds he had witnessed at the time of the massacre of the Portuguese garrison. The Portuguese, he believed, would be driven out of the country, but the natives had evinced every friendly disposition towards the English.³

Somerset himself, at the time of Owen's arrival, had suggested that a small party ascend and explore the Zambesi, and the Portuguese governor, Manuel de Silva, sponsored the idea.⁴ Consequently, on 23 September 1824, Lieutenant C. W. Browne, accompanied by a Portuguese corporal, a sergeant and several native carriers, departed for Sena, only to die within a few months.⁵ On the advantages of Delagoa Bay as a port, Somerset could not give any more reliable information than had already been received, since he had not visited the place. As a sister station to Cape Colony it was, and for many years would remain, useless—the tribes of 'Caffres' who inhabited the intermediate country being so entirely uncivilized and savage as to render all land communication 'dangerous and hopeless'. Moreover, all accounts, he added, were agreed on the extreme unhealthiness of the vicinity of Delagoa Bay.⁶ His opinion, therefore, can hardly be regarded as favourable to Britain's acceptance of the cession.

Attached to these opinions was a copy of Philip's letter which, although in many respects a repetition of much that Owen had said, is particularly interesting as an explanation of the reasons why Owen regarded Delagoa Bay as so important politically to

¹ P.R.O., C.O. 48/62, vol. I, No. 85, Somerset to Bathurst, Cape of Good Hope, 22 April 1824.

² P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Leven*, Delagoa Bay, 27 August 1823.

³ P.R.O., C.O. 48/62, vol. I, Copy, Lys to Brink, Cape Town, 12 April 1824, enclosure I in No. 85, Somerset to Bathurst, Cape of Good Hope, 22 April 1824.

⁴ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Leven*, Simon's Bay, 6 June 1823.

⁵ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2270, Vidal to Owen, H.M.S. *Barracouta*, Mombasa, 29 October 1824, enclosed in Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Leven*, at sea, 9 December 1824.

⁶ P.R.O., C.O. 48/62, vol. I, No. 85, Somerset to Bathurst, Cape of Good Hope, 22 April 1824.

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the Cape Colony—a point which he himself never appears to have defined. Philip described Delagoa Bay as a gate to the interior. It was obvious from the facts respecting the state of the Eastern Coast of Africa, and that of the interior immediately behind it, that the possession of the Bay would open many new channels which might occasion considerable increase in commerce. The Bay was the best station for whale-fishing on the whole coast and the rivers abounded with seals and hippopotami, while there were vast quantities of ivory and other valuable products in the surrounding country. The Portuguese, despite their cruelty and bad faith, carried on a brisk trade with the natives; the English might, therefore, by gaining the confidence of the natives, open new ways into the interior and develop a much greater trade. The trade between the Cape and the Bay had already increased since Owen's visit, and native products from the far interior would soon be conveyed to the coast if the whites residing there could be depended upon. A liberal and pacific policy towards the tribes round the Bay would be the first step in the civilization of Africa, which would be a considerable advance towards the attainment of an important colonial object. In seeking to promote the interests of the Colony these aims were not to be despised because the profits were at first small; there was nothing connected with the trade of Cape Colony so trifling that it might not one day contribute to its wealth and greatness. While the Portuguese were in the Bay it was scarcely safe for a small vessel to go there except when an English ship-of-war was in the neighbourhood. The island of St. Mary's at the mouth of the Bay or, alternately, the banks of the Mapoota on the mainland, were recommended by Philip as most healthy for a fort. Like Owen, he did not believe that there was anything in the claims of the Portuguese to prevent the English government from accepting the cession of Temby or of any district in the neighbourhood that might be ceded by its own native chiefs.

So far Dr. Philip's arguments were those long since used by humanitarians as a means of obtaining the English government's interest in the retention of conquered colonies and emigration, so as to limit the slave trade of other European powers. But the next argument, based on the question of American rivalry, was likely to cause the British government to subordinate their anti-territorial economy campaign to this important issue.

It was pretty generally known, Philip argued—a point which

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no doubt he had discussed with Owen—that the American government for several years past had been on the look-out for a favourable port between their own shores and India, and it was 'also known that Delagoa Bay' had 'been recommended to Congress with that view'. Slight attention to the coast would show that if Delagoa Bay was not the only port open to the American government it was by far the best not already occupied by the British, and it was evident that that Bay in the hands of America might 'afford that power the means of doing great injury' to the British India trade and to the Cape Colony. Were America in possession of Delagoa Bay, one of the first things she would attempt in event of war would be to arm the savage tribes between this Bay and Cape Colony and to excite them to attack the British. It was obvious 'from the description of the savages' with which the Griquas had lately contended, and the extended and defenceless state of the British frontier, particularly towards the north and north-east, that such a system would be expensive to the British Empire and ruinous to Cape Colony.¹

Of all these opinions of men 'on the spot' those concerning French and American rivalry were likely to carry most weight in England. Those of Commodore Nourse arrived at the very time that British cruisers were reporting French activity at Zanzibar. In addition, Canning realized that the French had been meditating a direct interference in Spain. Great Britain, moreover, was faced with the necessity of outmatching the intrigues of France in Portugal itself.² Dr. Philip's opinions, dilating on American rivalry, arrived a year later, at the end of 1824, at a time when England was making feverish attempts to try to prevent the United States from securing commercial advantages, particularly in Spanish America and the East.³ The Cape and the Whitehall authorities, moreover, were flirting with the idea of annexing Port Natal or of extending some sort of official control over it to check the sale of firearms to the tribes by Portuguese and Americans and, among other reasons, to forestall a possible Yankee annexation.⁴

Shortly after Nourse's communication, and before Somerset or Philip had written, Lord Bathurst, in October 1823, expressed

¹ P.R.O., C.O. 48/62, vol. I, Philip to Brink, Cape Town, 13 April 1824, enclosure II in No. 85, Somerset to Bathurst, 22 April 1824.

² Stapleton, *George Canning and his Times* (London, 1859), 501; Manchester, 193.

³ Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning*, 222-7, 261.

⁴ Walker, *The Great Trek*, 250.

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the opinion that Owen's treaty with Capella and Makasane appeared in its details 'objectionable and impracticable, even supposing that the cession was in itself desirable'. But he stated that 'His Majesty's pleasure' would not be taken about the rejection of the cession until after Lord Charles Somerset had reported whether the establishment of a post in Delagoa Bay would be beneficial to Cape Colony. Meantime Nourse was to withhold the promulgation of the document he had prepared to issue upon application from any merchant desirous of opening a trade between the Cape and Delagoa Bay.¹

Somerset, as we know, had replied to Bathurst in April 1824. And in December of that year the Admiralty had reprimanded Owen for having spent so much of his time and attention over matters foreign to the object on which he was employed.² Meanwhile, nothing was done about Delagoa Bay. It was not until the arrival of the *Eleanor*, in 1826, that the dispute between the British and Portuguese local authorities in East African waters was taken up by their governments in Europe, who proceeded to continue the argument on behalf of the claims of their respective nationals. But why was the British government now about to support a claim which the Secretary of State had frowned upon only three years before? The rejection of Owen's treaties was to have been decided according to Lord Charles Somerset's opinion of the value of Delagoa Bay to Cape Colony. That opinion could in no sense be termed favourable to annexation and yet the British government had neither accepted nor rejected the treaties. The reason is to be found in the diplomatic relations in Europe.

The possibility of France or America acquiring a stronghold in East African waters, which had been noted by British commanders, could not be ignored by the British government. Strategically, commercially, and also from the point of view of the carefully nurtured Cape Colony, such an event was undesirable. There was, moreover, the position of Mauritius to be considered: trade depression was exciting discontent and alienating the sympathy of the inhabitants, while France was encouraging and protecting the prosperity of Bourbon and the Netherlands that of Java. Mauritius, as Farquhar stressed in Parliament in 1825, had been permitted to 'dwell on her losses', so that if any

¹ P.R.O., Ad. 1/4239, Wilmot Horton to Croker, Colonial Office, 17 October 1823.

² P.R.O., Ad. 2/1587, 237, Barrow to Owen, Admiralty, 30 December 1824; Ad. 1/2270, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Simon's Bay, 27 September 1825.

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anti-English power should arise in India the possibility of co-operation from the inhabitants of this important strategic base was extremely slender.¹ Under such circumstances a British holding in Delagoa Bay could add to the welfare of Mauritius, frustrate the designs of the United States to obtain the Bay, and at the same time check the French in Bourbon and Madagascar.

Shortly after the arrival of the *Eleanor* in June 1826 the Marquis of Palmella, the Portuguese Ambassador in London, complained to Canning that the *Eleanor* had been seized in an illegal manner after its sequestration in consequence of a flagrant act of contraband. He demanded, therefore, either that it be given back to the Portuguese authorities for trial in Lisbon or that they be indemnified.² The matter was left in abeyance, at Canning's request,³ until Owen's arrival in August,⁴ when a full report of all his statements, together with the correspondence concerning the *Eleanor*, a claim for indemnification from the owners⁵ and Palmella's complaint, was submitted to the King's Advocate, Christ Robinson. On 1 February 1827 the latter returned his opinion that the first inference to be drawn from these statements was that the Portuguese prohibition was not founded on the general law of Portugal and that the several statements of Captain Owen showed strongly that Mapoota was not a part of the recognized dominions of that Crown. Unless the contrary could be satisfactorily proved, Canning would be justified in maintaining that there had been no violation of the article of the treaty which stipulated only 'that the general freedom of trade, thereby established, shall not be understood, or in any manner . . . interpreted' as invalidating or affecting the exclusive right possessed by the Crown of Portugal 'within its own dominions to farm for the sale of ivory, Brazil wood, urzela, diamonds, gold dust, gunpowder and tobacco in the form of snuff, provided, however, that should the above-mentioned articles, generally or separately, ever become articles of free commerce within the Dominions' of the Prince Regent of Portugal, 'the subjects of His Britannic Majesty shall be permitted to traffic in them as freely and on the same footing as those of the most favoured nation.'

¹ Hansard, vol. XIII, 1042, Mauritius Trade Bill, 3 June 1825.

² P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Palmella to Canning, London, 17 June 1826.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Draft, Canning to Palmella, F.O., 4 July 1826.

⁴ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2271, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, 15 August 1826.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Geo. Brown to Geo. Canning, 53 Ratcliffe Cross, London, 4 December 1826.

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The preliminary and principal question, therefore, was whether Mapoota was to be recognized as a part of the Dominions of Portugal. If not, the King's Advocate considered, there could be no complaint against Captain Owen, since he was not charged with any improper conduct towards the Governor nor with having in any unfriendly way except that he declared his duty to demand the restitution of the *Eleanor*—a demand which in friendly terms was complied with by the Governor, ‘subject to reference to the Portuguese Ambassador at London, and to his own government’. With respect to the complaint of the owner and his claim to indemnification, it would be necessary that the questions about territorial right and the law of Portugal should be first settled, but it might be proper to intimate to the Portuguese government that there was such a claim upon which it rested. Canning’s duty to insist. The master, according to the correspondence, had equivocated in some measure in acknowledging the authority of the Portuguese governor, and in acting at the same time in a manner which implied a consciousness that he was violating the law—so far as it was dependent on that authority. But as that was said to have been done in ignorance, it would not alone establish the law, although it might considerably embarrass the question of indemnification.¹ As a result of this advice Canning, on 25 April, stated the claims of Captain Owen and of the owners of the *Eleanor* to Palmella, and inquired on what right Portugal claimed ‘the spot at which the vessel was trading when she was seized’: was the claim based upon actual possession by a Portuguese force, a recognized cession of the territory by a native chief, or upon any other act or compact under the law of nations giving an unquestionable right of sovereignty?²

The Portuguese authorities claimed reparation for Owen’s interference with the commandant of the Portuguese factory; they requested that the *Eleanor* should be returned to Lisbon to be tried, Britain retaining the right of reclaiming compensation in the improbable event of Portugal losing the case. The rights of the Crown of Portugal to the territory in question were established, Palmella argued, upon priority in discovery on the first voyage of the Portuguese to the Indies, the establishment of a

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 85/2522, No. 335, Law Officers’ Reports, Portugal, Robinson to Canning, Doctor’s Commons, 1 February 1827.

² P.R.O., F.O. 97/309, Draft, Canning to Palmella, F.O., 25 April 1827.

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fortress which still existed in the Bay of Lourenço Marques where the Governor of Mozambique maintained a garrison, the acts and the treaties of the native people recognizing the supremacy of the Crown of Portugal which had continually been renewed through the centuries, the constant recognition by other countries of these rights, proved by an inspection of their geographical charts and, finally, upon Article II of the Convention of 22 July 1817.¹ Owen was accused, in his zeal for the profit of Britain, of having contracted with savages, which in itself made unnecessary the discussion of the obvious invalidity of his actions.² But in order to establish the priority of Portuguese claims similar treaties antecedent to those of the British were forwarded.³

This protest, together with the reply which the British Foreign Secretary proposed, was forwarded to the King's Advocate on 25 October. After again thoroughly investigating the facts, he was of the opinion that it would not be advisable to press this particular case to any positive result because of the peculiar difficulties that might attend the further discussion of 'rights of sovereignty in those remote parts'. Such a policy might, he considered, be highly conducive to the friendly understanding of the two governments. The proposed answer to Palmella's note was regarded as perfectly correct and proper in vindication of the right of free intercourse to those coasts and as 'an explanation or apology' for what had been done by Commodore Owen.⁴

Lord Dudley, Canning's successor at the Foreign Office, therefore, asserted in his reply that if the chiefs were independent, a statement which had not been questioned by Palmella, the fact that they were only half civilized would not alone 'invalidate' the 'solemn and regular' compacts by which they had pledged themselves to Britain. The fact that the Portuguese had 'spied them as they first sailed along the coast' would not put those native chiefs and their people so entirely under the control of the Portu-

¹ Cf. 224.

² P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Palmella to Dudley, London, 23 May 1827, duplicate in F.O. 63/327.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Declaration by 'Governor of Forts of Lourenço Marques and the King of Maputo Macazana at Maputo, 8 October 1823', and 'Grant of territory from Capela to King of Portugal, 10 November 1794', enclosed in Palmella to Dudley, London, 23 May 1827. For a detailed description of the Portuguese claims, cf. Mance, *Memória sobre Lourenço Marques* (Lisbon, 1870), Part II, 47 et seqq.

⁴ F.O. 85/2322, Robinson to Dudley, Doctors' Commons, 31 October 1827.

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guese as for ever afterwards to subject them to such laws as Portugal might choose to declare that she had imposed upon them. The Second Article of the Treaty of 1817, 'allowing for the utmost latitude of expression', might include every foot of territory between Cape Delgado and the Bay of Lourenço Marques, but it could not be held to mean the territory of those places inclusive. Neither by conquest, settlement nor compact could Portugal establish any claim which invalidated the trade at Mapoota secured to Britain by the treaties of Captain Owen. The return of the *Eleanor* to Lisbon was, therefore, refused. A claim was submitted, for the favourable consideration of the Portuguese government, by the owners of the *Eleanor* for the losses sustained by her detention. It was, however, stated that the British would go no farther in the meantime than to urge that 'orders may be issued to the Governor of Lourenço Marques to desist in future from unfounded claims or wanton aggressions similar to those which had, in that case, been practised'. It was in this confidence and from the earnest hope that the friendly understanding between the two governments might in no way be risked or diminished by discussions of the rights of sovereignty, in remote seas, that Britain avoided pressing this disputed right to any extreme result.¹

In reply to this dispatch the Marquis of Palmella still insisted on the right of sovereignty of the Portuguese Crown over the territory of Temby and Mapoota; and he added that after the departure of Captain Owen from Delagoa Bay, the King of Mapoota had signed a protest declaring that he recognized the authority of the Portuguese only and, that it never was in his power to cede his territory to the British Crown, since it belonged to the Crown of Portugal.² To this letter the British government never replied. In so far, therefore, as Dudley's was the last official pronouncement, Britain's claim to the south shore of Delagoa Bay was never relinquished. But in January 1832, when the owners of the *Eleanor* reminded Lord Palmerston of their claim lodged against the Portuguese government in August 1829, and asked what relief they could expect, Palmerston declined to interfere on their behalf because the Advocate-General's opinion

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Dudley to Palmella, 3 December 1817, also Draft, Dudley, to A'Court, F.O., 3 December 1817.

² P.R.O., F.O. 97/303, Enclosure G, 20 October 1823, in Palmella to Dudley, 23 May 1827.

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had been unfavourable'—a circumstance which seems to indicate an admission of the rights of Portugal to the disputed territory in Delagoa Bay.

This line of policy was upheld some thirteen years later, when Rear-Admiral Campbell at the Cape desired instructions in case the Americans should form a settlement at Delagoa Bay.² Palmerston stated that His Majesty's government 'could not have any just ground to object to, the execution of such a plan' if the American government contemplated it, 'as the Crown of Great Britain does not assert any Rights of Sovereignty in Delagoa Bay'.³ His reasons for saying this were that the King's Advocate, to whom the questions raised in 1828 had been submitted, had 'considered that 'it would not be advisable to press this particular case to any positive result' and because the Foreign Office reply to the Portuguese demand had 'in consequence been limited to an explanation or apology for what had been done by Captain Owen and to a vindication of the right to a free intercourse with the coast in question'.⁴ It should here be noted, however, that in the British claim to the territory, as drawn up in 1872, it was held that the Portuguese government paid a sum of money to the owners of the *Eleanor* as compensation for the illegal conduct of the authorities in respect of the seizure of that vessel, but that this payment was made upon grounds entirely distinct from any territorial question.⁵ Yet there seems to be no mention of this in the contemporary correspondence, and the statement is not in accord with the original opinion of the Crown Advocate that the territorial issue must be settled before any compensation could be exacted.

Even had the British government desired, diplomatic affairs in Europe in 1828 were extremely unfavourable to the continuance

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 63/395, Draft, Palmerston to Brown, F.O., 5 March 1832; C.O. 48/163, Memo on events of 1825 concerning Delagoa Bay, enclosed in Backhouse to Hay, F.O., 29 July 1835.

² C.O. 48/163, Wood to Hay, Admiralty, 30 June 1835, with enclosures.

³ C.O. 48/163, Backhouse to Hay, F.O., 29 July 1835; Uys: *In the Era of Separtions* (Lovedale, 1935), 140.

⁴ C.O. 48/163, Memo on events of 1825 concerning Delagoa Bay, enclosed in Backhouse to Hay, F.O., 29 July 1835; C. J. Uys, in *In the Era of Separtions*, 140.

⁵ Uys states that 'when Owen forced the Portuguese to surrender the *Eleanor* the Privy Council ruled him out of court'. This ruling is said to have been made in 1823 and enclosed in 'C.O. 48/163, Admiralty to Colonial Office, 30 June 1835'. No such statement, however, exists in the enclosure preserved in the Public Record Office, nor can it be traced in the Privy Council Register for 1823 and the years immediately following.

⁶ Accounts and Papers, 1873, LXXXIII, 148.

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of the argument regarding the rights of Great Britain and Portugal. Moreover, Palmerston obviously was satisfied that Britain's claim could not be substantiated, and it seems, therefore, he did not wish to raise the issue. It was in this way that Britain retained the right to reopen the question in later years. When in 1836 Portugal complained that her possessions in Africa were not enumerated in the proposed draft for a slave-trade treaty, Palmerston held that the enumeration of the 'Possessions of the Crown of Portugal in Africa' was omitted because it did 'not belong to Great Britain to determine by treaty with Portugal what those possessions were'. Further, that at all events the determination and enumeration of those possessions was a question of territorial right and had nothing to do with a treaty against the slave trade. The treaty, if concluded, would apply to all the possessions of the Crown of Portugal, but it formed no part of the objects to determine which parts of Africa did or did not belong to Portugal.¹ Meanwhile, the Portuguese continued to place a guard on board British ships visiting Delagoa Bay and to exact a toll from British merchants before allowing them to trade with the natives;² and the limits of Portuguese territory on the east coast of Africa remained undefined.

The correspondence from the King's Advocate in 1828 has not apparently been hitherto examined. Its very existence seems to have been ignored. Even confidential memoranda printed by the Foreign Office in November 1872,³ respecting the limits of the Portuguese possessions on the south-east coast fail to mention it. Whether the British government were aware of it and of Palmerston's interpretation, when they challenged Portugal's rights to the Bay, is impossible to say. If they were, the claim in 1872 must be regarded as an attempt to 'bring off a sporting chance'—an attempt justified by the increased importance of the Bay in consequence of events in Europe and Africa.

The chief arguments on the British side about what constituted 'possessions', were then precisely those used by the far-seeing Commander Owen nearly fifty years before. The independence of the inhabitants, it was argued, became the only test.⁴ The

¹ Bicker, XXVIII, 518.

² F.R.O., F.O. 65/698, Parker to Palmerston, Hampstead, 16 February 1848.

³ F.O. Library, Confidential, 'Memoranda respecting the Limits of Portuguese Possessions on the South-East Coast of Africa . . .', printed for the use of the Foreign Office, 20 November 1872.

⁴ Accounts and Papers, H.C. 1875, [c. 1361], LXXXIII, 243.

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authority of Portugal and of the Governor of Lourenço Marques had never been extended to the south or right banks of the Dum-das and English Rivers. The proof of this dominant fact was to be found, it was asserted, in the conduct of the natives and of the Portuguese themselves, and in acts and compacts entered into between the Portuguese and the natives as well as those made between the natives and the British. The ruins on the south bank of the river, it was argued, were the remains of a fort which the Portuguese, after the destruction of their fort on the north bank, were allowed to erect temporarily. For permission to build and occupy it, they paid a quit rent to the natives. With the exception of this permission, which granted the temporary occupation of a small piece of ground, the Portuguese had never held a foot of ground nor set up a single factory or establishment south of the river. This argument ignored the fact that the British, at least since 1781, had been refused the right to trade with the Africans on the south bank. It also avoided the question whether acquiescence in this prohibition amounted to a recognition *de jure*, or merely *de facto*, of Portuguese sovereignty. It should, moreover, be noted that in 1815 the Portuguese were known by Ramsden to have paid the customary tribute or subsidy for the privilege to hoist their flag on the south bank of English River, as they always did for the fort on the north side. This seems to indicate that their rights on both banks were established on the same basis.

A correct perspective of the dispute which arose over Delagoa Bay can be obtained only if the events are viewed first against their historical setting, and secondly in relation to the arguments brought forward by Britain at the arbitration in 1872. Although the issue was only then decided, Owen's actions constituted the grounds for the British claim. As the political and economic importance of the Delagoa Bay region increased, conflicts arose as a result of the determined attempts of British merchants to trade at the Bay and the equally determined attitude of the Portuguese to prevent them. These, as well as the political affairs, which brought the question to a crisis, form a distinct story. The British case in the Delagoa Bay arbitration was based on the legality of the actions of British commanders during the years 1823-6 and not on considerations arising from the politics of South Africa at that time.

The diplomatic considerations which exercised the minds of statesmen towards the end of the century were essentially similar

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to those of Owen's day. This is well illustrated by a Foreign Office Memorandum of 1884, which states:

We know the Portuguese would make considerable sacrifice to obtain the recognition of the claim to extension of territory on the West Coast. . . . It seems to me not improbable if they see their game likely to be lost, they will bid high for support, and if they do, it is evident that they have in Delagoa Bay a bid to offer which would be exceptionally powerful.¹

In the following discussion of the significance of the Bay in the hands of France, Germany or Great Britain, the strategic problem as seen by Owen, Nourse and Philip persisted, except that the growth of the Boer Republics and German ambition had introduced additional complications. The memorandum argued that if France were to get that Bay she would secure the only point from which she could, in case of war, keep watch over her Eastern trade at Mayotte and in the northern harbours of Madagascar, and that if Germany were to get it she would at once be brought into close relations with the Transvaal and the head waters of the Orange River and so might even stretch out a hand to the new settlement at Angra Pequena (South-West Africa). If, on the other hand, the Bay were English, it would be possible to hold in check the French fleets and make German intrigues in the Transvaal comparatively unimportant. A minute on this suggestion says:

The possession of Delagoa Bay seems to be very important, but I think we might also obtain from the Sultan of Zanzibar some other good harbours on the coast. . . .²

The question was eventually dropped because of the inexpediency of reopening the Delagoa Bay issue at that moment, but it was emphasized that Britain 'would not forget Delagoa Bay'. Moreover, as long as it remained in the hands of a weak power, the Bay could not be safer, and while in the possession of Portugal it was virtually neutralized. The danger to guard against was its acquisition by some rival.

This review of the history of the Delagoa Bay dispute amply illustrates the essential unity of the western shores of the Indian

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 84/1814, Memo by Percy Anderson, head of the African Dept., *against* the pending Berlin Conference on West African affairs.

² P.R.O., F.O. 84/1814, Lister's minute on Anderson's memo.

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Ocean, for Owen's activities demonstrated in unmistakable fashion the importance of Delagoa Bay to the Cape, Zanzibar, Mombasa and Muscat. Likewise Owen's actions emphasized the connection of India and Mauritius with South Africa and how intimately that shore has been linked with diplomatic currents in world affairs. Much of the subsequent history of East Africa is a commentary on Captain Owen's surveying expedition.

Chapter Seven

PORtUGUESE EAST AFRICA AND THE SLAVE TRADE

The history of the suppression of the slave trade in Portuguese East Africa begins in 1810. What happened in that year proved more destructive to Mozambique commerce than any other occurrence during the first four decades of the century. The reason lay not within East Africa but in Europe and Asia. The crusade to expiate sin and cut off the slave trade was not alone responsible. Britain's possessions, trade and investments in half the world stood or fell upon the safety of the trade routes to India and China round Africa. In this as well as in other contexts the entire East African coast, whether controlled by Muscat, Portugal or Britain formed one political, geographic and economic whole. Neither on the ocean nor within East Africa itself was the symbiosis of events between these sections of the coast separable. This was as true in the early Victorian age of expansive prosperity and liberal awakening, when Palmerston took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and championed the humanitarian cause, as it had been in the era of Napoleon.

The fullness of the change that had taken place within the course of a few years and brought the East African coast well within the orbit of European politics is shown by British negotiations concerning that coast in the fifteen years after Owen's visit. Britain's anti-slave trade crusade focused international interest upon East African waters. Tension in the Middle East stressed the need to maintain strategic friendships along the East African coast. To the north and south of Mozambique the arrival of British, American and German missionaries and explorers aroused the concern also of Portugal. Nor was it certain whether the 'missionary invasion' could be divorced from the growing interest of British, French and American traders who reflected the demand of an increasingly important European market for

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the products of East African slave labour. Faced with these often incompatible issues, the British Foreign Office was forced to temper humanitarian zeal to the needs of international relations. Hence British negotiations for the abolition of the East African slave trade fall into two distinct parts, each timed to meet the impact of world affairs upon the special conditions affecting Muscat and Portugal.

But within East Africa, Arab and Portuguese participation in the slave trade are inseparable. To try to eradicate that trade in one part or in one section of the coast was merely to shift the centre of supply, for example from Benguela to Mozambique and thence elsewhere within Portuguese or Arab territory. The real significance of the trade cannot be divorced from the trade in ivory. Bigger and richer populations were clamouring for the products of African slave labour: sugar, cloves, gum-copal, cotton and, above all, ivory for the European and American luxury industries, such as piano and organ keys, billiard balls, knife-handles, ornaments and fans. These new opportunities for profit excited European, Asian and American traders; brought European goods and techniques into the East African interior; and helped to accelerate that penetration from the coast begun from the Zambesi by the Arabs and after the end of the sixteenth century by Portuguese and mulatto *prazeros* and north of Mozambique in the second and third decades of the nineteenth century by a handful of Arab and Swahili merchants—many of them financed by Indian traders with connections in Zanzibar. Development of this trade with East Africa gave a new significance to the traditional connection between East Africa's major exports—ivory and slaves.

[i]

THE SUPPRESSION OF THE PORTUGUESE TRADE

In the 1810 Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of Friendship and Alliance¹ D. João pledged himself to no more than a promise to co-operate with England in the gradual abolition of the slave traffic throughout the world, and to forbid his subjects to carry on the trade from any place in Africa except from the actual possessions

¹ Negotiations for this treaty are discussed in Chapter Five, section 4.

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of the Portuguese crown.¹ Yet, as we have seen, by a strange turn of circumstances, the years immediately following the conclusion of this Treaty saw a more effective check on the Mozambique slave trade than resulted from any subsequent treaties Britain succeeded in forcing upon Portugal during the next quarter of a century. This is explained by the fact that when the Treaty was signed there were British cruisers in the Mozambique channel engaged in the capture of the French islands and by the humanitarian zeal which possessed Englishmen at that time. In the absence of Admiralty instructions to British cruisers, the terms of the Treaty were in practice misinterpreted. Portuguese slave ships, plying a lawful slave trade between Portuguese Africa and Brazil, were seized.²

The cruisers destroyed Mozambique's valued trade with the isles of Bourbon and Mauritius. Hence the control of those islands by the Portuguese ally proved more disastrous than their possession by declared enemies. The conquered French colonists became British subjects and passed under the prohibitions of the Slave Trade Act of 1807. No slave was to be admitted into any British colony after 1 March 1808, and any vessel for slaving, fitting out in a British port, was to be confiscated.³ Of equal importance to Mozambique was the fact that while the British cruisers were there, Britain's exercise of the belligerent right of search discouraged the ships of other European nations from approaching the East African littoral. Ships of the United States (even as neutrals until 1812) were thus liable to be subjected to inspection, detention or capture.⁴ True, an Act of Congress in 1807 had already prohibited the importation of slaves after the following January,⁵ but America, unlike Great Britain, was not yet prepared to enter an international movement against this trade, and so her subjects had continued to carry slaves.⁶

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 93/37/8, Portugal, Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, Article X; Manchester, 91.

² Edwards, *Colonial Policy and Slavery in South Africa, 1806-26* (Thesis, Oxford), 85; Theal, *Records of Cape Colony* (London, 1897-1905), IX, 285, and XI, 140.

³ Public Statutes, 47-9, Geo. III, 1807-9, 73, An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 23 March 1807; Clarkson, *History of the Abolition of the African Slave Trade by the British Parliament* (London, 1808), 344-7.

⁴ Mathieson, *Great Britain and the Slave Trade* (London, 1929), 11.

⁵ U.S.A. Statutes at Large, II, 436, quoted by Milne, *The Slave Trade and Anglo-American Relations* (Thesis, London), 468.

⁶ A.H.U., Moz., 75, Receipt from Jones Winberg, Moz., 6 November 1810; Moz., 66, unsigned letter to Governor of Mozambique, Inhambane, 21 April 1807.

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Britain's insistence during the war on the right of search, together with the enforcement of the British slave trade restrictions in the former French islands, accentuated the severity of the mistaken interpretation of the 1810 treaty. It also emphasized two other factors which are a constantly recurring theme, the better exchange value at Zanzibar and the consequent flow of trade overland away from Mozambique. In fact, if not in name, Zanzibar became the commercial capital not only for the Arab but also for the Portuguese territories in East Africa.

The misinterpretation of the Slave Trade Treaty of 1810 and the seizure of slavers off the coast of Africa by British cruisers raised a bitter storm of complaint from Brazil as well as Mozambique. The universal clamour of resentment killed any inclination which the Prince Regent of Portugal might have had towards assisting England's campaign for abolition. England, too, found the results of the Treaty of 1810 disappointing. Portuguese slave ships were accused of violating even the mild prohibition imposed by the Treaty; while subjects of the other powers used the Portuguese flag to continue the trade, unhampered by the international agreements of their countries.

The British envoy at Rio de Janeiro, Viscount Strangford, despaired, in face of the determined opposition of both Brazilians and Portuguese, of winning any further concessions from the Portuguese Court.¹ Early in 1815, however, Castlereagh succeeded in concluding a Convention and a Treaty with the Portuguese plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Vienna. By the Convention, signed on 21 January, Great Britain gave £300,000 in full discharge of claims for Portuguese ships detained by British cruisers before 1 June 1814.² The Treaty,³ signed the following day, declared illegal all Portuguese trade in slaves on any part of the African coast north of the Equator,⁴ but specifically permitted the traffic to the subjects of D. João between Portuguese Africa to the south of the line and 'the trans-Atlantic possessions' belonging to the Crown of Portugal 'until such time as the trade should universally cease'.⁵

Britain had attempted to obtain a promise that the trade would

¹ Manchester, 168-9.

² P.R.O., F.O. 94/169, Convention relating to the Slave Trade.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 94/170, Portugal, Treaty for the Suppression of the Slave Trade.

⁴ Article I.

⁵ Article IV.

be abolished in eight years,¹ but the Prince Regent bound himself only to negotiate a separate treaty later which should set a definite time for the complete abolition of the traffic. Portuguese subjects were forbidden to carry slaves to any country or possession not under the dominion of the Crown of Portugal.² In return, the Treaty of Alliance concluded at Rio in 1810 was declared void, although all the ancient treaties between the two powers were to continue in force.³ England remitted the unpaid balance due on a loan of £600,000 made to D. João in 1809.⁴ Ratifications were exchanged on 16 June 1815, and on the 26th of the following month copies of the agreements were sent to Mozambique by the Marquis de Aguiar, who expressed the hope that an increase in other commerce would result.⁵

As in Brazil, so in Mozambique, the community were completely out of sympathy with and untouched by the religious emotions and humanitarian doctrines concerning the slave trade which affected Britain. The traffic was considered so essential to the very existence of the European community that any attempts to curtail it, far from causing the people to try to adapt themselves to other trades, resulted in chaos and despair. The officials and most of the people clung to the trade if only because they could not understand how their whole economic life could be reorganized on a new basis. In Mozambique, as in Brazil, therefore, the terms of the Treaty of 1815 were received with discontent, though for different reasons. The Brazilians, who obtained the majority of their slaves from West Africa, objected to the prohibition north of the line.⁶ On the other hand, Mozambique looked forward to a probable increase in the Brazilian trade. This had already been facilitated by a decree of 1811 which opened the subordinate ports to Brazilian vessels.⁷ Although the Treaty limited the sale of slaves to Portuguese subjects, Portuguese East Africa's most cherished trade was not with the Brazilians, who paid low and comparatively unprofitable duties to the officials, but with foreigners, more particularly the French.⁸

The terms of the Treaty appeared to the Governor unjustly

¹ Biker, XXVIII (supplement), 254, de Walden to Ribeira da Sabrossa, 28 April 1839; cf. Manchester, 171 n.

² Article I.

³ Article III.

⁴ Article V.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., 83, Aguiar to M. C. d'Abreu e Meneses, Rio, 26 July 1815.

⁶ Manchester, 172.

⁷ Alpers, Chapter VI.

⁸ A.H.U., Moz., 49, P. Ant^º José da Cunha to R. de Souza Coutinho, Moz., 9 October 1800.

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restrictive of colonial liberties and in direct contradiction to the instructions he had received at the end of the war, when he had been authorized to admit French vessels flying the white flag of Louis XVIII to trade at Mozambique. To justify his actions, he argued that half a dozen French schooners frequenting that port for slaves could hardly destroy or harm the national commerce. The foreign slave trade accounted for most of the revenue in the colony's budget. Moreover, it was the most reliable source of income because it was based on an inexhaustible supply. The Governor attributed the decadence of the colony's trade not to foreign slave traders but to the proximity of the English settlements [presumably Zanzibar] where the 'heathen traders' and Banians went in 'surprisingly' increasing numbers. If foreign ships were prevented from entering Mozambique, they would resort to some other part of the long undefended coast. The natives had no predisposition to Portugal and were prepared to trade with any nation provided their needs could be satisfied. The French had already shown a preference for landing their cargoes at Cape Delgado and the island of Angoche or even farther north; the 'Kaffirs', he pointed out, therefore sometimes obtained their merchandise in other parts of the coast rather than at Mozambique, which resulted in considerable loss to the Royal Treasury. For these reasons, the Governor openly professed in 1817 that he had been acting in contravention of the Treaty and had been following the example of his predecessors who, despite the King's orders declaring the slave trade a Portuguese monopoly, had always tolerated foreigners.¹

Castlereagh soon found that a considerable revival of the slave trade had taken place in spite of the pledges of every European state, as well as America, to co-operate in abolishing the hateful traffic. In face of such opposition the obvious course was to try to obtain permission to exercise the right of search in time of peace.² In 1817 Spain granted England this right, and in the same year the Portuguese Crown was forced to accept the point. The Brazilians, whose interests, like those of the Europeans in East Africa, were strongly rooted in the slave trade, had refused to adhere to the 1815 Treaty stipulations.³ But the English reforming

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 86, M. C. d'Abreu e Menezes to Conde da Barca, Moz., 25 September 1817.

² Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1811-22*, 436; P.R.O., F.O. 84/2, Annex A to the 10th Protocol, Memorandum on the Slave Trade, 4 December 1817 (summary of Castlereagh's speech).

³ Manchester, 172.

party failed to understand the reasons which lay at the root of the reluctance of the Portuguese king to follow its example. Castlereagh realized at the time 'that the Abolition of the Slave Trade might have been better secured if instead of being imposed from without on nations not ready to accept it, it had been introduced more gradually together with the machinery to make it effective. But neither to him nor to his successors was such a policy possible in the state of public opinion in Britain.'¹

Obliged to push the British demands, Castlereagh based his claims on the promise of D. João in the Treaty of 1815 to negotiate the complete abolition of the trade. He forced the signature in London of the Additional Convention of 1817.² According to this, the territory on the East Coast of Africa, whose trade remained open to D. João's subjects, was defined as that possessed by the Crown of Portugal and lying 'between Cape Delgado and the Bay of Lourenço Marques'.³ The Portuguese king was required to publish two months from the date of ratification the penalties prescribed for violation of the existing agreement and to renew the prohibition to import slaves into 'the Brazils' under any flag other than that of Portugal.⁴ All Portuguese colonial vessels engaged in the slave trade were to carry Royal passports signed by the chief of the captaincy to which the port belonged, and if they came from Portugal by the Secretary of Marine, drawn up in conformity with a model annexed to the Convention.⁵ The two signatory powers agreed that the ships of war of both countries, acting under special instructions, could visit any merchant vessel of the two nations suspected, upon reasonable grounds, of having slaves on board which had been embarked in an African port forbidden by the Treaty stipulations.⁶ An additional article of the Treaty and its annexed instructions laid down that, as soon as the 'Total Abolition of the Slave Trade for the subjects of the Crown of Portugal had taken place', these stipulations were to be modified by common consent. 'But in default of such alterations' this Additional Convention was to remain in force 'until the Expiration of Fifteen years from the day on which the General Abolition of the Slave Trade' should have been brought about by the Portuguese government.⁷

¹ Webster, *Britain and the Independence of Latin America*, I, 54.

² P.R.O., F.O. 94/175, Additional Convention, signed 28 July 1817.

³ Article II. ⁴ Article III. ⁵ Article IV. ⁶ Article V.

⁷ P.R.O., F.O. 94/176, Separate article signed by Castlereagh and Palmella, 11 September 1817.

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Thus the suppression of the illicit slave trade combined with a certain measure of abolition, had been obtained on paper from both the Portuguese and the Spanish governments.¹ The only serious loophole in the Convention with Portugal was the article stipulating that no seizure was lawful unless slaves were actually found on board. This omission was rectified in March 1823, when an additional article was added, stating that if there were clear and undeniable proof that slaves had been put on board a vessel for the purpose of illegal traffic, that vessel could be detained by cruisers and finally condemned by the commissioners.² An attempt was thus made to prevent slave vessels avoiding forfeiture by dumping their cargo overboard or putting their slaves on shore prior to being visited. But by that time Brazil had declared her independence and the stipulation could not be applied to her subjects. While this right of search was confined only to three powers, and while the flags of France, Holland and the United States, whose subjects were the principal traders on the African coasts, were not included therein, 'the effect was merely to vary the ostensible character of the fraud rather than in any material degree to suppress the mischief'.³

In Mozambique the principal objection to the Convention of 1817, as to the Vienna Treaty which preceded it, was that the Portuguese were prohibited from trading with foreigners. The Governor argued that, since the Arabs were not bound by treaty, foreigners were encouraged to buy their slaves in the Arab possessions⁴ or in the ports south of Mozambique where customs duties could be avoided; that foreigners could thus offer higher exchange values than the Portuguese and entice away from the port of Mozambique the Arab and African dealers with their ivory and slaves; and that it was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain slaves in the 'neighbouring wilds' of Mozambique, whence both slaves and ivory were being diverted to Zanzibar. The Governor complained that the slave trade was becoming a monopoly of the national ships from Brazil and that since their duties were lower than those paid by foreigners, a great falling off in the Royal revenue, as well as a shortage of money,

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 84/2, Annex A to the 10th Protocol, Memorandum on the Slave Trade, 4 December 1817.

² Manchester, 176, footnote 48.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 84/2, Annex A to 10th Protocol, Memorandum on the Slave Trade, 4 December 1817.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., 93, Brito Sanches to Artos, Moz., 12 January 1820.

had resulted. There was already insufficient provincial coin and that brought in by Portuguese ships was taken away in return for merchandise by the ships from Goa, Damão and Diu.¹ While the ports to the north and south were open to foreign slave dealers, the Governor was powerless to prevent the trade, even had he desired, especially since the Governor of Quelimane was in effect often independent. In Mozambique it was regarded as useless to try to carry out the terms of the Convention of 1817 and to turn away such foreigners as did come to buy slaves. The Treaty increased the dislike of the British and strengthened the Governor's determination to encourage the trade with foreigners.

One of the most important effects of the measures to stop the slave trade was the increase of anti-Royalist opinion in Mozambique. Indeed, the measures consolidated and strengthened an important nucleus of anti-Royalist opinion created in the colony by political exiles from Portugal.²

No doubt the efforts that had been made by D. João to abolish the slave trade helped to consolidate pro-Brazilian sympathy, just as his actions had increased the power of the anti-British party in Brazil.³ For it was realized that once Brazil became a sovereign state she would be freed from obligation to observe the distasteful measures concerning the prohibition of the slave trade which Britain had forced upon the Portuguese king. Thus began the growth of that sentiment in Mozambique which in later years formed the basis of the government's demand that Britain guarantee the Portuguese possessions before anti-slave trade measures be enforced. Brazilians, moreover, were in future welcome in East Africa and were ensured a direct communication with Quelimane and Inhambane which enabled them to carry on the 'abominable' traffic more advantageously and 'to a greater extent'.⁴

The Portuguese slave trade should have stopped with the recognition of Brazil's independence in 1825, for the treaty with Britain of 1817 permitted Portuguese subjects to engage in the slave trade only between Portugal's African territories south of the Equator and her transatlantic possessions. But Portugal never prohibited the

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 96, Brito Sanches to Arcos, Moz., 10 October 1819.

² A.H.U., Moz., 93, Brito Sanches to Arcos, Moz., 16 January 1820.

³ Webster, *Britain and the Independence of Latin America*, I, 56.

⁴ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lawn*, Moz., 9 October 1823.

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trade to her subjects even after Brazil ostensibly abolished it.¹ The years after the Treaty actually showed an increase in Portuguese East Africa's trade, particularly to Brazil—and this despite the fact that the inhabitants of Pernambuco, in defiance of the slave trade treaties, had fitted out fast sailing vessels for illicit trade north of the line.²

In 1819 at least 10,000 slaves, or perhaps 12,000, are known to have been embarked from Mozambique for Brazil. In 1821 nearly 3,000 slaves were reported to have been shipped from Mozambique aboard Brazilian vessels, while export duties on more than 12,000 slaves were collected. Between 1822 and 1830 (but not including 1826) some 40,000 slaves were embarked at Mozambique and more than 33,000 landed at Rio de Janeiro. These figures would not include slaves illegally embarked in the subordinate ports north and south of Mozambique nor those disembarked at Rio de Janeiro without paying duties. In addition, an Englishman in 1826 noted that while 8,000 to 10,000 slaves were annually entered in the Mozambique customs list as exports to Brazil a quarter more were smuggled on board to cheat the custom house. There was also a substantial increase in slaves shipped to the French islands. In 1824 to 1826, thirty-five vessels carried 7,000 slaves from the capital and the subordinate ports of Ibo, Quelimane, Inhambane and Lourenço Marques. Many of these were first taken to the Seychelles to pick up a smattering of French so that they could be introduced to Bourbon and Mauritius as belonging to French islanders. The Spanish trade to Cuba and the Arab-Swahili trade to Madagascar were also active. In all it has been estimated that between 1820 and 1830 at least 15,000 slaves annually were exported from the port of Mozambique.³ This figure is in line with the estimate of Captain Owen who was an accurate observer.⁴

At Quelimane, as at Mozambique, the Brazilian trade flourished. Captain Owen estimated the average yearly export between 1814 and 1819 as 2,500 and that by 1823 it had risen to 10,000.⁵ The

¹ Mathieson, *Great Britain and the Slave Trade*, 20-1; Manchester, 222-3.

² P.R.O., F.O. 84/2, Annex A to 10th Protocol, Memorandum on the Slave Trade, 4 December, 1817.

³ Alpers, Chapter VI.

⁴ P.R.O., Ad. I/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lewes*, Moz., 9 October 1823.

⁵ *Ibid.*

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recorded figures of slaves exported from Quelimane are as follows:¹

Year	PORTS OF IMPORTATION			TOTAL NO. OF SLAVES EXPORTED
	Rio de Janeiro	Bahia	Pernambuco	
1814	882	—	977	1,859
1815	550	—	445	995
1816	788	709	1,884	3,381
1817	1,397	339	924	2,680
1818	746	371	—	1,117
1819	3,134	1,239	650	5,023
	7,497	2,678	4,880	15,555

British statistics at Rio de Janeiro for slave importations, while not necessarily accurate since they do not allow for slaves on which no duty was paid, are nevertheless interesting; in the years 1821 to 1825 and 1827 to 1830 they show a total of nearly 35,000 introduced at Rio de Janeiro from Quelimane.² Thus before 1830 Quelimane was already notorious as one of the greatest marts for slaves on the East coast.

The pre-1820 trade to Ibo in the Querimba Islands seems to have been stopped by Makua hostility and Sakalava raids from Madagascar, but after 1824 these dangers were partially overcome and Ibo again became a favourite French hunting ground for slaves.³ In response to the increasing demand for slaves at Ibo and at Quelimane, Bisa, Yao and other African traders soon had trodden well-worn paths towards these two markets which became particularly important in the mid-nineteenth century.

In 1819 of the more than 10,000 slaves known to have been sold to Brazilian slavers over 1,800 died at Mozambique while a further 2,200 died on the voyage to Brazil. Another 1,200 awaiting sale had died before being sold. This death-rate may not have been unusually high, particularly among the Yao, because of the fatigue of their journey to the coast, which may have covered some 250 leagues, and the debilitating effects of the coastal climate. Hence Makua slaves were preferred. But in 1819, the Governor made no mention of Makua slaves. That may have been because of the troubles with a section of the Makua, 'in whose

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 97, List of the cargoes and ships entering and departing from Quelimane, unsigned, Quelimane, 31 March 1820.

² Alpers, Chapter VI. ³ Ibid.

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lands coastal traders had frequently been robbed', and the campaign against them in 1820.¹ It is not impossible that, partly because of these renewed hostilities or simply because prices at Zanzibar were better, the Makua like some of the Yao and the Bisa may have been sending their slaves to Zanzibar. As early as 1811 Captain Smee identified Makua slaves among others awaiting sale at Zanzibar.² Remarking on the large number of slaves shipped in Brazilian vessels the Governor of Mozambique specifically noted that 'this is not due to those which come from the environs of this city' but to the abundance of slaves brought by Yao caravans 'from the interior near Tete, the farthest of the Rivers of Sena... so that this year they brought 3,500.'³ Where, then, did officials in the capital, dependent on a profit from the slave trade, obtain 10,000 or 12,000 slaves for export to Brazil in 1819?⁴ And that at the very time when the same Governor-General was complaining that the supply of slaves, like that of ivory, was being diverted away from Mozambique.⁴

Writing in 1824 Captain Owen provided an answer. 'I now know,' he wrote, 'that nine out of ten of the slaves obtained at Mozambique are received in Arab chelingas or prows from Kielwa (Kilwa), Zanzibar and other places north of Cape Delgado.'⁵ Perhaps when he made this a subject of complaint upon his arrival at Mozambique, even he had not realized how essential this Arab trade was to the Governor-General. At a time when African merchants were diverting ivory and slaves overland to Zanzibar, the Arabs, it seems, were bringing them by sea to Mozambique!⁶ Hence, in contrast with the ivory trade which was irretrievably lost, the Arabs enabled the Portuguese officials at the capital to maintain a substantial export of slaves. These long journeys probably also helped to account for the high death-rate of slaves at Mozambique port.

In London as in Bombay, Calcutta, the Cape and Mauritius the British knew that any attempt to win effective co-operation from the Portuguese in the anti-slave trade crusade was doomed to failure until the other side of the same problem, that of Muscat,

¹ Alpers, Chapter VI.

² Ibid.

³ A.H.U., Moz., 96, Brito Sanches to Arcos, Moz., 10 October 1819, quoted by Alpers, Chapter VI.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ F.R.O., Ad I/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Lewin* at sea, 8 March 1824; cf. 180.

⁶ Due no doubt to Parquhar's treaty of 1817 with the King of Madagascar, the 1818 French Act prohibiting French subjects from slave trading and Captain Moresby's treaty of 1822 with the Imam, cf. 171-2; 267-8.

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could be controlled. But the British government had always handled Sayyid with caution. Even during the Napoleonic wars it was only after French power had been broken that in 1812 (after the fall of the Mascarene Islands in 1810, and of Java in 1811) Bombay approached Sayyid to give publicity to the Bombay and Bengal anti-slave trade negotiations of 1805 and 1813.¹ Thereafter, except for the treaty negotiated by Farquhar in 1822 granting British cruisers the right of search, the Imam signed no further commitments. Captain Owen had not made matters easier. Taking advantage of words expressed by the Imam in a kindly mood he attempted a device for subjecting more vessels to the right of search while his actions at Mombasa aroused the Imam's worst suspicions of British 'protection'. After that, until the late thirties, nothing constructive was achieved. In fact paradoxically enough, even when the humanitarians did succeed in getting Parliament to pass an act abolishing slavery and all distinction based upon colour, and later when Thomas Fowell Buxton's Society for the Extinction of the Slave Trade was formed, an increase in the East African slave trade was brought about by rising demand in Europe and America for African and plantation products.²

[2]

PALMERSTON AND THE PORTUGUESE TRADE, 1830-42

It was against Portugal and not Muscat that Palmerston's method of extorting by treaty the 'right of search' backed if necessary by naval blockade was first applied. At the same time Buxton's scheme for the civilization of Africa could not be ignored. It was to be achieved not as Wilberforce and Pitt forecast, as a complement or sequel to abolition, but as McQueen had suggested in 1820 as a preliminary and the only effective means of abolition.

British public opinion was deeply impressed by the overwhelming proof in Buxton's book, *The African Slave trade and its Remedies*, that the slave trade was not being destroyed but was actually in-

¹ Two years before the British Act of 1807 the Bombay government prohibited the importation and exportation of slaves 'for purposes of traffic' at Bombay and at other ports subject to its authority. In 1811 Bengal enacted a similar measure, cf. Compland, *Imadars*, 206, 208.

² Cf. 26; and 99-100.

creasing. Men of influence in society and politics at once came forward in his support. The Society formed in 1839 was not concerned with Africa in isolated sections but with the continent as a whole, as a single source of supply. Strong external measures were still to be applied, but 'the deliverance of Africa' was to be effected by 'calling forth the capabilities of her soil'. Compulsion so long as it lasted, might restrain the act, but it would not eradicate the motive. Native rulers were to be convinced that they could obtain European goods more cheaply by cultivating the soil than by exporting their subjects; but, as instruction along these lines required time, it was proposed meanwhile to compel as well as to persuade. The chiefs were to be bound by treaty to prohibit the trade. This most important aspect of the plan was to rest entirely with the government, who, it was suggested, might find it 'expedient to obtain from the chiefs the possession of some convenient districts . . . best adapted to carrying on trade with safety and success'. This achieved, another and wholly distinct Society might be formed for aiding cultivation and for promoting the growth of valuable products for which the soil was 'peculiarly fitted'.¹ Thus a daring suggestion for territorial annexation was put forward at a time when the government regarded the extension of British possessions most unfavourably. But that was not all. Ambitious plans were laid down to promote the civilization of Africa in ways not already adopted by the missionaries. In addition the Preventive Squadron, far from being recalled, was to be strengthened.

No doubt the Melbourne government's support and encouragement of the scheme are partly attributable to the advocacy of Lord Glenelg (the son of Charles Grant) and James Stephen, his permanent under-secretary, both disciples of the Clapham Sect. Glenelg was therefore Buxton's natural ally in the Cabinet, but he must have been regarded as none too safe a guide in view of his recent dealings in Canada and South Africa.² More probably, therefore, the government supported the project because public opinion seemed to be catching fire again or because of the shrewd judgment of Glenelg's successor at the Colonial Office, Lord John Russell.³ Whatever the reason, Palmerston and Melbourne were

¹ *Prospectus of the Society for the Extinction of the Slave Trade and for the Civilization of Africa* (published at beginning of *The African Slave Trade and its Remedies*) (London, 1840), 6-10.

² C.H.B.E., VIII (Cambridge, 1963), 319-21.

³ Coupland, *Kirk on the Zambezi* (Oxford, 1928), 36.

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prepared to countenance Glenelg's ideas although not wholly in agreement with them. The attempted application of their scheme to West Africa and the tragic result of the expedition which set out for the Niger is well known. So is Buxton's suggestion to Glenelg that Mombasa might be as important to a portion of eastern Africa as Fernando Po was to the western coast.

Because Buxton believed that the English had never traded for slaves on the East coast he decided they had a moral influence there undiminished by the remembrance of former atrocities. Enormous as the slave trade was from the east—and the figure he quoted was twenty or thirty thousand Negroes from the Imam's territory to the north alone—Buxton argued that it would be increased as a result of the stoppage of the trade from the West. The time was opportune for a settlement there before the natives should become prejudiced against the British by any other nation, especially the Yankees, 'who with their accustomed long-headedness were evidently endeavouring to engross this profitable trade'. He concluded his account of Mombasa as a most promising locality 'for an anti-slave trade and legitimate commerce colony' by stating that Montgomery Martin, a ship's surgeon who had accompanied Owen's surveying expedition, recommended Owen as the first Governor. Owen had founded the original settlement,¹ was much beloved by the natives, liked the country, was a very fine clever fellow and, though rather eccentric, was 'half an Arab himself' and would no doubt be willing to go!

Palmerston knew all about Owen's desire to be British Consul-General for Eastern Africa and South Arabia.² In 1834 Owen offered his services while deprecating the 'back-handed policy of certain interested parties' who in 1827 had prevented the government from accepting the cession of Mombasa. But after his recent meddling within the cherished limits of Portuguese trade and territory and in 'the delicate web of Arab politics' Owen's proposal was naturally firmly negatived by the India Board, which in effect, meant the President of the Board of Control, Sir John Hobhouse. Stressing that it had only recently been agreed with the Secret Committee (who at this time appear

¹ Cf. 179-87.

² P.R.O., F.O. 54/1, Secret and confidential, Owen to Palmerston, Jersey, 8 September 1834.

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to have been the really effective body dealing with Indian Affairs) that no communication should be held with states like Muscat except through the Governor-General of India in Council, the Board described the reasons for the appointment advocated by Captain Owen as at variance with the Near East policy of the India Office. It considered the appointment of a Consul-General inadvisable in as much as he would not be an officer of the Government of India nor under its control.

Palmerston was also ruffled by Buxton's proposals, for he was far-seeing enough not to be carried away by idealism. He wrote to Glenelg:

. . . this settlement scheme of Buxton's seems to Melbourne and myself a wild and crude idea. In order to extirpate the slave trade by commercial settlements you must begird with them the whole circumference of Africa: for this plan is peculiarly open to the objection which Buxton makes to our slave treaties, that nothing is done till all is done, and as long as there should remain any great extent of coast unprovided with these commercial settlements you would not have cured the evil. But what an expensive and slow process it would be to so stud the coast of Africa with factories, even if there were no political difficulties in the way.

No doubt the extension of commerce in Africa is an object to be aimed at, but I am inclined to think that such extension will be the effect rather than the cause of the extinction of the Slave Trade. It is Europe and not Africa which takes the lead in the intercourse between those two quarters of the globe. We want to sell our commodities in Africa and we sent them thither. The Africans who want to buy will pay us in whatever way we like. If we insist on having slaves, slaves they will produce; if we prefer being paid by elephant teeth and gold dust, those articles will be collected and will be got ready for our merchants.

If then we can prevent Europeans from bringing slaves away from Africa, we shall at once convert the mode into one of barter of commodities; and it is obviously far easier to catch and condemn slave ships supposing all the nations who have flags to have combined for the purpose than to make the line of circumvolution of sets and factories which Buxton proposes. The reason why the trade is so extensive is not that slave ships elude the vigilance of our cruisers, but that this vigilance is rendered unavailing by want of treaty power.

I am very sanguine as to the effect that will be produced by putting down the slave trade under the Portuguese flag.¹

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 54/2, Palmerston to Glenelg, Windsor, 24 September 1838.

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In demanding the complete abolition of the Portuguese slave trade, Palmerston, backed by an enthusiastic public opinion, had no conception of the entire dependence of Mozambique colony on the development of that trade. But with humanitarian influence dominating British politics all negotiations with Portugal were completely overshadowed by his persistent efforts to obtain, by negotiation, cajolery and threats, Portugal's explicit prohibition of the traffic in slaves. Portugal, on the other hand, was chiefly concerned about the revision of the 1810 commercial treaty, due in 1815, but delayed by civil war and revolt in Portugal¹ until the late thirties. In 1830-1 the slave trade was outlawed and the right of search no longer curtailed by geographical limits. But there was still no equipment clause. Finally, in 1835,² negotiations for a new treaty were begun. But not till she agreed in 1842 to pay England's price—complete abolition—did Portugal obtain the desired revision. During those years the Portuguese governments' fears of the possible consequences of abolition exerted a profound influence on the negotiations for the new treaty. In Portugal and Mozambique there were people who realized the reasons for the deplorable condition of the colony. But the slave trade gripped East Africa in a vice, and as long as the great majority of Portuguese East Africans, especially the officials, favoured the trade, and as long as buyers could be found, any attempt made by Portugal to abolish it was to prove abortive.

A trading concern—the Lourenço Marques Company—was formed in 1827 to develop agriculture and legitimate commerce, but the principal official alienated the native chiefs and the company became only another participant in the slave market.³ Colonists from Europe were promised free passage and a grant of

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 97/304, *Observations on Treaty*. In 1825 Canning had drawn up the necessary projects, while a revised draft prepared by the Board of Trade and Palmerston was presented in Lisbon in 1836, but the 'Revolution of September' at Lisbon interrupted negotiations, cf. F.O. 63/522, No. 45, de Walden to Palmerston, Lisbon, 20 February 1841, and F.O. 97/304, Note from F.O., 9 July 1840.

² Biker, VI, 170, Palmella to de Walden, Palace of Necessidades, 21 July 1835; 208, de Loule to de Walden, Lisbon, 16 January, 1836; Hertslet, *Commercial Treaties*, IV, 362, Notifications of the Portuguese government relative to the suspension of the Treaty of 1810, Palace of Necessidades, 22 July 1835.

³ A.H.U., Moz., IV, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 20 October 1840; Moz., 138, Petition by eleven inhabitants of Mozambique, unaddressed, 13 November 1833.

land,¹ and any who established a factory at Mozambique were to be ennobled. To bring the province into closer communication with the mother country, Portuguese ships *en route* to India were compelled to touch at Mozambique.² More stringent punishments were decreed for equipping foreign slave vessels in Portuguese ports or Portuguese vessels in foreign ports.³ Suggestions for improving Mozambique were made and invited. A decree was issued for developing the newly discovered coal deposits. But neither Portugal nor Mozambique had men or money to execute these projects, and as long as officials were not given adequate salaries no suggestions or orders could prevent them reaping the profits of the slave trade.

In 1836 a bombshell far-flung from the Court in Lisbon burst at the feet of the Governor and other officials in Mozambique. A Royal Decree prohibited absolutely and under most drastic penalties all slave trading direct or indirect within Portuguese territory by any person whatsoever.⁴ The reply of the Governor of Mozambique, the Marquis de Aracaty, was to suspend the decree within the limits of his jurisdiction on the ground that it was impracticable to enforce orders issued from home in ignorance of local conditions. Enforcement of the decree, he asserted, would result in irremediable evils—the total ruin of the subjects of the Crown and the starvation of its officials.⁵ This insubordination of the Governor, under the pressure of ‘imperious circumstances’, resulted in an important undertaking by Great Britain. The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Viscount de Sá da Bandeira, feared that Aracaty’s example might prove infectious and that, given a sufficient state of internal disorder, the colonies of Portugal might encourage other powers to attempt their occupation. In these ‘delicate and dangerous circumstances’—the decadence of Portuguese sea power and the impecuniosity of her government—the Viscount proposed to Palmerston that Great Britain should guarantee to the Crown of Portugal her dominions against any insurrection or attempt on the part of

¹ *Lisbon Gazette*, 30 April 1839.

² A.H.U., Moz., I, Approval of ‘King and Constitution’ to proposals of the Deputy of Mozambique, Lisbon, 30 April 1838, signed J. José de Ábrantes.

³ Hertalet, V, 412, Circular signed Palmella, Palace of Necessidades, 22 October 1835; 420, Decree of 16 January 1837.

⁴ Biker, XXVIII, 41-65, Negotiations for treaty with England for suppression of the Slave Trade.

⁵ Biker, op. cit., 68, Circular of Aracaty, 21 November 1837.

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foreign powers to foment rebellion or to obtain possession of them.¹

In his reply Palmerston was typically frank. Britain, he said, long accustomed to Lisbon's inability to enforce its orders in East Africa, was not surprised at the Governor's action, for he had been encouraged to opposition by the dilatoriness of the home government in effectively abolishing the slave trade by treaty. Given the treaty, an adequate naval force on the coast to enforce it could easily deal with recalcitrant officials and merchants. The Governor's circular appeared equivalent to a manifesto for perpetuating the traffic. Let but Portugal sign the abolition treaty, and Great Britain would consider the question of a guarantee with the most solicitous regard for the interest and safety of the possessions of her old ally.² Although the Lisbon authorities continued to express abhorrence of the 'odious traffic', while on paper nothing could have been more satisfactory than Portugal's acquiescence in Britain's abolitionist policy, the signature to the treaty was not forthcoming and the slave trade continued to flourish. Yet Britain agreed in May 1838 that if the total suppression of the trade in the Portuguese possessions should excite any discontent she would afford the assistance of naval force to prevent such possessions transferring themselves to Spain or Brazil. After further negotiations the promise of aid was finally given against any attempts to endanger the tranquillity of the Portuguese colonies fomented by natives or foreigners.³ This was a reaffirmation of Great Britain's obligation⁴ which had existed since the seventeenth century to protect the Portuguese Empire.

Still, the conclusion of both the slave trade treaty and the commercial treaty hung fire. So far as the first was concerned, Palmerston demanded Portugal's agreement to a declaration that slaving was equivalent to piracy and could be dealt with as such.⁵ As delay succeeded delay and every possible excuse was brought forward to condone Portugal's dilatoriness, the tone of Palmerston's letters became more and more impatient. By the 1815

¹ Biker, op. cit., 66, Sá da Bandeira to de Walden, Lisbon, 8 May 1838.

² Biker, op. cit., 72–80, de Walden to Sá da Bandeira, Lisbon, 10 May 1838.

³ Biker, op. cit., 86, de Walden to Sá da Bandeira, Lisbon, 11 May 1838; 126, Additional article to draft Abolition Treaty.

⁴ Gooch and Temperley, *British Documents on the Origins of the Great War, 1898–1914*, XI, 919, No. 610, Telegram from Sir Edward Carnegie, F.O., 4 August 1914; Hansard, Debate of 15 April 1938.

⁵ Biker, XXVIII, 155, Sá da Bandeira to de Walden, Lisbon, 22 May 1838.

treaty, Portugal had undertaken to assimilate her laws on the slave trade to those of Great Britain and rigorously to restrict the use of her flag in that traffic. In return England had remitted the debt of £600,000 owed her by Portugal. Yet the treaty stipulations concerning the slave trade had been allowed to remain inoperative. Palmerston hinted at strong action on the part of Great Britain to enforce rights which were legally hers. She might claim absolution from her agreement not to molest the Portuguese slave trade south of the line: that trade, since the loss of Brazil, was a violation of law and treaty. No Portuguese authorities at home or abroad had ever taken effectual steps to punish or to interrupt it. Aracaty's plea that slaves were the only exportable commodity of his province and the export duty thereon his only sure revenue was ridiculed, the truth being that the trade enriched a few officials and merchants at the expense of the best interests of the State. The foreign marauder, in fact, profited more than the Portuguese subject. For the benefit of a few individuals 'Portugal permitted her flag to be disgraced, her laws to be violated, her good faith to be impeached and her treaty engagements broken'. Slavers who were denied the Spanish flag could find refuge by hoisting that of Portugal under whose protection the trade, denounced by the Brazilian government, was carried on.¹

At length, driven to desperation by Portugal's procrastination, Palmerston, in August 1839, obtained from Parliament an Act which permitted British cruisers to search and seize suspected or actual slavers flying Portuguese colours precisely as though they were the property of British subjects.² There was little exaggeration in Tory complaints that the bill authorized proceedings tantamount to acts of war; but when the Tory peers at first rejected it, Palmerston discussed the possibility of directing British cruisers to take action without authority from Parliament. One commentator remarks that 'Neither he nor Brougham "was quite accountable for his actions where the Black Man was concerned".'³ But there may have been another and less humanitarian aspect to Palmerston's concern in Portuguese East Africa.

Just at that time coal had been discovered in the Zambesi

¹ Biker, XXVIII, 242-96, de Walden to Sabrosa, Lisbon, 28 April 1839.

² Hertslet, V, 427, 'Act of the British Parliament, "for the suppression of the Slave Trade" and the seizure of certain Portuguese and other vessels engaged in such trade, 24 August 1839.'

³ Bell, *Lord Palmerston* (London, 1936), I, 235.

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basin¹ and Natal, and the potential value of Portuguese East Africa as an intermediate coaling station on the route to India² may not have escaped notice in the early days of steamships. Moreover, reports of French and American interest in those shores were at that time reaching London.³

Palmerston's high-handed policy raised resentment and suspicion in Portugal and also in the mind of the new Governor of Mozambique, J. P. Marinho. This is the more surprising for the latter had served under Wellington in the Peninsular War, was a staunch abolitionist and thereby won golden opinions from English naval officers on the East African station.⁴ The Governor revealed an appreciation of the strategic position in the Indian Ocean when he wrote that no European power could secure absolute dominion in Asia without being master either of Portuguese East Africa or Madagascar. Of these two, East Africa was infinitely preferable, as its resources and physical features were more favourable for development.⁵ Seventeen years later the British consul, McLeod, expressed a similar view when he asserted that any nation possessing Madagascar could command the Indian Ocean.⁶ Marinho suspected that the English would take East Africa once it was freed from the taint of the slave trade. It was much richer than the Cape or New Holland (Australia), and, by the route through the Red Sea, was nearer Europe. Once in possession and commanding, in addition, the resources of the Cape and New Holland, the English would be very difficult to dislodge. Britain's aim in stopping the slave trade, he thought, was to obtain a monopoly for colonial goods in the European and American markets and thus displace Brazilian and Havana produce by that of New Holland.⁷

Portuguese animosity towards English policy was increased by the 'scandalous' conduct of British sea captains⁸ on the coast and by the rigorous blockade of Mozambique enforced by the British Navy. Slave trading was at least a sideline with traders of all nations who frequented the port, and the exclusion of

¹ A.H.U., Moz., IV, Hall to Marinho, H.M.S. *Nemesis*, Moz., 21 October 1840.

² Uys, 8.

³ Cf. 215 and 243-4.

⁴ Hall, *Narrative of the Voyages and Services of the 'Nemesis'* from 1840-3 (London, 1843), 2nd edn., 47-50.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., IV (Confidential), Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 10 November 1840.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 63/822, McLeod to Clarendon, Moz., 12 December 1857.

⁷ A.H.U., Moz., IV, No. 49, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 20 October 1840.

⁸ A.H.U., Moz., IV, No. 61, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 2 October 1840.

suspicious characters, especially Banians and Arabs, by the presence of English ships of war in the entrance to almost every harbour, caused a shortage of provisions and other necessities with a consequent rapid rise in prices and attendant profiteering.¹ Complaints long and bitter arose against 'hypocritical' Britain, who 'merely enriched herself while pretending to be actuated by humanitarian motives'. It was said that the captured slaves were disposed of at the Cape of Good Hope, that Portuguese gold, ivory and tortoise-shell were denied their lawful purchasers and means of transport, that the factories of Great Britain threw by the manufacture of goods to be exchanged for slaves² and that 'many poor miserable wretches of her navy were enriched by captures at the expense of the Portuguese, Brazilian and Spanish nations'.³ An American, Commodore Skinner, in 1845 went so far as to claim that 'Under the pretense of suppressing the slave trade . . . it is the intention of both France and England to make as many settlements on the Coast as they can for the purpose of monopolizing the trade of the continent'.⁴

While the Portuguese governor's evidence against England was not entirely impartial he did make honest attempts to enforce the decrees of abolition, and must be acquitted of any suggestion of being interested in maintaining the trade for his own advantage. He hoped by suppressing the slave trade to divert into Portuguese hands the profits of the lawful commerce which were then enriching British subjects in India and elsewhere. To this end trading agreements were made with the Imam of Muscat and the Queen of Madagascar. The latter was asked to permit a Portuguese settlement in her territory as a counter to French intrigue.⁵ The notorious Company of Lourenço Marques was abolished and a commercial company—The Undertaking of Citizens from Oporto—instituted.⁶ An attempt to reorganize the civil service, improve commerce and encourage the cultivation of coffee, cotton and sugar-cane was made by obtaining boys from Europe of some education and sober habits;⁷ skilled fishermen and salt makers

¹ A.H.U., Moz., IV, No. 24, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 2 October 1840; Moz., V, No. 96, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 12 March 1841.

² Bicker, XXVIII, 489, Sabrosa to de Walden, Lisbon, 11 September 1839.

³ A.H.U., Moz., IV, No. 61, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 2 October 1840.

⁴ Duignan and Clendenen, *The United States and the African Slave Trade*, 42.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., IV, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 29 October 1840.

⁶ A.H.U., Moz., V, No. 84, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 3 March 1841.

⁷ A.H.U., Moz., IV, No. 28, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 3 October 1840.

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were obtained from the Cape Verde Islands. In 1841 cloth manufacture was started and some mines were opened. All this was done in the teeth of opposition from the slaving interest which tried to influence Portuguese in India to stop supplying Marinho with machines and materials necessary for launching his schemes.¹ They also continued to export slaves, varying the rendezvous with the native slavers and utilizing the shallow screened inlets where ships of war could neither observe nor follow them. The Governor's power in a community, where disloyalty and self-interest were rampant even among the officials, was insufficient to do more than hinder the trade. On one occasion he was obliged to seek the aid of a British cruiser to check incipient rebellion and assist in expelling seventy Spanish slavers.²

Despite the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1835, five years later Spanish slavers were intriguing with the native chiefs for the establishment of a slave market north of Mozambique.³ This danger of native aggression in the interests of slaving was ever present and potent in the defenceless colony. A union of Angola and Mozambique with Brazil or as independent states under Brazilian protection, was not without the bounds of possibility, for a branch of the society of slave owners with this as their avowed object existed even in Lisbon.⁴ It is no wonder then that on Marinho's departure the obnoxious trade sprang once more into its wonted vigour.⁵ But by this time the long-protracted negotiations between Portugal and England regarding the projects of the treaties proposed in 1835 were drawing to a close. Palmerston's famous Act giving British cruisers instructions to search and seize Portuguese slavers and the close blockade which resulted must have made Lisbon realize that she was playing a losing game and that no commercial treaty was possible without a formal renunciation of the slave trade. Moreover, Portugal was probably more willing to accede to Britain's demands for abolition since she had obtained the latter's guarantee of her territorial integrity. On 3 July 1842 the philanthropic and commercial issues converged to form the basis of two treaties.

¹ A.H.U., Moz., V, No. 83, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 2 March 1841.

² A.H.U., Moz., IV, No. 52, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 16 November 1840.

³ A.H.U., Moz., IV, No. 52, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 22 October 1840.

⁴ A.H.U., Moz., IV, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 19 October 1840.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., V, No. 41, d'Abreu de Lima to Minister of Marine and Colonies, Moz., 15 December 1843; P.R.O., F.O. 67/798, Trotter to Admiralty, Seringapatam, 26 March 1853, enclosed in Woodhouse to Admiralty, 4 July 1853.

The Slave Trade Treaty,¹ which Britain in effect forced upon Portugal, prohibited all forms of slave trading to Portuguese subjects. It declared the trade equivalent to piracy, it regulated rights of search, police supervision, capture, adjudication and reparation for the acts of over-zealous naval officers, it included the 'equipment' clause, it provided for the well-being of liberated slaves and made arrangements for future amendments of the treaty. The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation² was not merely a revision of that of 1810, as Palmerston had intended, but a new treaty to meet the changed relations between Portugal and Brazil. The substance of many articles in the old, however, was used as a 'necessary link' in the chain of reasoning behind the drafting of the new treaty³ which, although signed when Aberdeen was Premier, was the work of Palmerston and the Board of Trade, who had it carefully compared with the Brazilian treaty of 1825.⁴ Portugal agreed to reduce her duties on British manufactured goods and fish, and in return Britain would open her colonial trade to Portuguese ships. But since Portugal was wedded to a rigid protectionism England gained only the right of future negotiation.⁵

Although Portugal had desired to except Brazil, the new treaty was framed on the most-favoured-nation principle. English and Portuguese were to trade on equal terms as regards duties in each other's ports.⁶ Ships of either nation were allowed to export or import colonial produce to or from either home country on equal terms.⁷ Direct trade between Portuguese and British possessions was allowed in Portuguese products, with certain exceptions reserved for British importers, and, in return Portugal granted British nationals a like concession.⁸ The coasting trade

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 93/77/21, Treaty and Additional Article, Slave Trade.

² P.R.O., F.O. 93/77/19, Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, with Explanatory Notes, exchanged between Great Britain and Portugal at Lisbon, 3 July 1842.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 97/304, Draft of Preamble and Note by Palmerston, 17 December 1835.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 63/541, F.O. to MacGregor, 18 November 1841.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 63/529, No. 283, de Walden to Aberdeen, Lisbon, 6 December 1841; F.O. 63/551, Same to same, Lisbon, 9 December 1842.

⁶ Article I; cf. also P.R.O., F.O. 97/304, Palmerston's Observation on Treaty.

⁷ Articles V and VI.

⁸ Article VIII; cf. also P.R.O., F.O. 63/558, MacGregor to Canning, Office of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, Whitehall, 22 March 1842; F.O. 93/77/19, Explanatory Notes exchanged between the British and Portuguese plenipotentiaries; F.O. 93/58/20, Secret article to Treaty of Commerce; F.O. 63/542, No. 22, Aberdeen to Howard, F.O., 26 March 1842. Liberty of importation was reciprocally granted

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in each other's dominions was opened under certain restrictions to both parties.¹ The treaty was to be valid for ten years with the possibility of revision after five years of any articles 'not affecting the principle of the treaty'.²

Portuguese East Africa was not specifically mentioned in the treaty, although in the printed draft submitted to the Portuguese government in 1836, a clause to this effect had been included,³ as in the Treaty of 1810. At one stage the Portuguese agreed to its insertion,⁴ but the clause was omitted in the final form of the treaty because it was understood to be the intention of the Portuguese government to 'throw open' the 'general' or legitimate trade with all their African possessions.⁵ Britain obviously hoped that the importance which East Africa had assumed as a slave market had or would thrust upon nations the realization of its commercial potentialities. Meanwhile Zanzibar and the Arab ports to the north remained the central coastal depôts for the slave trade supplying Asian buyers from the north and, whenever possible, Europeans to the south.

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MUSCAT, FRANCE AND THE TRADE⁶

Palmerston's 'treaty' method of stopping Muscat's share in the slave trade was naturally a matter of considerable concern to the Portuguese. In attempting this task the British Foreign Office was

¹ Article X.

² Article XIX.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 97/304, Draft, F.O. to de Walden, 22 August 1836, Article XXV.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 97/304, pencilled note on Draft.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 63/529, No. 283, de Walden to Aberdeen, Lisbon, 6 December 1841. It is interesting to note that de Walden pointed out that 'Mozambique' was not by the Portuguese designated a colony. The islands of Madeira and Azores were also not considered colonies; the Cape Verde Islands were. The Portuguese laws described the possessions, which in common 'parlance' we should term colonies as 'ultramarine possessions'. In the treaty it was, however, expressly understood that the intention of the Portuguese was to 'grant the trade with all their African possessions', whether called colonies or not.

⁶ For an exhaustive study of relations of European Powers with Zanzibar, see Coupland, *East Africa and its Invaders*.

in the British colonies, but the words 'and dominions' were omitted because they would include the territories of the East India Company, and in negotiating commercial treaties of a general nature the British government were not legally able to contract any engagements including those territories—at least so far as duties on ships and goods were concerned.

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only continuing, not inaugurating, a policy. But in the late 1830s the question proved no less baffling than in the earlier years, especially as Palmerston was forced to consider the East African slave trade as only one aspect of a complex pattern of world affairs. The Arabs had a much longer tradition of dependence upon slaves than the Portuguese. For Britain to force Portugal's hand was difficult enough. To force the pace of Muscat's ruler on the question of abolition might mean losing his friendship to France or some other aspiring rival.

In the Middle and Near East an imminently explosive diplomatic situation was causing some alarm. Mahomet Ali, the ambitious leader of a virtually independent Egypt, not content with mastery of the Sudan and Syria, was aiming at incorporating Irak into a new Mediterranean and Muslim Empire from the Nile to the Persian Gulf. Russia had been thrusting south towards Constantinople, capital of a decaying Turkish Empire, and towards Persia and India. Through a native agency an attempt was being made to establish an intimate understanding with the Imam and to keep Russia fully informed of the resources of the British government. In 1830 France, with a complete disregard for British disapproval, had occupied Algiers. Bent, it seemed, on reviving Napoleon's eastern dreams, not only Egypt but India was courted. Britain was soon to learn that in East African waters France had given the Imam, now mostly at Zanzibar, exclusive trading advantages with the island of Bourbon (after 1848 known as Réunion) and her eastern possessions.¹

At Muscat the arrival of an agent from the Shah of Persia, to purchase European articles for the manufacture of muskets and pistols at the very time when the Egyptian Army was in the Persian Gulf, and the appearance of a French and an American ship of war frightened the Imam.² In July 1840, a French vessel of war from Bourbon arrived. The Commander, Captain Guillain, in a remarkable book to be published in 1856—the year of Sayyid's death—advocated that if only France would act quickly the cutting of a canal at Suez would bring 'an incalculable increase of vitality' to India and the East and would offer France increased compensation for the losses of 1815 by new acquisitions of territory and influence in East Africa.

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 54/2, enclosure, F.O. to Board of Trade, 2 May 1838.

² P.R.O., F.O. 54/3, Extract from letter of a native agent at Muscat, 9 October 1838, enclosed in Gordon to Backhouse, India Board, 25 January 1839.

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Guillain was said but recently to have attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the Sakalava inhabitants of Nos-Bé, or Nossi Bé, (a small island off the west coast of Madagascar) to accept French protection. He now applied to the Imam for permission to settle a consular agent at Zanzibar and to erect a fort and buildings at Mogadishu and Brava in preparation for a settlement—concessions which the French had previously failed to win either by threats or persuasion from the Imam's son and Governor of Zanzibar. The Imam conceived these requests to be highly detrimental to his interests and viewed the French visit to Nossi Bé with grave concern, since, he claimed, the Queen had some years previously acknowledged herself and her tribe to be subject to him.¹ Encouraged by the British East India Company's agent in the Persian Gulf and by its political agent at his own court, he peremptorily refused the French demands. But to maintain this attitude it was necessary to be assured of the British government's support. Failing this, the Imam dared not venture any longer to evade compliance.²

Palmerston had already heard much of the French activities on the West African coast and also in the Pacific, where fear of being forestalled by France had influenced Britain to annex parts of New Zealand.³ Besides, it was at this time that the Egyptian issue was causing a first-rate crisis between France and England.⁴ Clearly before the delicate question of abolition was broached the friendship of the Imam and the other Muslim states in the Near East had to be assured.

Arab goodwill was essential to the maintenance of the *status quo* and to the security of communications between East and West. Although the Suez Canal was not opened until 1869 this route had been regularly used since the eighteenth century for the conveyance of urgent dispatches between England and India. By 1835 a regular French steamer service had been initiated between Alexandria and Marseilles and two years later the British started a monthly mail service.

Consequently the Imam was assured of British assistance and was urged not to comply with any French demands which might

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 54/3, Hennel to Secret Committee, Muscat Cove, 31 July 1840, enclosed in Cabell to Backhouse, India Board, 23 September 1840.

² P.R.O., F.O. 54/3, Extract, Bombay Govt. to Secret Committee, 30 September 1840, enclosed in Hobhouse to Palmerston, India Board, 19 November 1840.

³ C.H.B.F.P., II, 262.

⁴ For details, cf. Grant and Temperley, 264.

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be incompatible with his interests¹—a course of action which was strongly supported by the Bombay officials, who realized that the political implications of the situation had remained unchanged since the time of Napoleon. If the French succeeded in establishing a more intimate connection with the Government of Muscat, then British political influence both there and in the Persian Gulf must be jeopardized.²

Letters continued to pour into Whitehall, recounting the Imam's ever-increasing apprehensions of French activity. Positive information had been received from his son at Zanzibar, that two French frigates had arrived at Nossi-Bé from Bourbon and landed a number of people who commenced building a fort and storerooms, without the slightest reference being made to Zanzibar. The Imam regarded this as evidence of the likely treatment other portions of his territories might be expected to experience should the French be able to establish themselves at Nossi-Bé.³

Before and amidst these alarms based on fact and fancy, the Imam had put out several diplomatic feelers to Britain. In the summer of 1834, travelling on a ship of a London Trading Company, one, Armeia Bin Hafman, arrived at Whitehall 'to ascertain the climate' at the request of the Imam.⁴ Four years later, in August 1838, the Governor of Mombasa, Sayyid Ali Ben Nassur, was royally entertained at the public expense and received as a guest at Windsor Castle.⁵ At Birmingham and Manchester where, no doubt, his advice on the type of manufactures desired by Africa was of considerable value, a cordial reception was ensured by letters from the Committee of the Privy Council for the Board of Trade to the chairman of the Chambers of Commerce.⁶ Two years earlier, in 1836, Captain Cogan of the Indian Navy, appointed as the Imam's agent in London and in Europe, had

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 54/3, Palmerston to Imam, F.O., 30 September 1840.

² P.R.O., F.O. 54/3, Extract, Bombay Govt. to Secret Committee, 30 September 1840, enclosed in Hobhouse to Palmerston, India Board, 19 November 1840.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 54/4, No. 102, Hennel to Reid, Secret Department, Residency, Muscat, 3 November 1840; Translation, Imam to Governor of Bourbon, 3 November 1840, enclosed in Hobhouse to Palmerston, India Board, 28 January 1841.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 54/1, Memo signed 'P', 17 July 1834.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 54/2, Cogan to Palmerston, 38 Fitzroy Square, 24 August 1838; Palmerston to Cogan, F.O., 27 August 1838.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 54/2, F.O. to Board of Trade, 8 September 1838; Munn to Strangways, Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade, Whitehall, 11 September 1838.

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emphasized at length that Britain alone, to whom the Imam's co-operation had been of the greatest value all through the Napoleonic wars, had made no overture to secure his friendship, and that the East India Company had envinced indifference in their intercourse with him. Despite the Imam's attempted sacrifices in the cause of the suppression of the slave trade in Africa, he had received no reward. Moreover, since the suppression of slavery was unpalatable to his subjects and injurious to his revenues, he would require much aid from the British government if they wished him eventually to support abolition.

Cogan suggested that the Imam be given the same trading advantages to the west of the Cape as his subjects now enjoyed to the east. If commercial intercourse were established with Muscat each of the Imam's returning ships would land, at a moderate cost, 400–500 tons of coal at Mocha or Muscat to aid steam navigation and the American piece goods which now supplied his African possessions would soon be supplanted by goods of British manufacture. It was necessary to keep on the best terms with the Imam since he had a perfect knowledge of all that passed at the Court of Persia. Moreover, although his friendship was solicited by France, America and, indirectly, by Russia, he wished to devote himself to British interests. Should Britain not assist him, Muscat with its dependencies would fall under the dominion of Mahomet Ali. This it was believed was one of the objectives of the Egyptian Army then in the Persian Gulf. Such an event would have seriously embarrassed Britain's Indian policy and neutralized British control in the Persian Gulf.¹ Both Palmerston and the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade were prepared to seize the opportunity of making a treaty of commerce and navigation with the Imam² especially as in 1833 America had concluded a treaty by which commercial advantages and the right to appoint consuls in the Imam's African dominions were obtained.³

The dominance of American trade, the efforts of Salem merchants—especially Bertram Shepard known as the 'Big Firm'—

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 54/2, Cogan to Carnac, Oriental Club, 5 January 1838.

² P.R.O., F.O. 54/1, Palmerston to Board of Trade, F.O., 7 February 1838; Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade to Backhouse, 20 February 1838.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 54/2, Enclosure F.O. to Board of Trade, 2 May 1838. During the negotiations the Imam it seems 'offered to allow American settlements . . . on the African mainland, if the United States would assist him in suppressing' a rebellion at Mombasa, cf. Clendenen and Duignan, *Americans in Black Africa*, 32.

to build a large trade embracing the whole East African littoral, the off-shore islands and Arabia, as well as representations from New York merchants for an Omani goodwill trade mission to the United States had obviously excited the Imam. In 1840 a barque flying the scarlet ensign of Zanzibar and owned by the Imam himself had arrived in New York.¹ The missionary invasion of East Africa lent colour to these reports.² In 1834 came the first agents of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in South East Africa, followed later by more missions in Natal.³

Rumour was rife that the Imam was likely to cede one of his ports in Africa to the American government for the convenience of their whalers on the coast.⁴ It was only a short while since the Americans had been reported to be contemplating a settlement somewhere in the neighbourhood of Delagoa Bay.⁵ If such a project were contemplated, Palmerston noted, no just objection could be made since 'the crown of Britain does not assert any rights of sovereignty in Delagoa Bay' and at India House the Secret Committee thought 'the supposed intentions of the Americans' was unlikely to affect British interests in India.⁶ Palmerston suspected that the Americans were concerned with no more than increased commercial interest following the treaty with the Imam. He doubted the existence of any desire to extend territory since the whole movement of population and capital of the United States could be fully employed in the unsettled tracts of their own country.⁷ Even so their increasing trade connection was not to be ignored, especially when the British government was keeping a watchful eye on external contacts with the Trekkers from Cape Colony. These recalcitrants were selling slaves through Delagoa Bay and might be thinking of accepting the protection of the Dutch or some other foreign power.⁸

The English merchant was crying out for markets and

¹ Clenenden and Duignan, *op. cit.*, 35.

² R. Oliver, *The Missionary Factor in East Africa* (London 1952), *passim*.

³ For details, cf. Coupland, *East Africa and its Invaders*, 375.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 34/3, 'A confidential outline of the character and government of His Highness the Sultan of Muscat,' enclosed in Cogan to Palmerston, London, 5 December 1839.

⁵ P.R.O., C.O. 48/163, Wood to Hay, Admiralty, 30 June 1835.

⁶ Coupland, *op. cit.*, 374-5.

⁷ P.R.O., C.O. 48/163, Backhouse to Hay, F.O., 29 July 1835.

⁸ C. P. J. Muller, *Die Britse Owerheid en die Great Trek* (Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1947), 162.

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customers. The phenomenal growth of British trade with Natal was practical evidence¹ in support of colonial opinion at the Cape which was waxing eloquent about Britain's lost opportunities in Africa. *The Grahamstown Journal* in the 1830s and 1840s excitedly extolled the benefits to the English manufacturer, the merchant and the colonial trader if the 'artificial' wants of the Africans 'in the heart of the interior' were stimulated by a taste for European comforts. A speech at Leeds by Molesworth showed how this echoed the feelings of the English merchant who possessed 'incalculable and inexhaustible means of production and purchase'.² Requests 'from Glasgow, from Liverpool and from merchants connected with the African trade in London' demanded the annexation of Natal. To those aiming at embracing an intercourse with the tribes 'who know the value of this country' . . . 'Its contiguity to Mosambique, to Madagaskar, and to the Comoro and other islands . . .' quoted the *Journal*, 'it is . . . the *point d'appui* from which commercial adventurers may take their departure to the north-east, and even to the Red Sea . . . lying so immediately in the course for the Mauritius; all the accumulated produce would find its way to England . . .'.⁴ British traders could enter into 'an advantageous traffic . . . now almost exclusively enjoyed by the Americans'.⁵ Others, like Dr. Philip of the London Missionary Society, actually counselled annexation 'up to the tropics' to save Africans from injustice and inhumanity,⁶ and to prevent Americans from training Africans in the use of fire-arms.⁷

Amidst this pressure for the expansion of British trade and territory, articles for the effective co-operation of the Imam in the abolition of the slave trade were inserted in the projected treaty, only to be rejected when all the considerations involved were taken into account. A number of Mohammedan chieftains and petty States, who from time immemorial had been supplied with slaves from the Imam's African possessions, were powerful adjuncts to his government. An attempt to enforce abolition might

¹ British exports to Natal for the period 1837-48 grew from £3,900 to £40,000, and imports for the same period from £300 to £8,300, Muller, op. cit., 141.

² Egerton, *Speeches of Molesworth*, 89, quoted by Muller, 152, 159.

³ Hansard, Parl. Debates, XLVIII, 3rd Series, 25 June 1839, col. 864, quoted by Muller, op. cit., 147.

⁴ Muller, op. cit., 143, 152.

⁵ Clendenen and Duignan, op. cit., 23.

⁶ Muller, op. cit., 57-8.

⁷ Clendenen and Duignan, op. cit., 26.

cause a combined attack on the Imam's power and, if supported by the Wahabi chiefs from the interior, might lead to the destruction of his authority in Arabia. A measure that would call forth such proceedings against the Imam would exclude him from all sympathy of the Arabian people and would be equally obnoxious to the governments of Persia, Egypt and the East African ports.

In such circumstances Britain, before demanding the Imam's co-operation in the suppression of the slave trade, had to be prepared to render him aid—a matter which might involve serious difficulties, especially in view of the growing complications in Egypt and Turkey. It was therefore decided that a treaty for the gradual abolition of the slave trade might be better effected and enforced through the government in India after the interests of Muscat and Britain had been closely cemented by a commercial treaty and when the Imam would feel flattered by the attentions his envoy had received. He might then aid abolition if acquainted with the strong feelings of the British government and the high esteem in which he would be held. In return, some equivalent would be granted by the government of India, such as the gratuitous use of their docks for repairs to his navy, exemption from port and pilotage dues and other considerations that would cause no actual outlay to the Company but which might be important and very acceptable to the Imam.¹ As a result, therefore, of the Imam's connection with political events in the Mediterranean and in Europe, England allowed the Arabs in Zanzibar and on the East Coast generally to continue with the slave trade. Britain could not run the risk of offending the Imam by asking concessions which he might find difficult to grant without causing discontent among his own subjects and the enmity of neighbouring states.²

Instructions to this effect were given to Cogan, who, in September 1838, was appointed British plenipotentiary to negotiate the treaty with the Court of Muscat. At the same time the government of India was specifically directed not to press for the abolition of the Arab slave trade.³ The treaty was to be largely based on that

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 54/2, Cogan to Cabell, 38 Fitzroy Square, 5 September 1838; Peacock to Cabell, East India House, 13 September 1838, enclosed in Cabell to Strangways, India Board, 17 September 1838.

² P.R.O., F.O. 54/2, Palmerston to Cogan, 28 September 1838.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 54/2, Secret Committee of the E.I. Co. to Gov.-Gen. of India in Council, E.I. House, 28 September 1838.

which the Imam had recently concluded with the United States,¹ but great caution was to be exercised so that Britain should not be committed to any guarantee of the Imam's territory against domestic or foreign enemies.² The opportunity was also to be used to obtain from the Imam a base in the Persian Gulf against Russia; the right to use Socotra as a coaling station; permission for British subjects to manufacture sugar and to reside at Zanzibar or any other part of the Imam's dominions in Africa.³

Simultaneously with the preparation of a commercial treaty it was decided to appoint a British consul to Zanzibar. The idea originated not with Cogan but with a completely independent source, and illustrates the growing commercial importance of South-East Africa to the British merchant. Palmerston had been constantly reminded of this by colonial opinion at the Cape and by occasional applications from merchants requesting letters of introduction to the Imam or the Governor of Zanzibar.⁴ But now the suggestion came from the Board of Control as the result of a representation made by a British merchant in India, Robert Brown Norsworthy, who described himself as a Master Mariner of Great Britain and a settler at Zanzibar, then residing at Bombay.

In November 1837 Norsworthy complained to the Bombay government that he and other Europeans who wished to reside in Zanzibar were placed in a position of considerable difficulty because Britain had no resident there possessing consular authority, and the distance was too great to apply to any other European court; that in this respect the American ships which visited the East coast of Africa possessed the valuable advantage of having a resident consul at Zanzibar.⁵ Moreover, the Imam had invited Frenchmen and other foreigners to grow sugar cane and clove trees there.

Actually, in 1837, there were in Zanzibar only one English-born merchant and his family besides a medical practitioner. But at least two thousand British Indian subjects were employed in various mercantile pursuits. A direct commerce between Great

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 54/1, de Merchant to Backhouse, Office of the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade, 23 July 1838.

² P.R.O., F.O. 54/2, Hobhouse to Palmerston, India Board, 7 March 1838.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 54/2, Imam's 'private opinions' on Cogan's queries, enclosed in Cogan to Carnac, Oriental Club, 5 January 1838.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 54/1, Cook to Palmerston, 41 Myddelton Square, 2 May 1836.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 54/2, Extract, Bombay Political Consultations, 20 December 1837, memorial of Norsworthy, Bombay, 23 November 1837, enclosed in Gordon to Backhouse, India Board, 31 May 1838.

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Britain and Zanzibar had only commenced within the past four years. At most, not more than six or seven vessels went from Zanzibar to England annually, as compared with twenty-five to thirty from India. But, as noted elsewhere, the exports of Zanzibar as the emporium for about 800 miles of sea coast were very considerable, and in 1837 the Banians were quoted as telling the American consul, Captain Waters, 'that English vessels carrying cottons would soon drive the Americans from the trade'. This evidence was obviously not reliable as the English company was soon to close down and leave the Americans dominant until the arrival of more European and American vessels and the appointment of a British consul broke up a monopoly between the Banian custom's master and Captain Waters both of whom leased their posts and engaged in trade.¹

Apart from the importance of establishing a British consul at Zanzibar to encourage British participation in the increasing trade, the appointment was expected to refute the belief in American superiority. Cogan believed this opinion was extensively held by the ignorant because the American flag was displayed over the walls of the Tower while that of the government was hoisted on the Castle. The only English firm competing with the Salem merchants had employed Norsworthy as agent,² but his negligence in their interests as well as his general misconduct had made necessary his removal. He was therefore not a suitable choice for the position of consul.³

On 31 May 1839, a month after Cogan's return to Zanzibar, a Convention of Commerce was signed.⁴ The commercial articles countenanced and protected British and British India subjects in the Imam's dominions and were intended to draw the greater share of the produce of those dominions directly into the hands of the British trader, hitherto at times entirely excluded. Subjects of Muscat were to be at liberty to enter, reside in, trade with and pass their merchandise through all parts of Britain's dominions in Europe and in Asia, where they were to receive most-favoured-nation privileges. The rights and privileges of commerce and navigation within the limits of the East India Company charters were confirmed. In return, among other advantages, British

¹ Bennett, *Americans in Zanzibar, 1825-45*, 101-2, 104, cf. 102.

² Bennett, *op. cit.*, 100, 101.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 34/2, Copy, Cogan to Gordon, Oriental Club, 9 June 1838, enclosed in Gordon to Backhouse, India Board, 11 June 1838.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 34/3, enclosure, Cogan to Palmerston, Bombay, 31 July 1839.

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subjects were to have the same favoured-nation treatment in the Imam's territories. The Imam reluctantly agreed that each party was to have the right of appointing consuls in the other's dominions. British subjects were to be allowed to purchase, sell or hire land or houses in the dominions of the Imam and no import duty exceeding 5 per cent was to be levied on any British goods imported by British vessels. No article was to be prohibited from being exported from or imported into the territories of the Imam, who undertook not to permit the establishment of any monopoly or exclusive privilege of sale within his dominions, except in ivory and gum between those mainland ports opposite Zanzibar where the Americans had obtained the right to trade. But on the question of the slave trade little was achieved. The Sultan,¹ as the Imam was called in the treaty, merely confirmed the engagements he had entered into with Great Britain on 10 September 1842 for the entire suppression of the slave trade between his dominions and all Christian countries, and ships and vessels of war belonging to the East India Company were to be allowed to act in full accordance with the stipulations of the treaty in the same manner as ships and vessels of the Royal Navy.² Actually Britain had demanded nothing more.

The extension of the right of search to the Indian Navy, it was hoped, would stop the practice of vessels under Arab and other flags clandestinely importing slaves into the Portuguese ports at Goa, Damão and Diu, as well as into the territories of various Indian Rajahs.³ Reference to the slave trade invariably brought the reply that the Sultan's financial resources emanated directly or indirectly from the sale of slaves, that Portuguese power in East Africa was maintained by means of slave trade revenue and that it was those ports that formed marts for the supply of slaves to Christian nations⁴—arguments which no doubt counted for much in determining Palmerston's action against the Portuguese slave trade in the autumn of that year. The terms of the convention to which the Sultan agreed were in some small details a

¹ Hereafter Sayyid Said, and later Imams of Muscat, will be referred to as Sultans.

² P.R.O., F.O. 54/3, Convention of Commerce between Her Britannic Majesty and His Highness the Imam of Muscat, Zanzibar, 31 May 1839, enclosed in Cogan to Palmerston, Bombay, 31 July 1839.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 54/2, Cogan to Cabell, 38 Fitzroy Square, 5 September 1838.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 54/3, A confidential outline of the character and government of His Highness the Sultan of Muscat, enclosed in Cogan to Palmerston, London, 3 December 1839.

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modification of the original project of the treaty.¹ Ratifications were exchanged in Muscat on 22 July 1840.²

A commercial treaty with Muscat and a British consul at Zanzibar marked the new importance which Britain attached to East Africa. In 1841 Captain Hamerton was the 'genuine Englishman' appointed, under the political control of Bombay, to serve with consular authority at the Sultan's court.³

The Sultan's power on the coast had become purely nominal. Indeed, the Arab belief that he was supported by Britain, alone enabled him to hold Zanzibar, which, on his death, would undoubtedly be wrested by one of his sons; and since there was a strong pro-French party there the island would no doubt in time seek French assistance.⁴ Thus the African territories of the Sultan—like those of the Portuguese—were retained only by British support. At the same time this weakness was the occasion and cause of international rivalry.

While the Sultan agreed in the event of a British attack on Persia, to counter Russian and Egyptian designs, to place his ports and navy at Britain's disposal, Palmerston instructed the British ambassador in Paris to deliver a protest against the intended French occupation of territory belonging to Britain's ally. Surely the French government would not forcibly take possession of a portion of his territory merely because occupation might be convenient to their interests! To this dispatch the French returned no answer.⁵

In the summer of 1841, when relations with France were considerably strained and British investigations were proceeding to ascertain the extent of French 'aggression' in East African waters,⁶ a change occurred in British policy. Palmerston went out of office, to be succeeded by Aberdeen, who had a profound respect for the French minister, Guizot, and hoped to maintain the peace of the world by remaining on good terms with France. Of

¹ P.R.O. F.O. 54/3, 1c Marchant to Strangways, Whitehall, 27 November 1839.

² P.R.O., F.O. 54/3, Hennel to Reid, Muscat Cove, 24 July 1840.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 54/3, Palmerston to India Board, F.O., 16 March 1840.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 54/4, Report by Hamerton, on the French aggressions on part of the territory of the Imam . . . enclosed in Baring to Canning, India Board, 11 June 1842.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 54/4, Copy No. 40, Palmerston to Granville, F.O., 5 February 1841. See also pencilled note.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 54/4, Extract, Gov.-Gen. of India-in-Council to Secret Committee, 11 January 1841, enclosed in Hobhouse to Palmerston, India Board, 19 March 1841.

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the two ministers, Guizot was the stronger personality and he obtained a considerable ascendancy over Aberdeen.¹ Guizot was determined to extend French dominions, to improve French commerce and to restore France to her former position as a great power in Europe. The effect was immediately felt in East African politics, and the Sultan was soon to realize the change of policy.

In August the British government rejected the Sultan's claim to any part of the island of Madagascar. There was, it was asserted, a material difference between territories that had for a length of time belonged to a sovereign and districts which had only recently tendered their submission, and over which he had never exercised any practical authority.² Although Aberdeen thus evaded supporting the Sultan he nevertheless reminded the British ambassador in Paris that no reply had been received to Palmerston's inquiry and that the British government was at all events interested in obtaining information about what the French were 'doing in that quarter, and in opposing any settlement on their part.'³

Until Palmerston's return to office, British interest was sacrificed to friendship with France. The growing importance of anti-British parties and the ill-will of some of the Sultan's officials towards English merchants proved to be the greatest difficulties confronting British trade. While the appointment of a British consul at Zanzibar soon brought advantages equal to those of the French and Americans,⁴ it soon became evident that the French had the most exaggerated ideas about the profits to be derived from the trade in the dominions of the Sultan, particularly in his African possessions.⁵ And in June 1842 they forced the King of Mayotte, one of the Comoro Islands, to submit to them.⁶

A British interrogation proved of no avail and this was the beginning of French occupation of the Comoro Islands which Britain later recognized. Early in 1843, with the consent of Britain, France was negotiating a commercial treaty with Muscat.⁷

¹ Wozencroft, *The Relations of England and France during the Aberdeen-Guizot Ministries, 1841-6* (Thesis, London), *passim*.

² P.R.O., F.O. 54/4, Draft, Aberdeen to Imam, F.O., 15 August, 1841.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 54/4, No. 6, Aberdeen to Lytton, F.O., 21 September 1841.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 54/4, No. 1, Hamerton to Aberdeen, Bombay, 21 May 1842; Hamerton to Governor of Mauritius (Sir S. Smith), Zanzibar, 17 August 1841; F.O. 54/5, enclosure in Slave Trade correspondence submitted to Parliament, 1842-3.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 54/5, Hamerton to Aberdeen, Zanzibar, 31 August 1843.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 54/4, Extract of dispatch from Col. Stanley to Lord Stanley, Mauritius, 10 June 1842.

⁷ P.R.O., F.O. 54/5, F.O. to Hamerton, 11 July 1845.

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There were two main difficulties. In accordance with treaty stipulations Americans had no right to purchase lands or houses in the Sultan's dominions, but they could trade on that part of the coast forbidden to British merchants. The British, on the other hand, had gained the former privilege. Now the French demanded both.¹ In addition, France wanted the power to establish at Zanzibar, or at any other port—even upon the 'chosen place' of Socotra, over which the Sultan had no power—store-houses and magazines of provisions.²

The French had, in fact, started the same system of treaty-making on the east as on the west coast, of which Palmerston was to complain that the 'French seem to have got considerably the start' of Britain.³ They had been at several of the Sultan's ports on the coast of Africa with money and presents, tampering with the chiefs to induce them to cede the island of Kilwa or to consent to a French settlement on the coast. Private agents had been established almost everywhere. Several of the chiefs, in consternation, rushed to the Sultan, who, though 'terribly frightened', could do nothing.⁴ The British consul, too, was alive to the dangers of the situation. He warned Aberdeen that should the French succeed in their determination to establish factories in the Sultan's ports the influence of the Sultan would in a few years be greatly circumscribed if, indeed, he continued to possess any territory at all.⁵

A strong influence in this French activity was no doubt the increasing difficulty of obtaining slaves, especially since Palmerston's drastic measures in the Portuguese ports. The strong pro-French party in Zanzibar hailed the coming of the French as heralding the re-establishment of the foreign slave trade which had until then to be transacted either from the Portuguese ports or the neighbouring islands. It was at this time that the French revived the slave trade in another form; while a commercial treaty between the Sultan and the French government was under discussion, a convention was signed on 21 April 1843 for the purpose of

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 54/5, Hamerton to Aberdeen, Zanzibar, 14 February 1843.

² P.R.O., F.O. 54/5, Additional articles enclosed, Copy No. 5, Hamerton to Aberdeen, Zanzibar, 31 August 1843.

³ Philpott, *The Origin and Growth of the Protectorate System, with special study of the system as developed in British Colonial History (1800-48)* (Thesis, London), 218.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 54/5, No. 2, Hamerton to Bidwell (Superintendent of the Consular Service), Zanzibar, 27 April 1843.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 54/5, No. 5, Hamerton to Aberdeen, Zanzibar, 31 August 1843.

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procuring 'free labourers' for the French colonies.¹ But slaves were not France's only concern with East Africa.

The extension of legitimate trade and the occupation of strategic points also received much attention, Guizot had publicly announced his policy in the Chamber of Deputies in March 1843. France had no interest in the possession of vast territories; but a network of stations on the strategic and trade routes of the world was of great importance to her, and it was the intention of the government to form by degrees, around the globe, such a network of strong naval stations at points judiciously chosen to further the spread of French commercial influence.²

In 1844 unsuccessful attempts were made to arrange with the Portuguese for the establishment of a French factory in Goa,³ while on 17 November of that year, the proposed commercial treaty was concluded with the Sultan.⁴ France was granted the right of buying, selling and leasing houses or land in the Sultan's dominions and the right of appointing consuls or consular agents to reside there. French agents were allowed to enter 'on their duties' with the exequatur of the sovereign in whose dominions they resided and they enjoyed the rights and privileges of the most-favoured nation. In return certain privileges were granted to the subjects of the Sultan, as well as the right to appoint consuls in the French dominions. The area in which French merchants were allowed to trade remained unsettled.⁵ France, therefore, in addition to the island holdings in East African waters, acquired the beginnings of a foothold in East Africa itself. Undesignedly, perhaps, England by reducing the tariff duties on sugar had increased the French desire for territory in East Africa, which was particularly suited for the growth of this commodity. Indeed, a proposal to this end was made to Mozambique in 1848.⁶

A new chapter had begun in the history of East Africa in which questions of trade, both legitimate and illegitimate, were intimately

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 54/3, Enclosure in No. 2, Hamerton to Bidwell, Zanzibar, 27 April 1843; cf. 271-3.

² C.H.B.F.P., II, 263.

³ A.H.U., Moz., IX, Gov.-Gen. of India to L. C. Girdon d'Orgoni, Goa, 20 July 1844, enclosed in D. F. do Valle to Secretary of State for Naval and Overseas Affairs, Moz., 30 July 1849.

⁴ Ratifications were exchanged on 4 February 1846.

⁵ Hertslet, *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, I, 315; S.P., XXXV, 1011; Martens, *Raccol.* VII, 623.

⁶ A.H.U., Moz., IX, Patec de Rosemont (?) to Colonel da Costa, St. Denis, 5 July 1848.

connected with political considerations. By the 1830s these various factors combined to give East Africa an importance which has never been lost. There was in Europe the increasing tension between England and France, arising out of the situation in the Near East and the consequent imperial rivalry of those powers. In addition, the position was complicated by American intrusion into a region which had hitherto been regarded as a European preserve because of its connection with India. Moreover, Great Britain was committed to an active interest in East Africa so long as the slave trade was continued by other powers. Thus the slave trade crusade, combined with considerations of national prestige and trading advantages, had brought East Africa into the orbit of international politics. It was precisely this intensification of demand from Europe for the products of plantation economies that gave a new impetus to the clandestine slave trade. The growth of 'a just and equitable traffic' predicted by Buxton, the humanitarians and the free traders far from killing the East African slave trade had resulted in an increased outflow.

[4]

AFTER 1845

The great days of the clandestine slave trade on the East coast were in the 1840s and 1850s and particularly after 1860. As the Portuguese trade was forced into the shadows earlier than that of the Arabs statistical information particularly on the Portuguese sector is not only scanty but thoroughly unreliable. It seems clear, however, that certainly until 1860 the numbers of slaves exported from the whole of the East coast never reached the proportions of those from the West coast, where in 1842 the figure was some 130,000 annually.

Each year British treaties and efforts to kill the slave trade multiplied. At the same time, humanitarians and free traders alike believed and assured both Arabs and Portuguese that when the growth of 'a just and equitable traffic' replaced the trade in slaves, any immediate loss caused by abolition would speedily be made good by the expansion of lawful commerce that would follow. If this faith was justified on the northern sector of the West coast, where first palm oil and then cocoa, groundnuts and cotton helped to tide over the change, 'it is clear that the advent of

European merchants with their wares and their demand for legitimate exports did not of itself produce any marked diminution in the slave trade of the Zanzibar and Portuguese coast'.¹ In fact, all the evidence about the East African slave trade in the period under discussion in this study indicates that the growth of legitimate commerce far from replacing the trade in slaves actually stimulated it.² In Zanzibar the struggle over the slave trade spelt the destruction of the Sultan's power and in Mozambique colony the procuring wars helped further to demoralize the people and to sap the strength of Portuguese authority. It was not simply that the Europeans tried to enforce a foreign morality and an alien ethic. While British cruisers were engaged in capturing and often arbitrarily destroying native vessels carrying slaves,³ and many Indians with British nationality in Zanzibar were compelled to manumit thousands of slaves,⁴ British capital and enterprise in Zanzibar were encouraging the slave trade by employing slave labour. Everywhere on the African and Arabian seaboard, British and in some measure probably all Europeans, were discredited among the natives and among the authorities in the Sultan's territory.⁵

Since the 1845 treaty allowed Arab vessels to convey slaves 'coastwise' from one part of the Sultan's territory to another, three-quarters of the trade from Zanzibar continued to be legal. Papers were seldom carried by Arab vessels and the system of passes was open to abuse. Consequently, it was found impossible to distinguish between the legal and illegal trade. Britain was accused of attempting to strengthen the Sultan by conniving at

¹ Alison Smith, unpublished paper, *The Slave Trade and Legitimate Commerce in East Africa in the mid-nineteenth century*.

² I.O.R., P. & S. Memo, B. 150^a, para 93, Lieutenant Colonel Rigby's consular report of 1861 went so far as to say that 'the suppression of the slave trade was a dead letter from the day the treaties with Muscat were concluded', and that 'the revision of the treaty was premature in the absence of a naval force to suppress the Zanzibar slave trade'. Cf. also 227-30.

³ Cf. 238-9.

⁴ I.O.R., P. & S. Memo., B. 150^a, No. I, *Memo on Seward's Despatch of 9 September 1866 relative to the Protest of Sultan of Zanzibar against interference of British cruisers with slave vessels in Zanzibar waters* (printed for use of F.O., 29 October 1869), 341.

⁵ I.O.R., op. cit., para. 106, Playfair to Russel, May 1861; para. 109, cites the case of Messrs Fraser & Co. at Zanzibar submitted to the Advocate-General at Bombay. These British merchants and sugar planters were accused of entering into contracts with Arab owners for the supply of slaves to work on their estates in Zanzibar. But it was held that a treaty of 31 May 1859 gave a right to British subjects in Zanzibar, like Englishmen holding estates in the West Indies and in North America, to purchase and hire slaves and no one had the right to interfere with them.

the carrying of slaves by his subjects.¹ Even after 1845, when the Sultan consented to prohibit this trade during the monsoon season (January to April), the Arabs from the Persian Gulf and Red Sea continued to frequent the Zanzibar coast. Swarms of rough piratical folk mostly from the Hadramaut beleaguered Zanzibar and unless a British ship of war was present they kidnapped slaves and children. Consequently, the Sultan was further discredited in the eyes of his people.²

The margin of profit was so great that a dealer could suffer many losses through death provided he eventually succeeded in selling a moderate percentage of his drove. Slaves bought in East Africa at \$6-\$12 were sold between the Berbera coast and South Central Asia at from \$60 to \$100 or \$200.³ The prices offered by transatlantic slavers off the coast were more than double those of the agents of French planters in Mauritius and Réunion which in turn were higher than those of the 'northern Arabs'.⁴ The trade in slaves became recognized as a distinct traffic and gave employment to about one hundred and fifty vessels.⁵

There were many reasons for the increased demand for slaves. Among these not the least important was the accelerating demand for ivory⁶ and the growing use of slaves in the interior and on the African coast itself. Unlike parts of the West coast, East Africa had no exportable crop which could take the place of slaves. Besides these the most valued export the coast had to offer was ivory, but this depended upon slave portage. As ivory hunting took traders farther and farther into the interior slave hunting became an essential adjunct.⁷ Moreover, ivory and firearms were often paid for in slaves used as currency. Slaves were also needed for field labour and by the rich as concubines, domestic servants

¹ I.O.R., P. & S. Memo., B. 150*, *Memo on Seward's Despatch*.

² I.O.R., op. cit., Buxton to Otway, 23 Upper Brook St., 16 January 1869.

³ I.O.R., op. cit., para. 102.

⁴ McLeod, I, 331; Select Committee, P. P., 1871, xii, 544, quoted by Alison Smith, op. cit.

⁵ I.O.R., op. cit., Brigadier Coghlan's Report of 1860 on Slave Trade, para. 92.

⁶ N. R. Bennett, *Studies in East African History*, Appendix II, gives figures to show the rising price of ivory in the Zanzibar market, 1826-97; cf. also 100-2.

⁷ In 1821 Governor Barboza in Rio de Sena remarked: 'Slaves are a most accommodating export as they not only carry themselves but very often they will not mind helping to carry ivory.' On the other hand, Alison Smith, op. cit., also in H.E.A., 268-9, notes that many slaves were used as porters and these would not have been sold with the ivory at the coast. To pay for ivory, bulky goods—wire, beads and cottons—had to be returned into the interior. If all the slaves were sold at the coast, then who carried back the return cargo? The objection is sustained by the

and soldiers. But even before 1860 there were times when, neither in Portuguese nor in Arab territory, not all the slaves captured could be utilized, a factor which would suggest that the capture of slaves was sometimes a by-product of turmoil rather than a response to a genuine demand. Many were slaughtered, 'and where the tribes were disposed to cannibalism, as in the Congo, they were used as food'.¹

How far the increase in demand for slaves from Portuguese territory was related to that of the ivory trade is not clear. Nor is it certain how this connection tied in with the reasons for the wars along the Zambezi.² McLeod mentions clashes between neighbouring tribes at Delagoa Bay to obtain slave captives and exchange them for European goods.³ More and more, life in the interior was becoming dependent upon economic conditions at the coast. As ivory became dearer, guns and fire-arms, rather than cotton, beads and wire, increasingly influenced the life of Africans. Domestic slavery, particularly in Zanzibar, was said to have become the principal source of the supply of slaves for exportation and it became difficult to distinguish between the domestic trade and 'the real slave trade'.⁴

Many slaves for export at Zanzibar came, as we have seen, from Portuguese territory.⁵ If, however, the expansion of trade in Zanzibar began only after 1835,⁶ undoubtedly the Portuguese Royal Decree of the following year, which further restricted exports of slaves in the south, must have been responsible. There is every indication that the jealous competition of Portuguese officials and their determination not to forfeit their profits was causing an increased number of African traders from Portuguese territory to carry their ivory and to march their slaves to Zanzibar. Arab merchants from Zanzibar were dealing with Portuguese mulatto traders.⁷ Describing this overland African trade a memorandum to the Foreign Office notes that 'it would seem that although the export of slaves from the Portuguese

¹ Alison Smith, op. cit.

² Cf. 274.

³ McLeod, I, 121.

⁴ I.O.R., P. & S. Memo., B. 150^a, Coghlan's Report, 1860.

⁵ Cf. 225, 229.

⁶ Cf. 99-101.

⁷ Livingstone, *African Journal*, I, 11.

fact that there were 'carrying' tribes. Among the Nyamwezi 'to carry one's tusk to the coast was the equivalent of winning one's spurs'. Secondly, most of the slaves came from the Lake Nyasa region and after 1850 the main ivory routes—at least to Kilwa and the northern coast—were generally not the same as the main slave routes.

possessions on the East coast has very considerably decreased, the numbers exported from the Sultan's territory must have considerably augmented'. Rigby remarks that except for the extortions and rapacity of the Portuguese there would be a considerable trade with their ports.¹

To compensate for the northward pull of the African slave trade (to which Rigby referred) it seems the Portuguese tried to obtain slaves from the south. In 1844 Governor Maitland at the Cape reported that the Swedish naturalist, Wahlberg, found that the Portuguese were trying to encourage the Trekkers to supply their slave trade as far as Sofala: a fact which may have accounted for Livingstone's complaint, in July 1843, that the Boers were again stealing the children of natives to make them slaves.² Again in 1846 and 1847 Maitland complained that the Boers at Ohrigstad were supplying 'conquered natives to the slave dealers at Delagoa Bay'.³ A year later Palmerston reiterated these complaints. But the slave trade commissioner at the Cape noted that 'the Boers . . . resort to Delagoa Bay for slaves . . . although some instances are mentioned in which the Portuguese have purchased slaves from the Boers'.⁴

The fact that Palmerston in 1846 requested that Lisbon prevent the Portuguese from supplying the Voortrekkers⁵ shows that the Portuguese supply was by no means dependent upon the Boers. During those years the Yao had become primarily slave traders. In addition to the African traders, who no doubt were the main source of supply, Portuguese *sertanejos*, mulatto traders or their agents, as we know, journeyed far into the interior and had contact with *mambari* (native agents of white traders) in Barotseland and elsewhere for slaves.⁶ Certainly, despite the leakage of

¹ I.O.R., P. & S. Memo., B. 150*, Memo on Seward's Dispatch of 1866, op. cit.; op. cit., Rigby to Charles Wood (India Board, London), British Consulate, Zanzibar, 1 May 1860.

² Muller, 257; Livingstone's writings about the Boers created the false impression that they 'flagrantly violated human rights and Christian principles', cf. I. Schapera, 'Livingstone and the Boers', *Journal of the Royal African Society*, vol. 59, No. 234, January 1960, 144-56. For further proof of Livingstone's attitude towards the Boers, cf. *African Journal*, II, 464, 467.

³ C.O. 1452, No. 110, quoted by Muller, 283.

⁴ Muller, 284. ⁵ Muller, 283.

⁶ Livingstone, *African Journal*, I, 11 and *Private Journals* 1851-3, 37, 131, 227. Natives from Bié and vicinity, whom Dr. J. T. Tucker believes were either 'slaves or descendants of slaves', were known as *mambari* and acted as agents for white traders, cf. *Africa*, vol. 26 (1956), 187. For a description of the Barotse, cf. J. D. Clark, *Trade and Travel in Early Barotseland* (London, 1963), 1-3.

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trade to Zanzibar, there are numerous indications particularly after 1860 that the slave trade in and with the Portuguese possessions continued to be extensive.¹

In the twenty years after 1835 the population of Zanzibar doubled and the import of slaves more than trebled. The export thither from Kilwa for the two years 1848-50 was between ten and twelve thousand.² Rigby in 1860 noted that the tribes opposite the Zanzibar coast, which formerly furnished most of the slaves, 'are now exhausted, only 4,000 having been brought from there during the previous year'. The remaining fifteen thousand, he said, came from the neighbourhood of the great Lake of Nyasa about forty days journey inland, south of Kilwa. During the next eight years, it was particularly noted that these imports to Zanzibar 'far exceeded the numbers taken to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Arabia'.³ Zanzibar Island as a central slave dépôt was particularly preferred; escape was impossible and many agents for the export trade, particularly to Arabia, lived there.

Several French, American and Hamburg mercantile houses were established at Zanzibar and by 1856-7 imports were higher than for Aden or Karachi, chief port of Sind, while exports, too, were higher than from Aden. Copper from Zanzibar was exported to Cutch. It is interesting to note, however, that even as late as 1860 there was still very little, if any, direct trade between Great Britain and Zanzibar or Portuguese East Africa. Although the chief part of imports from India, Singapore and Hamburg consisted of articles of British manufacture 'the whole of the foreign trade was conducted by British Indians of whom at Zanzibar there were some 5,000'.⁴ At Tete in 1856 Livingstone notes that clothing was fairly dear 'as it all comes from England to India (Bombay) and thence to Mozambique in small vessels'.⁵ The ivory from the interior was consigned to Indians and they purchased the entire cargoes of American and Hamburg vessels. These Indians were

¹ I.O.R., P. & S. Memo., B. 150^a, Rigby to Charles Wood (India Board), British Consulate, Zanzibar, 1 May 1860; Buxton to Otway, 23 Upper Brook Str., 16 January 1869.

² Alison Smith, *op. cit.*

³ I.O.R., *op. cit.*, para. 114. Slave Trade statistics by Churchill, 4 March 1868, noted that in the five years 1863-8, 100,000 registered slaves were exported from Kilwa and more than 76,000 of these were taken to Zanzibar; I.O.R., *op. cit.*, Egerton to Merivale, F.O., 8 January 1860.

⁴ I.O.R., *Secret Letters Received*, vol. 37, Letters and Enclosures from Aden to Zanzibar, Rigby to Charles Wood (India Board), Zanzibar, May 1860.

⁵ Livingstone, *Family Letters, 1849-56* (London, 1959), II, 283.

the only shopkeepers and artisans and had settlements at all the East coast towns, at the Comoro Islands and on the West coast of Madagascar, and they obtained possession from Arabs by purchase or mortgage of many landed estates at Zanzibar.¹

At least until the sixties the most important increase in the demand for East African slaves came from across the ocean. Between 1840 and 1850 the main 'pull' was still undoubtedly the export trade to Cuba and Brazil. In 1846 Britain's abolition of sugar preferences helped to stimulate the Brazilian economy at the expense of Mauritius.² Between 1846 and 1849 Brazil imported an annual average of sixty thousand slaves from the East African coast as against twenty-two thousand in the years 1842-5.³ The main Brazilian importers had agents in Mozambique, where in 1844-5 the amount of shipping indicates an export of some six thousand. During the next four or five years the estimates by the Slave Trade Commissioners at the Cape of Good Hope were round about ten thousand slaves from Mozambique per annum.⁴

Slaves in their thousands were also carried to the Turkish ports in the Red Sea and to the Persian Gulf.⁵ In 1847 the political agent at Zanzibar remarked that 'the whole of the gulf traders do not take slaves from Berbera. Many, after disposing of their dates, proceed to Zanzibar and there purchase slaves at a much cheaper rate, though they are not so highly prized.'⁶

After Palmerston's determined offensive and the 1845 agreement with Muscat which came into force on 1 January 1847,⁷ the attention of British cruisers was directed chiefly to preventing European slavers from supplying Brazil and Cuba. Comparatively few native vessels engaged in supplying the northern Asian

¹ I.O.R., *Secret Letters Received*, Rigby to Charles Wood, loc. cit.

² McLeod, II, 148.

³ Annual Reports to Foreign Office by the Slave Trade Commissioners in Brazil, quoted by Alison Smith in unpublished paper *The Slave Trade and Legitimate Commerce in East Africa in the mid-nineteenth century*.

⁴ Alison Smith, unpublished paper *The Pattern of the East African Slave Trade 1840-70*, London, 22 June 1955.

⁵ I.O.R., *Secret Letters Received*, vol. 40, Letters from Aden. True copy, Brig. W. M. Coghlan, Political Resident and Commandant, Aden, to Hon. H. L. Anderson, Chief Secr. to Government, Bombay, Aden 18, May 1863.

⁶ I.O.R., *Secret Letters Received*, vol. 29, Letters from Aden, 1846-7, Stafford B. Haines, Captain Indian Navy and Political agent at Aden to Arthur Malet, Chief Secretary to Government of Bombay, Aden, 15 December 1847.

⁷ Cf. 272.

markets were captured. But as the transatlantic demand decreased the slave traffic in native vessels considerably increased. The numbers exported from the whole coast were variously estimated by different authorities at from thirty to forty thousand annually. These came from Zanzibar and the Portuguese territories; the greater portion was derived from the territories of the Sultan, and it was particularly emphasized that, as duty was paid on every slave landed at Zanzibar, these figures were not exaggerated. Two-thirds of these slaves were said to be destined for the Red Sea and Persian Gulf markets. Six to eight thousand remained in the island of Zanzibar and presumably were employed on the plantations there. The balance found their way to Madagascar, the Comoro Islands and indirectly to the French possessions in the Indian Ocean under the name of free labourers.¹

Further indication of the increased slave trade in the Portuguese sector of the coast during this period is to be found in the procuring wars of the Zambesi region. These began about 1849, probably in response to the French *engage* 'system' and also to the sharp demand from Brazil that followed the British abolition of sugar preferences. It remains to be ascertained how far inland these wars penetrated, whether raiders from the West coast participated, how far Zanzibar shared in the profits on sea and on land, what part the pull of trade to Zanzibar and the increased demand from across the ocean for ivory played in the feuds and how the general characteristics of the wars compare with and are related to the violence and rapine after the 1870s, in the area hinging on Zanzibar. Certainly it is interesting to note that while Portuguese slave smuggling to Christian nations is generally assumed to have ended about 1860 the wars in the Zambesi region continued until 1888. This confirms that the growth and most significant effects of the East coast trade came much later than 1860 and persisted much longer than for the continent in general.

Even allowing for the fact that at the coast the expectation of life of a slave was three to four years and that many died on the transatlantic voyage since the horrors of the 'middle passage' were even greater for ships from the East than from the West coast, the export trade cannot account for the numbers of

¹ L.O.R., P. & S. Memo., B. 150^a, Memo. on Seward's dispatch of 9 September 1866; cf. also 271-2.

slaves who were annually reaching the East African littoral in the middle of the nineteenth century. The inference, according to one authority, is that even before 1860—after which time long-distance exports by sea were very largely curtailed—‘a considerable, and increasing proportion of them [slaves] were absorbed on that coast itself; . . . and that this development of the coastal economy in turn is due to intensification of contact with Europe’.¹

With the development of tropical plantations East African slave labour became essential to meet the rising demands of richer and bigger populations. Along the African coast an increased demand for ivory and slaves was promoted by economic development in Egypt and the Northern Sudan, plantations in Madagascar and the French islands, sugar plantations in Kenya, cloves in Pemba and Zanzibar and later agricultural development in Mozambique. But in Mozambique except for the officials and their collaborators who could divide and guard their ‘nefarious gains’, the increased demand after 1845, at least until 1856, appears to have stimulated war and turmoil, poverty and misery rather than wealth and economic advancement. All this despite many schemes for mineral and agricultural development, the abolition of the slave trade and slavery, the propagation of the faith and the promotion of civilization.²

Driven eastward by the British measures of suppression in the West,³ Portuguese, Spanish, American and French⁴ ships came for slaves. For the transatlantic trade Britain and America supplied most of the merchandise, America most of the ships and the Swahili, Arabs or Portuguese half-castes and the Banians the greater part of the slaves. But with this difference: the British government, it seems, did not know until the late thirties that goods were manufactured either expressly or indirectly for this trade, while the Americans openly specialized in the building of slave ships—Baltimore had become famous for the speed of its seaworthy

¹ Alison Smith, unpublished paper, *The Significance of the East African Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century*.

² Cf. 234–5, 302–3. Livingstone, *African Journal*, II, 429; Wallis, *The Zambezi Expedition*, 341; Livingstone claimed that a few Portuguese, ‘chiefly of the military class’ reap all the gain from trade and effectually prevent the development by foreign enterprise of the country’s other resources.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/698, Parker to Palmerston, Hampstead, 18 February 1848; Botelho, II, 163.

⁴ B.M., Add. MSS. 41265, f. 7, Farquhar to Hastings, Port Louis, 11 May 1821. French slaves came from France as well as from Réunion.

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clippers'—and the Portuguese, Swahili, Arabs and Banians, many of whom were British subjects, made no secret of filling them with slaves.

The Swahili, Arab or the Portuguese half-castes on the shores of Lake Nyasa, like the *prazo*-holders along the Zambezi, 'cared little whether the human beings he collected ended up as "free" labour on the French plantations of Réunion; were merged in the vast multi-racial melting pot of Brazil; absorbed into Arab or Persian harems on the shores of the Persian Gulf; or found their way into the social structure of a tribe in the African interior. The different political factors which affected these various destinations concerned him primarily as a man of business, directing his wares to the most profitable market'.² This was, of course, also true of the Banians who, often in Portuguese as always in Zanzibari territory, were the financial backbone of the trade. As we have seen, even before the 1840s there were Indian agents stationed on the Mozambique coast, as well as north of Cape Delgado. The main Brazilian importers also had agents in Mozambique.

Slaves were purchased from native dealers for cotton textiles manufactured specially for this purpose in Lancashire, Glasgow and Leeds.³ The extent to which British manufacturers were profiting by the trade, which their government was zealously trying to suppress, was revealed by the inquiries of the Select Committee on the West coast in 1842.⁴ Then it was pointed out that if English merchants were prevented from exporting this merchandise to Africa, the only result would be the enrichment of their rivals who would not scruple to supply the wants of slavers. It was impossible to differentiate at the time of manufacture between goods intended for the purchase of slaves and those to be exchanged for other commodities. Slaves were both a commodity acceptable to the European merchant and the only medium of exchange by which the native dealer could obtain the overseas goods he desired. The resident European merchants on the African coast or the Banian and Arab

² Mathieson, op. cit., 24; Duignan and Clendenen, *The United States and the African Slave Trade, 1619-1862*, 36.

³ Alison Smith, *The Pattern...*, 1, 3, 4. For reasons why some of the tribes did or did not seek to acquire slaves, cf. L. H. Gann, 'The End of the Slave Trade in British Central Africa, 1889-1912', *Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Journal*, 1954, and *The Birth of a Plural Society*, (Manchester, 1958) 66, 70-2.

⁴ Biker, XXVIII, 489, Sabrose to de Walden, Lisbon, 11 September 1839.

⁴ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1842, XI, xvii-xxi, Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Settlements on the West coast of Africa.

importers from India received the goods from England and sold them to the slave trader, who in turn exchanged them for the human cargo. These goods, bought on credit by slave contrabandists, also reached East Africa from Cuba and Rio de Janeiro in the very ships which were to return with slaves,¹ and from the West coast by overland routes. This traffic across the continent is vouched for by the presence of West Africans among the slaves shipped from the East coast, as well as by merchandise, manufactured in England exclusively for the West coast and known not to have been delivered by sea, always being obtainable in Mozambique.² How far the Portuguese ever participated in these 'caravan expeditions', which they often financed into the interior, is unknown, but if they did Portugal's diplomats appear to have failed to utilize the fact in their arguments concerning claims to territory. However, it is generally recorded that Silva Pôrto, in the 1850's, was the first Portuguese to cross Africa from west to east.³

In this mid-century co-operation much of what Captain Owen reported in 1824 still held good. In 1822 as in 1845 and in the late 1850s the treaty with Muscat checked the trade north of the equator only to push it farther south. Foreign slavers from Mauritius and Réunion as well as the Portuguese ceased to traffic openly to Zanzibar and Kilwa and the trade took a new direction.

Using Mizirabty (Misrinbathy), Mikindamgar (Mikindani), and Lindi as rendezvous slavers waited at these islands, whence slaves could not run away, for Arab *chalingas* bringing cargoes from Kilwa or Zanzibar. As the British increased their pressure upon the Portuguese the trade fell almost entirely into the hands of Arabs who later easily obtained French registers at Nossi-Bé and Mayotte, and almost every dhow sailed under a French flag.⁴ They carried on traffic in cargoes of slaves between those northerly places to and from Mozambique and Bembatook (Bembetoke)

¹ This practice was necessarily discontinued when the ships became liable to capture on the voyage out, and it then became usual to obtain goods as well as slaves on the coast; cf. Mathieson, 64.

² P.R.O., F.O. 63/698, Parker to Palmerston, Hampstead, 18 February 1848.

³ Antonio Francisco Ferreira da Silva Pôrto (1817-90) was a trader from Angola. Some reference to his travels is made in Livingstone, *African Journal*, I, II etc., and *Missionary Travels*, 217n. cf. also 307. 1 (articles by Machado de Faria e Hacia and Paul Barré).

⁴ I.O.R., P. & S. Memo B. 150^a, 83, para. 99, Coghlan's Report 97, para. 114, Slave Trade Statistics by Churchill, 101, para. 122, Report by Captain Mears.

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in return for the supply of provisions.¹ Still in 1856 Arab vessels from the Comoro Islands fetched slaves at the port of Bembatooka, and by this route many of the slaves formerly procured by the French were brought to Madagascar's west coast.² The southward veering of the traffic seems partly to be accounted for by the fact that the main source of slaves was in the neighbourhood of Lake Nyasa and 'could indifferently "drain" into either Portuguese or Zanzibar territory'.³ Captain Owen seems to have confirmed this when he noted that, by 1824, the Arab and Swahili trade with Europeans was 'almost entirely confined to the ports of Ibo, Mozambique and Bembatooka' except that the Spaniards of Manilla 'tried by a more direct process in large ships' and 'had some success'. But he also indicates that the northern trade was by no means dead.

The only places where slaves are called for export [he says] are Patta (Pate), Lamoo (Lamu), Mombas (Mombasa), Zanzibar, Monfeea (Mafia), Mikindany, Mizrinbathy. All these places are north of Cape Delgado; south of that the only places of collection are Qibo (Ibo), Mozambique, Kilimane, Inyamban (Inhambane) and Delagoa.

He explained that the Arabs carried on the trade with the interior and brought many slaves from the different 'tribes of Galla'; that the Malagash finding slaves so valuable, undertook the equipment of immense fleets to seize the victims 'at the fountain head like the goose and the golden eggs of the fable'. The horrors and miseries occasioned by their devastations were tremendous. They ravaged the whole coast from Querimba to Mafia and also visited Johanna in the Comoro Islands. They destroyed the fruit trees and villages, collected the Bantu in masses and in one expedition are said to have taken three thousand living captives from Mafia alone; that besides the sale by Arabs of slaves to Europeans, 'swarms' were annually sent to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf crammed in the smallest craft so that not half ever arrived at their destination; that 'this part of the traffic was no less inhuman than the other'. He estimated that Christian and Mahomedan markets took off not less than one hundred thousand

¹ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Leven*, 8 March 1824.

² P.R.O., F.O. 84/1008, Nolloth to Trotter, H.M.S. *Frolic*, Simon's Bay, 27 December 1856.

³ Smith, *The Pattern . . . 1840-70*.

annually and that for this number of living slaves the expense of lives for that part of Africa was near half a million.¹ Later it frequently happened that by trick or force, whole villages of people on the coasts were swept off to supply the 'imperial' demands of the slave dealers.²

By the middle of the century large inland dépôts in Mozambique province were kept in constant readiness. Communications between them and the coast were well established by means of signals so that slaves could be taken to any part at shortest notice. The neighbourhood of Quelimane became the central point of the trade. For 200 miles to the North-East and as far South-West, the coast was low and swampy, broken only by rivers, chiefly the mouths of the Zambesi, intersecting the country towards the sea in every possible direction. Most of the rivers were navigable for some miles by vessels of the size generally used in the trade and the densely wooded banks concealed them from observation. Numerous creeks, inlets, lagoons and islands afforded excellent shelter for Asian craft which collected the slaves from considerable distances and embarked them, often without landing, on to a slaver at the agreed rendezvous.³ Northward of the town of Mozambique there were also good harbours and across the channel no coast could have been more convenient than Madagascar where ships sometimes anchored for weeks.

Since the number of cruisers Britain employed was very limited, naval patrols could not visit so vast a coast except at long intervals. Consequently, slavers frequently eluded their vigilance by taking passage northward of Madagascar or among the islands off the eastern coast.

Even as early as 1823 few European slavers ventured on the coast trade as it was risky for them to spend more than a few hours at any one spot, except when it was known that no naval patrol was in the vicinity. If a British cruiser appeared the slaver stood out to sea and ran up French, Spanish or, more frequently, American colours. Many ships trading from Spain were French-owned and provided with two sets of papers and flags.⁴ Their trade

¹ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Leven*, 8 March 1824. For details of the 'northern trade' which in the 1850s again centred on Lamu, cf. Smith, op. cit.

² Biker, XXVIII, 489, Sabrosa to de Walden, Lisbon, 11 September 1839.

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Leven*, at sea, 8 March 1824; F.O. 63/843 No. 8, Livingstone to Malmesbury, steamer Pearl, Zambesi, 22 July 1858.

⁴ Russell, 137; McLeod, I, 328.

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was chiefly to Mauritius and Bourbon, for even after the former became a British possession the population was chiefly French, and there was such an understanding with slave traders in Bourbon that it was extremely difficult at times to know, till a vessel had been carried to a Court of Admiralty, to which island it belonged.¹

The progress made by British naval watchfulness against the slave trade twenty-four years after Owen's expedition, is shown by the words of Lieutenant Burrows of H.M.S. *Excellent*. Writing in 1847 he notes:

The Governor General of the Portuguese settlement still resides at the town of Mozambique (as its inhabitants still call it, though it has long lost any claims to such distinction) and here slaving is no longer carried on, or if at all, only indirectly, but the other five ports, Ibo, Quelimane, Inhamban, Sofala and Delagoa Bay are all more or less connected with it and if a Governor General were to be ever so much inclined to suppress it his influence would be very little felt.²

From this description it is clear that, except for new subterfuges and a worsening of circumstances at Mozambique—whence the trade was driven to the subordinate posts—the conditions in the trade had remained much as described in 1824.

American slavers were often old whalers bought at Rio de Janeiro or ships disguised as whalers. They carried a proper quantity of whale boats, the usual whaling apparatus and a great quantity of water equally required for either service. If boarded everything was arranged as if the crew were really whale hunting; an absent boat, loading slaves up a river, was said to be chasing whales; there were two sets of papers, one American and one Brazilian and also a crew of each nation, the Brazilians making the outward passage as passengers and afterwards landing the Americans to be taken up by some of their own ships at one of the Portuguese ports to navigate the ship back with the slaves.³

The Brazilian brig *Triumfante*, which in November 1845 put in to Quelimane ostensibly because of a leak, showed up another interesting subterfuge. Her passport was for 'Goa, touching at the

¹ P.R.O., Ad. 1/69, Nourse to Croker, H.M.S. *Andromache*, at sea in the Mozambique channel, 15 December 1823.

² R.H., MSS.Afr., x. 7. Notes by Burrows, op. cit. The main ports of shipment were probably Ibo, Angoche and Quelimane, and for the Arab sector, Kilwa.

³ *Ibid.*

ports of Africa'. But as the Portuguese law obliged all vessels trading at the Eastern ports to go first to Mozambique, the seat of government, the leak was used as a plea for remaining at Quelimane where the brig was under Portuguese protection and could not be searched by the English who had to observe the greatest delicacy towards the Portuguese government, and to combat effectively the bribery and intimidation exercised at the town by the captain and his agents.

The English knew that the brig would probably wait for a good opportunity to escape with a cargo of slaves, or if too well watched, land her slave equipment, face investigation and then make another attempt at a better opportunity. Even when the Governor was at length induced to order her out of the river, and she was boarded and thoroughly searched nothing was found to prove that the leak was a trick or that she had any connection with the slave trade. A slight irregularity in her papers, however, enabled her to be sent to the Cape.

After a long and tedious trial the brig was condemned by the Vice-Admiralty Court chiefly on circumstantial evidence. On breaking her up the truth came out. She was an experimental ship. A movable plank concealed a plug prepared at Rio by which water could be let into the hold. The slaves were to have been stowed in her hold instead of on deck, the casks of spirits which formed the greater part of her cargo were to have been used as water casks and a quantity of crockery was carried to be used instead of buckets for feeding.¹

The French trade known as the free labour 'system' was not officially recognized in Mozambique until 1854 at which time an added impetus seems to have been given to the wars along the Zambezi. But it is clear that, long before, many 'labourers' were supplied by the Portuguese. In fact, *Ecç* in his account of the Zambezi war of 1849 indicates that this was the main demand which the Zambezi bandits were supplying.² Slaves were purchased to be indentured as free labourers, known as *émigrés*, *travailleurs*, *cultivateurs* or *engagés*.³ Every vessel authorized to import *émigrés* was fitted out with ample rations and carried a military officer, whose duty it was to witness the legality and voluntary nature of

¹ R.H., MSS. Afr. z. 7, *Notes on Mozambique enclosed in a letter to the editor of the United Service Journal*, from M. Burrows, H.M.S. *Excellent*, 2 April 1847.

² *Ecç*, I, 320-45.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 84/1003, Nolloth to Trotter, H.M.S. *Frelis*, Simon's Bay, 27 December 1855, enclosed in Trotter to Admiralty, Simon's Bay, 2 January 1856.

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the agreements made with the Negroes, who were collected by Arabs at places distant two or three months' journey into the interior. Once on board the French ship the Negroes were treated with kindness and well fed, as it was in the interest of the captain to land his cargo in good condition. Upon arrival at Bourbon the slaves (now called free labourers) were immediately vaccinated and the sick placed in hospital at the expense of the captain or importer; the remainder, after passing fourteen days quarantine, were hired to sugar-planters for a term of five years. At the end of their service they should have been returned to their own country at the expense of the original importer, but this very rarely happened. Generally, they were taken into service at about 14s.-16s. a month and their keep.¹

Some vessels engaged in this traffic proceeded to Nossi-Bé or the Comoro Islands for their cargoes. Here they communicated with the Arab merchants who sent their dhows to the coast of Africa to obtain slaves. These dhows were from 20 to 50 tons, generally without decks, and as they knew that they were liable to be seized by British cruisers if they had mats, provisions or any extra cooking apparatus on board, they took nothing more than what was actually necessary for their own crews. In Africa slaves were bought or kidnapped. During the voyage they received just sufficient water and uncooked rice or beans to keep them alive, were left day and night without covering and if on arriving at their destination the French ship was retarded their sufferings were much increased. When at last they got on board the sudden change to an ample diet produced sickness and sometimes death.² This system had been taken over from the English. The French at St. Marie, Madagascar, had started the practice as early as 1828,³ but the trade appears to have assumed its largest proportions after 1848, one year subsequent to the date on which an agreement for the suppression of the slave trade (signed by the Sultan at Zanzibar on 2 October 1845)⁴ came into effect.

The general emancipation enacted by the Provisional government in France in May 1848, after the fall of Louis Philippe, further increased this trade. It did more. It changed the isle of

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 84/1019, *Memo on the (so called) Free Labour Emigration as carried on under the French flag between the East Coast of Africa, including the islands of Madagascar, and Réunion, or Bourbon*, enclosed in McLeod to Clarendon, Moz., 1 December 1857.

² *Ibid.*

³ P.R.O., Ad. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, H.M.S. *Leven*, Port Choiseul, 8 August 1824.

⁴ Hertslet, *Commercial Treaties*, VII, 818.

Bourbon's name to Réunion and a commission was appointed to examine the introduction of greater numbers of 'free workers'.¹ A proposal was made to Mozambique for a regular 'exchange business'. Slaves, oxen, pigs, goats, corn and other supplies were to be obtained in return for money or manufactured articles.² The introduction of free workers from Asia and Africa was indeed regarded as the only means of saving the French colony from economic ruin. Chinese labourers had been tried, but with unsatisfactory results. Indian workers had generally satisfied employers when they had been actual peasants and not vagabonds enrolled from the streets of large Indian towns, but they were much more expensive than Africans.

There were other advantages in obtaining Negroes from East Africa. The distance was shorter and Africans were generally found to be stronger and considered better suited for the 'hard work of farming'. They could be engaged for a longer period and at a smaller wage than Indians. Maize and manioc, produced in the country, could be used as food, whereas Indians insisted on rice which had to be brought in from abroad to the detriment of the 'colonial fortunes'. Most important was the probability that if the Negroes were made to realize that their return to Africa would merely result in being again enslaved they would settle on the island. In this way the expense of returning them to their native haunts would be saved and Réunion would benefit from the 'fruits of their saving'—assuming they made any. Indians, on the other hand, would insist on being returned and hoard their earnings to take back to their country and thus 'rob' the colony. At the same time it was thought necessary to employ a certain number of Indians. Varying the source and race of workers diminished the chance of labour unions and increased the possibility of the maintenance of tranquility and continuity of work.³ It was difficult for the British to prevent such transactions under the French system, for any regulation prohibiting the reception of the *émigrés* from these inveterate slavers could be easily evaded by collusion with the native chiefs.⁴

In Mozambique, attached as the inhabitants were to the slave

¹ Martens, *Recueil*, XII, 86.

² A.H.U., Moz., IX, Patec de Rosement (?) to Colonel da Costa, St. Denis, 5 July 1848.

³ Ibid.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 84/1008, Nolloth to Trotter, H.M.S. *Frelis*, Simon's Bay, 27 December 1855, enclosed in Trotter to Admiralty, Simon's Bay, 2 January 1856.

trade, the majority gained if anything only a small share in the profits of the clandestine trade. Portuguese officials jealously excluded from the trade all residents except the most influential who could assist them elsewhere along the coast or in Lisbon. For it will be remembered that participation in the slave trade was regarded as a grant, a compensation in lieu of inadequate salaries; therefore, if there were to be any trade in slaves, should not the local inhabitants supply the officials who had to shoulder the blame? Spoils there were still, but these as always enriched chiefly the officials in charge of the customs and their collaborators, the crafty Asian importer or financier, some Bantu chiefs and those merchants or *prazeros* who fetched or had the slaves fetched for them. Farther north Arab merchant princes, like Tippu Tip, set up their own states. But for the *prazeros* to bid unequivocally for political power was unnecessary since the Portuguese officials worked with them. Thus many a Portuguese mulatto or *nouveau riche* adventurer displaced a tribal chief, demanded allegiance from the Africans and lived as one of them,¹ while at the same time holding an official post. The most notorious of these lived in the Rivers of Sena and were descendants of two well-known families—that of Lacerda's guide, Gonçalo Pereira, and that of Antonio da Cruz, the traitor shown in the chapter on the Portuguese possessions to have been responsible in 1807 for Governor Truão's death.

The wars of these two families, which started in 1849 and continued until 1888, are regarded by the Portuguese as the most humiliating and painful in the history of East Africa since they endangered Portugal's sovereignty in the treasured region of the Zambesi. Only the first part of this period is germane to this study. The degradation, misery and despair which the conflicts reveal are a commentary upon every racial group whether Portuguese, African, Arab, Swahili or Indian; none could resist the temptations of wealth and aggrandisement and all were caught up in the clandestine slave trade and the spoils system. Duty and principle, the defence of tribe and country were surrendered to profit.² The words of C. V. Wedgewood, in describing the

¹ Eça, II, 25; Belchior, an ex-soldier of the Portuguese Army, married the sister of a half-breed chief below Tete and by the 1860s was living near the Lupata Gorge and raiding the Nyanja tribe on the Shire for slaves, cf. *The Zambesi Papers of Richard Thornton*, 48 n.

² The place of these wars in the history of East Africa has never been thoroughly investigated. The present version is condensed from Eça, I, *passim*, who seems to

'Thirty Years War, seem appropriate also in this context: 'The dismal course of the conflict', which dragged on from one decade to the next, 'is an object lesson on the dangers and disasters which can arise when men of narrow hearts and little minds are in high places'.

Antonio José da Cruz's natural son, known as Joaquim José da Cruz, was a gift from his African allies for his treason against Governor Truão in 1807. Joaquim's mother was the sister of the Monomotapa Chofoombo (or Chaufombo) who, at Antonio's instigation, had put the Governor Truão to death.

Joaquim was at first known as the Bamba, the name of his aunt's estate about 5 miles above Tete, where he was reared. About 1844 the military Governor of Tete, Major Tito Augusto d'Araujo Sicard, installed him in the *prazo* of Massangano on the ground that strategically and commercially this estate was well placed to act as a fortress against native invaders and to keep open the navigation of the river above the Lupato. No doubt Sicard's unofficial trading activities needed an accomplice at this spot!¹ But no sooner had the Bamba secured this well-fortified stockade on the right bank of the Zambesi immediately below the confluence of the Luenha² than he refused to pay taxes and with his garrison of some four hundred loyal retainers adopted and justified his native name of Nyaude or Inbaude—the human spider.

The hatred and reprisals of the Nyaude were provoked by Pedro III—the Kisaka, Quissaca or Chissaca Maturi, the destroyer—the third generation of Pereiras to make a mark on the history of Mozambique. Kisaka had inherited the wealth and the dominion acquired by trade and war built up by many of his family. His uncle Manoel was the Pereira who had visited Kazembe in 1796.

¹ Eça, I; 192–4, 216–17, 240–2, 239–40. Sicard (b. 1818–d. 1864) was a regular army officer from Portugal.

² Lat. 16. 24 S., long. 33. 47 E.; Eça I, 208, 216–20; Botelho, *Historia*, II, 190–1; Livingstone, *African Journal*, II, 459. 3.

be mainly concerned to apportion blame between the da Cruz and the Pereira families. According to Livingstone, 'The slave trade to Brazil was the primary and sole cause' of the falling off of the revenue in the Portuguese possessions. This, he claimed, 'effected such a depopulation of the country as completely to destroy the power the Portuguese possessed by means of armed slaves and retainers'. This state of weakness encouraged the rebellion of certain half-caste Asiatic Portuguese 'who harboured fugitive slaves and held crown lands in defiance of the Government'. Cf. Wallin, *Zambezzi Expedition of David Livingstone*, 340.

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His trader grandfather Gonçalo—*Dombo Dombo*, the Terror—of Indo-Portuguese origin and feared and respected by the Maravi north of Tete,¹ had, as we have seen, been one of the more enterprising traders. For his services Laçerda, before discovering his true nature,² had granted him an estate.³ Pedro's father—*Choutama* or *Chavatama*, the secret one—had started his freebooting career about 1841, terrorized Tete, forced the inhabitants to send cloth to the interior to exchange for ivory and slaves, invaded the lands of at least one of the government's native allies⁴ and robbed the *prazeros*, Maravi, Bisa and others, of gold, cattle, ivory and slaves.⁵

The Kisaka and the Nyaude each had his following among the people and officials of Tete and of Quelimane who provided cloth, arms and powder. Each hunted slaves for clandestine exportation. The Kisaka even had 'a special price for blacks at the end of the season'.⁶

In 1849, alleging that the da Cruz family were responsible for the death of his father, Kisaka invaded their Crown *prazos* on the left bank of the Zambesi—from Lupato Gorge to Zumbo—carrying all before him by the terror of his name.⁷ The Nyaude appealed to a new military commander of Tete, Captain Marcus Aurélio Rodrigues de Cárdenas, who raised a subscription to pay Portugal's native allies,⁸ and counting on Quelimane went to the help of Nyaude. But poor leadership and a failure of promises resulted in a Kisaka victory and a demand for concession of territory and hostages.

In 1852 and 1853 the native armies of Nyaude and Kisaka, reinforced by those of native allies, claimed fees for right of passage

¹ Eça, I, 249; Botelho, *Historia*, II, 185–6; cf., 94, 96. ² Burton, 94.

³ With the title of Head Captain of Mixongo, cf. Eça, I, 250.

⁴ The Maravi chief, Bivi.

⁵ Eça, I, 251–2. A small expedition against the Choutama sent by the military commander of Tete was beaten on 8 May 1841. The defeat was avenged 23 March 1842, but the rebel continued his thefts. When, in 1843, a new more powerful expedition set off, the Choutama pretended submission and protested faithfulness to the Crown while continuing to terrorize Tete.

⁶ Eça, I, 278, 252–6.

⁷ Eça, I, 254–5. The district 'commonly known as Chisaka seems to have extended some 60 leagues north of Tete' (cf. map 3, *The Zambesi Valley*), cf. Livingstone, *African Journal*, II, 435. 1; Bordalo, *Mozambique*, 223.

⁸ Eça I, 256–9, 323. The chief Chibica and the Monomotapa Catruza or Katuruza, Mwene-Mutapa XXIV, who ruled c. 1835–68 on the Zambesi close to Tete and 'was always being opposed by his enemies', cf. Livingstone, *African Journal*, II, 445. 2.

on the river from Sena and Quelimane, roamed the countryside, killing trade, stopping official messengers and plundering at will. For four months the Kisaka (now known as an autonomous sovereign king of Macanga and Maravia) and his ally, Chimpampata, King of Barué, interdicted river traffic from Sena which was only resumed after the Nyaude's military intervention as agent of the government.¹ Simultaneously, an independent chief associated with the Kisaka invaded a Crown *pazo* while the Landeens (Zulus) annually visited Sena for plunder or tribute.²

Later in 1853 Kisaka besieged Nyaude at Massangano, but by intrigue and desperate ruses the besiegers were repulsed. The victors immediately began reprisals against allies and followers of the Kisaka who retorted by putting a price of ivory on the Nyaude's head. The Governor of Tete, like the officials in Quelimane and Mozambique played a double game, changed sides or watered down requests for help and reports to Lisbon and Goa to suit themselves.³

Meanwhile, other bandits took advantage of the anarchy and the weakness of the government and entered the fray, nominally seeking to secure the award for the Nyaude's head, but ready to enrich themselves by any means fair or foul. Among these probably the most notorious were Antonio José da Cruz Coimbra, associated with Indian merchants, bandits and armed natives,⁴ and, in league with him, his celebrated brother-in-law of the Shire region, Mariano Francisco Vaz dos Anjos. Their bands of collaborators sought slaves among the pacific tribes of the north east and certainly as far afield as Katanga;⁵ these were sold and embarked from Quelimane as *engagés* for Réunion.⁶

¹ Eça, I., 272-4, 293.

² Livingstone, *African Journal*, II, 461.

³ Eça I., 278-304, 325, 376. In 1853 Cardenas at Tete was replaced by Delfim José de Oliveira. Believing that victory for the Kisaka was inevitable Oliveira pretended neutrality but stealthily arranged aid for the Nyaude. Oliveira was later nominated by the Governor of Mozambique to Inhambane. McLeod, II, 99, notes that the 'Governor-General of Mozambique, is entirely in the hands of the Finance Committee and they are governed by slave trade interests'; 127-31, gives details of the commander of a British ship of war who was friendly with a 'Major Olliveira Governor of Inhambane, who was carrying on the slave trade as successfully as his predecessor . . .'

⁴ Eça, I., 297-8, 442. Livingstone described Coimbra as the chief 'slave emigration agent' along the Zambezi, cf. Wallis, *Zambezi Expedition . . .*, 48, 163.

⁵ 'Notice of a Caravan Journey from East to West Coast of Africa . . .', *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, XXIV, 266-7.

⁶ Eça, I., 311, 2; D. & C. Livingstone, *Explorations du Zambèze et de ses affluents* (Paris 1881), 23; Stewart, *Zambezi Journal*, 11; Botelho, *Historia*, II, 192-3.

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In April 1854 Gemitto,¹ already famous for his explorations in Africa and South America and for the literary records of his journeys, arrived as first Governor of the newly constituted district of Tete with two hundred soldiers and the task of restoring order in the Sena Rivers. Gemitto had previously headed campaigns against the natives in Sofala, Delagoa Bay and around the port of Mozambique. But, now, as the expedition was leaving Mozambique he fell ill and the Governor Vasco Guedes de Carvalho e Meneses determined to prevent him from reaching the Zambesi. Finally, in June 1854, with the help of the American consul, he arrived at Quelimane.

During Gemitto's absence Major Sicard, apparently an inebriate and a drug addict,² in league with the Governors of Mozambique and Quelimane, was nominated to replace Gemitto. Sicard's main interest, like that of his surgeon and other accomplices, was the sale of an enormous cargo of merchandise purchased while on holiday in India and assigned as a blind to a Dominican friar in Quelimane, Father de Nazare. Consequently, the time of the expedition was wasted in private fortune hunting and slaving.

Gemitto's efficiency and conscientious desire to save something from the wreck of the expedition and to attempt the execution of its object was frustrated by the intrigues of his supposed colleagues who persuaded Meneses to suspend (September 1854) and finally dismiss (July 1855)³ Gemitto from a post he had never occupied. The decree of November 1853 dividing the Sena Rivers was annulled and Tete was again linked to Quelimane as it had been in 1829.⁴

Major Sicard, aided by the collaborators of the bandit Coimbra and the Kisaka, scraped together a force of about a thousand men and moved leisurely towards the headquarters of the Nyaude whom the Major determined to treat as chief trouble-maker. The forces met, there was a perfunctory skirmish and Sicard withdrew more interested in his trading profits than in military glory. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of his opponent, Nyaude made

¹ Cf. 98-9, 101.

² Sicard is often mentioned by Livingstone usually with warm appreciation for his 'disinterested kindness' and as a well known and pacific character, 'a little man with a quiet and gentlemanly manner', *African Journal*, II, 422, etc. Sicard also befriended Richard Thornton, cf. *Zambesi Papers*, 116-17, and Wallis, II, 289.

³ Eça, I, 334-8 also Doc. 27, 28.

⁴ Bordalo, *Mozambique*, 214, 219; Eça, I, 230.

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overtures for peace, but his messenger was hanged and quartered at Sicard's camp. Shortly afterwards, Sicard's troops mutinied either because he had opposed the execution or in his drunkenness had insulted them. His command passed to Cruz Coimbra who with the aid of the Kisaka moved against the Nyaude. The latter's forces continued to block and halt traffic on the Zambesi and to defy all attempts to dislodge him. In June 1855 Sicard left for Mozambique to justify his actions to the Governor-General. About the same time all orders against Massangano were suspended as the Nyaude had died in his home.¹ But the wars continued under his son Antonio Vicente da Cruz, later to become a much-feared rebel or Bonga—a native name meaning wild cat or tiger cat signifying a war-lord's prowess and used to describe several of the rebel leaders in the Zambesi region.²

The wars reveal the anarchy endemic in Portuguese East Africa where the power of the Crown, always feeble, was usurped by slave traders, officials or great estate holders, who gradually assumed, if not the efficiency, the main characteristics of the Arab 'war-lords' farther north.

In such circumstances, when in 1856 a British consul arrived at Mozambique with one of his aims the ending of the slave trade, the slave dealers in league with the Governor mobbed his home and so intimidated him that he and his wife were forced to seek asylum in Zanzibar. He reported that for years every conceivable difficulty had been thrown in the way of legal traders; that in Natal merchants complained that the tariff of the Portuguese authorities was 50 per cent above that established by the government of Lisbon; that relatives of the officials with exalted rank acted as agents to distract British watchfulness and employed other agents to purchase slaves and embark them at subordinate ports; that while direct slave trading was not countenanced by the authorities, they aided and abetted all concerned therein; to keep in touch with Quelimane numerous dhows with slaves on board were regularly employed, the governor in either place adding a sufficient number of names to the list of the crew. Almost all Swahili sloops trading between Delagoa Bay and Mozambique were slavers in a modified form. A limited number of slaves travelled as passengers with passports to evade detection. The governor at Mozambique claimed head money for every slave

¹ Ega I, Doc. 27, 28, 29; 320-74.

² Ega II, 17-30.

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leaving a subordinate port and kept an agent to communicate with slavers. Officials who would not collaborate were displaced and by bribing parties who had access to ministers or others powerful at court in Lisbon the King was prevented from taking measures to remove from Mozambique the well-known slave traders whose long residence in the colony gave them great influence over the natives. They formed a local party 'which aided by the climate, the poverty of the Portuguese government and the treachery of the officials and officers' rendered them all powerful. Nevertheless, in Mozambique slave risings which were put down with a 'refinement of cruelty' were not infrequent.¹

So high were the rewards at Mozambique that the consul noted that Bantu traders from the far interior had ceased to bring gold, silver, ivory, wax, skins and malachite to Mozambique since they themselves were likely to be seized and sold as slaves.² Allowing for McLeod's tendency not always to be strictly accurate, it is worth noting that his statement was confirmed as early as 1800 by the Governor of Mozambique who reported that retaliatory native raids were 'caused by our people who capture and sell any kaffir free'.³ If this be true it is difficult to see who would then have carried back to the interior the bulky goods—hardware, brass, fire-arms, wire and beads—that formed the return cargo.⁴ Is it possible that colonists, steeped in Portuguese tradition of restrictive trade practices, would imagine that by disposing of African traders there would be more and better trade for their own slave agents whether *patamores*, *musambushe*, African chiefs or Swahili? In the 1850s it is conceivable that the return cargo may have found its way to the interior through the subordinate ports whence it would be taken by Banian, Arab and Swahili acting on their own account or as agents for *pazeros* middlemen in control of the coastal trade. The hawkers and officials at these ports shared their profits with the officials at Mozambique and worked in collaboration with bandit *pazeros* and their armed parties on slave hunting forays among the people of the interior.⁵ On the other hand, if African traders were seized and enslaved at the port of Mozambique this must surely also have happened elsewhere. Africans hardened by many hazards to life nevertheless must have responded by trying out markets at other ports at least until such time as their departure or a slowing down of

¹ McLeod, I, 125, 158, 275, 297–8, 315, 327; II, 328.

² Alpers, Chapter V.

⁴ H.E.A., 268.

² McLeod, II, 262.

⁵ Cf. 277, 3

demand for slaves would bring amelioration of conditions at a particular place. Therefore, perhaps, in some measure such dangers were a cause contributing to the shifts in trade.¹

By payment or force of arms the *prazeros* were able to obtain the co-operation of Bantu chiefs with whom they curried favour and who 'became excessively proud and supercilious in their demands and looked upon the white man, as they called the Swahili half-whites, with the greatest contempt'. As the chiefs grew wise to the game, they would make the slave-traders pay for water, wood and even grass and invent every pretext for levying fines.²

When the traffic in Mozambique, under the name of the free French labour system, was renewed in 1854-5, there was a surplus of slaves in all the Portuguese settlements. The Governor-General and his subordinates at first found no difficulty in meeting the demand, for the Portuguese residents were only too glad to sell to the Portuguese officials those slaves whom the orders of the government of Portugal had prevented from being supplied to regular slave-ships from Cuba and the Southern ports of the United States. After twelve months slaves became scarce. The French dealers were unwilling to pay the increased price. The Governor-General found it necessary to send Arabs into the interior for slaves. When the chiefs refused to comply with their demands, saying that it was contrary to the wishes of the Portuguese government, soldiers in uniform, who had been living with the women of the country and had acquired the Makua language, were sent to accompany the Arabs 'as a guarantee to the chiefs in the interior that the slave trade was authorized by the Portuguese government'.³

By these means the price of slaves was kept low and the Portuguese officials made enormous gains. If the native chiefs were unco-operative and attacked the Governor-General's emissaries then his accomplices in the subordinate ports continued to assist slavers. But they were dismissed if they failed to share their head money with the capital.

Thus in the period under discussion, even though after 1834 the port of Mozambique became dull and lifeless and lacked the usual indefatigable activity of a trading centre, the slave trade continued. Attracted by the enormous profits a great number of dhows from the Western coasts and islands of the Indian Ocean

¹ Cf. 93-4; 100-3.

² Livingstone, *Narrative*, 30.

³ McLeod, II, 317.

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frequented Mozambique. Boats came, there was neither noise nor bustle, for activity was in the forbidden slave traffic and secrecy demanded noiseless and unobtrusive markets. The only revenue derived by the state coffers was from the customs duties, often farmed out for a fixed rent, a few stamp and death tolls and the rent from the picturesque slave-holding *prazeros* steadily being overrun by the Bantu.¹

As we have seen the Governor of Mozambique was powerless to prevent the slave trade even if he had wished, or if he had had stronger forces at his disposal. The towns were entirely dependent for vital food supplies on the 'exorbitant and capricious' Swahili traders. Two thousand of the small population in 1840 lived by prostitution or robbery. In Mozambique slaves supported themselves by selling stolen provisions. The military power was negligible, for even the troops from Portugal, sent out in 1826 to quell the attempt to join Brazil, were active in slave dealing to the subversion of discipline and efficiency. Slave slavers entered the town with impunity and stole slaves for export, while the neighbouring chieftains and the Zulus or Ngoni were a constant menace to the colony. Settlers from Portugal stayed only long enough to enrich themselves by slaving and then retired to Brazil.² Each year saw an influx of criminals and a loss of affluent citizens.³ To put a stop to this drain of wealth and population, emigration was prohibited in 1842.⁴

Meanwhile, the administrative separation of Quelimane from Mozambique,⁵ the threat of Zulu invasions since 'Trekkers' from the Cape Colony began pressing northwards, the hostile designs of Muscat on Ibo (which was rapidly being enhanced by the increased slave trade), together with an empty treasury, were added difficulties⁶ which beset Portuguese East Africa during the most flourishing period of the slave trade. The price of international

¹ Wallis, *Zambezi Expedition*, 340-1, Livingstone in 1859, notes that all the lands south of the Zambezi except in the immediate vicinity of Sena and Tete were either depopulated or under Zulu tribes retiring before the Boers and claims that they could no longer be called Portuguese colonies.

² A.H.U., Moz., V, No. 104, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 21 March 1841.

³ A.H.U., Moz., V, No. 107, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 29 March 1841.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 63/585, No. 129, de Walden to Aberdeen, Lisbon, 8 June 1844.

⁵ A.H.U., Moz., I, Members of the Civil and Economic Administrative Commission of Moz. to Secretary of State and Colonies, Moz., 16 February 1835.

⁶ A.H.U., Moz., IV (Confidential) Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 30 January 1840; Moz., VII, No. 3, d'Abreu de Lima to Secretary of State and Colonies, Moz., 31 August 1844.

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importance was indeed a high one and was paid, to quote a contemporary Governor, 'in the creation of a perfectly savage, indolent and demoralized people'.¹

But the most significant effect of the slave trade was not greed, vice, war, misery and depopulation. For centuries these, like witchcraft and disease, were natural hazards in Africa. They existed where slaves were articles of domestic consumption used as concubines, soldiers and in certain parts as food. Hence depopulation occurred even in regions only marginally concerned with the slave trade. It was after the eighteenth century when slaves became instruments of production in plantation economies that the trade was throttled at the coast and had its most significant impact.

Slaves and ivory became responsible for drawing Swahili, Arabs and Portuguese as well as European manufactures into the interior. More than a new type of warfare and tribal chief emerged. The growth of trade brought in its train the Islamic and Christian faiths and began that slow process of detribalization and awareness which has had its most important effect in the twentieth century. In Europe, humanitarian pressure and economic contact with Africa have created a new sense of responsibility towards its people which has helped to provide a place for them and their continent in world affairs.

¹ A.H.U., Moz., IV, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 24 September 1840.

Chapter Eight

PORtUGUESE EAST AFRICA EMERGES FROM OBSCURITY

It is commonly thought that until the 'scramble for Africa' in the late nineteenth century, England's interest in that continent had been limited to its seaboard from which 'her Navy had stamped out the slave trade' and which provided ports of call on the route to India.¹ But, though the struggle for possession of the African interior reached its climax only in the eighties of the last century, the prelude to the drama is to be found in the late thirties and the era immediately preceding Livingstone. Then, the growth of the Boer Republics, the increasing interest of Great Britain, France, the United States and of Hamburg merchants provided all the elements of the conflict which arose at the end of the century.

[1]

THE PORTUGUESE AND THE GREAT TREK

The Great Trek, which is usually considered as affecting only the Boers and the British, was an all-important problem to the Portuguese government and a major event in the history of the colony of Mozambique. Yet the Portuguese connection with the Great Trek, which is an essential part of the British-Trekker problem, has been wholly neglected by standard histories and consequently is almost entirely unknown.

On 2 June 1843 a Dutch schooner, *Brazilia*, loaded by Messrs. J. A. Klyn and Company, of Amsterdam, with a representative cargo of Dutch products ranging from cheese and gin to legal works, arrived at Mozambique.² This was the very vessel which

¹ Fay, 81.

² A.H.U., Confidential Docs., I, L. d'Abreu de Lima to Secretary of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs, Moz., 1 July 1843. (Cf. Appendix, Letter III.)

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had recently caused a great flutter among the Boers in Natal when the sight of the Dutch colours was taken to mean that old Holland was coming to the New Republic's assistance against the English. The 'astute and pushful' young super cargo, John Arnaud Smellekamp, remembering his instructions to 'push trade and to study the new republic in all its moral and scientific aspects', had made the most of the Boers' credulity.¹ He now applied to the Portuguese governor, d'Abreu de Lima, for leave to trade on the coast, especially at Lourenço Marques, where, he asserted, he and the three other Dutchmen and one woman on board wished to live and to establish contact with fifteen thousand Boer Trekkers 'about eight days journey from there'. Smellekamp gave a glowing account of the moral, martial and industrious character of the settlers who, under the leadership of the talented Pieter Retief, had left the English possessions in the Cape in 1837 and, journeying into the interior of the continent, settled at Pietermaritzburg, after being persecuted by the English in Natal.²

His oration roused the Governor to enthusiasm over the possibilities of this new scheme. Here was a wonderful opportunity! The squalid, unhealthy little settlement at Lourenço Marques, constantly depopulated by wars with the natives, might still become a great city, for the Boers would surely be more reliable neighbours than the Africans, and a band of industrious settlers would inspire the indolent inhabitants to work. Pending the decision of the Portuguese government at Lisbon, permission was at once given to the passengers of the *Brazilia* to reside at Lourenço Marques in order to establish contact with their friends.³

From Lourenço Marques, Smellekamp wrote to Natal that he would be delighted to trade, but he broke the news that no help could be expected from the Dutch government.⁴ Disappointed, but determined to verify this and to break away out of reach of the British government, three parties of men from Weenen and Potchefstroom-Winburg decided to get through to Smellekamp at all costs. Early in December one party set out for Sofala, while Potgieter, with a large following from Winburg and Potchefstroom, started for Delagoa Bay to make contact with Holland and Portugal at one and the same time. A smaller group, consisting of Commandant Gert Rudolph, Prinsloo and two others,

¹ Walker, *The Great Trek*, 267-70.

² Ibid.

³ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., loc. cit.

⁴ Walker, op. cit., 322.

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set off from Weenen down the fever-stricken valleys to meet Smellekamp in person. Only the Weenen party got through to Delagoa Bay. They were told by Smellekamp that Holland could and would do nothing for them and that the British government had declared its sovereignty up to the 25th degree south latitude,¹ but they were invited to open up trade with Messrs. Klyn and Company at Sofala or somewhere else to the north of that line. Twenty-four hours stay was enough for the disillusioned men. The Sofala expedition degenerated into an elephant hunt. Potgieter was held up by rains and swollen rivers, many of his oxen were destroyed by the tsetse fly and he made his way home with difficulty.²

Fortunately for the Governor of Mozambique, who had enthusiastically represented to Lisbon the advantages to be obtained from a Boer settlement at or near Lourenço Marques, his permission had been granted subject to confirmation from Lisbon. The Portuguese government viewed the matter in quite a different light. Here were these Boers, who by driving the natives northward had embroiled the Portuguese in wars, covertly trying to penetrate into their settlement.³ It was all very well in 1838 to have guided a small band of men under Trichardt from the Zoutpansberg to find their way to Delagoa Bay. They had been in difficulties and the Portuguese were always willing to help. Moreover, they had either died or been taken back to Natal shortly after.⁴ But if those who were now in the Bay succeeded in making contact with 'the colony of 15,000', the authorities feared they would shortly have an example of the fable of the 'dog who begged the sow to farrow on his face' so as to eat the little pigs.⁵ In future it would be necessary to provide against any malicious intention, on the part of these or any other visitors, to take advantage of their weakness in man power and resources. The only remedy, therefore, was to stimulate their own trade and industry and to strengthen the arm of the Governor in East Africa.

A Royal Portaria of November 1843 forbade the Governor of Mozambique to allow the Boers to settle in Lourenço Marques.

¹ A line approximately 50 miles north of Pretoria or Lourenço Marques.

² Walker, op. cit., 325.

³ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., Marginal annotation in pencil on letter, L. d'Abreu de Lima to the Secretary of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs, Moz., 1 July 1843. (Cf. Appendix, Letter III.)

⁴ Walker, op. cit., 112-13.

⁵ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., op. cit.

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The Governor hastily explained that there were only three Dutchmen left—one had died and another had already gone to Batavia. The three survivors had agreed that, if when the *Brazilia* returned from the Indies they had not heard from their friends in the interior, they would retire.¹ This letter was written in April 1844, the very month when the men of Potchefstroom-Winburg ‘washed their hands of Natal’ in the most public and formal manner. A *Burgerraad*—a burgher senate which included Hendrik Potgieter, who had already made one attempt to reach Delagoa Bay—declined to negotiate with the Lieutenant-Governor, Cloete, or any of the British authorities and declared the independence of the two great districts on either side of the Vaal River. Potgieter presently set out to enlarge the borders of his republic in the east and to find a road to Delagoa Bay. This time he went in the dry season and with good fortune.²

Smellekamp was on the point of returning to Holland when the party of about twenty-four Boers, adequately armed and well mounted, rode into Delagoa Bay, followed by three hundred slaves. Good business was done with ivory obtained from hunting *en route*. Potgieter secured permission to settle his people in the hinterland, provided they made their own arrangements with the native tribes and did not come too close to Delagoa Bay, where adequate water, the ostensible reason for the expedition, had been found.³ Thus in August 1844 the new village of Andries-Ohrigstad came into being on territory which—and this is a point not generally known—Portugal regarded as part of her colony.⁴

Before these events were known in Portugal, Lisbon had taken fright at the news that British reinforcements were being sent from the Cape to subject the truculent Natalians who had refused loyalty to Mr. Cloete and were said to be trying to form a settlement between Cape Province and the Portuguese dominions of Lourenço Marques. The establishment of an English colony on the very borders of the Bay of Lourenço Marques and a possible war between the English and Boers along their frontier were contingencies as distasteful to the Portuguese government as the

¹ A.H.U., Moz., VII, No. 98, d'Abreu de Lima to Minister of Colonies, Moz., 16 April 1844.

² Walker, op. cit., 328–9, 332.

³ A.H.U., Moz., VII, No. 5, d'Abreu de Lima to Secretary of State and Colonies, Moz., 31 August 1844. (Cf. Appendix, Letter II.)

⁴ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., I, 23, L. da Silva Mourinho d'Albuquerque to Gov.-Gen. of Mozambique, Lisbon, 9 September 1846. (Cf. Appendix, Letter VII.)

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possibility of a Boer colony contiguous to their own. An English colony would soon dominate the Bay, attract the inland trade to their trading posts and reduce Portuguese commerce to very little or nothing—Mozambique would sink into economic insignificance. A Boer colony, augmenting as time went on and having no communications with their fellow countrymen in Europe, would 'fall upon' Lourenço Marques either directly or indirectly by recourse to 'savages'.¹ It was believed that the strong Boer nucleus in the Republic had excited the jealousy of the British government. The English and Boers were more to be feared than the black tribes and it was in Portugal's interest to have neither abutting on the Mozambique frontier.

Far from assisting either, the Governor of Mozambique was instructed to let them destroy each other and seize the opportunity to place some of the border chiefs under allegiance, or at least seek their adherence to the Portuguese cause, so that a buffer state between Mozambique and the victor in the impending combat might be formed. Troops, munitions, artillery and workmen were to be sent to repair or build new fortifications and to strengthen Lourenço Marques against any sudden attack. Finally, all Dutch residents in Lourenço Marques were to be expelled. Everything was to be done covertly so as not to compromise the government.² If the mere news that British troops had been dispatched to Natal resulted in such detailed and elaborate instructions, it can be imagined how the Governor's narrative of Potgieter's visit to Delagoa Bay disturbed the Portuguese government. Their worst forebodings seemed about to be realized because of the crass folly of the Governor. Colour was lent to the situation by the Portuguese councillor to the Slave Trade Commission at the Cape, who wrote dilating on the dangers to which the national settlements from Lourenço Marques to Quelimane were exposed by the approach of the Boers, whom the Portuguese local authorities were suspected of having attracted by a trading contract.³

With studied sarcasm the official dispatch expressed amazement at the complacency with which the Governor rejoiced in the trading transactions in ivory and failed to see the danger of allowing

¹ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., I, No. 26, 7, J. J. Falcão to Gov.-Gen. of Moz., Sintra, 3 August 1844. (Cf. Appendix, Letter IV.)

² Cf. Appendix, Letter IV.

³ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., I, Nos. 26, 21b, J. J. Falcão to Gov. of Moz., Palace of Belem, 12 May 1845.

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a settlement capable of putting ten thousand men into the field to be established on his flank. Unless these settlers were willing to surrender their independent status, they were to be destroyed at all costs.¹ Information about the military strength of the Boers and their relations with the native chiefs was secretly to be obtained so that the force to be dispatched against them might be adequately prepared. The militia companies of each district were to be placed on a war-time footing; men and munitions were to be requisitioned from India.² Money was to be raised by loans, by commandeering deposits and through a financial agency in London.³ An experienced soldier was appointed as Governor of Sofala and to act as Commander-in-Chief of the expeditionary force. This campaign was ambitious enough. But it was not all. When everything was in readiness the Boers were to be summoned to surrender and on refusal were to be forced into flight or submission. Operations were to be conducted so that in case of retreat the Portuguese province might always be protected. Within the wide limits of Portuguese territory wooden buildings flying the national colours were to be erected as proof of ownership.

Clearly, the Portuguese government little appreciated the great reluctance of Britain to increase her territorial obligations at a time when the general policy was a restriction of commitments. Governor Napier had had much ado to persuade Lord Stanley, Secretary for Colonies, even to consider the retention of Natal. And then, the fact that coal was there, that it might become a source of supply for cotton, that trade would be drained away to the Trekkers at Delagoa Bay, the appearance of an American brig and the belief that Smellekamp was a 'tool in the hands of hostile France' had much to do with the final decision.⁴ But so much did the Portuguese misinterpret British policy that the fear that the Boers in their flight from British control might encroach on Portuguese territory and that British annexation might follow, resulted in all East African ports save Mozambique being closed to foreigners, especially to British subjects. The feeling caused by

¹ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., I, No. 26, 21b, J. J. Falcão to Gov. of Moz., Palace of Belem, 12 May 1845.

² A.H.U., Confidential Docs., I, No. 26, 8b, J. J. Falcão to Gov.-Gen. of India, Belem, 31 May 1845. (Cf. Appendix, Letter V.)

³ A.H.U., Moz., VII, d'Abreu de Lima to Secretary of State of Marine and Colonies, Moz., 30 October 1844.

⁴ Muller, op. cit., 154, 159 *et seq.*; Walker, op. cit., 300.

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England's direct intervention in the slave trade further accentuated this attitude on the part of the local authorities.

In this, the other side of the British-Trekker problem, the Boers came off more lightly. Instructions there were in plenty forbidding the Portuguese authorities to have any slave dealings with them, to invite them to approach the province or give them portions of territory to which the Portuguese Crown had a right.¹ But, tempted by the possibilities of profit that such a contact offered, some of the local authorities failed to obey the Home government.² Cotton, grain and even slaves were obtained from the Boer emigrants at Andries-Ohrigstad.³ The Boers, too, set on seeking a new way to the Indian Ocean, wished to maintain Portuguese friendship. In 1847 Potgieter, then about to settle in the Zoutpansberg, sent a party to Inhambane; but it returned unsuccessful.⁴ During the next few years, however, treaties were made with unauthorized subordinate officials.⁵ An attempt was also made to effect communication with the coast through St. Lucia Bay.⁶ Meanwhile, in 1852, England recognized the independence of the Transvaal Republic. This ensured that the British would cease to follow the troop of irreconcilable Boers northward. Temporarily, at least, the possibility of the English encroaching on Portuguese territory was therefore removed. Moreover, Portugal (by a Protocol of 1847, renewed in 1850)⁷ had secured, as a condition for permitting British warships to enter the coastal waters of Mozambique to suppress the slave trade, a definite engagement on Britain's part not to call in question the claim of Portugal to any territories on the eastern coast of Africa.⁸

The Boers in the highveld, however, were still forced to send their produce hundreds of miles over roadless, sparsely inhabited country to the British ports at the Cape or Natal. Attempts to negotiate with the Portuguese, therefore, were continued. In 1854 a party unsuccessfully attempted to establish relations with Quelimane. But in 1858 the Boers' persistent efforts were rewarded. The Governor of Lourenço Marques, Francisco de Salis

¹ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., I, 26b, J. de Fontes Pereira de Mello to Gov. of Moz., Palace, 20 November 1847; 25b, Secretariat of Marine and Overseas Affairs to Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 7 August 1847.

² Bordalo, *Ensaios*, 275.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/698, Parker to Palmerston, Hampstead, 18 February 1848.

⁴ Walker, op. cit., 359.

⁵ Botelho, II, 511-12.

⁶ Muller, op. cit., 163.

⁷ P.R.O., F.O. 93/77/26a, Protocol of a Conference at F.O., 19 November 1850.

⁸ Coupland, *Kirk on the Zambezi*, 87.

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Machado, was authorized to negotiate with a commission of important personages from the Afrikaner Republic north of the Vaal, among them Cornelius Potgieter, President of the Volksraad, Jacob Clerk, Frederick Combrink and Jacob Middel, magistrates in the district of Lydenburg. On 14 August a pact was signed which might have changed the whole history of South Africa. Portugal recognized the independence of the Transvaal Republic, the limits of the territories between the Portuguese and Boer colony were established, the slave traffic was absolutely prohibited as well as the selling of arms to Negroes; the two governments promised to render each other assistance in case of attack and a road was to be made between the two countries. But no definite confirmation or ratification of the projected treaty was effected. It was only three years later that a Portuguese vice-consul was placed in the Transvaal.

In England, Lord Stanley, Secretary of State for Colonies, had actually announced as early as 1842 that 'Her Majesty's government would not recognize, would not acknowledge and would effectually resist any attempt on the part of the Boers to place themselves under foreign protection'.¹ In 1853 the problem of forestalling any possible move of the Boers towards Delagoa Bay was discussed, for 'it was fancied' that this might be prejudicial to British interests. It was noted at the time that Owen's treaties actually gave England some claim to a part of that coast. But when the opinion of Sir George Grey, Governor of the Cape, was asked, he replied that he could not attach any significance whatever to a treaty 'which had been forgotten all these years'.² As the British government was at that time abandoning territory and was weary of the complications expansion brought in its wake, the matter was dropped. But to frustrate the Transvaal's approach to the sea remained an object of both Portuguese and British policy. To Portugal such an attempt threatened her jealously guarded territorial rights. To Britain it would mean the severing of her strongest hold on the Boers, for now their produce was forced to pass through her territory and in transit enriched the Cape Colony. Therein lay the germ of the Delagoa Bay Arbitration Case in 1872.

¹ Hansard, Part. Debates, LXIII, 3rd Series, 26 April 1842, cols. 1168-70, quoted by Muller, op. cit., 196.

² de Kiewiet, *British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848-72* (London, 1929), 148.

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THE FRENCH

The last years of Louis Philippe's reign were marked by several French imperial schemes, and in these South-East Africa had a place. In 1846, the Portuguese government were excitedly attempting to forestall British or Boer extension of territory at the expense of their African colonies, when news was received that an expedition had left France to explore 'the commercial possibilities of the East African coast between Lagoa [Delagoa] Bay and Cape Guardafui'. At once Lisbon took alarm and sent a warning to the Governor of Mozambique. Constant vigilance was enjoined; measures similar to those proposed against the Boers were to be adopted against French aggression. Any attempts to occupy territory were to be prevented by persuasive means, failing which protests were to follow and detailed reports of all that happened were to be sent to Lisbon.¹

Once more, however, a divergence of view between the home and local governments was discernible. Portuguese East Africa and the French islands were intimately bound by common commercial and strategic interests. The trade with the islands was the life-blood of Mozambique, and the officials quite naturally thought first of their own pockets. In any case, the British Navy was there to prevent trouble. The incident of Angoche,² whose Sultan and slave-trading associates defied the Governor and were reduced to submission by a British naval squadron, shows how willing Great Britain was to implement her guarantee of aid.³ In fact, Lisbon actually contemplated enlisting British assistance against the Boers.⁴

In 1847 a direct appeal to Britain was made by the Sultan⁵ of Muscat, who feared that the increased European interest in East

¹ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., I, 20b, Falcão to Gov.-Gen. of Moz., Belem Palace, 17 April 1846. (Cf. Appendix, Letter VI.)

² A.H.U., Moz., IX, Dacres to D. F. do Valle, H.M.S. President, Moz., 15 November 1847.

³ A.H.U., Moz., X, No. 270, D. F. do Valle to Secretary of State for Marine and Colonies, Moz., 13 Aug., 1850; Botelho, II, 164-5.

⁴ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., 26, Secretary of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs to J. de Fontes Pereira de Mello (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), Lisbon, 2 September 1847. (Cf. Appendix, Letter VIII.)

⁵ Throughout this chapter the Imam of Muscat is referred to as the Sultan—the title officially recognized by the treaty in 1840; Cf. 252.

The French

African trade would be detrimental to him.¹ A great trade in English manufactures had grown up and was steadily increasing in volume. Much of this was among the Portuguese at Mozambique, with whom merchants left part of their cargoes, calling on their return from Zanzibar and other parts of the north-east coast of Africa and the Red Sea for payment. In the Sultan's territories the coast opposite Zanzibar, known as the *Moreema* or the *Mrima*, was particularly valuable and cherished by him. Here the principal trade in ivory and gum copal was carried on by British subjects from India under the Sultan's flag. Ships of Great Britain and France were prohibited, but the Americans had obtained concessions by treaty. Actually few of them made use of the privilege since their trade was firmly entrenched at Zanzibar and in other parts of the adjacent mainland. The coarse, unbleached cotton cloth—'domestics' of American origin—which was the principal article brought to Zanzibar by all the United States vessels, had come into almost universal use in Arabia and the East coast of Africa and was fast establishing a monopoly in these markets to the exclusion of similar articles of British manufacture. The French trade was not very considerable, while British goods sold on the African shore consisted mostly of muskets, hardware, earthenware, cutlery, brass and iron wire, taken there by American or German vessels.² The Hamburg and other vessels from the Hanseatic States had as yet done little trade in the Sultan's dominions. Their principal traffic was in the Red Sea in gums. The produce taken from Zanzibar was coconut oil and copal, chiefly for cash.³

It was doubtful whether any alteration in the treaty between the Sultan and England would have made it possible for Great Britain to recapture the trade controlled by the Americans.⁴ Nevertheless, the Sultan appealed to Palmerston soliciting his offices in securing the annulment of the American right to trade in the *Mrima*⁵ and in preventing the French government from fining his subjects who tried to sell gunpowder in Nossi-Bé.⁶ It was not possible, however, to persuade the United States to agree

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 54/11, Hamerton to Palmerston, Zanzibar, 26 March 1847.

² In 1847 only four English vessels traded to Zanzibar—two from Liverpool and two from London.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 54/12, Hamerton to Palmerston, Zanzibar, 15 December 1848.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 54/11, Hamerton to Palmerston, Zanzibar, 25 March 1847.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 54/10, Hamerton to Aberdeen, Zanzibar, 28 September 1846.

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to the abrogation of her treaty rights, but as a consolation the Sultan's subjects were allowed to trade with Bombay and Mauritius on the same footing as British subjects.¹

In 1846 Muscat obtained English help against the Wahabi² and to counteract French influence in the Comoro Islands, where the Sultan complained that the French were encroaching on his dominions at Mohilla,³ a consular officer, Josiah Napier, was sent there from Mauritius.⁴ His function was to maintain the Sultan's influence over the native chiefs against French intrigue.⁵ To assist this purpose an English ship of war was from time to time to visit those islands as well as the Sultan's dominions on the African coast. Commercial relations were started with the chiefs on the south-west of Madagascar, while English cruisers called at Johanna in the Comoro Islands to stimulate trade with Mauritius.⁶

The French were not easily daunted. The next year a French sloop of war, under Captain Guillain, tried to induce the chiefs of Brava, Lamu and 'Mukdeesha' to sell certain ports. In spite of protracted negotiations the chiefs refused to sell what they said was the Sultan's territory, but one of them—there were seven at Brava—known to be ill-disposed towards Muscat, embarked with the French. It was supposed that he might have gone to conclude an arrangement for the establishment of a French settlement, although it was not known where.⁷ The plan came to naught owing to the 1848 revolution in France.

A lull in French imperialist activities in East African waters followed the fall of Louis Philippe and that of his minister, Guizot. Yet the revolution in turn presented the Governor of Mozambique with a difficult problem. A decree of 1 May of the Republican government of France abolished slavery within two

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 54/11, Note by Palmerston, 19 August 1847; Palmerston to Hamerton, F.O., 16 October, 1847.

² P.R.O., F.O. 54/10, Blackwood to Admiralty, H.M.S. *Fox*, Bombay, 14 March 1846.

³ The Sultan claimed that when Mombasa was taken in 1827, these islanders had placed themselves under his rule, cf. P.R.O., F.O. 54/11, Seid Bin Sultan to Palmerston, Zanzibar, 19 August 1847.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 54/13, Hamerton to Palmerston, Zanzibar, 26 September 1850, announcing death of Josiah Napier.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 54/11, Note by Palmerston, 12 December 1847.

⁶ P.R.O., Ad. 1/5596, R. 55, Dacres to Palmerston, H.M.S. *President*, Simon's Bay, 21 November 1848, enclosed in letter to Ward.

⁷ P.R.O., F.O. 54/12, Hamerton to Brown, Zanzibar, 2 and 4 August, 1847, enclosed in Dacres to Ward, H.M.S. *President*, Simon's Bay, 31 December 1847, enclosed in Admiralty to Stanley, 2 March 1848.

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months throughout the French dominions.¹ Confronted by 'ruin and desolation' a great number of planters from Réunion proposed to emigrate *en masse* to Mozambique. Untouched by the storm in Europe personal considerations counted for more than national loyalty. Riches they no longer had to offer, but instead they promised to introduce agriculture, commerce and industry into Portuguese East Africa.² The project filled the Governor with misgivings. An influx of an able, energetic, commercial community of a foreign nation was in itself a sufficient problem, but the disadvantage it would be to the future formation of any Portuguese commercial company was also to be considered.³ To the Governor's comfort the French met the difficulty by the scheme of increasing free, indentured labourers; and Mozambique signed a contract for an 'exchange arrangement'—slaves and supplies in return for money or manufactured articles.

It was the same old story as in the first years of the century. Everything had to wait for the day that Portugal herself could undertake new ventures. It mattered not that nothing constructive was done in the meantime. 'Tomorrow was also a day.' And so it was that although time and people might come and go, while humanitarian and liberal movements might sweep Europe, the inhabitants of Mozambique remained untouched by change. The history of the East African seaboard might to a great extent be the story of the reverberation of events in Europe, but in that distant region, when the echoes died away, the deadly calm returned and the old stagnation persisted.

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In 1842 the position of the European powers on the East African shore was as follows: Britain, America and France each had a consul at Zanzibar. Great Britain also had special trading privileges in certain of the Sultan's ports and access to Portuguese colonies on most-favoured-nation terms while the second British occupation of Natal had begun. The United States, by a treaty signed seven years before that of Great Britain, had the right of

Martens, Recueil, XII, 86.

A.H.U., Moz., IX, d'Orgoni to Gov. of Moz., undated, enclosed in D. F. do Valle to Secretary of State for Naval and Overseas Affairs, Moz., 30 July 1849.

A.H.U., Moz., IX, D. F. do Valle to Secretary of State for Naval and Overseas Affairs, Moz., 30 July 1849.

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trade in all the Sultan's African possessions and (by a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Portugal signed in August 1840) the same privileges as British merchants in Portuguese territory. One of the Sultan's high officials, Ahmad bin Na'amān, the commander of a commerce and goodwill mission from Zanzibar to New York in April 1840, had become the leader of what the British consul at Zanzibar bitterly called the 'American party'. Leading American trading companies had agents in Mozambique, Madagascar, Muscat and Aden.¹ In 1830 American traders tried to secure a foothold in Madagascar, at Majunga and later in Tamatave.² France had agents in almost every one of the Sultan's ports and was gaining increasing influence by reason of the revival of the slave trade under the name of 'free labourers'. By the Portuguese, also, the French traders were more welcomed than the British, who suffered in popularity because of the anti-slave trade policy of their government. Britain had one theoretical advantage: the right to purchase or hire land in the Sultan's dominions—a privilege the United States neither possessed nor desired but which after 1844 was accorded to France.

The British position in relation to that of her trade rivals was considerably weakened by the decree of the Lisbon government in June 1844,³ which, on the pretext of regulating the trade of the colony, restricted foreign ships entirely to Mozambique and the goods they might import to those which Portugal and her possessions did not produce. Hitherto, although Quelimane, Sofala and Inhambane, important slave-trading ports, were firmly sealed against British subjects, they were allowed to trade in Delagoa Bay on compliance with port regulations there. The ship's register had to be surrendered to the custom-house authorities and two port guards maintained on board at a pay of \$1 per day during the time the ship remained in the harbour. There was an export duty of 25 per cent *ad valorem*. Despite Owen's declaration that the Portuguese had no authority in Delagoa Bay, these regulations were complied with, but after 1843 no British vessels were allowed to remain more than forty-eight hours, and then only when in want of water or repairs, although American vessels anchored there for weeks.⁴

¹ Clendenen and Duignan, op. cit., 35–6.

² Toussaint, *Early American Trade with Mauritius*, 6.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/590, Decree published in *Diário do Governo* at Lisbon on 13 June 1844, enclosed in Smith to Aberdeen, Lisbon, 19 June 1844.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 63/698, Parker to Palmerston, Hampstead, 18 February 1848.

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The Portuguese restriction was said to be based on the decree of 1844, although in practice the prohibition was enforced in East Africa chiefly against British subjects, probably because of the fear that Britain, on account of the Anglo-Boer complications, might occupy new territories adjacent to Portuguese East Africa or even encroach on Portuguese territory. This attitude on the part of Portuguese local authorities was accentuated by English hostility to slave trading—still the life-blood of the colony. At this time, therefore, greater obstacles were placed in the way of British vessels than before the 1842 treaty.¹ The Lisbon government, in formulating the decree, first announced as a project of law in June 1843—a year before the events in South Africa caused such panic in Lisbon—were probably actuated by other considerations. A system of heavy duties and restrictions formed the very basis of the Portuguese colonial system. As quoted by a Portuguese historian, '*Les colonies ont été formées par la métropole et pour la métropole.*'² And even when the mother country could be persuaded to relax this rule the officials in Mozambique used it when it served their purpose. The development of free trade principles in England and the arrival of private merchants, consequent upon the modification of the East India Company's charter, merely accentuated this attitude. Moreover, the Banians who sometimes justifiably claimed British nationality aroused the jealousy of both Portuguese and Arab. It was at this time that an attempt was again made to expel them from Mozambique.³

British merchants were not slow to protest against the restrictions on their trade: the first test case in 1846 was that concerning indigo-dyed cloth, hitherto allowed to be imported into Portuguese East Africa from Bombay.⁴ The Bombay government took up the attitude that, since this particular import had been allowed under the 1842 treaty, the Portuguese were not competent to prohibit it by subsequent decree, for this was tantamount to modifying the treaty without negotiation; that principle once accepted might be extended to a complete prohibition of trade.⁵

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 63/698, Parker to Palmerston, Hampstead, 18 February 1848.

² Manso, *op. cit.*, xxxiii.

³ A.H.U., Moz., X, D. F. do Valle to Secretary of State, Moz., 13 August 1850.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 63/672, India Board to Stanley, 15 February 1847.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 63/672, No. 1 of 1847, Political Department to Court of Directors, Bombay Castle, 1 January 1847, enclosed in India Board to Stanley, 15 February 1847.

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This opinion was reinforced by that of the Queen's Advocate,¹ the ambassador in Lisbon was ordered to lodge a formal protest and a request for the removal of the restriction.² There is grim humour in the fact that, while these discussions were going on, Portugal was negotiating for British help against the Boers and the Sultan was accepting British aid against France.

Early in 1848, E. D. Ward Parker, agent for a Liverpool merchant, sent Palmerston a voluminous correspondence complaining of the Portuguese and the Sultan's unwarrantable restrictions on English traders.³ Parker, to enlist more active sympathy for his case, presented also a glowing report on the prospective value of the East African trade to Britain, if only reasonable access to it might be had. He was chiefly interested in the trade between Africa and Mauritius and extolled the land round Delagoa Bay as an inexhaustible source of supplies for the island. He detailed the Portuguese interference with his enterprises. Despite Captain Owen's declaration that Portuguese territory extended no farther than the east bank of the river and Bay of Lourenço Marques, a licence to trade in Delagoa Bay could be obtained from Mozambique only on payment (such as that customarily made by the brig *Pilot* from Natal) of £150; he was denied asylum for repairs; his cargo was shut out from its peculiar market—the natives—and remained unsold; he was not allowed to dispose of his freight in any port except Mozambique; the conduct of Portuguese officials in enforcing port regulations was most arbitrary; the loss, especially in war munitions, was extreme and the export duty excessive; and finally, the English had no consul or other representative in Portuguese East Africa and relied for redress of grievances on the commodore in charge of the Mauritius station. Parker wound up by asserting, falsely as it proved,⁴ that the Sultan prohibited all trade of British merchants in his dominions, while Americans and French had had free access because they would connive at slave trading.

Parker's complaints led to further British protests in Lisbon and to requests that the treaty of 1842 be maintained as the basis

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 83/2325, Law Officers' Reports, No. 443, Dodson to Addington. Doctors' Commons, 15 October 1847.

² P.R.O., F.O. 179/113, No. 243, Palmerston to Seymour, F.O. 23 October 1847.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/698, Parker to Palmerston, Hampstead, 18 February 1848.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 54/12, Hamerton to Palmerston, Zanzibar, 15 December 1848.

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of Anglo-Portuguese commercial relations;¹ but it is significant that the Portuguese right to close Delagoa Bay to British merchants was not questioned. Although no satisfactory reply was obtained, the Foreign Office dealt cautiously with Lisbon, for the condition of Portugal was such that a Miguellite rising was not unlikely,² and if she failed to arrange terms with England, her principal creditor, she might be driven by financial stress into the arms of France. It was suggested that in this event the Portuguese government might be tempted to part with some of their colonies in return for French or American financial aid³—a contingency which was viewed by Palmerston with the utmost disfavour since ‘the alienation of any of the colonial possessions of Portugal to any foreign power’ was a ‘transaction to which Great Britain could not consent’.⁴ The fall of Louis Philippe and conditions in Spain further complicated a situation already delicate.

In November 1848, after considerable delay, the Portuguese government replied to the British protests by submitting a further restrictive decree and intimating that these decrees took precedence over the treaty of 1842.⁵ On the advice of the Queen’s Advocate further protests followed,⁶ and in April 1849 the Duke of Saldanha, Foreign Minister in Lisbon, proposed an amazing remedy. He prefaced the proposal by stating that it was entirely his own idea, not yet communicated to the Queen nor his colleagues, and by dilating on the hopeless financial condition of Portugal, which made it impossible to carry out the best intentions of the government or to pay interest on foreign loans. The proposal in brief was that Great Britain should take over the whole of the Portuguese East African possessions for fifty or sixty years and in return make herself responsible for the sum of £10 million owed by Portugal in Britain. England would thus be certain of

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 83/2325, Dodson in reply to Eddisbury’s instructions from Palmerston, Doctors’ Commons, 2 August 1848; P.R.O., F.O. 63/680, No. 105, Draft, F.O. to Seymour, 4 August 1848.

² P.R.O., F.O. 63/699, Extract from de Horta to Palmerston, Hertford Street, 23 October 1848.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/681, Private and Confidential, Seymour to Palmerston, Lisbon, 7 January 1848.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 179/120, Confidential, Palmerston to Seymour, F.O., 26 January 1848.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 63/689, Translation, J. J. Gomes de Castro to Seymour, Lisbon, 4 November 1848.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 83/2325, Law Officer’s Reports, No. 483, Dodson to F.O., Doctor’s Commons, 27 December 1848; F.O. 63/700, No. 47, Draft, Palmerston to Seymour, F.O., 18 April 1849.

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payment to English creditors, be in a position to suppress the slave trade, save money by reducing the squadron on the East African station and reap a rich harvest of trade in African products.¹ In other words, England was to have the initial trouble and expense of putting the colony on its feet and then to return it, while remaining permanently saddled with the debt. Whether Saldanha's 'preposterous offer' emanated wholly from himself or not is impossible to say. Seymour, Britain's ambassador, thought that other members of the Cabinet concurred and, having made a proposal which they knew would be unacceptable, were satisfied at having done what probity required.²

Although little desirous of extending their territory in Africa and very sceptical of the value of these highly rated possessions,³ the British government made inquiries about the present and prospective revenue of the colony. At the same time an offer to purchase Goa, Diu and Damão was repeated by the East India Company.⁴ But it was soon evident that Saldanha's offer was not intended to be taken seriously, but was merely a face-saving expedient.⁵ No alienation of Portuguese territory could take place without the consent of the Chambers, and any reluctance they may have had to part with any portion of their national possessions was likely to have still greater weight with the Queen, whose extreme repugnance to part with any 'particle' of her dominions was well known. With a change of government in Lisbon and the return of Seymour to London the matter was dropped.

The incident itself is unimportant. Many such projects were in the air at that time. In fact, Britain in 1850 bought the Danish possessions in West Africa. But it is interesting to observe that questions which were occupying great attention at the end of the last century, such as Germany's lease of Kiao-Chau and Britain's of Wei-hai-wei,⁶ as well as the guarantee of the

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 63/704, Private and Confidential, Seymour to Palmerston, Lisbon, 28 April 1849; Saldanha to Seymour, Lisbon, 27 April 1849, enclosed in Seymour to Palmerston, Lisbon, 28 April 1849.

² P.R.O., F.O. 63/704, Private and Confidential, Seymour to Palmerston, Lisbon, 28 April 1849.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/704, Seymour to Saldanha, Lisbon, 28 April 1849, enclosed in Seymour to Palmerston, Lisbon, 28 April 1849.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 63/700, Private and Confidential, Palmerston to Seymour, F.O., 14 May 1849.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 63/705, Private and Confidential, Seymour to Palmerston, Lisbon, 28 May 1849.

⁶ For details, cf. *Cambridge Modern History*, XII, 314; Grant and Temperley, *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, 416-17.

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Portuguese colonies, were on the Foreign Office files in the late forties.

Meantime, the value of the European trade with East Africa steadily increased as the colonists acquired a growing taste for foreign luxuries, such as handsome furniture and dress, costly mirrors and china.¹ Chintzes, painted American cloths, taffetas, brightly coloured linens and English cottons now bedecked European, Arab and many a Negro inhabitant,² while silver ornaments, necklaces and armlets or coloured Venetian beads often adorned their female slaves, dressed generally in a piece of Indian dyed cloth, coloured cotton or chintz.³ With the love of finery, Arab as well as Portuguese acquired a passion for spirituous liquors, and the consumption of these rapidly increased. The growing impotence which resulted made the trade of both Zanzibar and Mozambique more than ever a monopoly of the natives of India.⁴ Slaves were still the most important saleable commodity, although the Portuguese officials rather than any other inhabitants were now, more than ever, the chief salesmen.⁵ But there was still the faint hope that the growing disturbances in India⁶ would cause the withdrawal of the watchful English cruisers and thus allow freer scope for the illicit trade. The trade might still become what it was in the 'good old days' and Mozambique inhabitants be left to enjoy with the fruits of the slave trade the easy life of their forefathers.

Yet even Englishmen and their cruisers had their use, although this was admittedly a moot point. In 1850 Commander Wyvill, of H.M.S. *Castor*, had assisted the Governor to reassert Portuguese authority over the Sultan of Angoche.⁷ It is, however, symptomatic of the changed position that East Africa now occupied in world affairs that three years later Britain was questioning the legitimacy of Portuguese authority and dominion in Angoche.

¹ A.H.U., Moz., 138, Report of goods bought from an English ship, *London*, 'Quartel do Governo da Bahia Lourenço Marques', 2 May 1833.

² A.H.U., Moz., 138, Declaration of the Cargo of the American brig *Generous*, Capt. B. Connant, anchored in Mozambique, 20 February 1837.

³ Russell, 332.

⁴ Ibid.; A.H.U., Moz., V, Marinho to Bomfim, Moz., 22 October 1841; Bordalo, 52-66.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 84/1019, McLeod to Clarendon, British Consulate, Moz., 3 October 1857.

⁶ On India, cf. Williamson, *A Short History of British Expansion* (London, 1930), II, 239.

⁷ P.R.O., F.O. 63/778, Draft, F.O. to Admiralty, 31 October 1853.

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The question arose because the British consul¹ at the Comoro Islands, on the invitation of the Sultan, had conducted a trading expedition² in the Angoche River. A Portuguese warship, however, seized the English trader and took it to Mozambique, where the cargo was confiscated and a heavy fine inflicted.³ Protests through the British Foreign Office were unavailing and failed to obtain compensation; the Portuguese maintaining the legality of their action on the grounds of the decree of 1844 restricting foreign trade to Mozambique. In 1853, Clarendon, the British Foreign Minister, considered that a nominal supremacy was insufficient warrant for the Portuguese prohibition of trade with the remoter shores of their East African province, even though the Slave Trade Convention of 1817 had tacitly acknowledged as Portuguese all the coast between Cape Delgado and Lourenço Marques, and though Wyvill had assumed Portugal's right to rule over the Sultan of Angoche. The Sultan in fact denied the Portuguese pretensions and stated that Muscat's subjects drove a flourishing trade in Angoche. Britain, therefore, sent a warship to investigate the extent of Portuguese authority.⁴

The Portuguese government had cogitated long, but at last, in the very month that Clarendon raised the question of the limits of Portuguese authority in East Africa, they reduced customs duties and relaxed restrictions on foreign trade in their East African possessions. The decrees⁵ effecting this were not to be operative until numerous customs houses had been erected at Ibo, Quelimane, Inhambane, Lourenço Marques and a host of smaller ports. Then only were these ports to be opened to foreign traders.⁶ This apparently generous Portuguese action was not prompted by Britain's tireless and persistent protests regarding the slave trade nor by the constant extolling of the benefits of freer commerce. The real reason, it seems, was to be found in South African affairs. The protocol of 1847⁷ ensured that Britain would not call in question the claim of Portugal to any territories

¹ W. Sunley was appointed consul in February 1851; P.R.O., F.O. 54/13, Draft, Palmerston to Hamerton, F.O., 14 May 1851.

² P.R.O., F.O. 63/744, Enclosure in No. 112, Pakenham to Palmerston, Lisbon, 18 December 1851.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/736, Draft, F.O. to Pakenham, 6 August 1851.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 63/778, Draft, F.O. to Admiralty, 31 October 1853.

⁵ Decrees of 17 and 19 October 1853.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 63/772, Nos. 134 and 135, Pakenham to Clarendon, Lisbon, 28 October 1853; No. 134 enclosed two decrees for encouragement of trade with Mozambique.

⁷ Cf. 290.

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on the eastern coast of Africa. Moreover, Britain's recognition in 1852 of the Transvaal Republic temporarily, at least, removed the possibility of the English encroaching on Portuguese territory. And though the extent of these territories inland had never been officially defined, the limits north and south had been fixed in the Anglo-Portuguese Convention of 1817. The Boers up in the high-veld were still without a seaport and consequently were a potential danger, but at least England was as desirous as Portugal of defeating their purpose.

Great Britain professed herself delighted with the Portuguese decrees for the encouragement of trade with the 'important province of Mozambique',¹ but the dead hand of inefficiency and corruption among Portuguese officials soon made itself felt, and in 1856 the ports were still unopened and the customs dues not reduced.² The Governor, fearful of the consequences of such abrupt and sweeping changes, had suspended the execution of the decrees³ and proposed alternative measures which were then under consideration.⁴ But these were matters which could hardly have been foreseen in 1853. In that year not only Britain's but Portugal's hopes for an improvement in Mozambique ran high. In June, just before the promulgation of the decrees for opening the East African ports to foreign trade, negotiations were started by some speculators in Lisbon to form a company, analogous to the English East India Company,⁵ to administer and develop the province of Mozambique. The entire province was to be ceded to the Company for a period of ninety-nine years to colonize and civilize by the propagation of the faith, by the effective abolition of the slave trade, by the progressive emancipation of slaves and the development of education, industry and commerce.⁶ Great Britain was suspicious of the lofty moral protestations of the Company, even though ostensibly it was under the patronage of the English Quakers and bound by existing treaties.⁷ Unfortunately

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 63/781, Copy, Pakenham to d'Athogina, Lisbon, 24 November 1853.

² P.R.O., F.O. 63/799, Draft to Howard, F.O., 30 April 1856.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/801, Howard to Clarendon, Lisbon, 18 April 1856.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 63/803, Translation, de Loure to Howard, Palace, 13 August 1856, enclosed in Howard to Clarendon, Lisbon, 16 August 1856.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 84/908, Pakenham to Clarendon, Lisbon, 28 June 1853.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 84/940, Pakenham to Clarendon, Lisbon, 18 October 1854; No. 59, Same to same, Lisbon, 18 November 1854, enclosing basis of contract.

⁷ P.R.O., F.O. 63/779, Draft, F.O. to Pakenham, 8 November 1854; F.O. 63/182, Pakenham to Clarendon, Lisbon, 18 November 1854; F.O. 84/908, Pakenham to Clarendon, Lisbon, 28 June 1853.

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or otherwise the project died before the necessary capital or the men with sufficient intelligence, energy and integrity to manage its affairs had been found. Partly instrumental in its failure seems to have been the Viscount Sá da Bandeira, who as President of the Overseas or Ultramarine Council had every opportunity for learning a great deal about the happenings in the Portuguese colonies and Lisbon.¹ No doubt, therefore, he had good reason for not favouring the projected company.

Viscount Sá, the man on whom Palmerston had ten years before poured a storm of protests regarding Portugal's attitude to the slave trade, was Britain's steady friend and ally in everything relating to the prevention of that traffic. It was from him that Britain's next move concerning Portuguese East Africa emanated and it shows a momentous change in Portugal's attitude. In January 1855 he suggested that a British consul be appointed to East Africa. This would help to increase legitimate trade, especially British, now carried on extensively by Americans, and be a powerful factor in reducing the slave trade.² The British Cabinet and the Lords of the Privy Council for Trade welcomed the suggestion. It seemed to provide an effective remedy for the complaints which poured in from the Cape and from India at the delay in implementing the decrees of 1853.³ French rivalry seemed, temporarily, at least in East African waters, to be removed by the events in the Crimea, where by a strange turn of circumstances French and English soldiers were appearing as allies and comrades on the battlefield. Nevertheless, France had maintained her hold in the Comoro Islands and made a treaty with Portugal in 1853 obtaining most-favoured-nation terms in the Portuguese colonies.⁴ The increased facilities for checking the slave trade,⁵ which had revived⁶ owing to Britain's preoccupation in the war against Russia and the disturbed state of affairs in

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 84/966, Slave Trade, Pakenham to Clarendon, Lisbon, 28 January 1855.

² *Ibid.*

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/798, Extract, Trotter to Admiralty, Seringapatam, 26 March 1855; F.O. 63/781, Pakenham to Clarendon, Lisbon, 28 April 1854; F.O. 63/789, No. 44, F.O. to Ward, 2 October 1855.

⁴ S.P., XLIV, 1078, Decree issued in Paris, 27 December 1853, promulgating the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Portugal, 9 March 1853.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 63/765, Tennent to Hammond, Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade, Whitehall, 3 March 1855.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 63/842, Admiralty to Hammond, 14 January 1858; F.O. 84/908 No. 15, Pakenham to Clarendon, Lisbon, July 1855.

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India,¹ American rivalry, the importance of encouraging legitimate trade, the complaints from the Cape that the natives in and about the immediate vicinity of the British colonies were receiving arms and ammunition from Delagoa Bay,² were all reasons which convinced the British government that the appointment of a consul to Mozambique was extremely desirable.

Britain's first consul in Mozambique was John Lyons McLeod—nominated on the recommendation of Sir R. Murchison, one time President of the Royal Geographical Society, and of Macgregor Laird, the now well-known African merchant-explorer.³ McLeod, judging by his antecedent conduct and experience, was well qualified to execute his duties. As lieutenant in the Royal Navy he had served for many years on the West African coast. He was young, only thirty-two years of age,⁴ having forfeited his navy commission in May 1853, when a request for leave on important private affairs had been refused.⁵ Above all, he was a man of ideas. Early in 1852 he had laid before the Royal Geographical Society a project for ascending the Niger 'with the rising waters'.⁶ The plan had been communicated to Laird, who had been busy since about 1830 on exploration projects of the Niger delta. The Society and the government had supported McLeod's purpose and an expedition had started out two years later under Dr. Baikie. In December 1856 McLeod set out for Mozambique accompanied, in addition to the usual instructions and equipment for his post, by a wife, a civil service certificate of qualification confirming his knowledge of the Portuguese

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 84/1019, McLeod to Clarendon, British Consulate, Moz., 30 October 1857.

² P.R.O., F.O. 63/844, Price to Governor of the Cape, Cape Town, 23 March 1855, enclosure II in Merivale to Hammond, Colonial Office, 6 June 1855; Athogina to Ward, Lisbon, 13 September 1855; cf. also *Journal of Modern History*, VI, 427; Hansard, CXIX, 187, House of Lords, 6 February 1852, and 476, 13 February 1851; F.O. 63/803, No. 200, Howard to Clarendon, Lisbon, 25 August 1856; F.O. 63/810, Lavradio to Clarendon, London, 1 March 1856; F.O. 63/799, No. 10, Draft, F.O. to Howard, 2 February 1856; F.O. 63/811, Draft, F.O. to Colonial Office, 29 February 1856; F.O. 63/800, No. 44, Howard to Clarendon, Lisbon, 3 March 1856; No. 37, Same to same, 16 February 1856.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/809, Note on Rowe to Clarendon, 124 Cheapside, 27 September 1856; Murchison to Hammond, Tunbridge Wells, 3 October 1856.

⁴ P.R.O., F.O. 63/808, McLeod to Clarendon, 7 Lisson Grove South, New Road, 3 October 1856.

⁵ P.R.O., F.O. 63/809, Admiralty to Hammond, 6 October 1856; *Navy List*, 1849, 1850, 1851.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 63/808, Presidential Address at the Anniversary meeting of the Royal Geographical Society, 26 May 1856, by Rear-Admiral F. W. Beschv.

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language, charts of the East Coast of Africa and instruments for taking meteorological observations.¹

The right granted to Britain to appoint a consul in Portuguese East Africa was not an exceptional concession. The United States had secured it in 1840, Spain had obtained similar privileges in 1845 and France in 1853, but Portugal reserved the right to exclude such officers from any of her ports. It was on the latter basis that Dr. Livingstone in 1858 was refused the exequatur as consul for Sena and Tete, then not yet opened to foreign commerce. But the appointment is interesting for other reasons. It illustrates that although Britain had taken advantage of her privilege and now had three consuls on the East African seaboard—at Zanzibar, the Comoro Islands and Mozambique—in addition to her naval base at Mauritius, other countries too and especially her two dreaded rivals, the United States and France, had kept pace with her in Portuguese East Africa as they had in Zanzibar. In addition they had other advantages. Their subjects were still slave trading and were therefore more popular than the British in East Africa. The United States, though without territorial ambition, had secured the greater share of trade at Zanzibar and in Portuguese East Africa; France was firmly established at Madagascar and the Comoro Islands; a Prussian scientist, Wilhelm Peters, had appeared in Mozambique as early as 1842,² while Hamburg merchants were pushing their trade with Zanzibar and soon they were to attempt to obtain territory as a base for further enterprise. The Boers of the Transvaal, too, had nearly succeeded in 1855 in arranging a trade agreement with Portugal and obtaining a shorter road to the sea through Portuguese territory.

Hence at the time of McLeod's appointment all the characters in the future East African drama were assembled on the stage. Indeed, the appointment of a British consul at Mozambique is not in itself an important event; its significance lies in the series of events of which it was the consummation. The emergence of East Africa from the obscurity which had long veiled it from the sight of European statesmen was in a fair way to being achieved.

¹ P.R.O., F.O. 63/809, Tennent to Shelburne, Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade, Whitehall, 28 October 1856; Draft, F.O. to Admiralty, 30 October 1856; Admiralty to F.O., 3 December 1856; F.O. 63/808, F.O. to McLeod, 6 November 1856.

² A.H.U., Moz., VI, No. 50, d'Abreu de Lima to Secretary of State for Marine and Colonial Affairs, 21 November 1843. (Cf. Appendix, Letter I.)

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The pressure of events had brought the coast prominently into the awareness of statesmen and merchants who perhaps had been led to expect rather too much from the unseen consumer in the African interior. But the importance the coast had acquired was not realized by the English man in the street. British public opinion was still only aware of Africa in so far as it desired the destruction of the seemingly indestructible slave trade. And indeed the huge stretch of country then known as 'Equatorial Africa', occupying nearly twenty degrees of latitude and extending from coast to coast, was with the exception of the fringe on either side still almost *terra incognita*.

There had been and there still were explorers of every nationality. On the East coast, which as late as the 1820s had been neglected by philanthropists, new interest had recently been manifested. Dr. Krapf spent thirteen years, from 1836 to 1849, as missionary and explorer in Abyssinia and East Africa. Burton and Speke were at this very time (1858) in quest of Nyasa, which had been described in 1856 by the Rev. J. Erhardt. The Portuguese themselves had done little to open Africa. But even they, listless, unadventurous and improvident, had accomplished something since the days when Dr. Francisco de Lacerda e Almeida had advanced up the Zambesi to the chief Kazembe's kraal. In addition to the Monteiro-Gamitto expedition in 1831¹ another under Dr. Salis got no farther; but, as in 1806–11, some native traders accompanying it continued westward when the expedition withdrew, bearing a letter to the Governor of Angola dated 10 March 1832, which they delivered on 25 April 1839. Three Arab traders also achieved a crossing from Zanzibar to Benguela, reaching their goal in 1852. They left Benguela again on 9 June 1853, and arrived at Mozambique on 12 November 1854. Then at last, between 1853 and 1856, Silva Porto² made his way from Benguela to the mouth of the Ruvuma. He must have passed somewhere near Lake Nyasa, and one of his personal slaves was said to have seen it.³

¹ Cf. 91, 98.

² Cf. 267.

³ F.R.O., F.O. 63/808, Beechy's address; C. R. Machado de Faria e Maia, 'As viagens dos portugueses na África e na Ásia', *Boletim Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa*, Series 51^a, Nov.–Dec. 1933, Paul Barré, 'Prioridade dos exploradores portugueses nas travessias africanas', *Revista Portuguesa colonial e marítima*, 1897–8, I, 145–8; 'Notice of a Caravan Journey from East to West Coast of Africa', communicated by Vice-Consul Brand through F.O., 'Extracts from letters of an Hungarian traveller...', etc., *Journal of Royal Geographical Society*, XXIV, 1854, 266–73.

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These and many other expeditions, from east and west and from north and south, had from time to time ventured into the interior to trade, to ascertain the general features of the country and to inform the interested world in what quarter future movements might with greater advantage be directed. It was left to a greater man to open Africa and light the spark that was to kindle the enthusiasm of Europe.

Dr. Livingstone, who had reached Angola fever-stricken and exhausted early in 1854, crossed back through the swamps and jungles of the African interior with its hostile native tribes to Tete, where he arrived a mere scarecrow in March 1856.¹ Nourished and cared for by hospitable Portuguese, a month later he was in Quelimane. At last, on 12 July, H.M.S. *Frolic* put in and took him to Mauritius. On 12 December he landed in England.² McLeod had set out for Mozambique six days before.³ Thus he who was opening a new chapter in African history passed near the coast of England the man whose appointment marked the end of the previous chapter. With the coming of McLeod the setting of the East African stage was completed. The advent of Livingstone put in motion the forces dominating the next act of the drama.

It does not matter that McLeod arrived in Mozambique to find the slave traders so strongly entrenched that his life was made unbearable.⁴ Portugal had recognized that the most effective step she could take to suppress the slave trade was to follow Britain's lead and do her part. McLeod's appointment which had actually originated in Portugal was proof enough. But that was not all. As early as 1848 a commission had been appointed to consider the abolition of slavery in all Portuguese colonies.⁵ In the course of time its labours bore fruit. During 1854⁶ and 1856 laws were enacted for the registration of slaves and the liberation of those belonging to public bodies, those entering Portugal, Madeira or the Azores, children born of slaves and all slaves in certain districts and colonies. Only the final step remained. In 1858 it was en-

¹ Livingstone, *Travels and Researches*, Chapters XXVI-XXX.

² Coupland, *Kirk on the Zambesi*, 70; Livingstone, op. cit., Chapters XXXI-XXXII; Blaikie, *The Personal Life of David Livingstone* (London, 1880), 159-65.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/809, Draft, F.O. to Admiralty, 30 October 1856.

⁴ McLeod, II, 1-143; cf. pp. 279-80.

⁵ S.P., XXXV, 435; Coupland, op. cit., 20.

⁶ P.R.O., F.O. 84/940, *Díario do Governo*, No. 305, Decree of December 1854.

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acted that slavery would cease to exist altogether throughout the Portuguese colonies at the end of twenty years.¹

In other directions, too, although the effect of good intentions at far-away Lisbon was wont to prove neither continuous nor effectual, efforts at stimulating progress in the colony were again being made. An attempt was made to promote the production of oil.² Provision was made in 1856 for the education of clergy and missionaries in the Empire,³ and finally at least one little breach in the traditional policy or commercial monopoly was made—foreign trade was permitted at two or three African ports.⁴

Meantime, Livingstone's lecture tour in England focused attention on the state actual and potential of South-East Africa. At numerous meetings he made long speeches to prove that the Zambesi River was the principal means of communication with 'south central Africa' and that along this waterway an enormous trade might be done. It was said that these accounts were again exciting that dangerous weapon, British public opinion, and that companies for the purpose of availing themselves of the facilities indicated by Dr. Livingstone were being formed.⁵ The Portuguese were thrown into a dilemma from which there was no escape. They realized that the encouragement of trade with other countries, agricultural development as well as white colonization in Africa were very desirable so long as there was no infringement of the rights of the Royal Crown over the territory through which the Zambesi flowed. But Livingstone was returning to continue his exploration, and the British government was planning to send an expedition up the Zambesi. This could hardly be refused.⁶ Yet the flimsy nature of Portugal's claims to a vast territory, with its ill-defined boundaries and shadowy jurisdiction, was bound to be revealed. In fact such claims had already been called in question.⁷

¹ Coupland, *Kirk on the Zambesi*, 85.

² P.R.O., F.O. 63/804, No. 304, Howard to Clarendon, Lisbon, 27 December 1856.

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/803, No. 201, Howard to Clarendon, Lisbon, 25 August 1856.

⁴ S.P., XLVII, 905–11; XLIX, 603, 611, 1063.

⁵ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., 76b, Sá da Bandeira to the Gov.-Gen. of Mozambique, Palace, 21 October 1857. (Cf. Appendix, Letter IX.)

⁶ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., I, 108b, Sá da Bandeira to Finance and Overseas Commissions, Lisbon, 15 December 1858. (Cf. Appendix, Letter XI.)

⁷ P.R.O., F.O. 63/801, No. 133, Howard to d'Athogina, Lisbon, 15 April 1866, enclosed in Howard's Dispatch, No. 80, of 18 April 1856. For report on conditions in Angoche, see F.O. 63/788, extracts from letters of Commander Talbot and Monro of H.M.S. *Hyde*, enclosed in Admiralty to Hammond, 6 June 1854.

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Prolix and incoherent instructions to the Governor of Mozambique show the alarm which beset the Lisbon authorities. Fear of the French, Boers and English had previously resulted in the erection of wooden fortresses in many places. Minor officials had been appointed in every place where there were any Portuguese at all, but now every mail brought more detailed instructions for erecting a façade of government over the whole province. A show of occupation was to be made wherever possible, but only by Portuguese subjects; individual foreign settlers could stay in the province only if they remained subject to Portuguese laws.¹ A skeleton of defence works was to be erected at all strategic points. Armed parties of foreigners and foreign ships were to be excluded. Livingstone was not to be allowed to establish political relations with native chiefs; those chiefs were living in Portuguese territory and even though there had been penetration by some other Kaffir tribes the Portuguese hoped shortly to drive them out. It was never to be forgotten that Livingstone's expedition had been sanctioned 'solely in the interests of science and none other'. Plans were to be prepared of towns and forts at important points along the Zambesi² and the name 'Zambesia' was appropriated to all the Portuguese territories 'in the valley of the Zambesi from the mouths of that river to beyond the fortress of Zumbo'.³ Plans such as these, it was hoped, might prevent Dr. Livingstone, 'under cover of the Gospel or of science' from changing 'his status of explorer for that of a conqueror'. As proof of Portuguese dominion, sundry proposals made by agents of German societies for the concession of land to form a colony on the banks of the Zambesi were actually granted.⁴ Little did Portugal or her wise Secretary of State, Viscount Sá da Bandeira, then dream that the latest comer on the scene might yet prove a great potential danger to the cherished African possessions!

¹ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., I, 108b, Sá da Bandeira to Finance and Overseas Commissions, Lisbon, 15 December 1858. (Cf. Appendix, Letter XI.)

² A.H.U., Confidential Docs., I, 90b, No. 26, Sá da Bandeira to the 'Commander of the Patrol which is to lie off the mouths of the Zambesi', Palace, 28 January 1858. (Cf. Appendix, Letter X.)

³ P.R.O., F.O. 63/842, No. 4, Livingstone to Malmesbury, steamer *Pearl*, 22 March 1858; No. 34, Howard to Clarendon, Lisbon, 8 February 1858, quoted by Coupland, *Kirk on the Zambesi*, 92-3.

⁴ A.H.U., Confidential Docs., I, No. 26, 108b, Sá da Bandeira to the Finance and Overseas Commissions, Lisbon, 15 December 1858 (cf. Appendix, Letter XI); P.R.O., F.O. 63/843, No. 513, Howard to Malmesbury, Lisbon, 22 December 1858, enclosing translated extract from *Diário do Governo*, 21 December 1858.

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Portuguese activity and the manifestation of German interest in East Africa mark the beginnings of the change heralded by Livingstone's arrival. Livingstone's journeys begin a new epoch in the history of the dealings of European powers with East Africa, not because he followed different methods from those of his fellow missionaries nor because he overcame greater obstacles. His observations are not always accurate and his Zambezi expedition (1858-63) proved that his ability to handle whites, as well as his judgement, were often faulty. But like Drake's circumnavigation of the globe, his transcontinental journey (1853-56) excited the admiration of the enlightened world. His courage, his scientific discoveries, his lecture tours and his voluminous writings all helped to galvanize British public attention and to direct it towards East Africa. Since the eighteenth century it had been focused on the west; now for the first time the eastern seaboard came into the forefront of public concern. No longer were only a few politicians, manufacturers and traders to be interested in that coast. Europe as well as the British people had their attention directed to East Africa. It was as though Livingstone applied the spark which set alight the existing elements laid in the era before his arrival. Slowly at first the flame began to burn, but presently with a steadily gathering strength, until in the closing years of the century, the whole of Africa was illuminated by the fierce light of publicity. European as well as British policy in Africa had become positive to an extent far greater than the humanitarians had ever dreamed possible. The scramble for Africa, so acute an international problem in the eighties, was but the accentuation of the circumstances of Livingstone's day. Indeed, the fundamentals of the present international complications in East Africa and its waters—the African dilemma to look outwards or inwards, whether to face towards the west or towards the east and whether black, brown and white men can learn to face each other—are to be found in the problems surveyed in this study.

Appendix

PORTUGUESE DOCUMENTS WITH TRANSLATIONS

i d'Abreu de Lima to Minister and Secretary of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs, Mozambique, 21 November 1843. Report of Governor's visit to Zanzibar and Mayotte (Maiata). New Trade arrangements with the Imam (Moz. VI) page 313

THE PORTUGUESE AND THE GREAT TREK:

ii d'Abreu de Lima to Secretary of State for Colonies, Mozambique, 31 August 1844. Reporting Potgieter's arrival in Delagoa Bay (Moz. VII) 315

iii d'Abreu de Lima to Minister and Secretary of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs, Mozambique, 1 July 1843. Reporting the arrival of the *Brazilia* and the reasons for allowing Smellekamp to reside in Lourenço Marques. Marginal annotation in pencil discusses Portuguese government's reaction 317

iv Joaquim José Falcão to Governor-General of Mozambique, Sintra, 3 August 1844. Portuguese reaction to the dispatch of British troops from the Cape to subject the Natalians 320

v Falcão to Governor-General of India, Belem Palace, 31 May 1845. India to aid Mozambique with forces and munitions 323

vi Falcão to Governor-General of Mozambique, Belem Palace, 17 April 1846. The French have dispatched an Expedition to the East coast of Africa. Measures to be adopted by the local Portuguese officials 324

vii Secretariat for Marine and Overseas Affairs to Governor-General of Mozambique, 9 September 1846. The Dutch to be treated with tolerance pending final decision of the Portuguese government 326

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viii Secretary of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs to page 328
João de Pontes Pereira de Melo, 2 September 1847.
Discussing whether British help from the Cape should
be enlisted against the Dutch

PORtUGUESE REACTION TO DR. LIVINGSTONE:

ix Sá da Bandeira to Governor-General of Mozambique, Palace, 21 October 1857 329

x Sá da Bandeira to 'the Commander of the Patrol which is to lie off the mouths of the Zambesi', Palace, 28 January 1858 332

xi Sá da Bandeira to Finance and Overseas Commissions, Lisbon, 15 December 1858. Discussing German proposals for the concession of land in Zambezia 339

xii Andriano Mauricio Guilherme Ferreri to the Governor-General of Mozambique, Palace, 31 May 1859 341

NOTE: Letters III-XII are to be found in Confidential Documents, vol. I, 4 October 1838-24 November 1884.

[i]

Moz. VI: No. 30

Rodrigo Luciano d'Abreu de Lima
to: The Minister and Secretary of State for Marine and
Overseas Affairs

Moçambique,
21 de Novembro de 1843

Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr.

Em meu officio com o No. 25 na data de 30 d'Agosto ultimo,
dei conta a V.Exa., para conhecimento de Sua Magestade, A Rainha,
da minha hida ao Distrito de Quilimane: agora cumpre informar a
V.Exa., que aportando aqui a Fragata Ingleza *Cleopatra* no dia 17 de
Setembro, o respectivo Comandante Christopher Wyovill offereceu
transportar-me na mesma Fragata a Zanzibar: considerando eu o
nenhum enconveniente nesta digressão, attenta a tranquilidade de que
gozão estes moradores, julguei transcedente pessoalmente tratar com
o Imão de Mascate sobre o fraudulento trafico dos habitantes da
Costa do Norte que dissimulando-se Vassallos de Mascate, continua-
mente contrabandeio nesta Província, e por este motivo acceitei a
opportunidade da Fragata Ingleza, embarcando nella, no dia 19 do

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referido Setembro segui em direitura a Zanzibar, aonde cheguei a 27, demorei tres dias, neste intervallo tratei com o Imamo as medidas, que se devião adoptar, como convenção entre este e aquelle Estado, annuindo a ellas, estabellecemos, que os Pangaios, e mais embarcações, que demandassem esta Província, para serem consideradas, como pertencentes aquelle Estado, devião vir munidos com os Documentos, que authenticassem a bandeira, o que tudo consta da inclusa copia da traducçao da Convenção assignada pelo Imamo de Mascate (Documento No. 1) cujo proprio original fica nesta Secretaria do Governo: d'esta maneira evita-se o contrabando, dos Mujojos, e outros povos d'este Canal, que á sombra d'aquelle Estado, o praticavão, pretextando sempre serem Vassallos de Mascate, punhão este Governo no embargo de proceder: finalmente conseguiu-se que as Embarcações navegassem mais competentemente, e effectivamente fui obsequiado pelo Imamo de Mascate, convidando-me a jantar, e presenteando-me com uma Espada, segundo o costume Oriental.

Deixei Zanzibar no dia 30, seguindo as Ilhas de Comoro surgiu a Fragata em Anjuane no dia 13 d'Outubro, a 14 navegamos para Maiata, que aportamos a 17; esta Ilha foi ultimamente occupada pelos Franceses, que a guarnecião, largando a 19 de volta por Anjuane, regressei a esta capital no dia 26: nesta derrota de 36 dias, fui acompanhado do Doutor Guilherme Peters Naturalista da Prussia, certificando a V.Exa. que nenhuma despesa pezou nos cofres publicos: prevenindo igualmente, que durante a minha auzencia ficou encarregado do Governo Geral por unanime accordo dos Membros do Conselho d'este Governo, o Secretario Geral, o Bacharell, Francisco de Moraes Correa de Castro: o que tudo espero, V.Exa. terá a bondade de fazer presente A Sua Magestade, a fim de merecer a Real Approvação.

TRANSLATION

Mozambique,
21st November 1843

In my dispatch No. 25, dated 30th August last, I acquainted Your Excellency, that you might inform Her Majesty the Queen, with the particulars of my visit to the District of Quilimane; now I must advise you that the English frigate *Cleopatra*, putting in at this port on the 17th September, the Commander, Mr. Christopher Wyovill [sic] offered to take me as far as Zanzibar. In view of the present state of tranquillity [in Mozambique] I saw no harm in making this voyage, as I thought it highly important to have a personal interview with the Imam of Mascate regarding the illicit trade practised by the inhabitants of the northern coast, who, pretending to be vassals of Mascate, are constantly smuggling goods into our Province. I therefore accepted the

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invitation to make the voyage in the English frigate, and we sailed on the 19th of September for Zanzibar, where we arrived on the 27th, staying three days. In this space of time I negotiated with the Imam regarding the measures which should be adopted, in the form of a Convention between his State and ours, and we were able to arrive at an understanding. We established that any *pangais* or other vessels bound for the ports of our Province, in order to be considered as belonging to that State (Mascate), should be able to produce documents authenticating their flag, all of which is set forth in the enclosed copy of the translation of the Convention signed by the Imam of Mascate (Doc. No. 1), the original of which is filed at the Government Office. In this manner we put an end to the smuggling of the Mujujos and other peoples of this channel who, under the protection of the flag of Mascate, were much addicted to such practices, always pretending to be vassals of that State, thereby considerably embarrassing the action of the Government. At last a way has been found of suitably regulating the navigation in those parts. The Imam of Mascate entertained me very cordially, inviting me to dinner and presenting me with a sword according to the custom of the East.

I left Zanzibar on the 30th and proceeded to the Comoro Islands, the frigate making Anjuane on the 13th October. On the 14th we sailed for Maiata, where we put in on 17th. This island has been lately occupied by the French, who have a garrison there. Leaving on the 19th, by way of Anjuane, I arrived back at this Captaincy (Mozambique) on 26th. During this part of the voyage which took 36 days, I was accompanied by Doctor Wilhelm Peters, a Prussian naturalist. I beg to confirm that this voyage cost the State nothing and, further, that in my absence my duties, by the common consent of the Council of this Government, were discharged by Francisco de Moraes Correa de Castro, Bachelor-at-Law and Secretary-General; all of which I trust Your Excellency will have the kindness to communicate to Her Majesty, for the favour of her approbation.

[ii]

Moz. VII: No. 3

R. L. d'Abreu de Lima
to: Secretary of State for Colonies

Moçambique,
31 de Agosto, 1844

... Não concluirá o meu sentir a respeito do Lourenço Marques, sem informar a V.Ex^a. que 24 indivíduos dos Hollandezes vierão aly convenientemente armados, e montados em bons cavallos seguidos

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por 300 Escravos: fizerão bom negocio aos moradores, no marfim, que venderão caçado na excursão emprehendida para escolher situação mais accommodada, onde possão descubrir agoa, cuja falta os tem obrigado a peregrinar a oito annos do 34° ao 26° S de Lat. e correspondente Long. Elles comunicarão ao Governador do nosso dito Destrito, que vinhão assentar a sua residencia junto d'um Rio, mais proximo distante quatro dias de jornada, aqual vereficavão no presente verão.

Pelas informações d'esta Tribu, que dispõe de todos os recursos, com conhecimentos theoreticos, e praticos, adestrados nas guerras cafriaes em que podem promptificar 10,000 combatentes, se evidencia serem insuperaveis os trabalhos da exploração do continente africano, que ja tem em acção o principio germinante da mudança, que vão soffrer os intrincados labirintos das especias selvas guardadas dos mais feroz animaes; colligindo-se d'aqui mais a certeza dos recursos que he mister emprégar do que das eruditas e prolixas exposições laboradas nos gabinetes.

TRANSLATION

*Mozambique,
31st August 1844*

. . . I shall not conclude the expression of my opinion about Lourenço Marques without informing your Excellency that 24 of the Dutchmen came there adequately armed and mounting good horses, followed by 300 slaves. They did good business with the inhabitants in ivory which they obtained while hunting. Their excursion had been undertaken in order to find a more adequate supply of water, which they had had to fetch during the last eight years from 34° to 26° Lat. South and corresponding longitude [?]. They informed the Governor of our said district that this summer they would settle their residence near to a river about four days' journey away.

According to our information of this tribe, it has at its disposal every available resource, theoretical and practical knowledge, as well as being experienced in wars with the Caffirs [*sic*] for which they are capable of putting 10,000 fighting men in the field. It is evident that their work of exploration in the African Continent is formidable. These men have set in action the beginning of the change which the intricate labyrinths of thick woods full of wild animals will undergo. Their experience shows that more resources must be employed than those generally used in the skilled and tedious explanations elaborated in Government Offices.

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CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

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Governor of Mozambique—Rodrigo Luciano d'Abreu de Lima
to: The Minister and Secretary of State for Marine and
Overseas Affairs

Mozambique,
1º de Julho de 1843

Ill.^{mo} e Ex.^{mo} Snr.

No dia dous de Junho proximo passado apontou a esta o Patacho Hollandez, denominado—Brasilité—com directa procedencia de Master-dam, para negociar nesta Costa, e com especialidade no 4º Destrito, Lourenço Marques, pelo sobre cargo me foi comunicado, que a bordo do dito Patacho seguião viagem mais tres individuões Hollandeses, e uma Senhora, os quaes todos, assim como elle sobre-carga, pertendião hir residir em Lourenço Marques, para d'aly procurarem correspondencia com uma Tribu, tambem Hollandeza, situada á oito dias de jornada do referido 4º Destrito; considerando a pertençao, acheia-se reconhecida vantagem pelos motivos seguintes.

A tribu de que se trata, são quinze mil individuos dianbos os sexos Hollandeses, que, abandonando as Possessões Inglezas do Cabo em 1837 verão peregrinando pelo interior no continente, e finalmente ali se estabelecerão, depois de terem sido perseguidos na Costa de Natal pelos Inglezes; reconhecem por seo Chefe um homem de talento, por nome Pedro, a sua principal habitação he denominada Cidadella de Pedro Maria, são muito laboriosos, e tem levado a agricultura, e industria ao que he accreditavel n'esta parte do mundo; são respeitados pelos indigenas Pretos, a quem severamente esterminarão nas profiadas pelejas, que forão obrigados a sustentar na sua excursão.

O nosso Presidio de Lourenço Marques he susceptivel de ser uma Grande Cidade; acha-se deshabitado, e limitado as imediações da nossa Fortaleza, por cauza das continuas Guerras com os Pretos, seos poucos habitantes são tão indolentes, que lhes faltão os generos de primeira necessidade, nestas circunstancias ponderei que devia permitir a residencia interina áquelle individuo, não desprezando a oportunidade de começar relações amigaveis com aquella Tribu, que seguramente são mais fieis, e leaes do que os Pretos; e não obstante poder-se agourar o melhor exito d'esta medida, com tudo isto fui mui cauteloso na concessão, comprehendida no contheúdo do meo officio, que dirigi ao Comandante Militar daquelle 4º Destrito, que incluo por Copia, Documento nº 1. e assim na tambem inclusa Copia da Relação adjunta, Documento nº 2; VEx^a terá a bondade de ver os nomes, e

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profissões dos quatro homens, e uma Senhora, Hollandezes, que interinamente vão residir em Lourenço Marques para procurarem correspondencia com a mensionada Tribu.

Accrescento a VEx^a que tomei as convenientes providencias, afim de que, quando VEx^a anteveja o contrario, e disponha o que mais convier nenhuma consequencia possa resultar: VEx^a melhor do que eu pode avaliar a importancia, e resultado d'esta medida, que não desprezei definitivamente por desejar deveras o engrandecimento d'aquelle Bahia, hoje insignificante a todos os respectos, parecendo-me da maior conveniencia não só a aquisição d'individuos industrioso, mas mesmo presumo proveitosas as relações com os Hollandezes, naquelles limites estabelecidos.

Deos Guarde a VEx^a.

Tem á margem os apontamentos seguintes feitos a lapis:

Aqui temos os Holandezes, q-se tem querido estabelecer na outra banda da Bahia, e que nos tem motivado as guerras dos indigenas, a quererem entrometer-se á sordina no nosso estabelecim^{to}; e se estes que agora se estabelecem na Bahia chegarem a comunicar com a tal Colonia dos 15:000, em breve teremos a fabula da cadella q-pedio á porca a mercé de parir na sua cara.

Não sei que remedio dar-lhes é precizo mandar acautelar, que sejam vigiados q-se lhe dé a protecção ord^a p. qualquer ramo de Commercio que quizerem, mas que é necess^o acautelar em futuro contra as maliciozas intenções q- estes e outros hospedes podem ter p. tirar partido da nossa fraqueza em homens e meios naquelles Estabelecimento.

O unico remedio é activar a industria e do nosso lado e a respeito de Moçambique, urge q- de cá se levante o Braço do Gov.^{or} o mais q-for possivel.

TRANSLATION

*Mozambique,
1st July 1843*

Your Excellency,

On the second day of June last there entered into this Port the Dutch Barquentine *Brasilia* direct from Masterdam [Amsterdam?] for the purpose of trading on this coast, especially in the 4th District, Lourenço Marques. I was informed by the Supercargo that on board the said vessel were three other Dutchmen and a lady, all of whom as well as he wished to reside at Lourenço Marques and there endeavour to establish relations with a Tribe, also Dutch, established at eight days' journey from the said 4th District. I duly considered their application and found it acceptable and reasonable for the following reasons:

The Tribe in question is composed of fifteen thousand Dutch individuals of both sexes who left the English Possessions in the Cape in 1837 and, journeying into the interior of the continent, settled in

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their present locality after being persecuted by the English in the coast of Natal; they acknowledge as leader a man of great talent, by the name of Pieter; their principal settlement is called the Citadel of Pieter Marie: they are very hardworking and have developed farming and industry as much as it is possible to do in this part of the world; they are respected by the Blacks whom they have severely punished in the many hard engagements they have had to fight in the course of their migration.

Our settlement at Lourenço Marques can still become a great city; yet, because of the constant wars with the natives, it is depopulated and extends little beyond the fortress. Its few inhabitants are so indolent that they lack the barest staple necessities. Under the circumstances I judged that I ought to allow the said individuals to reside there temporarily and that I should not neglect an opportunity to establish friendly relations with the Tribe in question, who surely will be safer and more loyal friends than the Negroes.

Nevertheless, though the success of this measure might reasonably be anticipated, I observed the greatest care when granting the permit as contained in my dispatch to the Military Governor of the aforesaid 4th District, copy of which I enclose herewith (Document No. 1), together with a copy of the Report appended (Document No. 2). Your Excellency will kindly note the names and occupations of the four Dutchmen and one Dutchwoman who are about to establish themselves temporarily in Lourenço Marques with a view to getting into contact with the aforesaid Tribe.

For Your Excellency's information, I beg to add that I have taken suitable precautions to avoid any ill consequences [of this step], should Your Excellency at any time wish to rescind it and take other measures. Your Excellency, better than I, will be able to judge the importance and possible consequences of this affair, which I thought proper not to turn down peremptorily because I truly desire an improvement of the conditions in the said Bay which at present are very poor indeed in every way. It seemed to me highly convenient to secure the services of industrious settlers and at the same time I deem it profitable to maintain relations with the Dutch established on the aforesaid border.

God Keep Your Excellency.

Bears the following marginal annotation in pencil:

The Dutch who have wished to establish themselves on the other side of the Bay and who have embroiled us in wars with the natives are covertly trying to penetrate into our Settlement. If these who are now established in the Bay succeed in making contact with the said Colony of 15,000, we shall shortly have the fable of the dog who begged the sow to farrow on her face.¹

¹ It has not been possible to find the origin of this fable. It seems the dog wished the sow to farrow on her face so as to eat the little pigs.

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I do not know how best to settle this matter. We must write out to say that every precaution must be taken but that they [the new Settlers] be assured the ordinary safeguards in whatever branch of business they pursue. However, in future, it is necessary to provide against any malicious intention on the part of these or any other visitors to take advantage of our own weakness in man power and resources in the aforesaid settlement.

The only remedy is to stimulate our own trade and industry and, as far as Mozambique is concerned, it is imperative that the arm of the Governor should be strengthened as much as possible, without delay.

[iv]

No. 26, page 7

Joaquim José Falcão
to: The Governor-General of Mozambique

*Sintra,
3 d'Agosto de 1844*

Manda A Rainha pela Secretaria d'Estado dos Negocios da Marinha e Ultramar participar ao Governador Geral da Provincia de Moçambique, que por noticias que acabão de receber-se pelo Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, consta que do Cabo de Boa Esperança sahirão em 15 de Julho do anno proximo passado para o porto de Natal, Reforços de Tropas Britanicás com o fim d'aniquilarem, ou reduzirem á obediencia d' huma Colonia Inglesa que pretende estabelecer-se entre a do Cabo e o nosso Dominio de Lourenço Marques, os Boers (Lavradores) que formão a Republica de Natal, aos quaes os Ingleses chamão rebeldes em consequencia da má Recepção que fizerão a Mr. Cloete, Secretario do Governador Geral do Cabo Sr. Jorge Napier, quando lhes apresentou huma proclamação que os convidava á obediencia, acontecimento que naturalmente provoca huma guerra, se he que não tem já tido Logar as hostilidades.

O estabelecimento de huma Colonia Ingleza que confine com a nossa da Bahia de Lourenço Marques, e huma guerra nas nossas fronteiras não podem ser indiferentes ao Governo de Sua Magestade, bem como o não he a existencia d' huma Collonia Hollandeza tão proxima da dita Bahia: huma Colonia Ingleza n'aquelle paragem em breve dominará a mesma Bahia, atrahirá para as suas Feitorias todo o commercio do interior, e reduzirá o nosso á insignificancia, ou á nullidade, males que progressivamente se estenderão ás d'Inhambane, e Sofala: a Colonia Hollandeza, engrossando com o tempo, e não tendo porto para communicarem com os seus compatriotas da Europa, virá lançar-se sobre L.M. directa, ou indirectamente por meio dos

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Barbaros que se lhes vão unindo ou já se unirão, formando todos a Republica do Natal, que por isso mesmo que inclue a Força Hollandeza mais excita o ciume do Governo Inglez, se he que essa circunstancia não deu origem á lembrança de crear huma nova Colonia entre a do Cabo e L. M.: finalmente huma guerra na fronteira, estando o estabelecimento Portuguez desprovido e em fraqueza pode ter em resultado a ocupação delle, ou pelo menos graves dificuldades, e a impossibilidade de conservar a neutralidade, e de a manter rigorosa, quando assim o convenha.

Neste estado de cousas, he necessario que o sobredicto Governador Geral, applicando a maior attenção ao Destrito de L.M. cuide em o por em respeito e a coberto de qualquer golpe de mão, fazendo para ali partir a Tropa que julgar conveniente com a Artilharia e Munições correspondentes, bem como com alguns operarios, que possão reparar qualquer ruina que haja na Fortaleza, ou mesmo crear alguma de novo se for indispensaval; o que tudo se fará sem ostentação e alarme, incobrindo-se quanto possa ser o verdadeiro objecto das medidas que se adoptarem.

2º. Que dê ao Governador do referido Destrito, confidencialmente, as ordens necessarias para adquirir todas as noticias dos designios e movimentos dos beligerantes, redobrando d'actividade e diligencia quanto a segurança, á proporção que se forem aproximando.

3º. Que faça conhecer ao mesmo Governador como hum segredo d'Estado e a que fica ligada a maior responsabilidade, que o interesse da Nação está em não ter por fronteiras n'aquelle paragem, nem Inglezes, nem Hollandezes, por que ha mais a temer d'elles do que das Tribus negras e barbaras, e por tanto que longe d'auxiliar qualquer d'aquellas duas Nações Europeas, deverá deixa-las destruir entre si, aproveitando a occasião d'avassalar, ou aliar alguns Regulos Limitrofes, de forma que qualquer das duas Colonias que venha por fim a prevalecer não toque imediatamente o Dominio Portuguez. Este pensamento a que não pode d'aqui dar-se todo o desenvolvimento de que carece, será comprehendido pelo Governador Geral para dar ao seu Subalterno as regras de conducta que deverá guardar nas diferentes occurencias que possão offerecer-se; não perdendo nunca de vista que tudo se deve obrar por manejos de tal forma secretas, que não possão comprometter o Governo, para o que se torna necessaria a maior attenção e politica, que Sua Magestade Espera ver empregada pelo mesmo Governador Geral.

4º. Que se ainda não tiverem sahido de L.M. os individuos Hollandezes, que ali mandou admittir por seu Officio de 10 de Junho do anno passado, e que se mandarão retirar por Portaria deste Ministerio de 28 de Novembro do mesmo anno (confidencial B) os faça effectivamente e logo sahir para se evitar qualquer comprometimento.

Appendix

TRANSLATION

*Sintra,
3rd August 1844*

The Queen instructs the Secretariat of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs to inform the Governor-General of the Province of Mozambique that, from news just received by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, it appears that on the 15th July of last year reinforcements of British troops left the Cape of Good Hope bound for the port of Natal, for the purpose of destroying or reducing to obedience a band of English colonists who are trying to establish a settlement between the Cape Province and our Dominion of Lourenço Marques. These Boers or farmers who form the Republic of Natal are termed 'Rebels' by the English owing to the bad reception they gave to Mr. Cloete, Secretary to the Governor-General [*sic*] of the Cape (Mr. George Napier) when he delivered to them a proclamation calling upon them to remain loyal. This event is likely to cause a war, and hostilities may already have commenced.

The establishment of an English colony on the very borders of our Bay of Lourenço Marques and a war along our frontier are matters to which Her Majesty's government cannot remain indifferent, just as they are not indifferent to the existence of a Dutch Colony so close to the said Bay. An English Colony in the said locality would soon dominate the Bay, would attract all the inland trade to their factories [i.e. trading posts] and would reduce our commerce to very little or nothing, which ills would gradually extend to our centres at Inhambane and Sofala. The Dutch Colony in time augmenting in numbers and having no port enabling them to maintain communication with their fellow-countrymen in Europe will fall upon Lourenço Marques either by direct action or indirectly by recourse to the savages who have and are joining them. The very fact that this Republic has a [strong Dutch] nucleus excites the jealousy of the British government. It may even be that this fact gave rise to the idea of creating a new Colony between the Cape and Lourenço Marques. Lastly, a war on our border, in view of our lack of resources and our weakness, may result in the occupation of our territory or at least cause us grave difficulties, and make it very difficult to observe and maintain a neutral position, whenever it should suit us to do so.

In view of these circumstances the said Governor-General, paying special attention to the district of Lourenço Marques, must take measures to safeguard that District from any sudden raid or operation, by dispatching to that locality such forces as he may deem convenient, with the necessary artillery and munitions, and also workmen for the purpose of repairing any parts of the Fortress which may have fallen into ruin, or even of creating new fortifications if necessary. All this

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must be carried out without ostentation or signs of alarm and the true purpose of the works must be disguised as much as possible.

2. He must further confidentially instruct the Governor of the District in question, to take the necessary steps to keep himself informed of the designs and movements of the belligerent parties and to strengthen all measures of security as the operations draw near to Lourenço Marques.

3. He must convey to the said Governor, as a secret of State involving the greatest responsibility, that it is in the country's interest to have neither English nor Dutch abutting on our frontier in those parts, for they are more to be feared than the black and savage tribes and, therefore, far from assisting either of those two European countries, he should let them destroy each other and seize the opportunity to place under allegiance to us, or to seek alliance with, some of the borders chiefs, so that whichever the Colony that shall win in the end, it shall not march absolutely into Portuguese territory. This policy, which cannot be fully expounded here, must be kept in mind by the Governor-General when instructing his subordinates about the rules of conduct they must observe during any events that may occur. It must never be forgotten that everything must be done covertly so as not to compromise the Government; this will require great attention and ability, and Her Majesty expects that these qualities will be shown by the Governor-General.

4. If the Dutch individuals whom the Governor-General allowed to settle in Lourenço Marques, according to his Dispatch of the 10th June of last year, and who were ordered to leave, by the Ordinance issued by this Ministry on 28th November of the same year (Confidential? B), have not yet left, they are to be sent away at once so as to avoid any complications.

[v]

No. 26, page 8

Joaquim José Falcão
to: Governor-General of India

*Palacio de Belém,
31 de Maio de 1845*

Tendo aparecido em frente da Bahia de Lourenço Marques uma Colonia, ou Republica Hollandeza fugindo á perseguição dos Ingleses do Cabo de Boa Esperança, que tambem se viu aproximando pela occupação da costa do Natal; e cumprindo por todos os modos ter a dita Colonia em respeito, e mesmo faze-la desviar por vontade, ou por

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força para paragem donde não possa prejudicar os Estabelecimentos da Corôa Portugueza: Manda A Rainha pela Secretaria d'Estado dos Negocios da Marinha e Ultramar, que o Governador Geral do Estado da India, tomando na mais alta consideração, o que nesta se lhe participa, auxilie o Governador Geral de Moçambique com todos os meios de Força armada, munições etc. que por elle lhe forem requisitados, e de que possa dispor; o que Sua Magestade Ha por muito, e muito recomendado, como a importancia do negocio o exige.

TRANSLATION

*Belem Palace,
31st May 1845*

Whereas a Dutch Colony or Republic [i.e. group of settlers] has made its appearance opposite the Bay of Lourenço Marques, fleeing from the persecution of the English in the Cape, and whereas the English, too, are approaching [our territories] by the occupation of the Natal Coast; and since the said band of Settlers must at all costs be made to respect our authority, and must indeed be turned back, by persuasion or force, to other parts where they cannot work harm to the Portuguese Crown Settlements: The Queen, through the Secretariat of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs, ordains that the Governor-General of the State of India, giving the matter herein contained his most serious attention, shall aid the Governor-General of Mozambique with such available armed forces, munitions, etc., as the latter Governor shall demand; this Her Majesty earnestly recommends in view of the gravity of the issues involved.

[vi]

No. 26, page 20b

Joaquim José Falcão
to: Governor-General of Mozambique

*Palacio de Belem,
17 de Abril de 1846*

Constando a Sua Magestade a Rainha pelas participações recebidas do Ministro da mesma Augusta Senhora na Corte de França que d'aquelle Reino estava proximo a partir huma Expedição Marítima concertada entre os Ministros da Marinha e do Commercio, com o fim ostensivo e declarado de explorar debaixo de aspecto Commercial a Costa Oriental d'Africa compreendida entre a Bahia da Lagoa, e o Cabo de Guardafu, e fazendo huma tal tentativa, juntamente com as

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tendencias que has tempos se observão no Governo Francez de ocupar muitos pontos daquelle Costa, conceber serias apprehensões ao Governo de Sua Magestade pela usurpação que pode vir a verificar-se de algum territorio Portuguez, em que não haja estabelecimentos fixos, sendo tambem certo que a exploração commercial he alli prohibida ás Potencias Estrangeiras que para tal fim não tem tratados com Portugal: Manda A mesma Augusta Senhora pela Secretaria d'Estado dos Negocios da Marinha e do Ultramar recommendar este tão importante assumpto ao zélo, cuidado, e vigilancia do Governador Geral da Provincia de Moçambique, para que por todos os meios, e diligencias que estiverem ao seu alcance procure sustentar os Direitos da Coroa de Portugal, e evitar que cheguem a ser levados a effeito quaisquer sinistras intenções de huma tal expedição, incumbindo especialmente os Comandantes dos Navios de Guerra estacionados na dita Provincia de vigiarem toda a Costa, e de darem immediata participação de qualquer ocorrência, para o que lhes ministrará instruções muito confidenciaes. Pelo que respeita aquelles pontos do territorio Portuguez, em que não ha estabelecimentos fixos, e que sob falsos pretextos podem ser occupados, Sua Magestade novamente lembra ao mesmo Governador Geral a medida, que em Portaria de 9 de Dezembro do anno proximo passado lhe foi recommendeda, de fazer levantar naquelles ditos pontos, em que fôr possivel a Bandeira Portugueza, estabelecendo Feitorias, e fazendo mesmo construir algumas cazas de madeira nos sitios mais abandonados, com a cautela porem, de que tais cazas não se possão considerar Barracões d'escravatura. Dado comtudo o cazo de que se venhão a verificar as suppostas intenções daquelle Expedição, o Governador Geral uzando de todos os meios de persuasão que a sua prudencia lhe sugerir, procurará fazer evacuar qualquer ponto, que tenha sido occupied, e quando por fim veja frustrados todos os seus esforços, protestará então contra semelhantes factos dando parte circunstaciada de todo o ocorrido pela mesma Secretaria de Estado.

TRANSLATION

Belem Palace,
17th April 1846

Whereas Her Majesty the Queen has been given to understand by the Minister of the said August Lord at the Court of France that a maritime expedition, organized by the Minister of Marine and Commerce is about to set out from the Kingdom, for the alleged purpose of exploring the commercial possibilities of the East Coast of Africa between Lagoa Bay and Cape Guardafui; whereas this scheme, together with the tendency which the French Government has shown for some time to occupy many localities on that coast, causes serious apprehension to Her Majesty's government owing to the possible usurpation of

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Portuguese Territory in places where there are no permanent settlements; and whereas trade with those parts is forbidden to foreign Powers which have not commercial treaties with Portugal: The said August Lady, has instructed the Secretariat of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs, to recommend this important matter to the zeal, care and vigilance of the Governor-General of the Province of Mozambique, that by every means at his disposal he may diligently strive to uphold the Rights of the Crown of Portugal and to prevent the execution of any nefarious plans envisaged by the said expedition, to which end he shall particularly give highly confidential instructions to the captains of the vessels-of-war stationed in that Province to watch the whole length of coast and to communicate immediately any untoward occurrence.

With regard to those parts of Portuguese Territory where there are no fixed settlements and which may be occupied under specious pretexts, Her Majesty again calls the attention of the Governor-General to the measure recommended to his notice in Ordinance of 9th December of last year whereby the Portuguese flag was to be hoisted in those localities wherever possible, factories were to be established and even wooden buildings erected in the most remote parts, care being observed that such buildings shall not be taken for Slave Depots. Should, however, our fears concerning the purpose of the expedition be realized, the Governor-General, making use of such persuasive means as his judgment shall dictate, shall endeavour to procure the evacuation of any localities occupied, and if his efforts are in vain then he shall protest against such acts, communicating events in detail through the said Secretariat of State.

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Secretariat of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs
to: The Governor-General of Mozambique

*Lisboa,
9 de Setembro de 1846*

Ilmo e Exmo Sr.

Tendo chegado ao conhecimento de S. Mag^{de} informações circunstanciadas á cerca das Familias d'origem Hollandeza, outrora residentes na colonia Ingleza do Cabo de Boa Esperança, e hoje estabelecidas no territorio Portuguez proximo á Bahia de L. M.; e merecendo estas comunicações huma seria atenção afim de se tomar sobre este importante facto, com a madureza e circunspectão que elle

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exige, huma resolução conveniente; Quer Sua Mag^{de} que no entretanto V.Ex^a e todas as authoridades suas subordinadas, longe d'inquietarem os referidos Colonos, lhes permittão toda a liberdade de tranzito, e permutas que lhes sejão uteis, e que não compromettão os interesses e mais considerações do servico publico, e dos subditos Portuguezes em particular, por assim o exigir não só o bem intedido interesse publico; mas superiormente as leis da humanidade. O que V.Ex^a comunicará a todas as authoridades suas subordinadas sempre em forma confidencial e poderá fazer saber áquelles Colonos se assim o achar conveniente. V.Ex^a ao mesmo passo procurará informar-se do que entre elles se passa, e de quaes sejão as suas relações tanto com a Colonia do Cabo, como com os portos da Costa, e de tudo informara circunstanciadamente por esta secretaria d'Estado. Deos Guarde a V.Ex^a.

TRANSLATION

*Lisbon,
9th September 1846*

Your Excellency,

Whereas detailed information has been conveyed to Her Majesty regarding the Families of Dutch extraction formerly residing in the English Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and now established in Portuguese territory near the Bay of Lourenço Marques; and whereas the fullest attention must be given to this important matter so that after mature and circumspect consideration a fitting solution may be found for it: Her Majesty wills that, in the meantime, Your Excellency and all officials under you, far from disturbing the aforesaid settlers shall allow them to go about their business and effect such barter as they may require provided such activities on their part shall not run counter to our interests and other considerations of public weal, the rights of Portuguese subjects being especially preserved, seeing [such toleration] is alike imposed by a true understanding of public interest and, on a higher plane, by the laws of humanity, Your Excellency will instruct your subordinates always confidentially, to this effect and may also communicate [the Queen's wishes] to the aforesaid Settlers if you deem it convenient. At the same time Your Excellency will endeavour to keep yourself informed of whatever takes place amongst them and what their relations are both with the Cape Colony and with the Coast ports, forwarding full details through this Secretariat.

God Keep Your Excellency.

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Secretary of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs
to: João de Pontes Pereira de Melo, Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs

*Lisboa,
2 de Setembro de 1847*

Hlmo Exmo Sr.

Em resposta ao officio confidencial deste Ministerio datado de 7 de Agosto proxº passº se recebeo o do antecessor de V. Exº de 12 do mesmo mês no fim do qual lembra, que no caso de dispozições dos Boers para invadirem o nosso territorio seria talvez melhor pedir auxilio ao Governador da Colonia do Cabo de Boa Espera.

Esta lembrança não he para desprezar: poderemos não ter forças suficientes a debellar aquella Colonia Hollandeza, que veio estabelecer-se de fronte da B. de L. M. apezar das dispozições adoptadas e que constarão a V. Exº dos documentos com que foi instruido o sobredito officio de 7 d'Agosto, porem a dificuldade está em conhecer 1º se o Governador da Colonia do Cabo de B. Espa està autorizado a prestar o auxilio que se lhe peça: 2º a qualidade do auxilio que possa pedir-se. Poderá pedir-se a força de 2 ou 3,000 homens de todas as armas, poderá pedir-se ainda alguma força naval, e estas forças serão mantidas á custa da Grão Bretanha ou de Portugal durante a expedição?

Nestas circunstancias, e havendo conhecido empenho da parte d'Inglaterra, de que seja aniquilada ou pelo menos afugentada a sobredita Colonia dos Boers como não pode deixar de concluir-se na presença do officio do antecessor de V. Exº de 30 de Julho ultimo, vou rogar a V. Exº queira tratar com o Ministro de S. Magestade Britanica nesta Corte sobre os objectos que deixo ponderados a fim de saber do seu Governo se está disposto a auxiliar-nos e porque maneira profundo primeiro a concessão dos armamentos, Artilheria e Munições; e a cooperação da força armada para quando for requerida pelo Govdor Ger. de Moç.

D. Gº a V. Exº.

TRANSLATION

*Lisbon,
2nd September 1847*

Your Excellency,

In reply to the Confidential Dispatch from this Ministry dated 7th August last, we received an answer from your Excellency's predecessor, dated 12th of same month, towards the end of which it is suggested

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that should the Boers show a tendency to invade our territory it would perhaps be better to ask for assistance from the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope.

The suggestion is certainly worth considering. We may not have sufficient forces to deal with the Dutch Colonists in question who have established themselves at the end of the Bay of Lourenço Marques, in spite of the measures taken which are described in the documents accompanying the said despatch of 7th August. However, the difficulty lies in ascertaining (*a*) if the Governor of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope is willing to authorize such help; (*b*) the nature of the assistance which should be requested. May we ask for a force of two to three thousand men of all arms or even a naval force as well, and will such forces be maintained at the cost of Great Britain or Portugal during the expedition?

Under the circumstances, since Great Britain is very willing that the said Colonists should be destroyed or at least driven away, as one cannot fail to deduce from the dispatch of Your Excellency's predecessor of 30th July last, I would beg Your Excellency to discuss with Her Britannic Majesty's Minister the points I have raised so that you may know whether his government is willing to help us and in what manner. It would be well first to propose the supply of armaments, artillery and ammunition, followed by the co-operation of armed forces as and when required by the Governor-General of Mozambique.

God Keep Your Excellency.

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No. 156, page 76b

Sá da Bandeira
to: The Governor-General of Mozambique.

*Palacio,
21 de Outubro de 1857*

Constando a Sua Mag^{de} El Rei, que desde a chegada a Inglaterra do D^r Livingston, que explorou a maior parte do curso do rio Zambeze, tem havido numerosas reuniões, em que o dito D^r tem feito longos discursos procurando provar que aquelle grande rio é a principal via de communicacão para a Africa central austral, e que por ella se pode fazer um commercio immenso, sendo que estes discursos tem creado uma opinião favoravel á organização de uma ou mais companhias que se ocupem de aproveitar as vantagens indicadas pelo mencionado viajente, e Desejando o Mesmo Augusto Senhor que ás transacções

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commerciaes com todas as nações aos trabalhos da agricultura e a colonisação europea proveniente de Portugal e Ilhas Adjacentes se dé toda a protecção, mas sem detimento dos direitos da Sua Real Coroa sobre os territorios banhados pelo curso do mesmo rio, manda, pela Secretaria d'Estado dos Negocios da Marinha e Ultramar, fazer sciente o Gov^{dor} Geral da Prov^{cia} de Moç. de que cumpre—1º que se proceda imediatamente á construcção do forte que, nas instrucções geraes que lhe forão dadas, se lhe recommendou que fizesse construir na barra de Luabo, que é a principal do Zambese; 2º que se fortifique tambem aquellas das outras barras do mesmo rio, que sejão navegaveis; 3º que a colonisação dos territorios banhados pelo mesmo rio, assim como a de quaesquer outros da Província se faça unicamente com gente portugueza, não sendo permitido o estabelecimento de colônias de estrangeiros em nenhum dos referidos territorios, mas assegurando tão sómente a qualquer estrangeiro isolado, ou com familia, que com o fim de commerciar ou cultivar a terra, queira fixar sua morada em Quelimane, ou em algum outro lugar da Prov^{cia} a protecção, que lhe concederem as leis portuguezas, as quaes se deverá sujeitar; 4º que se não permitta a navegação do Zambeze e dos outros rios da Prov^{cia} em embarcações que não sejão Portuguezas sem que as mesmas embarcações tenhão sido autorizadas pelo Governo de Sua Magestade a fazer essa navegação; 5º que se não consinta a passagem de gente estrangeira armada atravez de territorio portuguez, nem pelos rios portuguezes sem licença especial do Governo da Metropole. E como a entrada pela barra de Luabo para se estabelecer por ali o commercio com as terras do alto Zambeze, ha de necessariamente dar lugar a fundação de uma povoação em sitio apropriado na proximidade da mesma barra, a qual com o tempo deverá tornar-se importante; Determina outro sim Sua Mag^{de} que o referido Gov^{dor} Geral designe, sem demora, localidade mais conveniente para assento d'essa povoação, e faça tambem traçar o plano que haja de seguir-se na respectiva construcção, e marcar n'elle os lugares para os edificios publicos, tacs como—Igreja—Caza do Governador—Alfandega—etc, e bem assim praças regulares, e ruas largas e bem alinhadas; devendo encarregar deste trabalho o Gov^{dor} de Quelimane, e procurar, ao mesmo tempo, que os moradores, abastados desta villa construão algumas cazas, como principio da nova povoação, á qual dará o nome de—Petropolis—Finalmente quer tambem Sua Magestade que, o D^r Livingston, que segundo consta está para regressar a Africa com brevidade, ache na Província de Moç., no cazo de ahí voltar, a melhor hospitalidade, e seja tratado com a mais obsequioza civilidade; porem que, ao passo que assim se uze para com este distinto viajante de toda a cortezia, senão consinta que elle, nem os que porventura o acompanhem pratiquem actos offensivos da soberania da sua Real Coroa, o que tudo Sua Magestade Há por muito recomendado ao mesmo Governador Geral,

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Esperando da sua discreção e do seu zélo pelo serviço público que dará prompta e satisfatória execução às Reaes Ordens que lhe são transmittidas por esta Portaria.

TRANSLATION

*Palace,
21st October 1857*

It having come to the knowledge of His Majesty the King that, since Dr. Livingstone's return to England after exploring the greater part of the Zambesi River, numerous meetings have been held at which the said explorer has made long speeches to prove that the aforesaid river is the principal means of communication with South Central Africa and that along this waterway an enormous trade may be done and that these accounts have created a favourable atmosphere for the creation of one or more companies for the purpose of availing themselves of the facilities indicated by Dr. Livingstone; and whereas Our Lord the King desires that every encouragement shall be given to trade with other countries, to agricultural development and to white colonization from Portugal and the Adjacent Isles, yet without infringement of the rights of His Royal Crown over the territory through which the said river runs, he ordains, through the Secretariat of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs that the following instructions be communicated to the Governor-General of Mozambique:

First: that he take immediate steps to build a fort commanding the bar of the Luabo (the main outlet of the Zambesi) as already instructed in general orders;

Second: that he fortify the other bars of the said river where navigation is possible;

Third: that the colonization of the territories on the banks of the said river (or any rivers in the Province) be effected solely by Portuguese. Settlements of foreign persons are not to be allowed in any of the territories in question. Nevertheless individual foreign settlers, with or without their families, shall be allowed to make their residence in Quelimane or any other part of the Province, for the purpose of trading or farming, such individuals remaining subject to Portuguese laws;

Fourth: that vessels other than Portuguese vessels be not allowed on the Zambesi unless specially authorized to do so by His Majesty's government;

Fifth: that foreign armed bands be not allowed to pass through Portuguese territory or along Portuguese rivers except with special permission from the Home government.

And whereas the passage over the Luabo bar in the trade route to High Zambesia will naturally lead to the foundation of a township in the neighbourhood of the said river mouth, His Majesty determines

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that the aforesaid Governor-General shall choose, without loss of time, a site for the said town, and cause a suitable plan of same to be elaborated, showing the position of the principal buildings such as the Church, Governor's House, Customs, etc., and the general lay out of the streets and squares which should be wide and straight; the Governor-General is to entrust this scheme to the Governor of Quelimane and should endeavour to persuade the wealthier inhabitants of that town to start building houses of their own on the site of the new town.

Finally, His Majesty also desires that Dr. Livingstone, who he understands is shortly to return to Africa should be very hospitably treated in the Province of Mozambique, should he go there, and be shown every possible civility; at the same time, while this distinguished visitor is to be treated with the utmost courtesy, neither he nor any persons of his company must be allowed to act in any manner prejudicial to the Sovereign rights of the Crown.

All of which points His Majesty earnestly enjoins the said Governor-General to observe and trusts that his discretion and public zeal will lead him satisfactorily to carry out the instructions contained in the present Ordinance.

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No. 26, page 90b

Sá da Bandeira

to: The Commander of the Patrol which is to lie off the mouths of the Zambesi

*Palacio,
28 de Janeiro de 1858*

Manda Sua Magestade, El Rei, pela Secretaria d'Estado dos Negocios da Marinha e Ultramar, participar ao Commandante do navio, que de Loanda seguir viagem para Moçambique, que as Instruções Reservadas que tem a observar para o pontual desempenho da importante Comissão, que se lhe confia se compõe dos seguintes artigos: 1º Visto e observado por elle Commandante o estado em que se acha o estabelecimento da ilha do Bango no archipelago de Bazaruto, e socorrido de alguns refrescos, se delles precisar, e tendo ali a menor demora possivel, largará para Quelimane, a cujo Governador entregará a correspondencia que para elle vae dirigida, e tambem aquella que vae para o Governador Geral da Província, para lhe ser remettida na primeira occasião opportuna. 2º Não obstante o que nestas Instruções se acha consignado, deverá intender o mesmo Commandante do Navio que as ordens do Governador Geral da Província, expedidas depois d'elle haver recebido a correspondencia mencionada no artigo

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primeiro, devem ser sempre observadas como se directamente dimandas sem do Governo de Sua Magestade.

3º Estando determinado pelo Governo de Sua Magestade que a Barra do Luabo, uma das fozes do rio Zambese, seja convenientemente fortificada; e defendida para que seja ali respeitada a soberania da Coroa portugueza, cujo dominio he, dá-se por especial incumbencia ao oficial de Marinha, encarregado desta importante Comissão, o intende-se com o Governador de Quelimane, para que de acordo com elle se escolha na proximidade da foz do Luabo o lugar mais apropriado á sua defesa para nelle se levantar um pequeno forte, que guarde a entrada do rio, e assegure a sua posse.

No mesmo lugar, ou proximo a elle, se designará o sitio onde com vantagem para os navegantes se estabeleça um Farol, ou sómente um signal, ou signaes para a entrada da barra durante o dia.

4º Designado qual seja esse lugar, deverá o Commandante do navio, encarregado do desempenho desta commissão, assim como o Governador de Quelimane, prestar-se mutuo auxilio para que os trabalhos de forte so appressem com a maior rapidez, içando-se a Bandeira Nacional o mais breve possível, e assentando-se as duas peças d'artilheria que para este fim vão abordo do citado navio, ou outras de que possão dispôr. Para serem empregadas nestes trabalhos se destinam as ferramentas que acompanham aquellas mesmas peças.

5º He da maior importancia que no comêço, e desenvolvimento dos respectivos trabalhos, que deverão ser auxiliados tanto pela gente de terra como pela gente de bordo, se não faça alardo, nem se mostre nelles ostentação de tal, que provoque a attenção dos navios estrangeiros, que casualmente passarem a distancia do os poder observar.

6º Igualmente se recommends que apenas o forte se achar artilhado, seja logo guarnecido por um destacamento de tropa cujo commando deverá ser confido a um official de reputação e intelligencia.

7º Constando pelas communicações officiaes, vindas ultimamente de Inglaterra, que no mes de Fevereiro proximo futuro, sahirá dali para explorar o Zambeze o Dr. David Livingstone com mais tres ou quatro individuos, que o acompanham, os quaes se propõe subir aquelle rio em todo o seu curso navegavel com uma lancha de ferro movida por vapor, a qual vae de Inglaterra desmanchada para em porto portuguez, proximo á barra do Luabo, ser ali armada, Sua Magestade, para mais cabal conhecimento desta materia, Manda remetter por copia ao Official Commandante do navio, destinado a esta importante commissão, a inclusa copia da Portaria, que na data de 18 do corrente mes se expediu ao mesmo Livingstone, pela qual se lhe concedeu permissão de poder explorar scientificamente o rio Zambese, devendo para esse fim (e sómente para esse fim), receber das authoridades portuguezas todo o possivel auxilio, e protecção, e o melhor acolhimento possivel, a fim de que se não ofendam, nem

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desconfiem que se desconfia d'elles por ser da Mente de Sua Magestade collaborar igualmente para o progresso das sciencias naturaes, e augmento dos conhecimentos geograficos desta parte d'Africa.

8º Sendo certo que O Mesmo Augusto Senhor dera licença para esta exploração unicamente no interesse da sciencia, e nada mais, como se vê da copia da Portaria precedentemente citada, convem que as authoridades portuguezas, ao passo que tem de prestar aquelles auxilios debaixo do indicado ponto de vista, tambem tem obrigaçao rigorosa de empregar todos os meios ao seu alcance para verificar se os exploradores se afastam dos termos da licença concedida, buscando estabelecer relações politicas com os regulos do litoral visinho, ou com os das margens dos rios, que todos elles habitam terras pertencentes á Corôa de Sua Magestade, ainda mesmo que algumas destas terras tenham sido invadidas pelas tribus Cafres, as quaes o Governo do Mesmo Augusto Senhor conta de em breve tempo fazer expulsar de todas as terras portuguezas.

9º Attenta a possibilidade desta ultima hypothese, seria muito conveniente que se fizessem seguir os ditos exploradores do tão perto quanto podesse ser, por alguma lancha convenientemente guarneccida, e commandada por algum Official, ou Guarda Marinha, habil, a fim de verificar se elles se limitam com effeito ao assumpto para que se concedeu a licença, ou se se afastam delle, tais como: 1º levantando em algum ponto estabelecimento permanente; 2º fazendo ajustos politicos com os regulos indigenas.

10º Verificado que seja qualquer destes casos, as authoridades da terra, e o oficial commandante da respectiva lancha farão saber aos exploradores que a licença que lhes foi concedida pelo Governo de Sua Magestade lhes não permite praticar actos semelhantes, e que por isso se espera, que delles se abstensem.

No caso porem delles não attenderem ás advertencias amigaveis, que se lhes fizerem, em semelhante caso se lavrará um protesto que lhes será communicado, e de que se mandará copia ao Governo de Sua Magestade.

11º Alem do levantamento do forte, e do mais que se acaba de expôr, Ordena Sua Magestade que o Official de Marinha encarregado desta importante commissão, se occupe com todo o possivel cuidado da exploração de todos os braços do rio Zambese, ou Cuama, que separando-se desde o sitio denominado *Boca-do Rio*, por onde se faz a communicação delle com Quelimane, d'ali para baixo communica com o mar pelas barras de Luabo, de Linde, e outras, braços estes que formam o grande delta do Zambese. Para este fim he indispensavel empregar os trabalhos da sonda onde necessarios se tornem, certo de que para melhor desempenho desta incumbencia se lhe remette, para sua informação, a inclusa copia das observações ha poucos annos feitas por dois Officiaes da Marinha real britanica nos ditos braços,

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será muito conveniente que a citada exploração se faça desde as suas fozes até ao sitio da Bôca do rio, que é o ponto em que o grande rio Zambeze se bifurca no tempo das cheias em dois ramos, um dos quais vem para a barra do Luabo, e o outro abre passagem para Quelimane.

12º O especial cruzeiro do navio, destinado a esta comissão, será nos mares, e costas comprehendidas entre o Quirungo Grande, e a Bahia de Lourenço M., tocando igualmente nos pontos intermedios de Quelimane, Sofalla, Bazaruto, e Inhambane, certo porem de que so deve demorar com preferencia, o observar com mais individuação as fozes principaes do rio Zambeze, com especialidade e de Luabo, e vizitando o porto de Quelimane, posição em que tem de esperar a chegada da expedição do Dr. Livingstone.

13º Deverá no seu cruzeiro procurar embaraçar o trafico da escravatura, procedendo em conformidade do tratado de 3 de Julho de 1842, concluído entre Portugal, e a Grã-Bretanha. No caso de que effeitue alguma preza, deverá faze-la conduzir com toda a segurança para a Cidade do Cabo; mas elle Commandante ficará com o seu navio na costa de Quelimane para executar estas instruções.

14º Quanto ao pagamento da tripulação do navio, destinado a esta comissão, o seu commandante fica autorizado a ir de tres em tres mezes receber, na conformidade das Leis, e regulamentos de fazenda sobre este ponto, a respectiva importancia da casa commercial estabelecida na Cidade de Urban, na Colonia ingleza do Natal, que lhe houver sido designada pelo Comissario portuguez da Comissão Mixta do Cabo da Boa Esperança, para cujo fim se lhe ordenou ir tocar na Cidade do Cabo. No caso de que este pagamento ali se effeitue, como se espera, assim o participará desde logo ao Governador Geral de Moçambique na mesma occasião em que para elle se dirigir a correspondencia official, que para elle se destina. Se porem nada se lhe tiver dito no Cabo sobre este ponto ao regular pagamento das despezas do seu navio, ser-lhe-ha permitido em tal caso dirigir-se a Moçambique de trez em trez mezes, para ali receber a respectiva importancia, na certeza de que a este respeito se officia igualmente ao respectivo Governador Geral.

15º Desempenhadas que sejam as duas primeiras partes da sua comissão, mencionadas nos artigos 4º e 11º fica intedido que lhe cumpre observar as ordens que pelo Governador Geral de Moçambique lhe forem transmittidas.

TRANSLATION

Palace,
28th January 1858

His Majesty the King ordains, through the Secretariat for Marine and Overseas Affairs, that the Commander of the vessel which will

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leave Loanda for Mozambique be informed that the Confidential Instructions which he is to follow so that he may strictly execute the important mission entrusted to him are as follows:

(1) After visiting and inspecting the settlement in the island of Bango in the Archipelago of Bazaruto (where supplies may be landed if necessary) the Commander, with least possible delay, shall leave for Quelimane to whose Governor he shall deliver the mail addressed to him and that addressed to the Governor-General of the Province, which should be forwarded to the latter at the earliest opportunity.

(2) Notwithstanding the tenor of these instructions, the Commander will understand that any orders which he may receive from the Governor-General of the Province, after receipt by the latter, of the above-mentioned mail, are always to be observed as if proceeding direct from His Majesty's government.

(3) It having been decided by His Majesty's Government that the bar of the Luabo, one of the mouths of the Zambesi River, is to be suitably fortified and defended, for the better preservation of the sovereignty of the Portuguese Crown to whom it belongs, the Commander is specially enjoined to confer with the Governor of Quelimane as to the best site for a small fort which shall defend the said entrance to the river and ensure its dominion. In the same place, or near to it, a site shall be chosen for a lighthouse or just a beacon or beacons to facilitate the entry of vessels into the river in the night time.

(4) A suitable site having been agreed upon, the Commander and the Governor of Quelimane are to render each other mutual assistance, to the end that the fort may be built with the least possible delay; the Portuguese flag is to be hoisted as soon as possible and the two pieces of ordnance which are being sent by the said patrol vessel and any others which may be available, are to be mounted. Suitable tools and appliances for this purpose are being sent with the guns.

(5) It is highly important that this work—in which both shore folk and the ship's crew shall participate—shall be commenced and proceeded with quietly and unobtrusively so as not to draw the attention of foreign vessels sailing close to the shore.

(6) It is further recommended that as soon as the ordnance is mounted in the fort, the latter be garrisoned by a detachment of troops under the command of an officer of proved ability and intelligence.

(7) Whereas it is known, from recent official communiques from England, that in the coming month of February Dr. David Livingstone, accompanied by three or four persons, will sail from that country for the purpose of exploring the Zambesi River, it being the purpose of the expedition to go up the whole navigable length of the river in a steam-driven iron launch dispatched in sections from England and to be assembled in a Portuguese port near the bar of the Luabo, His Majesty, for the fuller elucidation of this matter, orders that a

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copy of the Ordinance dispatched on 18th of the current month to the said Livingstone, be forwarded to the Commanding Officer of the ship entrusted with this important mission. This Ordinance authorizes Dr. Livingstone's party to explore the Zambesi River in the interests of Science, and for this purpose and to no other; the party is to be assisted and protected by the Portuguese authorities to the utmost of their powers and to be treated with the greatest courtesy so that they may not be offended or made aware of our suspicions, since His Majesty, too, desires to collaborate in the task of scientific investigation and increase of geographical knowledge concerning this part of Africa.

(8) And whereas the said August Lord sanctioned this exploration solely in the interests of science and in none other, as may be seen from the above-mentioned copy of the Ordinance, the Portuguese Authorities, while bound to render all assistance from the said point of view, are equally bound to employ every means at their disposal to ascertain whether the explorers in any way diverge from the conditions of the permit, by seeking to establish political relations with the chiefs of the neighbouring coast (?) or those on the banks of the river, for those chiefs are living in territories belonging to His Majesty's Crown, even though there has been penetration by some Kaffir tribes whom the said August Lord intends shortly to drive out of all Portuguese territories.

(9) In view of the possibility suggested in the preceding article, it would be convenient to have these explorers' movements followed as closely as possible, by means of a launch suitably manned and commanded by an able officer or midshipman, in order to make sure that the party confine themselves to the activities sanctioned in the permit and refrain from unauthorized activities such as (1) the establishment of permanent Posts, or (2) entering into political agreements with the native chiefs.

(10) If any of these irregular practices shall be verified the land authorities and the officer commanding the launch in question shall inform the explorers that the licence granted by His Majesty's Government does not empower them to engage in such activities and that therefore they are expected to refrain from them in the future.

Should they, however, pay no attention to friendly remonstrance, then a formal protest shall be drawn up and shown to them, a copy being sent to His Majesty's Government.

(11) Besides the building of the fort and the other measures already explained, His Majesty ordains that the Naval Officer entrusted with this important mission shall take careful steps to explore all the arms of the Zambesi or Cuama river, which divides at the place called Boca do Rio (mouth of the River), (one branch) communicating direct with Quelimane (and the other) farther down, with the sea, at the Luabo and Linde bars and others, these arms forming the great delta of the

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Zambesi. To this end recourse must be had to sounding operations where necessary and for the better execution of this work the enclosed copy of observations carried out a few years ago in these same arms of the Zambesi by two British naval officers are forwarded. It would be highly convenient if this exploration were made (along the arms of the delta) up to the Boca, which is where the great Zambesi River in flood time divides into two (main) arms, one leading to the Luabo bar and the other to Quelimane.

(12) The special patrol area of the ship commissioned for this work shall be the sea and the coast line between Quirungo Grande and the Bay of Lourenço Marques, including the intermediate points of Quelimane, Sofalla, Bazaruto and Inhambane, though the longest stay should be made and the greatest attention concentrated on the principal mouths of the Zambesi River, specially that of Luabo; the vessel is also to call at Quelimane, there to wait the arrival of Dr. Livingstone's expedition.

(13) In the course of the patrol, the ship must endeavour to impede slave traffic as much as possible, in accordance with the Treaty of 3rd July 1842, between Portugal and Great Britain. Should any prize be captured, it must be sent, with all possible security, to Cape Town; but the Commander must remain with his ship off the coast of Quelimane so as to carry out the present instructions.

(14) With regard to the payment of the crew of the ship engaged in this commission, the Commander is authorized to proceed to Urban [sic] in the English Colony of Natal, there to receive—in accordance with the legislation and regulations of the Exchequer at this point—the necessary amounts from such commercial firm as shall be indicated to him by the Portuguese Commissioner on the Joint Commission of the Cape of Good Hope, to which end he has been ordered to call at Cape Town. Should these payments be effected there (Durban) as is expected, the Commander is at once to advise the Governor-General of Mozambique to that effect, when forwarding the official correspondence addressed to that official.

If, however, nothing has been said to him at Cape Town regarding the regular payment of the expenses of his ship, he shall have permission to proceed to Mozambique every three months, there to receive the amounts in question. Instructions to this effect are being dispatched to the said Governor-General.

(15) Provided the first two main parts of the Commission, contained in Articles 4 and 11 are carried out, it is understood that the Captain shall obey such instructions as may be conveyed to him by the Governor-General of Mozambique.

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Sá da Bandeira
to: The Finance and Overseas Commissions

*Lisboa,
15 de Dezembro de 1858*

Senhores,

A publicação das viagens do Dr. Livingstone, modernamente efectuadas no interior da África Oriental e Occidental, e nas quaes elle faz uma vantajoza descripção da riqueza e importancia das nossas Possessões da Zambezia, tem por tal modo atraiado a attenção da Nação ingleza e do seu Governo, que consta terem já partido para o Cabo da Boa Esperança, com destino para as proximidades d'aquellas nossas Possessões, um grande numero de Missionarios ingleses com suas familias.

O proprio Dr. Livingstone acha-se actualmente na Zambezia em uma nova exploração, acompanhado de alguns individuos, não tendo o Governo podido negar-se a conceder para isso licença que lhe foi pedida pelo Governor inglez visto ter-se pretextado o interesse da sciencia; dando todavia ás Authoridades de Moçambique instruções adequadas ás circumstancias.

Em presença pois destas noticias, que são de grave natureza, e de todas as mais que se podem vêr da copia junta extraida de diversos Officios do Commissario portuguez na Comissão Mixta portugueza e britannica estabelecida na Cidade do Cabo, não pode o Governo deixar de tomar providencias tendentes a garantir a integridade das referidas Possessões que elle vê ameaçada.

Como meio de obstar a que subditos ingleses se estabeleçam em territorio portuguez, ou de Regulos que sejam subditos de Portugal por meio de contractos que consigam efectuar com elles formando Colonias britannicas, deseja o Governo fazer partir para ali uma ou mais Colonias militares, organizadas pela mesma maneira porque o foi a que ultimamente partiu para a Huila no interior de Mossamedes.

Conhece bem o Governo que a Colonisação livre portugueza era a que melhores resultados offerecia; mas esta que hoje é impossivel só mais tarde se poderá efectuar, e no entretanto é indispensavel providenciar a nenhum outro meio se apresenta ao Governo como mais efficaz e prompto do que o indicado, e por isso pede ser habilitado com a somma que julga por ora indispensavel para tal fim.

O Governo deve informar igualmente as Comissões de que algumas propostas lhe teem sido apresentadas por parte de Agentes de Sociedades Allemães para a concessão de terrenos na Zambezia,

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afim de por elles serem colonisados e cultivados, e de que está na intenção de attender a taes propostas nos termos convenientes. Mas a colonisação portugueza deve exceder em numero a estrangeira para evitar que no futuro tenhamos graves embaraços a superar.

Nestas circunstancias espera o Governo que as commissões pesando bem as considerações que lhes apresenta neste memorando confidencial, não deixarão de concorrer com o seu parecer para que se realisse quanto antes a concessão dos meios que o Governo pede: afim de que elle possa fazer partir a dita Colonia abordo da Fragata D. Fernando, já para tal serviço destinada no principio da proxima primavera, por ser esta a monção mais propria para a ida d'aquelle vas de guerra, e para que a Colonia chegue a Zambezia na estação em que os Europeos não tem que recear das febres do Paiz.

Os motivos que o Governo tem para não dar publicidade ao que expõe ás Commissões neste memorando serão certamente por reconhecidas como justos e ponderozas. Secretaria d'Estado dos Negocios da Marinha e Ultramar.

TRANSLATION

*Lisbon,
15th December 1858*

The publication of journeys recently effected by Dr. Livingstone in the interior of East and West Africa, in which the author gives a glowing account of the natural wealth and importance of our possessions in Zambesia, has so engaged the attention of the British nation and government, that a great number of English missionaries and their families are reported to have left for the vicinity of those territories.

Dr. Livingstone himself is at present in Zambesia, with some other persons, engaged in a fresh expedition. The Government was unable to refuse the necessary authorization requested by the British government, as the expedition was for alleged scientific ends, but suitable instructions, in view of the particular circumstances of the case, were given to the authorities in Mozambique.

In face of the above report, which is of grave import, and of the other news contained in the enclosed copy which is an extract of various dispatches from the Portuguese Commissioner at the joint Portuguese-British Commission sitting at Cape Town, the Government cannot fail to take steps to safeguard the said Possessions which they consider threatened. As a means of preventing British subjects from settling in Portuguese territory or in the territory of native chiefs who are Portuguese subjects, by means of contracts which they may effect with them thus creating British settlements, the Government wishes to send out one or more military colonies organized in the

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same way as the force recently dispatched to Huila in the interior of Mossamedes.

The Government is well aware that free Portuguese colonization would be the best means of counteracting foreign infiltration. Unfortunately, this type of colonization is as yet impossible and can only be carried out later. The Government can see no other quick and efficient solution than the one proposed, and therefore beg to be supplied with the sum they deem indispensable for the purpose.

The Government beg further to inform the Commissions that sundry proposals have been made to them by agents of German societies for the concession of land in Zambesia, for the purpose of settlement and farming, and that they intend to give a favourable answer to these proposals, with the necessary safeguards. But Portuguese colonization must be greater than the foreign settlements so that grave difficulties may not arise in the future.

Under the circumstances, the Government hope that the Commissions, after duly considering the reasons put forward in this confidential memorandum, will not fail to return a favourable answer and that the Government will be thus supplied with the means applied for, as soon as possible, so that they may send out the said Colony on board the frigate *D. Fernando* (which has been reserved for that purpose) at the beginning of the coming spring, this being the most suitable monsoon for the said vessel of war, in order that the Colony may reach Zambesia at the season when Europeans need not fear the fevers of the country.

The reasons which lead the Government not to give publicity to the subject of this memorandum will no doubt be recognized by the Commissions.

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No. 26, p. 113

Adriano Mauricio Guilherme Ferreri
to: Governor-General of Mozambique

*Palacio,
31 de Maio de 1859*

Tendo o Governo de Sua Magestade por Portaria dirigida ao Governador Geral da Província de Moçambique em 18 de Janeiro de 1858 Ordenado, que ao Dr. David Livingstone, e bem assim as pessoas da sua comitiva, fossem prestados todos os auxílios possíveis, para se levar a efecto a viagem de exploração científica ao interior d'Africa austral, de que aquelle Viajante havia sido encarregado pelo Governo Britânico; e constando neste Ministerio, que o mesmo

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Viajante tem projectado formar nas vizinhanças de Tete una Feitoria Ingleza com o fim de exigir depois a livre communicação dessa Feitoria com a foz do rio Zambese, abusando assim da generosidade com que o Governo Portuguez auxiliou a sua exploração, e da boa fé com que depois lhe concedeo o Regio *Exequatur* de Consul Ingles em Quelimané; Manda Sua Magestade El Rei, pela Secretaria d'Estado dos Negocios da Marinha e Ultramar, que o Governador Geral da Província de Moçambique trate com toda a prudencia, e por todos os meios ao seu alcance, de investigar quaes sejão os planos do Dr. Livingstone, e de evitar, que elle leve a efecto aquelle de que ha suspeitas, ou quaesquer outros, que intente sem a previa authori do Governo de Sua Magestade; afim de se obstar a que elle escudado com o Evangelho, e a sciencia se transforme de Viajante em Conquistador.

TRANSLATION

Palace,
31st May 1859

Whereas His Majesty's government, in an Ordinance dispatched to the Governor-General of the Province of Mozambique on 18th January, 1858, ordered that every assistance should be given to Dr. David Livingstone and to those of his party, to facilitate his exploring expedition into the interior of Southern Africa, which he was carrying out at the behest of the British government, and whereas this Ministry has been informed that the aforesaid traveller has planned to set up in the neighbourhood of Tete a British factory to the end that he may subsequently demand the right of free access from the said factory to the mouth of the Zambesi River, thus ill repaying the generous assistance given him by the Portuguese government and the good faith in which that Government subsequently procured for him the Royal *Exequatur* for his appointment as British consul at Quelimané; His Majesty the King hereby ordains, through the Secretariat of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs, that the Governor-General of the Province of Mozambique shall take, with the utmost discretion, every possible measure to find out what the plans of Dr. Livingstone may be and to prevent him from carrying out the suspected scheme or any others which he may attempt to put into execution without the previous consent of His Majesty's government, so that he may not under cover of the Gospel or of Science, change his status of explorer for that of a conqueror.